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This book examines the connected histories of Spain, China, and Japan as 
they emerged and developed following the foundation of Manila as capital 
of the Spanish Philippines in 1571. Cross-cultural encounters not only 
shaped Manila’s development as a ‘Eurasian’ port city, but also had profound 
political, economic, and social ramifications for the three pre-modern states 
involved. This becomes obvious when looking into the diverse nature of 
long-distance trade, including trans-Pacific silver-for-silks bargaining, direct 
Sino-Japanese exchange, and provisions trade. In order not to overlook the 
role of human beings involved in proto-global struggles for power and foreign 
trade control, Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644: Local Comparisons 
and Global Connections combines a systematic comparison with a focus on 
different actors and their agency. The author offers an example of empirical 
global history based on multilingual primary source research and a critical 
evaluation of different historiographical traditions. Integrating Manila into 
world history helps in revising many long held misconceptions by replacing 
them with a more balanced, multi-facetted view.
Birgit Tremml-Werner (PhD University of Vienna 2012) is a Japan Society 
for the Promotion of Science Research Fellow at the University of Tokyo. 
Her current research focuses on intercultural diplomacy and diplomatic 
actors in Tokugawa Japan and the Spanish Empire.
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Gradually commerce has so increased, and so many are the Sangley1 ships which 
come to this city laden with goods – as all kinds of linen and silks; ammunition, 
food supplies, as wheat, flour, sugar; and many kinds of fruit (although I have not 
seen the fruits common in Spaña) – and the city has been so embellished, that were 
it not for the f ires and the calamities visited upon her by land and by sea, she would 
be the most prosperous and rich city of your Majesty’s domains. As I have written 
to your Majesty in other letters, this city has the best possible location for both its 
temporal and spiritual welfare, and for all its interests, that could be desired. For 
on the east, although quite distant, yet not so far as to hinder a man from coming 
hither, with favourable voyage, lie Nueva España and Perú to the north about three 
hundred leagues, are the large islands of Japón; on the northwest lies the great 
and vast kingdom of China, which is so near this island that, starting early in the 
morning with reasonable weather, one would sight China on the next day.2
The Empirical Setting
All crucial dimensions of early modern Manila are summarised in the 
above-mentioned quote: the city’s cross-cultural character, her promis-
ing commercial potential, and the challenges that would determine the 
development of the colony. Voiced by the first Bishop of Manila, Domingo de 
Salazar (1512-1594), in a letter to the Habsburg King Philip II (1527-1598), it il-
lustrates multilayered encounters in Manila at the beginning of the historical 
processes that serve as the frame for a ‘connected histories’ analysis. During 
the first decades of Spanish colonial rule (1565-1898), the far-reaching dimen-
sions of contacts between several political economies led to a pre-modern, 
‘regional globalisation’,3 with positive and negative features.4
1 The origins of the pejorative term used by the Spaniards for members of Fujianese merchant 
communities are still debated among historians. It probably originated from a mispronunciation 
of chang lai (those who come frequently) or shang lai (those who come to trade). See Ollé (2002), 
Empresa, pp. 244; 263. 
2 Bishop Domingo de Salazar to King Philip II in 1588. Cf. Blair, Robertson, The Philippine 
Islands, 1493-1898 (hereafter BR), vol. 7, pp. 221-222.
3 Jan de Vries has used following def inition based on Manfred Steger’s short summary: ‘glo-
balization is about shifting forms of human contact leading toward greater interdependence and 
integration, such that the time and space aspects of social relations become compressed, resulting 
in the ‘intensif ication of the world as a whole.’ Cf. de Vries (2010), ‘Limits of Globalization, p. 711.
4 Vanhaute (2012), World History, pp. 9-23.
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Soon after the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan (pt. Fernão de Magalhães, sp. 
Fernando de Magallanes, 1480-1521) in Cebu half a millennium ago, the ab-
sence of spices and precious metals disappointed the new arrivals. Even after 
the formation of a permanent colonial settlement, the Philippines remained 
of secondary interest to imperial Spain – not many Spaniards lived there, and 
those who did behaved rather independently.5 Yet, although developments in 
the Philippines did not reflect what the Spanish Crown wanted, the capital of 
the Spanish Philippines, Manila, happened to be the specific area where the 
Spanish interacted with the Chinese and the Japanese, as did their political 
economies.6 Hence global economic historians regard 1571 as the starting 
point for sustained long-distance trade that was for the f irst time truly 
global. Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez wrote in an article about the 
impact of intercontinental silver flows on world affairs that ‘Manila was the 
crucial entrepôt linking substantial, direct, and continuous trade between 
the Americas and Asia for the f irst time in history’.7 With the establishment 
of Manila as a permanent trading base for exchanging American (primarily 
Mexican)8 silver and Chinese silk in the last third of the sixteenth century, the 
economic zone grew by integrating various regions into the emerging global 
economy. The point of departure for this book is this Manila-based triangular 
trade.9 However, while economic historians characteristically focused on 
trade currents and their impact on economic long-term developments,10 they 
have failed to see the fascinating nature of Manila trade, being the ambiguous 
product of diverging political and ideological concepts of three powerful 
5 The introductory chapters of John Crossley’s biography of the Spanish soldier and procurador 
general Ríos de los Coronel, outlines several determined and glory-seeking individuals who 
governed the colony far away from the motherland. See Crossley (2011), Ríos Coronel. 
6 Mercantilist thought dominated the Spanish political economy of the time. See Bonney 
(1995), ‘Early Modern Theories’, pp. 171-172.
7 Flynn, Giráldez (1995), ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”‘, p. 201.
8 Alfonso Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2011), ‘Era de la plata española’.
9 In its original meaning the term refers to the Atlantic exchange of European manufactured 
goods, African slaves, and New World resources as well as agricultural products. Hence it differs 
strikingly from exchange via Manila. In the Pacif ic, triangular trade refers to the characteristic 
trade patterns that linked the China Seas to the American continent and its East and Southeast 
Asian peripheries. 
10 Jan de Vries has early on acknowledged the global relevance of the trading route: ‘The 
ultimate expression of this speculative basis of international trade was the Manila-Acapulco 
trade. Because of the inordinate value of silver in Asia and the inordinate demand for silk in 
Europe, Spaniards found it worthwhile to send silver to Manila and exchange it for silk, which 
would be sent back to Acapulco, transshipped to Vera Cruz, and then sent on to Spain. Small 
changes in those conditions undermined this trade in the early seventeenth century.’ Cf. De 
Vries (1976), Economy of Europe, p. 115.
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pre-modern states.11 Manila’s economic and urban development would have 
looked entirely different without the direct and indirect contributions from 
the cultural and economic spheres of China, Japan, and Overseas Spain.12
As a ‘Eurasian’ port city, early modern Manila was undoubtedly the prod-
uct of a histoire croisée at the heyday of what Anthony Reid has termed an 
‘Age of Commerce’.13 In this respect, several historians have tried to evaluate 
the Manila Galleon trade in American silver and Chinese silk, its effects on 
the Spanish economy, and the Philippines’ delayed economic development, 
as non-self-sustaining economy and a disintegrated hinterland.14 Valuable 
evaluations certainly have to go beyond hasty conclusions about laziness 
and human greed. Indeed, it has often been argued that the poor economic 
development of the Philippines was more the result of ineff icient Castilian 
governance and less the product of the multicultural nature of the area. How 
remote Spain, despite her fragile political power structure in Asia managed 
to dominate Manila, where annually at least 100,000 kilograms of silver 
circulated, and where f ierce competition from other powerful pre-modern 
states existed, had not yet been suff iciently confronted.15 Not only do we 
have to abandon the popular view that the city was nothing more than a 
11 I will here use Charles Tilly’s straightforward def inition of a state: ‘When the accumulation 
and concentration of coercive means grow together, they produce states; they produce distinct 
organisations that control the chief concentrated means of coercion within well-def ined ter-
ritories, and exercise priority in some respects over all other organisations operating within 
those territories.’ Tilly (1990), Coercion, p. 19. David Kang has also worked with the concepts 
of ‘states’ by supporting his reasoning with Max Weber who def ined a state as representing ‘a 
social community and territory, with a monopoly of legitimate violence within that territory.’ 
See Kang (2010), East Asia, p. 26. For a discussion on how to apply the concepts of early modern 
state and state building in a transcultural context and terminological challenges, see Flüchter, 
“Structures on the Move”, 1-19. The author (p. 2) def ines ‘states as phenomena produced by social 
actions, as spaces of interaction, and as networks of institutions that structure action’.
12 Bhattacharya (2008), ‘Making Money’, pp. 1-20. For a concise synthesis, see Iaccarino (2008), 
‘Manila as an International Entrepôt’, pp. 71-81.
13 See Gipouloux (2009), La Méditerranée Asiatique.
14 Bjork (1998), ‘Link’, pp. 51-88; Escoto (2007), ‘Coinage’, p. 213: ‘Hispanic colonial Philippines 
present a classic example of a nation’s commerce gone awry right from the beginning. The 
island colony had a f lourishing foreign trade unparalleled elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but its 
interior commerce was generally stuck in a barter system until the mid-nineteenth century. 
The underlying cause of this imbalance was the lack of appropriate coinage.’ The author blames 
the Mexican peso’s functioning as currency not only for the continuation of the barter system 
but also for the Chinese monopoly of the domestic market.
15 For an overview on the political entities in South East Asia and the connections between 
them, at the moment of the Spanish arrival, see Reid (1999), Charting.
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trading outpost for the Spanish and the Chinese,16 but also any tentative 
explanation for these peculiar circumstances has to take two diverging 
aspects into account. Research that characterises historical aspirations 
and attitudes about Manila must consider both the role of environmental 
circumstances that included pre-existing maritime networks on the macro 
level and rivalry of actors and agencies ‘at home’ on the micro level.17
The South China Sea offered particularly favourable conditions for the 
development of long-distance trade.18 However, considerable differences in the 
behaviour of states, the role of cultures represented in language, religion, and 
traditions, as well as political economies shaped the outcome of proto-global 
connections.19 Between 1570 and 1640 trade expanded not only because rulers 
showed an interest in benefiting directly from foreign commerce, but also 
through passive connections and interaction. Spain, China, and Japan may be 
described as having a period of similarities found in ‘territorial consolidation, 
administrative centralisation, cultural/ethnic integration, and commercial 
intensif ication’, as Lieberman has noted.20 Moreover, at the dawn of this 
period, recently described as the ‘1570s system’ by Nakajima Gakushō,21 of 
closer connections between Europe and Asia, certain parts of each of the three 
pre-modern states had achieved a high literary culture and civilisation and had 
‘attained a high degree of socio-political organization and material culture’.22
After 1570, the crossroad identity of the maritime macro region, where 
commercial exchange had stimulated regional networks since the f irst 
millennium, created a f luid environment, which in turn encouraged the 
emergence of what I hereafter will call the ‘Manila system’.23 The term ‘system’ 
here stresses reciprocal forces and long-lasting structures that overlap with 
16 For the ‘way-station thesis’, see among others Boxer (1970), ‘Plata Es Sangre’, pp. 457-478, Knauth 
(1972), Confrontación Transpacífica, and Spate (1979), Spanish Lake. For the ideas of the ‘California 
School’ on Manila’s role in global economic history, see the famous work of Frank (1998), ReOrient.
17 Serge Gruzinski has addressed the colonisation of the Philippines within the diversif ied 
frame of Iberian colonial mobility. Gruzinski (2004), Quatre Parties du Monde, pp. 30-60.
18 Grove, Hamashita, Selden (eds) (2008), China, East Asia and the Global Economy.
19 For the role of culture in influencing economic developments, see Vries (2003), Via Peking 
Back to Manchester; Jones (2006), Cultures Merging; Sanjay Subrahmanyam specif ically synthe-
sised culture’s impact on maritime relations, political economies, f iscal regimes, geography, 
and society in Asia. Subrahmanyam (1990), Political Economy of Commerce, pp. 9-45. 
20 Lieberman (1999), ‘Transcending’, p. 7.
21 Nakajima (2013), ‘Kōeki to funsō’, p. 26.
22 Darwin (2007), After Tamerlane, pp. 27; 42.
23 I am aware that the term ‘system’ is already taken and moreover problematic since the 
Manila system is not characterised by centre-periphery relations as stipulated by sociologists 
since the 1960s. My conceptualisation borrows from Braudel’s world economy def initions as 
well as from global history empire theories of John Darwin.
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ideas about connected histories. The Manila system was characterised by 
multilayered connections based on negotiations, a complex market torn 
between protectionism and free trade, triangular circulations and bi- or 
multilateral communication involving different parties of the pre-modern 
states Ming China, Azuchi-Momoyama and later Tokugawa Japan, and the 
Spanish Overseas Empire.24 Contacts were not confined to Manila: ports such 
as Quanzhou (泉州) in Fujian/China or Nagasaki (長崎) in Kyushu/Japan, and 
surrounding oceanic space all the way to Mexico, also became integral parts of 
the network. Crucial to the understanding presented in this study is the high 
degree of improvisation in this formative period. The hybrid outcomes of the 
state-controlled exchange in silver and silk and continuous tensions caused by 
smuggling and corruption, linked to other systems or networks including the 
Japanese licensed foreign trade system from 1604-1635 (朱印船, jp. shuinsen), 
the Atlantic system, and the Chinese tributary trade system.25 S.A.M. Adshead 
already used the term ‘Manila system’ in 1988 in an attempt to integrate 
the concepts of empire, government, and statehood.26 My formulation of the 
concept Manila system serves as a micro model for the macro analysis of 
the complex entanglements and forms of competition between the states 
mentioned above and between the local and the central in those states. A 
limitation to central and local factors may indeed be too narrow and at times 
it will be necessary to modify the scope, adding categories such as regional 
and global. Moreover, this book will present several actors who simultaneously 
represent local and global interests as characteristic of the Manila system.
The three pre-modern states discussed here considered commercial rela-
tions as a form of ‘negotiation’, a fact that stresses the close links between 
diplomacy and trade. The strong role of diplomacy is a further important 
characteristic of the Manila system. Close diplomatic ties were just one 
24 In each of these three pre-modern states we f ind a single hereditary ruler who reigned 
over a well-def ined territory with a largely agrarian economy. Governance was supported by 
sophisticated bureaucratic structures. See Goldstone (1991), Revolution and Rebellion, p. 4.
25 Not far from Manila another system developed a few decades later. Paul van Dyke described 
it in his seminal work as the Canton system. Van Dyke (2005), Canton Trade. The Canton sys-
tem lasted from 1700 until 1842. It required European traders to have guild merchants act as 
guarantors for their good behaviour and f inancial transactions. Describing transactions and 
interactions with a specif ic focus on the power of knowledge as well as the use of language 
as political tool, the meticulous study shows how foreign merchants were treated and which 
institutions and actors supervised and controlled them. Paul van Dyke concluded that the 
Chinese state was particularly interested in maintaining harmony and control in foreign trade.
26 Adshead (2001), China in World History, pp. 206-208. While Adshead has to be credited for 
a tentative comparison with Habsburg Spain, his hasty conclusions, such as calling the Manila 
system China’s most important link to the outside world, are problematic.
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aspect of East Asian interconnectedness, complicating a clear distinction 
between prof it-oriented commerce and political communication.27 Less 
acknowledged is the fact that Luzon, the largest island in the Philippines 
on which Manila is located, was part of the East Asian diplomatic net, to 
the same extent as the archipelago was part of a larger South East Asian 
maritime world and the Hispano-American colonial culture zone.
Historical research on the South China Sea has shown that in part because 
of Ming China’s restrictive policies on foreign trade, this region encouraged 
mainly private traders, who were calling at key Malay entrepôts such as 
Melaka and Chinese coastal centres prior to the arrival of the Iberians.28 
Private traders included people of a range of backgrounds: Muslim, Malay,29 
Overseas Chinese mostly from Southern Fujian, Ryukyuan, and merchants 
from the Indian subcontinent. This liberal environment fuelled the forma-
tion of loosely allied Japanese and Chinese trading groups including so 
called ‘Japanese pirates’ (倭寇, ch. wokou, jp. wakō).30 It is noteworthy that 
the latter’s maritime activities peaked around the middle of the sixteenth 
century, at a time when the Iberians appeared as promising business part-
ners in East Asia.31 Together with merchants from Fujian, illicit merchant 
adventurers would become the pioneers of Manila trade and substantially 
contribute to the flourishing decades in the development of the Manila Bay.32
27 Japanese historians put particular emphasis on diplomacy and trade as overarching frame of 
pre-modern transnational relations in East Asia. Tanaka Takeo and Murai Shōsuke, for instance, 
have carried out pioneering research since the 1970s in Japanese. See Tanaka (1996), Zenkindai; 
Murai (1999), Chūsei nihon; Murai (2013), Nihon chūsei. English-language scholarship caught up in 
recent years. Kang (2010), East Asia, p. 108: ‘Trade served as a double-edged instrument of system 
consolidation: it facilitated both more intense state-to-state interactions and the development 
of domestic state institutions. The picture that emerges is one [...] governed by national laws, 
diplomacy, and protocols, with states attempting to control, limit, and benef it from trade.’
28 For the mobile networks in the South China Sea I refer to Lockard (2010), ‘Sea Common to 
All’, pp. 219-247.
29 Anthony Reid called the term ‘Malay’ an as ‘portentous label’ as ‘China’ in the context of 
South East Asian history. The term’s connotations changed over time. During the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries it commonly served the Europeans as cultural-linguistic marker for people 
inhabiting the area between Melaka, Brunei, and Java. See Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 81.
30 Wokou/wakō literally means ‘Japanese pirate’. But most of the time, these associations 
comprised a larger number of Chinese merchants.
31 Maehira (2008), ‘Minchō’, pp. 61-76. 
32 Chinese merchants calling on Manila were mainly Min people also known as Hokkien or 
Minnan 閩南. Integration of the archipelago into macro-regional networks dates back to earlier 
centuries; yet the attraction of Luzon and Visayas increased enormously once the Europeans 
had settled there.
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Map 1 The Manila System
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Manila’s economic ‘failure’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
contrasts sharply with developments in the early decades. The fact that most 
studies of pre-modern Manila fail to see local and proto-national influences 
from China, Japan, and Europe calls for a deeper and more systematic 
look into the subject.33 Why Manila trade (the ‘generative role of the gal-
leons’34) appeared to encourage only short-term profits invites a closer look 
at the role of the state in determining foreign relations and at how off icial 
decision-making affected economic possibilities. When the three political 
economies of Spain, China, and Japan first met, central governments did not 
try to monopolise power in Manila.35 In fact, before the sixteenth century 
no one nation tried to dominate Asian trade.36
This research covers broad themes such as the nature of governance in 
early modern Manila, what sovereignty meant to each of these countries, how 
they applied the concept to Luzon, and to what extent the Manila system 
influenced maritime policies and geo-political strategies in China, Japan 
and Spain. My study differs from previous research in the method of analysis 
used to address the importance of the state for private trading patterns. The 
chief theme of my narrative describes interactions between local and central 
actors and agencies that determined most proto-globalisation processes. The 
multilayered Manila system of mutually influencing levels allows engaging 
with dynamics and hybrid processes resulting from encounters and interac-
tion. I argue that state-local competition in China, Japan, and the Spanish 
Overseas Empire more than cultural aspects of these encounters added to 
Manila’s distinct development as Eurasian port city. These encounters’ last-
ing effect on both foreign and domestic policies in all three pre-modern states 
suggests that low-ranking actors such as merchants possessed signif icant 
passive power – both in East Asia and the Iberian Peninsula.
Noteworthy Scholarship
The majority of historical writing has looked at the Philippines in isolation 
and has repeated long-held misconceptions of their early modern history. 
33 One of the most recent examples is Gipouloux (2009), La Méditerranée Asiatique.
34 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, pp. 27-30.
35 Legarda (2001), ‘Cultural Landmarks’, p. 44: ‘The resulting trade between the great empire of 
China and the silver-rich colonies of the Americas, with the Philippines standing in the center 
of the whole enterprise, gave a completely new dimension, and a new direction, to Asia’s trade. 
It completed the circle of world trade.’
36 Francia (2010), History, p. 30.
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To conceive an alternative narrative, disentangling the historical processes 
from national history writing is essential. As indicated above, integrating 
a focus on Manila into world history means examining ‘large processes’ 
embedded in multilayered structures by (a) considering the city’s contribu-
tion to (proto-)global developments and socio-economic phenomena to 
understand the empirical level and (b) providing a balanced view of differ-
ent narratives and discourses to understand the historiographical level. The 
city of Manila serves as a framework for this study’s triangular relations and 
thus appears as a convenient starting point. Yet this is not a straightforward 
task because historical research on the early modern Philippines is scat-
tered. At f irst glance much of the historiography on the Philippines lacks 
objectivity. Often it reads as a story, history, or historiography of extremes, 
based on either positively or negatively prejudiced views of developments. 
The colonial period fared particularly poorly, biased by authors’ hidden or 
obvious agendas.37 Such prejudiced views date back to Catholic chronicles, 
and continued in imperialist and nationalist writing of the late nineteenth 
century and the f irst half of the twentieth. Eventually, it experienced a 
revival in the post-colonial search for a new identity after the country’s 
independence in 1946. The rare examples that address triangular relations 
do so mostly only indirectly.38
The most prominent work highlighting Manila’s role as multiethnic 
port city is The Manila Galleon by William Lytle Schurz, f irst published in 
1939.39 His book gives insights into the exciting history of the ships passing 
between Acapulco and Manila on behalf of the Spanish Monarchy from 
1565 to 1815, i.e. shortly before Mexico gained independence from Spain. 
French economic historian Pierre Chaunu’s Les Philippines et le Pacifique des 
Ibériques deserves special credit for collecting extensive statistical data on 
trans-Pacif ic trade in Spanish archives, revealing that more than a third of 
American silver went to Asia before the early nineteenth century.40 Chaunu 
argued that Spanish Pacif ic trade largely adapted to the Atlantic system, a 
thesis that has been often challenged since.41
37 For strong nationalistic Philippine history writing see José Rizal’s annotations of Morga 
(2008), Sucesos; For a later example see Zaide (1949), Philippines. A few exceptions exist, i.e. 
Jocano (1975), Philippines at the Spanish Contact. This reader for students gives a fairly compre-
hensive primary-source based overview of the early Spanish period.
38 One exception here is Felix (ed.) (1966), Chinese in the Philippines.
39 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon.
40 Chaunu (1960), Les Philippines. His study is based on almojarifazgo records.
41 Carmen Yuste López has argued that merchants of Mexico City were the winners of the 
trans-Pacif ic-trade in later decades. See Yuste López (2007), Emporios Transpacíficos. She has also 
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Several Filipino historians have carried out internationally recognised 
research, although of varying quality. Benito Legarda Jr. started a trend 
in researching the country’s complex economic history, in the late 1960s, 
and Leslie Bauzon and others followed in the 1980s.42 Starting in the 1970s, 
William Henry Scott’s publications constructed a pan-regional model of the 
Philippines’ socio-political organisation, providing students of Philippine 
history with descriptive detail and analytical insights.43 Although attempts 
to place the Spanish Philippines in a bigger picture have drawn on research 
in geography, economic history, and social sciences, China and Japan were 
rather loosely linked to events in Manila in these studies.44 Popular history 
on the beginning of the Philippines’ triangular relations is also problem-
atic.45 While Mexican historians rarely insert specif ic topics in large-scale 
overviews, despite their acknowledged accomplishments in emphasising 
the Mexican legacy in the Manila Galleon trade, Filipino historians are 
reluctant to neutrally address the Hispanic past of their country.46 A newer 
generation of scholars are committed to a more nuanced, objective view of 
the colonial heritage in their search for distinct features of the Philippines 
within the context of South East Asia.47
Within the f ield of macro-level perspectives in parallel or comparative 
histories, scholars often uncritically accepted the leyenda negra by painting 
a picture of a Spanish Crown unable to enforce efficient economic policies.48 
shown that Mexican traders after 1640 enjoyed f inancial advantage in Manila. Consequently, 
Mexican traders and intermediaries became the main benef iciaries of the prof its created by 
the Manila Galleon trade in the eighteenth century. 
42 Legarda (1999), After the Galleons; Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government.
43 To name just the most famous of many: Scott (1994), Barangay. 
44 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila; Roth (1977), Friar Estates.
45 The controversial question is no longer simply tackled by a few historians but has become a 
topic of popular interest. See Martínez Montes (2009), ‘Spain and China’ (accessed 22 November 
2013); see also Vilaró (2011), Sol Naciente.
46 Filipino historians of the second half of the twentieth century seem to have had diff icul-
ties leaving dependency theories behind, due to ideological, racial, nationalist, or indigenist 
reservations. A Filipino-centric approach is notorious in the work of Teodoro Agoncillo. John 
Leddy Phelan’s research demonstrates that one did not necessarily have to be born Filipino in 
order to promote such views. See Phelan (1959), Hispanization. For tendentious national history 
discourses, see Schmidt-Nowara (2008), Conquest of History, pp. 175-180.
47 The trend only changed recently with scholars revisiting the multicultural heritage of 
various aspects of the Philippines’ cultural history. See Donoso (ed.) (2008), More Hispanic Than 
We Admit; Other works with similar intentions include Almario (ed.) (2003), Pacto de Sangre; 
Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society.
48 The so-called black legend refers to anti-Spanish propaganda. Its origins date back to the 
Revolt of the Netherlands. While the original leyenda negra writing only focused on political 
and religious issues, Spain’s failing economic performance has held centre stage in more recent 
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Anti-Spanish propaganda has survived in the historiography to the present 
day. Serious scholars, in turn, overstress a Mexican legacy and Philippine 
dependence in trans-Pacif ic contributions as expressed in the idea of the 
Philippines as a colony of a colony.49 For most of the time the question of 
where to place the Philippines, whether geographically in South East Asia 
or cultural-politically within the Spanish Empire has limited virtually all 
studies. Most scholarly publications regarded the Philippines as the fringe 
colony of an overstretched empire and missed possible considerations of 
contributions to South East Asian history. In this fashion, Latin Americanists 
have studied the trans-Pacif ic link. Both Vera Valdés Lakowsky’s work on 
Sino-Mexican relations and the flow of Mexican silver and Fernando Iwasaki 
Cauti’s on the early links between Asia and Peru fall into that category.50 
Two monographs focus on the link between the Spanish Empire and Japan 
with a perspective shift to the Philippines, one by the German historian 
Lothar Knauth (1972), the other by ex-Jesuit Antonio Cabezas (1995). Both 
are important forerunners to the present study.51 Yet these too have their 
f laws when it comes to source criticism and interpretation.
Apart from the aforementioned Filipino and Mexican research, Spanish 
scholarship has carried out outstanding research in the f ield. Research by 
Maria Lourdes Díaz Trechuelo and María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso 
on socio-economic developments during the Spanish period and Alonso 
Álvarez’s work on the indigenous taxes and financial aspects of the ‘Spanish 
project’ in Asia are particularly noteworthy.52 Juan Gil’s study on Spanish re-
lations with East Asian powers, and Emilio Sola’s work on Hispano-Japanese 
relations, as well as conference proceedings published by Florentino Rodao, 
have all contributed to a better understanding of the Asian context.53 It is 
black-painted histories. The term itself was coined by Julián Juderías in the early twentieth 
century and refers to the hostile writing about the Spanish Monarchy and its people. The leyenda 
negra accuses the Spanish of ruthlessly spreading Catholicism and political tyranny. For the 
impact of the leyenda negra propaganda in the days of Philip II, see Pérez (2009), Leyenda Negra, 
pp. 53-139. Spanish historiography responded with the leyenda rosa, a narrative that aimed at 
demonstrating positive Spanish contributions to colonial territories.
49 Barron (1992), Presencia; Yuste López (2007), Emporios Transpacíficos.
50 Lakowsky (1987), De las Minas al Mar; Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente.
51 See Knauth (1972), Confrontación Transpacífica; Spate (1979), Spanish Lake; Israel (1974), 
‘Mexico’, pp. 33-57; Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico. The last one is furthermore infamous for its 
lack of references.
52 Díaz-Trechuelo (2001), Filipinas; Pérez-Grueso (2003), Relaciones entre España y Filipinas; 
Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio.
53 Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais; Gil (2011), Chinos; Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro; 
Rodao, Solano, Togores (eds) (1988), Extremo Oriente Ibérico.
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unfortunate that academic exchange between Spanish and Anglophone 
researchers is still limited in this way, to the effect that the archipelago is 
often only relegated to a footnote in English monographs on the Spanish 
Empire.54
As indicated in the preceding overview, primarily Anglophone research 
tackled the Philippines’ connections with emerging world trade.55 Yet, al-
though a signif icant share of the Manila trade entered China, insuff icient 
attention has been paid to Manila’s overall role in pre-modern economies of 
the region. Spanish scholars have approached the topic via classic economic 
history, adding profound quantitative research to existing scholarship.56 
Only in recent years a more nuanced view on transnational collabora-
tions have highlighted the archipelago’s outstanding role within a more 
integrative picture, offering refreshing insights.57 Long-held criticism that 
historians of South East Asia consistently failed to integrate comparative 
approaches into their research has lately fallen silent thanks to a number 
of contrary attempts.58 Recent interest in the highly profitable trans-Pacif ic 
exchange of silver and silk has drawn scholars’ attention to South East 
Asia’s role in early globalisation processes.59 Strictly speaking, most of these 
works only added to the already biased view of the Spanish Philippines in 
world history.
54 See among others Boxer (2004), South China, pp. xl-xli. See also Kamen (2003), Empire; Parker 
(2001), The World Is Not Enough. One chapter is dedicated to the Philippines, called ‘The Pearl 
of the Orient’, pp. 197-237. 
55 Dennis O. Flynn reprinted seminal scholarship on the history of the Philippines in his 
Ashgate Valorum series The Pacific World, including Laufer (1907), ‘Relations of the Chinese’, 
pp. 55-92; Paske-Smith (1914), ‘Japanese Trade’, pp. 139-164; Pearson (1968), ‘Spain and Span-
ish Trade’, pp. 117-138. For Manila’s urban history I refer to Doeppers (1972), ‘Development’, 
pp. 769-792.
56 Martínez-Shaw, Alfonso Mola (eds) (2008), Ruta. The edition provides both a comprehensive 
synthesis and fascinating illustrations.
57 See Ollé (2002), Empresa; Newson (2009), Conquest and Pestilence; Crossley (2011), Ríos 
Coronel; Warren (2012), ‘Weather’, pp. 183-220. 
58 Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 2. For a recently published comprehensive description of the 
area in the early modern period, see Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2; The f irst volume 
of the series focuses less explicitly on the South China Sea but provides nevertheless worthwhile 
insights: Lieberman (2003), Strange Parallels, vol. 1. I should also like to draw attention to 
Roderich Ptak’s work. Ptak (1998), China.
59 In this respect, the work by Dennis O. Flynn and Antonio Giráldez on trans-Pacif ic bullion 
f lows and their impact on the pre-modern world economy has been f iercely debated amongst 
scholars of economic history. Flynn, Giráldez (1995), ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”‘, p. 201: ‘[Global 
trade] emerged when all important populated continents began to exchange products continu-
ously – both with each other and directly and indirectly via other continents – and in values 
suff icient to generate crucial impacts on all trading partners.’
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It goes without saying that scholarship has developed differently within 
the realm of Chinese and Japanese history. A distinct set of questions and 
politico-economic issues about interaction with the international world 
fostered an understanding of the period before 1639 as a rather insignificant 
intermezzo of heightened exchange across borders. Historians of Tokugawa 
Japan used to overemphasise the ‘closed-country thesis’, which influential 
scholars such as British historian Charles R. Boxer promoted international-
ly.60 Beginning in the 1970s, Japanese historians looking at Japan within the 
Asian context began to challenge the closed-country view. While Japanese 
historians suggest replacing the controversial term ‘closed country’ (鎖国, 
jp. sakoku) with the more correct ‘maritime ban’ (海禁, jp. kaikin), Ronald 
Toby criticised the contention that scholars had overlooked Tokugawa 
Japan’s relations with Asia by overrating the rupture in Japan’s relations 
with European powers after 1639. Other Tokugawa foreign relations experts 
including Arano Yasunori (荒野泰典), and Tanaka Takeo (田中健夫) re-
futed Boxer’s thesis on the transformative impact of Japan’s encounter with 
Christianity and the overemphasis of Europeans in foreign relations. In 
doing so, however, Toby in particular underestimates Europe in the overall 
picture and exaggerates early modern Japan’s position within the East Asian 
international system.61 In addition, more and more research has stressed the 
maritime dimension of late medieval and early modern Japanese history 
and thus encouraged studies on coastal interaction and foreign trade.62
Nagazumi Yōko’s (永積洋子) survey of foreign traders in Japanese ports 
such as Hirado (平戸) and off icial Tokugawa trade in South East Asia has 
left a signif icant imprint on the scholarship of the past decades. Outside 
Japan, Leonard Blussé’s ‘large and broad’ agenda paved the way for numerous 
works on the interface between diplomacy and trade in the entire China 
60 Boxer (1951), Christian Century in Japan, p. 362.
61 Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy.
62 Catch phrases used by publishing houses such as ‘umi kara mita’ (Views from the sea) or ‘Ajia 
no naka no nihon’ (Japan within Asia) point at approaches to Japanese history as inseparable 
part of the East Asian macro region. Amino Yoshihiko advocated for a multiplicity of centres 
of medieval Japan as well as looking at Japanese history ‘from the sea’; Bruce Batten strongly 
focused on centre-periphery concepts when arguing against Japanese heterogeneity. Batten 
(2003), To the Ends of Japan. Murai Shōsuke opted for wider time frames in understanding 
Japanese history. Murai (1997), Umi kara mita sengoku nihon. For a synthesis of ‘umi kara mita 
ajia’ (Japan as seen from the ocean)-research, see Ching (2009), ‘Japan in Asia’, p. 407. He speaks 
of Japan’s ‘historical position vis-à-vis Asia’ and based on Edward Said, about a ‘imaginative 
geography’ that determines Japan’s place in a world economy. Nakajima (2007), ‘16 seikimatsu’, 
pp. 55-92.
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Seas in relation to the Dutch East India Company.63 Gradually a group of 
scholars with a clear focus to overcome Japan-centrism in the study of 
foreign relations (対外関係史, jp. taigaikankeishi) and integrating Japan 
into world history emerged.64 Nevertheless, Japanese research is only gradu-
ally beginning to play a role in new scholarship in other regions of the world 
because of language differences.
Notwithstanding influential national history circles, an essential aware-
ness for foreign relations in Japan dates back to the early 1900s and is reflected 
in a very long tradition of scholarship on early modern Japanese-Filipino 
relations. Since the early decades of the twentieth century, an impressive 
number of books and edited source translations by Murakami Naojirō 
(村上直次郎), Nara Shizuma (奈良静間), and Iwao Seiichi (岩生成一) 
have provided edited translations of European chronicles and pre-modern 
Japanese primary source material to students and interested readers.65 More 
recently, academic research by Hirayama Atsuko (平山敦子) and Sugaya 
Nariko (菅谷成子) have added to the body of available knowledge.66 Others 
have studied European presence (spearheaded by Jesuits and Portuguese 
merchants) and the impact of Catholicism on Japan.67 What all these studies 
have in common is an astonishing exactness and outstanding familiarity 
with the multilingual source material, but they often also clearly lack a 
solid theoretical framework, the courage to link empirical f indings with big 
questions, or a willingness to share research results with scholars outside 
their discipline. Benefitting from such thorough source-based education 
and encouraged by gradually increasing exchange with the international 
academic community and participation in trans-national research projects, 
a younger generation of scholars has placed Japanese interaction with the 
63 Colleagues and students alike honoured Leonard Blussé’s innovative scholarship including 
monographs and contributions to numerous source editions in Nagazumi (2010), Large and 
Broad; For his Japan-related research, see Vermeulen, Van der Velde, Viallé, Blussé (eds), Deshima 
Dagregisters (13 vols); Fernández-Armesto, Blussé (eds) (2003), Shifting Communities; Blussé 
(1996), ‘No Boats to China’, pp. 51-76; Blussé (1986), Strange Company.
64 See among others Ōishi (ed.) (1986), Shuinsen. 
65 The majority of these play a crucial role in Japan’s historical studies up to the present day. 
Many were published in edited series by the Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo 
University (史料編纂所 Shiryō hensanjo). The most relevant works in the context of the Manila 
system include translations of Antonio de Morga, Pablo Pastells, Rodrigo Vivero y Velasco, and 
Sebastian Vizcaíno as well as the Nihon kankei kaigai shiryō series including volumes of Jesuit 
records as Iezusukai nihon nenpō and the diaries of the Dutch and the English trading factories 
in Japan.
66 Murakami (1929), Don Rodorigo; Iwao (1937), Nanyō; Nara (1942), Supein komonjo; Hirayama 
(2012), Supein teikoku.
67 Takase (2002), Kirishitan jidai; Gonoi (2003), Daikōkai jidai; Gonoi (2002), Nihon kirishitanshi.
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outside world into a larger context. Their works have furthermore suc-
cessfully bridged the artif icial gap between foreign relations as almost 
exclusive domain of Japanese history (日本史, jp. nihonshi) and Western 
history’s (西洋史, jp. seiyōshi) monopoly on studies about the ‘Southern 
Barbarians’ (南蛮, jp. namban).68 Of particular value to the present study are 
Nakajima Gakushō (中島楽章), Shimizu Yūko (清水有子), and Igawa Kenji’s 
(伊川健二) research on communication between intruding Europeans 
and the old regimes in East Asia; in addition, Shimada Ryuta’s (島田竜登) 
survey on Japanese-VOC (Dutch East India Company) trade in Asia, Oka 
Mihoko’s (岡美穂子) study of the networks of Portuguese Nagasaki-Macao 
merchants, Adam Clulow’s research on the Dutch East India Company in 
Japan and surrounding waters, Peter Shapinsky’s investigations of wakō 
networks, and Ubaldo Iaccarino’s work on Japanese-Spanish relations in 
the early Tokugawa period proved to be extremely stimulating.69 Shimizu 
Yūko’s study on the impact of relations with the Spaniards in Luzon until 
1625, the year of the f inal rupture and end of trade relations, addresses 
the question to what extent European military and missionary aggression 
spurned Japan’s transition from ‘medieval’ to ‘early modern’. The book 
furthermore provides a crucial analysis of trade patterns, which explain 
the complex relation between Luzon and Japan against the background of 
political modernisation.
Historical treatises on China’s role in the emerging trade relations are a 
slightly different, but no less complex story. Chinese historiography is still 
underrepresented in comparative studies of global connections. Manila-
based studies are no exception, even though Zhang Weihua (張維華) has 
already carried out signif icant research in the f irst half of the twentieth 
century.70 While I certainly intend to once and for all leave Fairbank’s 
out-dated narrative of ‘Western impact and Asian responses’ behind, I 
am also conscious of potential new misinterpretations.71 According to 
Takeshi Hamashita, who transferred Wallerstein’s world system theories 
to East Asia, the rest of the world had to adapt to China.72 As a pioneer in 
68 For the rather strict trichotomy (Japanese history, Oriental history, and Occidental history) 
of historical studies in Japan, see Haneda (2011), Atarashii sekaishi, pp. 14-30. 
69 In alphabetical order: Clulow (2014), Company; Csaba (2009), Räuberische Chinesen; Igawa 
(2007), Daikōkai jidai; Iaccarino(2008), ‘Manila as an International Entrepôt’; Nakajima (ed.) 
(2014), Nanban; Oka (2010), Shōnin to senkyōshi; Shapinsky (2006), ‘Polyvocal Portolans’; Shimada 
(2005), Intra-Asian Trade; Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon. 
70 Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji.
71 Fairbank (ed.) (1968), The Chinese World Order.
72 Arrighi, Hamashita, Selden (eds) (2003), Resurgence.
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advocating Asia’s global integration, he overturned Marxist narratives and 
anti-maritime discourses that had long determined the picture of a stag-
nant Asia and emphasised that China was integrated in the early modern 
world economy, instead of having a closed economy. Despite widespread 
consensus on Ming China’s function as major economic drive in the macro 
region, the positions of historians diverge when it comes to the question 
of the economic spirit and the actual role of Confucian ideology in socio-
economic transformation processes in the late Ming. Over the past years 
similar forms of outspoken Sino-centrism have been challenged. While 
many non-Chinese scholars have abandoned lengthy debates on oriental 
despotism, Chinese history f inds itself still torn between older stagnation 
discourses, the desire to stress the values of Sino-centricism, and a new focus 
on the integrating dynamics of traditional tributary systems.73
Classical Chinese history tended to relegate maritime and coastal topics 
to obscurity. In contrast, recent historians have established a more nuanced 
view on China’s economic integration by focusing separately on regional 
and maritime developments.74 John E. Wills’s wide-ranging survey of the 
Chinese maritime trade and contacts with the Europeans, including a focus 
on late Ming/early Qing diplomatic contacts with the West, or Leonard 
Blussé’s efforts to understand the dynamics in the macro region between 
Xiamen, Batavia, and Nagasaki (social aspects of merchants communities, 
diplomacy of VOC personnel), have changed our understanding over the 
past decades. As far as the Manila system is concerned, work by Ray Huang, 
Lin Renchuan, Angela Schottenhammer, and Manuel Ollé offer particularly 
relevant insights.75 The present study moreover owes a lot to studies on the 
margins and periphery of the Ming Empire, including research by Timothy 
Brook and Cheng Wei-chung and new scholarship on Taiwan by Tonio 
Andrade and José Eugenio Borao.76
73 Cohen (1984), Discovering History, pp. 1-56; 149-198; For twentieth-century scholarship on 
pre-modern China, see Zurndorfer (1988), ‘Guide’, pp. 148-201; A recent Cambridge University 
Press manual synthesises works on hydraulic despotism, feudalism, anti-imperialism, Chinese 
nationalist, and traditionalist narratives, as well as recent Western scholarship influenced by 
postmodernism: Wilkinson (2012), Chinese History.
74 For studies on China and Japan’s role in an emerging global world around 1600, see Von 
Glahn (1996), Fountain; An economic focus also dominates in Kishimoto (2012), Chiiki.
75 Huang (1988), ‘Lung-Ch’ing’, pp. 511-581; Lin (1990), Fukien’s Private Trade; Ollé (2002), 
Empresa; Schottenhammer (2007), East Asian Maritime World. 
76 Andrade (2006), How Taiwan Became Chinese; Borao et al. (2002), Spaniards in Taiwan, 2 
vols; Borao (2009), Spanish Experience in Taiwan; Brook (2008), Vermeer’s Head; Brook (2010), 
Troubled Empire; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy.
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Multilingual Primary Sources
This study uses data drawn from correspondence between the Spanish 
Crown and the colonial government in the Philippines, seventeenth-century 
records of Japanese foreign affairs, and off icial records of the Ming dynasty. 
The inequality in quantity of Western and Eastern sources should not be 
interpreted as a sign of Euro-centrism, but lies rather in the fragmentary 
nature of relevant sources. Spain collected far more records on Philippine-
related topics than the other countries. Even though China’s and Japan’s 
bureaucratic traditions also contributed to an enormous output of historical 
data, efforts usually excluded records on maritime ventures and the outside 
world.77 Furthermore, Chinese and Japanese interactions and transactions 
were more often carried out on an unoff icial or semi-legal basis. The pre-
dominance of private merchants in all trade actions aggravates the dilemma 
of scholarship in that f ield. Very often they have left only the faintest trace 
in documentary records.
The Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in Seville hosts the bulk of off icial 
decrees on governing the Philippines, commercial policies, correspond-
ence between authorities and other individuals based in ‘Asia Oriental’, 
and memorials and orders of the King and his councils.78 Other valuable 
sources can be found in the Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), the Archivo 
Histórico Nacional (AHN), and the collections of the Real Academia de 
Historia (RAH), as well as in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (ARSI). 
Chinese and Japanese off icial records on foreign relation are largely con-
f ined to defence policies.
Despite their scarcity, Japanese primary sources on foreign relations 
of this period represent the second important pillar of this research, pre-
dominantly early Tokugawa information gathering about the foreign world, 
including about the newly arrived Europeans. Most prominent among early 
modern foreign relations texts are the Ikoku nikki (異国日記, Diary of Foreign 
Countries) and the Tsūkō ichiran (通航一覧, Records on Navigation).79 The 
77 These developments were part of the seclusion policies and maritime restrictions imple-
mented by the central government both in Ming China and Tokugawa Japan. 
78 Clerks (escribanos) in all parts of the overstretched Overseas Empire were busily record-
keeping in order to keep superiors and supporters in the motherland up-to-date. The voluminous 
document corpus of the Audiencia de Filipinas of the Archivo General de Indias holds the bulk of 
relevant Spanish material for this study. Other related sources can be found among documents 
of the Audiencia de México and the Patronato Real.
79 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran. A compilation of foreign relations documents, issued 
between 1588 and 1825. For the f irst printed edition (1911) of the Ikoku nikki, see Murakami (ed.) 
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Gaiban tsūsho (外蕃通所, a collection of Tokugawa diplomatic documents), 
and a collection with the Bakufu’s off icial daily records (大日本史料, jp. 
Dainihon shiryō) also provide details on relations with Luzon.80 A further 
remarkable document is the Ruson oboegaki (呂宋覚書), which was drafted 
in the 1670s, 40 years after relations with the Spaniards had come to a 
standstill.81 When using these materials, one must keep in mind that the 
majority of these sources were originally collected and compiled by order 
and under the supervision of the regime.82 Historically speaking, record-
keeping was monopolised by Zen Buddhist monks, in particular in the 
realm of foreign affairs, because they controlled correspondence with 
Japan’s Asian neighbours. For the period of this study a very small group 
of individuals were involved in drafting authorised documents, including 
licences for foreign trade. Most famous among them are Toyotomi Hidey-
oshi’s diplomatic advisor Saishō Jōtai (西笑承兌, 1548-1608) and Ieyasu’s 
diplomatic staff Sanyō Genkitsu (三要元佶, 1548-1612) from the Enkōji 
(円光寺) temple83 and the Zen Rinzai monk Ishin Sūden (以心崇伝, 1569-
1633), a disciple of Genkitsu.84 The language used in all off icial documents is 
classical Japanese. During the seventeenth-century Chinese-style Japanese 
texts (漢文, jp. kanbun) remained the language of law, and the syllabaries 
(仮名, jp. kana) are increasingly used for administration records and oc-
casionally in sources drafted outside Japan.
As for Chinese data, works of interest on foreign and tributary trade 
include printed editions of imperial histories such as the Ming shi (明史, 
Ming Annals) and the Ming shi-lu (明實錄, Veritable Records). Whereas the 
Ming shi with its 332 volumes that were written in the f irst century of the 
(2005) Ikoku nikki shō.
80 Nagasaki magistrate Kondō Seisai (1771-1829) collected material for the Gaiban tsūsho (1818). 
See Kondō (1901), Shinka, vol. 17. 
81 Kawabuchi (1671), Ruson oboegaki.
82 It is worth mentioning that hardly any records were drafted in sōsho 草書 (cursive script), 
meaning a calligraphy of abbreviated Chinese characters, still largely legible. Increased bureau-
cratisation inspired a faster way of writing and led to a spread in kyōsho 狂書 (or 行書 gyōsho).
83 Also known by his monk title Genkistu Kanshitsu 元佶閑室 and referred to as Gakkō-sama 
(学校様) by contemporaries, he followed Saishō as drafter of shuinjō 朱印状 and in later years 
contributed largely to the Fushimi press. Ikoku tokai goshuinchō: Register of documents related to 
the overseas trade licences (shuinjō). See also Ikoku kinnen goshosōan ‘Draft of foreign commerce’ 
that included 21 licences to Luzon and Bisaya between 1604-1611.
84 Also known as Konchiin Sūden金地院崇伝, after having built Konchiin temples in both 
Edo and Sunpu, Isshin Sūden commuted between these two shogunal residences. Sūden played 
an important role in negotiations with the Chinese Ming court over the reopening of trade. He 
was also instrumental in organising foreign delegations and drafting correspondence (国書 jp. 
kokusho). He compiled all the diplomatic records of the Ikoku nikki. 
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Qing dynasty (1644-1911) is part of the official 24 histories of China, the latter 
contains the imperial annals of the Ming emperors. After the death of each 
emperor, a governmental off ice of historical affairs would create a section 
about his reign using various historical sources, including, for example, 
the ‘daily records’.85 Both the Ming shi and the Ming shi-lu are designed to 
preserve historical knowledge under the control of the dynasty. Therefore 
it is only natural that records on foreign trade, in a period of rigid govern-
ment control and restriction, are rare.86 The most valuable primary record 
on maritime affairs during the Ming is the Dongxi yangkao (東西洋考, 
Thoughts about the Eastern and Western Oceans) – f irst published in 1617.87 
A study of 12 scrolls by a pre-modern scholar named Zhang Xie (1576-
1640) describes the economic situation of overseas countries. One of the 
strengths of his study lies is its account of the collection of tax revenues from 
maritime trade. It comprises studies on the Eastern and Western Oceans 
and is dedicated to the descriptions of the regions of East Asia and their 
relations with China, and maritime routes.88 Furthermore, certain sections 
of provincial chronicles and annals from Fujian and Guangdong provide 
additional details on social and economic matters that help to elaborate on 
a bigger picture of foreign policies and maritime trade.89 Unlike Spanish, 
Portuguese or Italian manuscripts, a signif icant amount of Chinese and 
Japanese material has been edited and reprinted for reasons of legibility 
and archival maintenance.
The Spanish chronicles must also be tested for their reliability, acces-
sibility, and relevance. Early on, members of Catholic orders published 
documentary records either on what they saw or considered worthwhile 
85 Thanks to the painstaking efforts of Geoff Wade, Ming shi-lu entries referring to South 
East Asia have been translated into English. For further information, see Wade, MSL, http://
epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/ (hereafter Wade, MSL and URL). In this respect an open database on a 
large number of Ming shi-lu records is an extremely useful tool for non-Chinese speakers and 
provides extensive information on Ming China’s foreign policy.
86 Genealogies were essential tokens of gentry prestige in imperial China. A survey of six-
teenth- and seventeenth-centuries Fujian genealogies could add signif icant f indings to our story. 
See Zhuang, Zheng (1998), Quanzhou pu. Coastal China has had a long tradition of migration 
to South East Asia. For an analysis of intercultural relations in Manila Fujian genealogies are 
therefore very valuable as a particular form of historiographical records that was often kept 
secret to the outside world.
87 Another related source is the Daming huidian, a compilation of the Ming dynasty published 
in 1510 on the tributary system and foreign trade. Chang (1983), ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, p. 9.
88 Zhang (1981), Dongxi yangkao (hereafter: Dongxi yangkao). Large parts of the collection are 
based on records of the Ming shi.
89 Chen (1964), Fujian tongzhi; Ruan Yuan, Li Mo (eds) (1981), Guangdong tongzhi.
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to disseminate.90 Their works on the Philippines are closely linked to other 
potential missionary f ields and projects. Thus, accounts of ‘Asia Oriental’ 
include extensive descriptions of countries and peoples of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. Although these are of undisputed interest for 
our purpose, the famous example of Juan González de Mendoza’s Historia 
de China, challenges their reliability.91 Some of them are still scattered 
over the globe in the original print and others have been re-edited over 
the years and can be found in almost any academic library. Antonio de 
Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas also deserves special mention as a 
chronicle by a high-ranking government off icial in Manila, f irst published 
in 1609 in Mexico. De Morga is one of the f irst non-clerical Spanish writers 
of Philippine history.92 Doctor de Morga, as he is conventionally referred to 
in sources of his time, was a very controversial, yet well-informed, colonial 
f igure who served as a judge in Manila from 1595 to 1602. His book, which 
has been widely used by critics and admirers alike, provides a detailed 
description of political issues, the native inhabitants, Japanese and Chinese 
settlers and foreign politics. Morga’s contemporary, Hernando de los Ríos 
Coronel, also left detailed accounts,93 and Miguel de Loarca, a soldier, also 
contributed to the corpus of early civilian Spanish accounts.94
No study on the Spanish Philippines will be complete without mentioning 
Emma Helen Blair and James A. Robertson’s 55 volumes of translated Spanish 
90 Friars in all parts of the Philippines collected information and drafted chronicles from 
an ethnographic perspective. In chronological order of the f irst publication date they include 
Pigafetta (1534), Primo Viaggio Intorno al Globo Terracqueo; Chirino (1604), Relación de las 
Islas Filipinas; Pedro Chirino had worked in the hinterland of Manila until 1596 and was then 
transferred to Cebu, where he became the f irst Jesuit to administer to a community of Chinese 
settlers; Aduarte (1640), Historia de la Provincia del Santo Rosario; Colín (1663), Labor Evangélica 
(edited and re-published by Pablo Pastells in the early 1900s); de Santa Cruz (1693), Historia de 
la Provincia del Santo Rosario II. 
91 Mendoza (2008), Historia del Gran Reino de la China. Originally published as Historia de las 
Cosas más Notables, Ritos y Costumbres del Gran Reyno de la China in 1586. An Italian (Dell’ Historia 
de la China) and an English translation followed in 1588. Even though it is based on eyewitness 
reports of Martín Rada and others, the author himself never set foot on Chinese soil. Unlike his 
namesake, Juan Mendoza Mate de Luna personally visited China. His global life as a New World 
merchant from Seville, who travelled from Peru to China, Manila, Macao and eventually Mexico, 
appears in various colonial records. See Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, pp. 65-105.
92 For the rise and fall of Antonio de Morga as a high-ranking Crown off icial in the Philippines 
and the American viceroyalties, see Elliott (2009), Spain and the Wider World, pp. 16-17.
93 Crossley (2011), Ríos Coronel.
94 Miguel de Loarca participated in the f irst mission from the Spanish Philippines to China 
in 1574-1575. Loarca (1582), Relación de las Yslas Filipinas, see BR V, pp. 134-187.
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and Filipino archival material.95 One of the problems of this magnus opus is 
that it was compiled at the heyday of American imperialism. Although its 
very selective contents reflect the anti-Spanish bias of the years after the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, the compilation is of unprecedented value.96
Comparisons and Connections
Instead of using historical evidence to produce superficial, ‘f lat’ generalisa-
tions of the early modern world, this book is an attempt to write global 
history as a combination of traditional history and broader considerations 
of recent research in global history.97 While trying to avoid lofty, unfounded 
theories, I also want to prove that primary source data is not reserved for 
micro history.98 In combination they help to evaluate the transforming and 
interconnected world of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.99 Meth-
odologically, this means reading sources ‘against the grain’.100 The method 
is from anthropology and describes the process of reading a text beyond 
its author’s intention. It encourages the reader to look for hidden views, the 
‘unexpected’, what an author left unsaid, and ultimately to think of reasons 
for omitted information.101 In our specific case, it requires a very high degree 
95 Blair, Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898.
96 Prior to Emma Blair and James Robertson, the Spanish civil servant and ambiguous scholar 
of the Philippines Wenceslao E. Retana had busied himself in making important documents 
of the Spanish colonial government accessible to the public. Retana (ed.) (1895-1905), Archivo 
del Bibliófilo Filipino, 5 vols. For a critical assessment of Retana’s work, see Cano (2008), Retana 
Revisited; also Pastells, Torres y Lanzas (1925), Catálago de los Documentos Relativos a las Islas 
Filipinas, 9 vols; Martínez de Zúñiga (1893), Estadismo de las Islas. 
97 For criticism of being superf icial and counter-arguments see Fernández-Armesto (2009), 
‘I would be f lattered’, pp. 170-183. For specif ic methods and theories of global history that have 
been subject to major scholarly debate, see Engel, Middell, ‘Bruchzonen der Globalisierung’, 
pp. 5-38; Mazlish (1998), ‘Comparing Global History to World History’, pp. 385-395; Armitage 
(2004), ‘Is There a Pre-History of Globalization?’, pp. 165-175; Manning (2003), Navigating World 
History; Bright, Geyer (1995), ‘World History in a Global Age’, pp. 1034-1060.
98 One example of recent attempts to combine both lines of research is Andrade (2011), ‘A 
Chinese Farmer’, pp. 573-591.
99 Haneda (2009), ‘Introduction’, p. 1; Haneda, Kojima (eds) (2013), Umi kara mita, pp. 3-37.
100 The term was coined by David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky. See Bartholomae, 
Petrosky (1993), Ways of Reading.
101 Carole A. Myscofski has summarised it as ‘a subversive approach to the off icial historical 
documents that one encounters from the early modern period. It entails using the documents 
contrary to the way they were designed and intended, to draw out materials, insights and 
understandings that the recorders never intended to preserve.’ See http://digitalcommons.iwu.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=teaching_excellence (accessed 9 March 2013). 
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of linguistic sensitivity. Generating data from multilingual sources poses a 
major risk to data interpretation. In addition to phonetic challenges, there 
are also specif ic political rhetoric and semantic problems due to concepts 
existing in one of the respective languages and not in another. This lexical 
shift from one language to the next leads to the historical development of 
asymmetrical perspectives.
Thanks to comparative studies, scholars are able to understand structural 
similarities and differences and to distinguish between the particular 
and the general. Manila offers a stage to analyse to what extent similar 
conditions for foreign trade in China, Japan, and Europe existed up until 
the end of the eighteenth century.102 The early f igure of global economic 
history Mark Elvin wrote a famous study on technological decline in the 
traditional Chinese textile industry that became the base argument for his 
path-breaking, high-level equilibrium trap theory on the non-occurrence 
of the industrial revolution in China in 1973. Talking about precisely 
this issue of cross-cultural difference, he states that ‘[a]t this point our 
analysis becomes more complicated, essentially because we are shifting 
from explaining what did happen to trying to explain what did not.103 Ac-
cordingly, I will also start by drawing a general picture in order to f ind out 
which institutions, ideologies, and structures were missing, both in Manila 
and in the political economies of the three pre-modern states.104 My study 
builds on a combination of external and internal explanations and on a 
comparative analysis that emphasises differences and ‘parallels’, to use 
Victor Lieberman’s term.105 This book seeks to understand Manila-related 
Michel Foucault (‘subjugated knowledges’) and Carlo Ginzburg also promoted similar methods. 
My own research benef its from their once revolutionary approaches.
102 This question is prominent in scholarly debates on ‘the great divergence’. Pomeranz (2000), 
Great Divergence, pp. 16-24; 225-263. There is a wider debate on China’s global economic integra-
tion, trade, and capital, dating back to Max Weber and Karl Marx. Leading f igures of the last 
decades include G. William Skinner in the 1960s, and Mark Elvin, Philip Huang, Peter Perdue, 
and R. Bin Wong from the 1970s until the present day. Most of these authors studied the rural 
sector; Felipe Fernández-Armesto regularly compares developments in China, Japan and Europe 
(Spain in particular) and classif ies them together: Fernández-Armesto (2001), Civilizations, 
pp. 402, 473.
103 Elvin (1996), ‘High Equilibrium Trap’, p. 33.
104 See e.g. Rueschemeyer, Mahoney (2005), ‘Comparative Social Analysis’, pp. 3-40; Marc Bloch 
has already promoted the comparative method for its usefulness to elaborate on contrasts and 
f ilter unifying principles from a multiplicity of circumstances. Bloch (1989), Feudal Society, vol. 1. 
105 Lieberman (2003, 2009), Strange Parallels, 2 vols. His seminal work is a study of the rise 
and the fall of state power in six different geographical regions, in which the author applied a 
comparative approach to discover historical connections across separate settings.
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cultural and economic developments as connected histories,106 while being 
sceptical about generalising interpretations. It is an attempt to challenge 
one-sided explanations of geographical contingencies or overemphasises 
on institutional explanations for the early modern world.107
A ‘connected histories’ approach provides the framework for the analysis 
of historical processes.108 In the case of early modern Manila, the develop-
ment of the f irst global market was a global process that was sustainable in 
a way that would have been impossible without interregional cooperation. 
Manifold contributions from different parties in China, Japan, and Spain 
created the characteristics of the Manila trade. Regular access to the Manila 
market led to far-reaching interregional encounters that consequently trig-
gered economic, cultural, and political changes in all three pre-modern 
states. In response to the 1980s post-colonial critique, the ‘connected 
histories’ approach pays attention to a variety of subjects involved in the 
historical process. Emphasising coexistence, parallels, and interconnections 
helps highlight the reciprocal process of interaction between the global and 
the local, or, the universal and the particular. In contrast to ‘exceptional-
ist’ interpretations of the historical paths taken by Europeans, Chinese, 
or Japanese, the all-encompassing framework of this book is influenced 
by Max Weber’s attempt to illustrate the historical development of social 
processes on a macro level in connection with local peculiarities.109 When 
Patrick O’Brien pleads that histories must no longer be written ‘within 
the parameters set by geopolitical competition for economic hegemony, 
backed by armed forces, among a succession of European states and cities, 
106 Eric Vanhaute has suggested two different paths for carrying out research in global history: 
make global comparisons or look at global connections. Vanhaute (2009), ‘Who Is Afraid of 
Global History?’, p. 31: ‘Human societies are interconnected on a systematic level, there exist 
large-scale units of analysis that condition historical developments’. De Vries (2008), Industrious 
Revolution, p. 4.
107 Regarding economic trends around 1600 I agree with Derek Massarella, who has argued that 
both Europe’s and East Asia’s contributions to long-distance trade have been misinterpreted. 
Massarella, ‘What Was Happening?’, http://www.casahistoria.com/happeningin1600.pdf (ac-
cessed 13 October 2013).
108 The methodological framework of ‘connected histories’ goes back to Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s 
manifesto for the study of connected history that became one of the leading directions in the 
study of global history. In that article he advocated focusing on the connectedness of different 
entities and areas aiming to get a broader view on early modern history. See Subrahmanyam 
(1997), ‘Connected Histories’, pp. 735-762. 
109 Despite his efforts to explain phenomena that were in his view uniquely European, such as 
capitalism or bureaucracy, Max Weber remained sceptical about large-scale generalisations in 
his systematic comparison of economic, political, and religious phenomena in different world 
civilisations. Turner (1993), Max Weber, pp. 26, 32.
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experiencing their own particular circles of rise, decline and revival’, he does 
so with good reason.110 The only way to overcome the barriers constructed 
with national history narratives and a strong focus on European competi-
tion as an ‘engine’ for change is by shifting one’s perspective to port cities as 
fluid centres of commerce that enabled exchange of all kinds of ideas. Both 
connected and comparative histories show that demographic and economic 
forces are undeniably linked with culture and are thus suitable approaches 
for an examination of Manila, where both Catholic and neo-Confucian 
morals were affected in everyday lives.111
For quite some time port cities were primarily studied within the frame-
work of urban history; in recent years, however, port cities have often been 
perceived as deus ex machina explanations for innovative developments 
or exceptional developments. Often being created by outside agency, they 
functioned as connectors, hubs, and motors of change within their own 
framework. Rather than being integrated into a country or region, port 
cities were often closer connected to each other by the merchants sojourn-
ing freely between them, than to a metropolis.112 Despite the popularity 
of the buzzword ‘port city’, satisfying def initions are ironically still rare. 
Studies on the history of port cities have primarily focused on processes 
and developments after 1600 and global trade held centre stage; but there is 
much more to look at. Historians have credited port cities for being centres 
of far-reaching autonomy, ethnic diversity with astonishing organisational 
and singular logistical requirements, which hosted expert communities.113 
Manila features Haneda Masashi’s (羽田正) broad port city characteristics 
as ‘important political centre’, ‘hub of regional economy’, and place ‘where 
new arts, ideas and technologies developed’.114 The oceans and sailing routes 
110 O’Brien (2001), ‘Introduction’, p. 7.
111 Cf. Mahoney, ‘Historical Comparative Analysis’, p.  9, http://www2.asanet.org/
sectionchs/09conf/mahoney.pdf (accessed 5 December 2012); Goldstone (1998), ‘Initial Condi-
tions’, pp. 829-845.
112 Konvitz (1978), Cities and the Sea, p. 31. He speaks of the early seventeenth century as the 
‘age of new port city’. This trend corresponds with the original conceptualisation of new port 
cities in Northern Europe and the classic examples of Amsterdam and London.
113 Parker (2010), Global Interactions, p. 136. Between 2005 and 2006 the Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 
歴史学研究会 published a trilogy on port cities called Shiriizu minatomachi no sekaishi (‘Port 
Cities in World History Series’) with research highlights in the f ield, including Murai (ed.) (2005), 
Minato machi no sekaishi; Fukasawa (2006), Minato machi no topogurafi; Haneda (ed.) (2006), 
Minato machi ni ikiru. Since 2013 the new series Ajia kaiiki ni kogidasu アジア海域に漕ぎだす 
(literally ‘Rowing beyond Asian Seascapes’ = Lectures on the East Asian Maritime World) edited 
by Kojima Tsuyoshi, has already produced f ive volumes. Contributions focus either on cultural, 
social, or political aspects of littoral cultures. 
114 Haneda (2009), ‘Introduction’ to Asian Port Cities, pp. 3-4.
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surrounding them were their strongest cultural, structural, and economic 
units, which is why port city communities’ evolution usually diverges from 
national history narratives.115
The theoretical framework has been inspired not only by the cultural-
linguistic and spatial turn in the social sciences but also by work on political 
consolidation, theories of state formation, empire building, and studies 
using post-modernist approaches on accommodation and appropriation. 
Employing these views to this project helped to replace conservative views 
maintaining that East Asian states were backwards, that the Spanish 
engaged in a rigid colonial enterprise in the East, and that the sixteenth-
century Asian maritime world can be exhaustively explained with narra-
tives of aggression and response. An actor-centred approach sensitive to 
the complex interactions within juxtaposed networks of interactions is of 
further interest for studying ‘triangular’ relations.116 Researchers using the 
network approach have stressed the specif ic nature of maritime merchants 
and the various types of collaborations and partnerships based on distinc-
tive, non-hierarchical relationships.117
Before moving on to the f irst chapter, a few clarifying comments will be 
necessary. The spelling ‘South East Asia’ is used to indicate that the term 
both covers regions in East and Southeast Asia. The Philippines, for instance, 
is a unique example. Being considered periphery or ‘rimlands’,118 Luzon 
stands in clear contrast to the core regions def ined by the powerful inter-
national forces of China, Japan, and Spain. The ‘Philippines’ themselves are 
a further problematic concept, being nothing else than a sixteenth-century 
115 Inhabitants of port cities and those of the hinterland undeniably differed. The earlier are 
sometimes classif ied as commercial communities while the latter are considered administrative 
society members. Paul Cohen distinguishes for late imperial China a littoral zone oriented 
towards foreign trade, where cosmopolitan ideas f lourished, and a vast interior (‘hinterland’) 
that was landlocked, agrarian, and Sino-centric. See Cohen (2003), China Unbound.
116 Trivellato (2002), ‘Jews of Leghorn’, pp. 59-89. Francesca Trivellato introduced an analytical 
use of network approach in her study of seagoing merchants. She advocates a micro-analytical 
approach to macro phenomena with the potential to narrow the gap between anthropological 
and economic historical understanding of merchant communities. Similar phenomena have 
been studied for trans- and cross-Pacif ic merchants. See Ardash Bonialian (2012), Pacífico 
hispanoamericano. He also concluded that Mexican merchants dominated the thriving com-
merce between Manila, Acapulco, and Callao, while Spain actively sought to limit commerce 
in the Pacif ic. 
117 Ribeiro da Silva, Antunes (2011), ‘Cross-cultural Entrepreneurship’, pp. 49-76.
118 Victor Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, def ines the rimlands as areas on the path 
to economic and political consolidation. 
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imperial Spanish construct. Strictly speaking there were no Philippines and 
no Filipinos before the arrival of the Spaniards.119
As for the concept of early modern or pre-modern states, Spain, China, 
and Japan represent advanced administrative and hegemonic entities with 
clear centralising foci, including elements of Weber’s modern state.120 In 
theory, violence was an indispensible means of political organisation. Other 
f itting attributes include territoriality, jurisdiction over population, sover-
eignty, legal personality, the ruling elite’s monopoly on foreign relations, 
and a compelling ideology. While sensitivity to the blurring lines between 
empire and state at that time cannot be harmful, one should perceive the 
Spanish Overseas Empire as a multinational composite monarchy with 
a variety of territories in which it employed f iscal military reforms and 
coercive exploitation.121 Agrarian Ming China projected power beyond its 
vast territorial borders, while post-Warring States Japan actively built a 
pre-modern state.122
Changes in South East Asia, which shifted parts of the Philippines into 
its proto-global age, include the arrival of the European trading nations, 
Japan’s appearance on the global stage, and the Ming-Qing transition, 
which meaningfully coincided with the ‘mid-seventeenth-century crisis 
in Southeast Asia’.123 The focus on the period between the 1560s to the 1640s 
opens up for revisiting the conceptual construct of ‘early modernity’, which 
differs from region to region,124 and has been criticised for its Eurocentric 
connotation.125 Despite his critique of the concept, Jack Goldstone, for 
instance, admits the existence of an ‘age of transition’ that manifested 
in economic and socio-political dualism within centralised, bureaucratic 
monarchies.126 Notions of ‘early modernity’ change, transformation, and 
increased mobility are not only all too obvious in encounters in Manila but 
119 For scholars’ ideas on the construction of this concept, see Legarda (2001), ‘Cultural Land-
marks’, pp. 43-44. At present, the view that colonialism has created the Philippines is generally 
accepted, i.e. Francia (2010).
120 See Darwin (2007), After Tamerlane, p. 23.
121 Darwin (2007), After Tamerlane, p. 27.
122 Yamamoto (ed.) (2003), Teikoku kenkyū.
123 For the mid-seventeenth-century crisis, see Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 2, p. 26. See also 
Rothermund (2009), ‘Krise des 17. Jahrhunderts’, p. 57. The period interestingly covers the peak 
decades (1580-1630) of the small ice age.
124 Goldstone (1998), ‘Problem’, pp. 249-284.
125 Lieberman (1999), ‘Transcending’, p. 2. He argues that using the term ‘early modern’ for Asian 
history implies a ‘degree of comparability to Europe’. He furthermore states the interrelatedness 
of the ‘age of commerce’ and ‘early modern’.
126 Goldstone (1998), ‘Problem’, p. 253.
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also reflect in the Spanish translation of ‘early modernity’ into ‘edad mod-
erna’ (1492/1500-1800). China and Japan started to apply this concept during 
the twentieth century. While Chinese historiography remained true to its 
own classical periodisation based on imperial dynasties, modern Japanese 
scholarship transposed date indications using traditional historical eras 
into the Western calendar and began applying Western historical periods.127 
Generally speaking, the pre-modern era in China is often said to begin with 
the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and in Japan usually with the establishment of 
Tokugawa rule in 1600.128 Similar to such ambiguities, the concept of Spain 
poses further terminological challenges: I am aware of the debates about 
whether Spain is a proper term to use for the power that reigned over Manila 
in that period, given that all matters of expansionism and colonialism in 
the New World were subject to the Crown of Castile. Nevertheless the term 
‘Spaña’ or ‘Hispaña’ is regularly found in contemporary sources. For the 
sake of simplicity, the terms ‘Spanish’, ‘Castilian’ or ‘overseas Spanish’ will 
therefore be used interchangeably in this work.
This book is divided into four parts containing an introduction and eight 
chapters. In part I, the general context presented in the introduction and 
chapter 1 provides the readership with the comparative framework and 
relevant factors of Spain, China, and, Japan’s connected history in Manila. In 
part II, chapter 2 sets the stage of this study by giving a general introduction 
into the political and economic development of early Spanish reign over 
the Philippines and Manila and chapter 3 evaluates the different levels 
of Manila trade, in order to contribute to a better understanding of the 
complex state relations in the early modern period. In part III, chapter 4 
covers the extent to which shifts in governance and sovereignty changed 
self-conceptions in China and Japan as a consequence of increasing contact 
with ‘foreigners’ and how diplomacy and maritime trade came to play a 
critical role in East Asian quests for identity and polity building. Part III also 
includes specif ic case studies, presented in chapters 5 and 6, that evaluate 
the signif icance of bargaining between local and central levels for global 
representation. The two chapters show how global, central, and local factors 
co-existed and ‘controlled’ economic, political, and social developments. 
127 Lieberman (1993), ‘Local Integration’, pp. 475-572, discusses periodisation and the structural 
changes that def ined South East Asian space.
128 It is largely accepted that under the Tokugawa reign a stable political, social, and religious 
order was established, in particular compared to the preceding century. The time before 1570 
and 1600 may therefore also be considered a critical juncture before the beginning of the early 
modern era. See Lewis (2009), ‘Center and Periphery’, p. 431.
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In part IV, the two f inal chapters (7 and 8) examine how these connected 
histories influenced local history in Manila by pursuing what daily live in 
Manila looked like. Here, an actor-based approach contributes to a global 
social history for the sake of demystifying early modern ‘globality’. Turning 
global, if understood as responding to the unfamiliar, making efforts to 
integrate and to f ind peaceful solutions in a multiethnic setting, was mostly 
the result of bargaining on the spot.
A note on names and places
This research project raises some awkward issues concerning the transcrip-
tion of names and places. In general, names of people are given in the order 
of their own cultural practice. European names are given in the order f irst 
name followed by family name. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names 
are given in the common order of family name followed by f irst name. 
Place names are given in their English form, i.e. Luzon instead of Luzón 
and Tokyo instead of Tōkyō. Chinese or Japanese characters are indicated 
to avoid confusion with similar phonetic terms. Other foreign terms are 
transliterated using spelling as close as possible to the original, while in 
cases of doubt attention is drawn to the original characters.
1 The Comparative Framework
Comparing Political Economies
Encounters that led to triangular trade in the China Seas could either 
be told as fairy tale or horror story: Either, one that follows a story line 
of impoverished Chinese merchants and Japanese outcasts coming to 
riches and f inding their happy endings, or one featuring ruthless Spanish 
conquistadores killing innocent indigenous people, and fearless Japanese 
raiding the coasts while a decadent Ming emperor faced the decline of the 
great Chinese empire. This chapter aims to set faulty discourses straight by 
exploring political and economic similarities and differences at the dawn of 
Hispano-Sino-Japanese co-existence in Manila. A systematic comparison of 
foreign trade policies and ideology helps to outline these three pre-modern 
states’ involvement in the wider world. Late-sixteenth-century Spain, 
China and Japan represented highly advanced yet diverse entities with 
hegemonic aspirations. Economic and political gaps between them were 
less prominent than in later centuries.1 Hereditary rulers of all three states 
shared a fascination for the lure of glory, trusted in bureaucracy and were 
confident about their own superiority.2 In the realm of political economy, 
they would assert the right of state intervention and protectionism for the 
sake of increasing profits.3
The very existence of such similarities between disparate nations when 
they were f irst coming into contact links this study to larger debates. When 
looking at their encounters in Manila in the sixteenth century, we may 
start wondering whether a ‘striking resemblance’ thesis is tenable, or if it 
were rather ‘striking difference’ that shaped experiences in Manila.4 For a 
1 Darwin (2007), After Tamerlane, p. 23.
2 Parsons (2010), Rule of Empires, p. 4; Burbank, Cooper (2010), Empires in World History.
3 I here endorse Adam Smith’s classic def inition that describes political economy as ‘a branch 
of science of a statesman or legislator that proposes to enrich both people and the sovereign’, 
Smith (1981), Wealth of Nations, pp. 678-679.
4 For several reasons this approach can even be seen as marginally linked to the debates sur-
rounding the so-called great divergence. Pomeranz (2000), Great Divergence, pp. 16-24; 225-263. 
For Japan and the Great Divergence, see Sugihara (2005), Japan, China. See also Shimada (2006), 
‘Kinsei nihon keizai’, pp. 63-87. One explanation given for Japan’s extraordinary development 
is based on differences in consumption patterns that triggered the ‘industrious revolution’. A 
term coined by Hayami Akira and promoted in Western-language scholarship by Jan de Vries, 
it explains industrial growth and development in regions with a scarcity of natural resources. 
See De Vries (2008), Industrious Revolution.
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better understanding of both complementary and contrary dynamics this 
chapter examines the background of the encounters between Habsburg 
Spain,5 late Ming (明) China and Azuchi-Momoyama (安土桃山)/early 
Tokugawa (徳川) Japan. Because the Spanish Overseas Empire was the 
off icial ruling power of the Philippines and provided the most active input 
for connections in the period discussed, the comparison will begin with an 
analysis of its power structure.
The Spanish Overseas Empire
In order to fulfil a glorious scheme of turning sixteenth-century Spain into a 
global power, Philip II relied heavily on the legacy of his ancestors, the Catho-
lic Monarchs and Charles I (of Spain; also Holy Roman Emperor Charles V). 
Since the end of the f ifteenth century, the pursuit of political agendas in and 
outside Europe had rested upon mutually beneficial agreements with the 
Pope, business deals with German bankers, and a well-funded diplomatic 
service.6 With their nuptial union in 1469 in Valladolid, Isabel I of Castile 
and Ferdinand II of Aragón consolidated power on the peninsula by creat-
ing a composite monarchy. The monarquía compuesta included kingdoms 
and seigneurial lands in the Castilian-Aragonese realm on the Iberian 
Peninsula; Italian satellites such as Naples, Sicily and Milan; the Southern 
Netherlands; maritime outposts Ceuta, Tripoli, and the Canary Islands, and 
after 1492 the newly discovered colonies in the Atlantic and Pacif ic.7 The 
monarquía compuesta has often been labelled the best-organised monarchy 
in Europe due to its bureaucratic structures and tremendous network of 
hierarchical administration. Complex institutions helped to keep the huge 
entity of the Spanish empire functioning. Parts of Castilian and Aragonese 
territorial policies were adapted to new administrative patterns that would 
later be adopted in the colonies.8 J.H. Elliott and others have stressed the 
heterogeneity of political players in Spain and her colonies: next to the 
Crown and the royal various councils, cities, nobilities, and other subjects 
5 As represented overseas and not as European territorial power.
6 Kamen (1986), Spain, 1469-1714, p. 129.
7 For different structures of exercising power in Castile and Aragon, see Ladero Quesada 
(1995), ‘Spain Circa 1492’, p. 123. For the conceptualisation of Iberian territorial empires in the 
Americas, see Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 5-7.
8 For Spanish juridical and economic institutions, see Yun-Casalilla (2004), Marte Contra 
Minerva.
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actively participated in ruling the Overseas Empire and negotiated complex 
and increasingly flexible modes of governing.9
The year 1492 heralded the high point of the Spanish Overseas Empire, 
when after the conquest of the last moro bastion in Granada and the expul-
sion of the Jews, Genoese seafarer Christopher Columbus ‘discovered’ the 
Caribbean for Europe under the f lag of the Catholic Kings. Before long, 
military force turned large parts of the American continents, including the 
empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, into Spanish colonial territories. After 
founding the Spanish viceroyalties of New Spain (Mexico; 1521) and Peru 
(1542), establishing permanent power in Asia in 1565, the Overseas Empire 
reached its territorial pinnacle, which in turn caused unavoidable economic 
struggles. Shortly thereafter, sixteenth-century Castilian policymakers 
were torn between colonial and European interests and tempted to spend 
American silver on religious and dynastic warfare. Philip II pursued his 
father’s hegemonic gambling with France over dominion in Italy, struggled 
with the Protestant Dutch and upheld dynastic traditions of f ighting the 
Muslims. The latter was understood a ‘primary task of a Christian prince’ 
and peaked in Spain’s joining forces with Venice and the Papacy in the 
Holy League against the Ottomans. The Battle of Lepanto in October 1571 
ended in an historical yet temporary defeat over the invincible marine of 
the Ottomans.10
The dynastic union with Portugal from 1580 (to 1640) provided further 
crucial momentum for Philip II’s strategy. Spanish politics in Asia and 
most efforts to designate a Spanish empire on which the sun never sets 
were hampered, however, by Philip II’s oath at the estates of the Cortes of 
Tomar in April 1581 expressing the intention that governance of the overseas 
territories would not be joined with that of the Castilian territories, and 
later agreements based on the Treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragoza 
(1529).11 Hence the Habsburg struggle to combine European and world power 
aspirations marked the entire 60 years of the Iberian Union. James Mahoney 
has noted that ‘empire building required staunch mercantilist policy, 
which made Spain a conquering power but ironically jeopardised long-run 
9 Elliot (2006), Empires of the Atlantic World.
10 Rodríguez-Salgado (1988), Changing Face, p. 1. For tensions with the Ottomans and other 
struggles to defend Spanish possessions in the Mediterranean, see Abulaf ia (2011), The Great 
Sea, pp. 446-457.
11 Parker (2010), Felipe II, pp. 720-729; 759: ‘Sol mihi semper lucet: el sol siempre brilla sobre 
mi’, Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, pp. 133, 153-155; Elliott (1989), Spain and Its World, pp. 7-9. See 
also Kamen (2003), Empire; Elliott (2006), Empires of the Atlantic World.
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accumulation in the Castilian economy’.12 Many historians conclude that 
Spain was in decline, pointing to economic loss due to too much hegemonic 
ambition, numerous state bankruptcies that occurred during the reign of 
the Casa de Austria and the beginning of the downturn in silver imports 
from the Americas in the seventeenth century.13 Needless to say, the concept 
of decline will always be a matter of perspective. After the death of Philip II 
serious socio-economic struggles complicated imperial policies and weak-
ened royal power. The reigns of his successors, the Austrias Menores, who 
were overshadowed by their powerful ministers (validos), such as the Duke 
of Lerma Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas (1552/53-1618) or Count-Duke 
of Olivares Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimental (1587-1645), stand for the crisis 
of the seventeenth century.14 While Henry Kamen famously advocates a 
backward Spain with no truly unif ied economy, which strongly depended 
on external supplies,15 recent scholarship has convincingly refuted this 
decline thesis by emphasising regional diversity. A relatively stable Iberian 
performance overseas and how well Spain played its part in the Manila 
system serve as a counter narrative to the fall of Habsburg Spain due to 
absolutist, interventionist and overly bureaucratic governance.16
The mechanism behind Spain’s political and economic decisions in over-
seas affairs founded upon the Gobierno Supremo y Universal de las Indias 
launched in 1536.17 In the process of building up an imperial administration, 
Spanish jurists and scholars drafted explanations to legitimise Spanish 
conquest and suzerainty over new territories. The Council of the Indies, 
launched in 1524 as Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias, enjoyed enormous 
12 Citing the work of economic historian Robert S. Smith, James Mahoney stresses that ‘the 
absence of … simple competition’ were the consequences of Spanish mercantilism. Cf. Mahoney 
(2003), ‘Colonialism’, p. 8.
13 Elliott (1963), Imperial Spain. Next to Henry Kamen, John Elliott has strongly influenced 
the wide acceptance of a decline of Spain beginning after the death of King Philip II. They argue 
that while the sixteenth century was the century of unif ication, social peace, and economic 
wealth thanks to the inflow of American silver, the seventeenth century was shaken by revolts, 
loss of central power, and inflation as the Spanish fell behind the Dutch and English in terms 
of military and hegemonic power.
14 Validos describe royal favourites who took the position of decision-making ministers during 
the reigns of Philip III and Philip IV. On the history and political impact of validos, see Brockliss, 
Elliott (eds) (1999), World of the Favourite; Vaca de Osma (1997), Nobles e Innobles Validos; Williams 
(2006), Great Favourite, pp. 54-78. For a broad discussion on the general crisis of the seventeenth 
century due to climate change and wars, see Parker (2013), Global Crisis.
15 Kamen (1971), Iron Century, p. 291; Elliott (1961), ‘The Decline of Spain’, p. 62. 
16 Phillips (2007), ‘Organization of Oceanic Empires’, p. 72. 
17 Lockhart, Schwartz (1989), Early Latin America.
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influence in overseas affairs.18 As a bureaucratic advisory board it was part 
of the colonial government separated from the King, whose constitutional 
prerogative was to dismiss initiatives put forward by council members.19 
Together with the right to elect new off icials and to create most of the laws 
for the Americas, the Consejo’s political power rested on its almost exclusive 
control of communication channels between the motherland and distant 
territories. Although hardly ever setting foot on colonial territory, members 
(eight in 1609) of the Consejo de Indias also acted as spokesmen for the colo-
nies presenting their issues regarding administrative and judicial accounts 
at the court.20 Understandably, communication was the biggest enemy of 
the system, with many intermediaries between the highest authority and 
the rather independent executive institutions of royal jurisdiction at the 
local level in the colonies.21 Research has also shown that institutions and 
laws that developed over centuries were often resistant to innovation.22 In 
later years, the most striking feature of the supposedly eff icient Spanish 
administration was the creation of specif ic juntas during the rise of the 
so-called letrados, influential advisors with valuable knowledge or skills 
whose work seemed to make previous administrative institutions obsolete.23 
Despite the competitive nature of Spanish colonial administration, Henry 
Kamen concluded that direct control was virtually absent and control was 
only possible through a set of compromises: ‘The world’s greatest empire of 
sixteenth century, consequently, owed its survival to the virtual absence 
of direct control.’24
The general concept of governing the Indies was strongly linked to the 
Christian gospel and its Catholic interpretation, which can be seen in the 
rapid extension of the ideas of the Reconquista in the new territories. The 
dual efforts of colonisation and evangelisation were sanctioned by a bind-
ing papal decree that ensured them support and benevolence in several 
other imperial matters. This religiously motivated concept of governance, 
18 For a more detailed description, see Barrientos Grandon (2004), Gobierno, pp. 105; 108-111. 
Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 142; Burkholder, Johnson (2001), Colonial Latin America, p. 81.
19 Phillips (2007), ‘Organization’, p. 72.
20 Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 142.
21 Lamikiz (2010), Trade and Trust, p. 97. According to a note on the infrastructure for long-
distance communication, off icial mail (avisos) packet boats existed from 1525. They travelled 
between Cartagena, Portobelo, Veracruz, and Havana, but on a very irregular basis. For colonial 
administration, see Barrientos Grandon (2004), Gobierno, pp. 67-70.
22 Yun-Casalilla (2004), Marte contra Minerva, pp. 405-407.
23 For the history of letrados, who held the Spanish empire together, and the increase in the 
number of universities for their education and training, see Elliott (1989), Spain and Its World, 16.
24 Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 142.
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widely known as Patronato Real, dated back to the Catholic Kings, who were 
entrusted to the defence of Catholicism within their realm my means of the 
Inquisition of Pope Sixtus IV in 1476. The same remit was later extended to 
the New World in 1493 by the papal bulls Donación Apostólica and Eximiae 
Devotionis of Alexander VI, a Spaniard who had issued a series of bulls 
aiming at extending the power of the Catholic Monarchs. The famous bulls 
Inter Caetera and Dudum Siquidem, or Bulls of Donation of 1493, extended 
the Spanish influence to all new territories that lay west of an imaginary 
line of demarcation a hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde 
Islands.25 The Portuguese, fearing Spanish intrusion in the South Atlantic, 
called for an adaptation of the terms of these bulls which resulted in the 
famous Treaty of Tordesillas 1494 that divided the world theoretically 370 
leagues (1770 km) west of the Cape Verde Islands.26 The treaty was an attempt 
to create two separate spheres of influence following the discoveries of the 
Americas of 1492. It assured the Portuguese Crown a ‘direct’ route to India 
as well as active participation in America by way of Brazil, which Pedro 
Álvares Cabral discovered for King Manuel I in 1500, and encouraged the 
Castilians to expand via the Antilles to the American mainland. Practically, 
all Spanish overseas possessions enjoyed legitimisation by the Pope.27 As 
a consequence, the church and religious orders came to play a signif icant 
role in social matters as well as the execution of power.28 At times they col-
laborated out of mutual interest, at other times church and civil authorities 
were f ierce opponents (but also mutual correctives). In the Philippines, the 
latter case seemed to be more common.
Institutional diversity characterised the political economy of the over-
stretched Spanish Overseas Empire.29 The Habsburg rulers transferred 
a centralised institutional framework, previously tested within various 
political units of the composite monarchy, to the colonies, and produced 
a constant demand for sophisticated operatives well trained in the latest 
administrative necessities.30 The Viceroy was head of a colonial macro 
25 Parry (1990), Seaborne Empire, pp. 22-23.
26 The treaty was signed on 7  June 1494 in Tordesillas near Valladolid after Christopher 
Columbus had returned from the West Indies. Pope Julius II (1443-1513) ratif ied it in 1506. For a 
transcription of the original, see Fonseca, Asencio (eds) (1995), Corpus Documental, pp. 158-167.
27 Steinberg (2001), Social Construction of the Ocean, pp. 79-86.
28 Barrientos Grandon (2004), Gobierno, p. 75. It included the right to extract revenue of the 
tenth of which one-half should be used for ecclesiastical matters and the other for the Real 
Hacienda.
29 For further information, see Yun-Casalilla (2009), ‘Institutions’, p. 5.
30 Elliott (1989), Spain and Its World, p. 14; Mahoney (2010), Colonialism, p. 38.
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unit. This office was f irst established in 1535 in New Spain (present day Mes-
oamerica); a viceroyalty followed in Peru in 1542. Viceregal duties in theory 
included supervising the colonial administration, controlling the treasury 
and dispensing royal patronage.31 Colonial bureaucratic and military career 
paths, for which social origin and ethnic background were secondary ac-
cording to Bartolomé Yun, created knowledge of unprecedented value.32
For the organisation of colonial and maritime matters back in Spain, the 
Casa de Contratación (House of Trade), founded in 1503 by royal decree, 
played a key role. It controlled all commerce in the new territories and 
administration of transcontinental trade. Before long, the Casa de Con-
tratación became integrated in the Council of the Indies, which virtually 
monopolised trade between Spain and America until the 1650s. This meant 
that the Spanish Crown took a supervisory rather than active role in mari-
time trade.33 At the same time, this monopoly hindered private initiatives. 
Taking measures to increase the profitability of overseas trade and reacting 
to changing supply and demand became increasingly challenging.34
A crucial point considering the exceptional character of the Spanish 
colonial concept is that overseas politics followed a territorial model that 
brought along structural problems.35 Hence, the prime interest lay in 
subduing large territories to Spanish suzerainty by employing a combined 
agenda of tax collection and evangelisation of indigenous populations, 
followed by resource exploitation and implementation of Hispanic cul-
tural values. Unlike the English and Dutch, whose seventeenth-century 
overseas enterprises are nowadays described as trading-post empires, the 
Spanish aspired to establish political dominance.36 In light of the extreme 
distances and remoteness within the empire, the question of how Spain 
administered power over areas such as the Philippines or Rio de la Plata 
has with good reason fascinated generations of researchers. The answer is 
that policymaking displayed a high degree of compromise and was often 
the result of good bargaining skills among different colonial authorities 
31 Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 142. In the eighteenth century the Viceroyalties of New 
Granada and Rio de la Plata were added as administrative bodies of the Americas. 
32 Yun-Casalilla (2004), Marte contra Minerva, pp. 114-128.
33 For the different levels of control of the Spanish Atlantic, see Macleod (1984), ‘Spain and 
America’, pp. 350-351.
34 This stands in sharp contrast to merchants of chartered companies, who outsmarted the 
Spaniards in overseas trade in the seventeenth century. 
35 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper speak of the integration of ‘extra-European territories 
and non-European peoples’ into the monarchy. Burbank, Cooper (2010), Empires in World History, 
p. 128.
36 For a clear def inition, see Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 137-144.
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and lengthy negotiations between the metropolis in Spain and colonial 
representatives and settlers.37 Over the past years, several scholars have 
fought heated debates that elaborated on a thesis of a decentred Spanish 
empire where compromise won over absolutism.38 For seventeenth-century 
Spain, internal and European agendas naturally required more urgency 
than those of colonies thousands of sea miles away.39 A similar pattern 
determined the political economy of the Overseas Empire: metropolitan 
interest came f irst.
Overseas Colonies and the Spanish Political Economy
The Iberian strategy to exhaust the new territories’ resources by any possible 
means earned the Spanish and Portuguese colonial trade the unflattering 
description ‘exploitative trading system’.40 In essence, conquerors, colonial 
off icials and merchants robbed and shipped what seemed lucrative and 
suitable as quinto real (royal f ifth) back to the Crown. The discovery of 
enormously rich silver stocks in Mexican mines (Zacatecas and Guanajuato) 
and the veins of Potosí (Cerro Rico) in the Viceroyalty of New Castile in 
1545, together with the introduction of mercury for amalgamation in the 
1560s, increased the speed and prof itability of Spanish silver production 
tremendously.41 Mass production of silver moreover allowed seaborne trade 
with the Philippines.42 Within a few decades, the peso de ocho reales, coins 
minted in Peru and Mexico, became a globally recognised currency and 
37 Lockart, Schwartz (1995), Early Latin America, p. 127. For a lively introduction into the modi 
vivendi of the Spanish project overseas, see a compilation by Schmitt (ed.) (2008), Indienfahrer 
2, p. 7. For the different implications of early modern colonialism, see Raman (2001), Framing 
‘India’, p. 5, where the author described the particular relationships between the colonised 
and the centre and stressed that new territory was not directly incorporated into the colonial 
empire.
38 Grafe, Irigoin (2008), ‘Bargaining for Absolutism, pp. 173-209. Grafe and Irigoin refute 
Douglas North’s model of inferior economic development due to exploitation and regulation 
by the Crown by showing that the administration of the Spanish Empire was anything but 
centralised or absolutist, but rather the product of major negotiations between different political 
actors. See also Marichal (2008), ‘Rethinking Negotiation’, pp. 211-218. 
39 For the conflicts with Catalonia, see Yun-Casalilla (2004), Marte Contra Minerva, pp. 364-376.
40 De Vries (1976), Economy of Europe, p. 116.
41 What was of further advantage to the Crown was its monopoly on mercury resources in 
Spain and Peru; see Burkholder, Johnson (2001), Colonial Latin America, p. 135.
42 The American silver trade was the undisputed backbone of the entire Spanish oceanic trade 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Marichal (2006), ‘Spanish-American Silver Peso’, 
pp. 25-52.
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enabled rapid commercial expansion.43 Even so, Spanish maritime trade 
followed a simple reciprocal pattern of annual shipments of American silver 
to the Spanish mainland and the monopolised export of manufactured 
European goods to the overseas colonies.44 Organising trade with the Indies 
in a mercantilist f leet system known as carrera de Indias, helped to pre-
serve the illusion of control.45 Regulations included that foreign ships were 
prohibited from entering colonial ports even though the metropolis could 
not completely satisfy consumer demands in the vast Overseas Empire.46 
Regular commercial traff ic was carried out between f ixed harbours in the 
Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and Seville under the supervision of the Casa 
de Contratación. Its agents were in charge of securing commercial exchange, 
providing access to agricultural products from a wealthy hinterland, offer-
ing suff icient services for ships on the Guadalquivir, as well as f inancial 
services.47 The Spanish trans-Atlantic trade, which exceeded the Portuguese 
trade with the Indies in scale and value, kept foreign merchants out despite 
constant struggle to satisfy the needs of a growing colonial market.48
Thus consumer behaviour could not develop freely nor was the mercan-
tile class always able to respond to market changes. Telling indications for 
loopholes in mercantilist state interventionism are reactions in Spain. In 
the 1620s, the Castilian protectionist movement campaigned vigorously for 
the exclusion of Portuguese merchants from the commanding positions 
they had won for themselves in the economic life of both Spanish America 
43 Alonso Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2008), ‘El Lago Español’, pp. 47-64.
44 Parry (1990), Seaborne Empire, pp. 105-110.
45 Fisher (1997), Economic Aspects, pp. 43-68; McAlister (1984), Spain & Portugal, p. 426, sum-
marises regulations of the f leet system including ‘limiting its ports of call; the restraints placed 
on trade between the Indies and Manila and between Mexico and Peru; the expansion of the 
function of the House of Trade and the Merchant Guild of Seville; the chartering of merchant 
guilds in Mexico City and Lima; the limitations placed on the production of silk, olives, wine, 
and textiles in America; and the establishment of royal and private monopolies for the sale of 
essential monopolies’. For the f inancial issues of the Spanish Empire, see Barrientos Grandon 
(2004), Gobierno, pp. 131-147; and on hacienda: pp. 183-194.
46 John Lynch also stresses the high number of regulations in sixteenth-century Spanish 
protectionism. Lynch (1992), Hispanic World in Crisis.
47 Parry (1990), Seaborne Empire, p. 102.
48 Despite obvious loopholes, historians even speak of a ‘completely mercantilist Hispanic 
model’. Cf. Picazo Muntaner (2012), ‘Ports, Trade and Networks’, p. 256. For a concise description 
of Spanish-American mercantilism, see Mahoney (2003), Colonialism, pp. 36-44; For the Spanish 
silver trade and the role of Seville, see Cipolla (1998), Conquistadores, Piratas y Mercaderes. 
Regina Grafe has recently debunked the narrative of early modern Spain as a backward state. 
She argues that Spain did not lack intellectual initiatives for economic or administrative reforms. 
See Grafe (2014), ‘Polycentric States’, pp. 241-267. 
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(including Peru and the Philippines) and the Iberian Peninsula.49 These 
Portuguese merchants controlled a network with other private foreign 
merchants (residing in Seville and later in Cadiz) participating in Atlantic 
trade, whose number would increase signif icantly during the eighteenth 
century with the establishment of a consulado de cargadores, a body of 
registered merchants entitled to load their goods on ships to Spanish 
America.50 Rivalry and intrigues with powerful guilds lobbying in order to 
secure income for the Crown and overseas Spanish citizens in influential 
positions in the colonies were unavoidable.51
The narrative of decline mentioned earlier has further roots in naval 
developments, in the sense that Spain enjoyed a reputation of a great 
seafaring nation for more than a century before stagnation and losses in 
naval battles evoked mischievous critics.52 The prime example of Spain’s 
dire straights was the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English naval 
forces in 1588. Causes and consequences have been revisited in recent years 
and several historians now disagree with the general decline narrative, 
since Spanish sea power recovered within a year after the lost sea battle.53 
Moreover the royal government invested in competitive shipping by ‘defin-
ing ship sizes, configurations, and operating norms for voyages between 
Spain and America’ in 1607, 1613, and 1618.54 However success also depended 
on the effort of many individual groups – such as sailors, miners, and mule 
drivers who operated between the main American ports of Veracruz in 
Mexico and Portobelo in Panama, and the colonial centres. Shipping was 
furthermore determined by the weather: while rainfalls were crucial for the 
silver mining process, favourable winds were important for a safe journey 
back to Europe.55 In Asia, being inconsiderate of monsoons or typhoons 
could easily spell disaster.
Once the silver f lows from the Americas drained off to other parts of 
Europe, state bankruptcies recurred. Moreover manpower decreased in 
traditionally productive areas such as central Castile and Andalusia, causing 
49 Cf. Pellicer de Ossau (1640), Comercio Impedido.
50 Crespo Solana (2006), ‘Iberian Peninsula’, pp. 6-8; Lamikiz refers to the system as Colbertian 
model of mercantilism; Lamikiz (2010), Trade and Trust, pp. 14-16.
51 Lamikiz (2010), Trade and Trust, p. 50.
52 Goodman (1997), Spanish Naval Power; See also Grafe (2011), ‘Strange Tale’, pp. 81-116.
53 Edelmayer (2009), Philipp II, pp. 254-257. Referring to Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Edelmayer 
has shown convincingly that it was not as much the military failure as it was the lost propaganda 
battle that harmed the image of the Spaniards.
54 Phillips (2007), ‘Organization’, p. 73.
55 For a good account of the general facts on the Atlantic trade, I refer to Macleod (1984), ‘Spain 
and America’, pp. 341-388.
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previous mercantile adventures to take a toll on a weakened economy.56 
This period, commonly referred to as the ‘seventeenth-century crisis’, was 
characterised by economic and demographic stagnation (as forces imped-
ing sovereignty), rebellions, and a crisis of absolutism.57 Contemporaries 
in Spain were well aware of the recession. The arbitristas (projectors), a 
group of scholars or ‘economic projectors and moralists’,58 dwelt on how to 
solve Spain’s overall crisis with numerous suggestions for reform during 
f irst decades after the reign of Philip II.59 Yet neither their suggestions nor 
recommendations from the Junta de Reformacíon, established in 1623, af-
fected the privileged society in a time when increased revenue extraction 
weakened the rural society even further and ultimately jeopardised the 
whole economy on the peninsula.60 Simultaneously, losses were feared 
and felt in all Spanish territories and the gap between a small wealthy 
merchant class and the rest of the population widened throughout the 
entire Overseas Empire.61
Repositioning in an Emerging Global World: European Conflicts in an 
Overseas Context
What exacerbated the Crown’s poor economic standing, aside from the high 
costs of hegemonic policies, was domestic friction deriving from unsolved 
problems on the Iberian Peninsula, such as the repression of the Catalans 
in 1578, and continuous disputes with Barcelona’s elite. With regard to 
socially motivated conflicts in Andalusia, it is important to remember 
that the economically strong parts of the former Emirate of Granada were 
only integrated into the Catholic monarchy a few decades before. Religious 
56 This paragraph is based on De Vries (1976), Economy of Europe, pp. 27-28. State bankruptcies 
under Philip II and Philip III occurred in 1557, 1560, 1576, 1596, and 1607. See Braudel (1995), 
Mediterranean, vol. 1, pp. 505-512.
57 For a discussion, see Parker (2001), The World Is Not Enough; and more recently Global Crisis 
(2013) by the same author. 
58 García Sanz (1998), ‘Contexto Económico’, pp. 17-42. Elliott (2009), Spain, Europe and the 
Wider World, p. 140; Navarrete (1792), Conservación.
59 For rational scripts of the arbitristas and a history of the movement, see Bonney (1995), ‘Early 
Modern Theories’, pp. 162-230. They particularly criticised the selling of off ices, a policy that was 
also common in the Philippines. For an overview of Spanish intellectual life in the seventeenth 
century, see Robbins (2007), Arts of Perception. Some arbitristas, such as Juan Antonio de Vera 
y Zuñiga y Figuera de Roca also tackled the state of Spanish diplomatic relations of the time.
60 Spanish literature often speaks of a decadent monarchy for the time of growing influence 
of validos.
61 On illusion and disillusionment of the Spanish in the Indies, see Elliot (2009), Spain, Europe 
and the Wider World, p. 142.
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intolerance, which dated back to post-Reconquista Christian laws, further 
jeopardised domestic stability.62 Muslim converts were believed to pose 
a serious threat to national security. They were widely considered a ‘f ifth 
column’ and potential allies of the Ottomans. Although pressure from the 
Eastern Mediterranean could be banished temporarily in 1571, Catholic 
Spain had just lost an ideological and political battle against the Protes-
tants in the Low Countries in an extremely revenue-consuming agenda. 
Maintaining empire-wide security, against the background of ideological 
and political struggles with Muslims and Protestants, whilst at its pinnacle 
as an imperial power after 1580 resulted in Philip II’s foreign policy being 
deliberative and defensive.63
The English, French, and Dutch started to attack Spanish possessions in 
the Americas by the end of the sixteenth century. The Protestant Dutch and 
English, in particular, were determined to break the Iberian monopoly in the 
Atlantic trade, if necessary by extending systematic assaults to the Pacif ic 
and ultimately the Asian arena.64 The Caribbean was by nature vulnerable 
to foreign intrusion, and Northern European privateers became a potential 
threat to all ships passing there.65 Aggression continued even after European 
conflicts had off icially been settled in separate peace treaties and truces.66 
On his Atlantic voyages, Francis Drake (1540-1596) plundered the Spanish 
settlement of Cartagena de India, from where the silver fleets usually started 
their journey across the Atlantic, in 1572 and 1586; in the following year (1587) 
Thomas Cavendish (1555-1592) seized the Manila Galleon Santa Ana off Cabo 
San Lucas in Baja California/Mexico.67 Maritime attacks experienced an 
upsurge in the 1620s when the Dutch West Indies Company in the Antilles 
and other European powers established hegemony over vast territories in 
62 Including uprisings in Aragon between 1580 and 1590 and waves of famine in Valencia 
when the rural population was hit by the breakdown of the irrigation system after Philip III had 
decreed the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609-1614. See Pérez (2007), Aragón en la Monarquía 
de Felipe II; Lomas Cortés (2008), Expulsión de los Moriscos. At the same time, the composite 
empire was shaken by the 80 years’ war with the Netherlands following the revolt of the Dutch 
beginning in 1568 of an autonomy-seeking population that made the overseas routes of the 
Iberians extremely vulnerable after 1600.
63 Kamen (2005), Spain, 1469-1714, pp. 135; 161-168.
64 Parthesius (2010), Dutch Ships; Gaastra (2003), Dutch East India Company, pp. 13-40; Parry 
(1990), Seaborne Empire, pp. 225-238; 273-293; Schmidt (2009), ‘Dutch Atlantic’, pp. 163-190.
65 Schmidt (2009), ‘Dutch Atlantic’, pp. 163-190.
66 For a detailed description of the events in the Atlantic and political reactions in Europe, 
see Parry (1990), Seaborne Empire, pp. 254-256.
67 Ladero Quesada (2008), Indias de Castilla.
tHe CoMPArAtIve FrAMework 55
the Caribbean Rim and North America.68 Similar developments in the China 
Seas will be discussed separately in the following chapters.
Ming China
Giving a brief introduction into the main factors influencing the foreign 
policy of the Middle Kingdom during the reign of the Ming dynasty – nowa-
days considered the last stage of a strong Chinese empire – is a diff icult 
undertaking, for one because of simplistic failure narratives fed by imperial 
myths and Cold War-era historiographic constructs. The universal Middle 
Kingdom with its pyramid-like bureaucratic organisation of vast territory 
existed with minor changes since the end of the Warring States period and 
the foundation of the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE). Its long history of political 
stability has encouraged the view of an ethnically and culturally homog-
enous empire. Since the nineteenth century it has been popular to attribute 
the beginning of decline (of universal rule and economic independence) that 
would ultimately hit rock bottom during the reign of the Qing (清, 1644-1911) 
to the Ming (1368-1644) period. More recent scholarship has challenged such 
views by highlighting China’s multiple identities as the interplay of various 
actors co-existing in relative social stability.69 From the early seventeenth 
century onwards, complex relations between the late imperial state (the 
Emperor and his court eunuchs, off icials in the bureaucracy) and gentry 
elites in (coastal) cities had created a public sphere for negotiation and 
compromise. In fact, unique political and social compromises for the sake 
of a certain degree of local autonomy between the imperial dynasties and 
the elites date back as far as the Song dynasty (960-1279).70
Geographically far-reaching economic and diplomatic relations and 
cultural guidance stand in sharp contrast to the notion of a conservative, 
despotic and inflexible agrarian state burdened by a protectionist economy, 
68 For an overview of Spanish involvement in sea battles and economic warfare, see McAlister 
(1984), Spain and Portugal, pp. 429-430; Grafe (2011), ‘Strange Tale’, pp. 86-87; Major strikes 
included the Anglo-Dutch attack on Cadiz of 1625 and the Dutch admiral Piet Heyn capturing 
the silver f leet in 1628.
69 See Kishimoto (2012), Chiiki shakairon, pp. 3-15. 
70 Elman (2002), ‘Rethinking’, p. 539; Wakeman (1998), ‘Boundaries of the Public Sphere’, 
pp. 167-189. Wakeman argues in favour of an ever-shifting public sphere in the late Ming period as 
an arena between 官 guan (bureaucratic/off icial) and 公 gong (public) encouraged by economic 
changes in China during the late 1500s following the influx of American silver and the com-
mercialisation of the coastal economy.
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without serious maritime agendas, and with little interest in the world 
beyond its vaguely defined borders.71 In a similar fashion as Habsburg Spain, 
narratives on Ming China also have to be put into the perspective of the 
Manila system. Towards the end of the dynasty, growing private maritime 
trade in the South East Asian macro area challenged China’s traditional 
foreign exchange patterns. When Asian trading groups established new 
markets more or less at the same time as certain European regions and 
Japan became globally integrated, off icial China was only able to react 
slowly, if at all.72
The Ming rulers inherited political institutions from former dynasties, 
such as the Yuan dynasty’s elaborate administrative systems. They also 
adopted the geographic units of the Mongols and adapted them to their 
own needs: a hierarchical regional government subdivided into provinces, 
prefectures and sub-prefectures that split up into counties governed by 
individual magistrates.73 Another heritage from former dynasties was 
social stratif ication in four occupations, or classes, based on neo-Confucian 
values.74 The state ideology was not without contradiction: Although all 
members of society should have been equal, the hierarchical social class 
structure with different rules for different classes was prejudiced against 
certain professional groups such as merchants, who were considered a 
non-productive class.75 The highest class of intellectuals (師, ch. shi) served 
as state off icials and pulled the strings in court bureaucracy, and enjoyed 
economical advantages as major landlords, which differentiated them 
from off icials (官, ch. guan) and people (民, ch. min). Outside traditional 
structures of elite culture, different actors from various regions managed 
to successfully control sea lanes, coasts and maritime trade networks, often 
embodying the ambivalence of the local/central, official/unofficial, or mari-
time/domestic. The Emperor, in contrast, eagerly adopted older governing 
concepts, regarding his power as absolute, unlike European monarchs who 
negotiated it to some extent with those they ruled.
In light of China’s technological advancement and accomplishments in 
mastering the sea, generations of historians wondered why the Iberians 
71 For a discussion of the frontier debate, see Crossley (ed.) (2006), Empire at the Margins. 
72 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, pp. 201-238; For Chinese state consolidation in frontier 
regions, see Miles (2008), ‘Imperial Discourse’, pp. 99-136. For the maritime frontier in particular: 
pp. 112-117.
73 For more details, see Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, pp. 39-41.
74 Mote (1999), Imperial China, pp. 757-761.
75 For a detailed description, see Atwell (1998), ‘Ming China and the Emerging World Economy’, 
pp. 376-416.
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explored America and not technically advanced China. What is more, 
pioneering Chinese inventions (including the compass and gunpowder) 
would become symbols of Iberian expansionism,76 following the Ming 
decision to withdraw from maritime enterprises after the seven great voy-
ages of the Chinese explorer Zheng He between 1405 and 1433. During the 
progressive maritime reign of Emperor Yongle (永楽, r. 1398-1424), so-called 
treasure fleets successfully sailed distances of similar length to those of 
Iberian sailors and their logistic achievements exceeded those of European 
seafaring projects by far.77 Nonetheless, the benefits of these expeditions 
would prove unsustainable and recruiting new tributary trade partners 
did not achieve the expected results.78 As for the question why technologi-
cally advanced China did not launch its own industrial revolution, a broad 
stagnation during the Ming was held accountable. While many scholars see 
a repressive effect in this sudden withdrawal from the sea, a second line of 
explanation employs Mark Elvin’s ‘high-level equilibrium’ trap thesis. Mark 
Elvin convincingly showed that it was China’s very wealth and stability that 
impeded further commercial, economic and technological development 
after an economic revolution had already occurred under the Southern 
Song (1127-1279).79
Off icial Chinese anti-maritime attitudes manifested in the Ming’s retreat 
within China’s territorial borders after the construction of the Forbidden 
City (1406-1420). With loosely def ined and constantly changing borders, 
defence forces became occupied with f ighting back the Mongols and the 
Vietnamese, which accelerated the complete withdrawal from maritime 
activities. External intervention ended in 1449 with a last border conflict 
between Burma and Shan. That year is commonly considered the turning 
point in foreign policies in the south. Thereafter an inwardly oriented Ming 
dynasty developed its court monopoly on foreign trade, which prohibited all 
76 Both David Landes and Eric Jones came to the conclusion that China lacked interest and 
capacity deriving from the idea of cultural superiority. See Landes (1998), Wealth and Poverty; 
Jones (2003), European Miracle.
77 The seven sponsored expeditions of Zheng He are often referred to as ‘Eunuch Sanbao’s 
Voyages to the Western Ocean, 1405-1433’ in popular history. They are also a proof of China’s 
detailed geographical knowledge at the time.
78 During these expeditions Chinese subjects acted as hegemon abroad: ‘During these voyages 
Zheng’s f leet subjugated a misbehaving Chinese enclave in Sumatra; intervened in a civil war in 
Java; invaded Sri Lanka and took its captured ruler to China; and wiped out bandits in Sumatra’. 
Cf. Mann (2011), 1493, p. 124.
79 See Elvin (1973), Pattern of the Chinese Past, pp. 137-172. For a further study see Deng (1999), 
Premodern Chinese Economy.
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private maritime exchange. While it is often claimed that piracy provoked 
such drastic steps, a new political-ideological raison d’état initiated by 
the f irst Ming Emperor probably played an equally decisive role here.80 
Considering private overseas trade a major risk to domestic stability, Ming 
China’s off icial foreign policies became strongly concerned with security.81 
As a passive geopolitical player, China prioritised national security over 
profits from maritime trade.82 Since from this perspective the sea presented 
problems, not opportunities, the state restricted dealing with maritime 
issues to a trickle. Barbarians were therefore to be dealt with far away from 
the centre.83 Speed in responding to border troubles and keeping foreign 
matters outside China’s political agenda were both of major importance 
to the court.
A certain notion of decline, precisely during the reign of Wanli (萬曆, r. 
1572-1620), caused by weak imperial leadership, decreasing rural revenue 
and disobedient court eunuchs, are believed to have had negative effects on 
late imperial rule.84 Ideologically, late Ming patronage of Buddhism is also 
believed to have affected economic and political decisions.85 Although the 
brisk population increase to 100-150 million people in 1650 spurred by the 
introduction of crops from the New World may well be considered a sign 
of prosperity, it primarily meant that imperial bureaucracy would soon 
lag behind.86 With the introduction of more eff icient taxation, the dynasty 
retreated gradually from local affairs and was replaced with a mediating 
gentry-landlord elite that was neither stagnant nor decadent.
In its own eyes, Ming China remained the centre of its own world, 
nourished by a centuries-old tradition of Confucian thought.87 The con-
cept of the ‘Middle Kingdom versus Barbarian states’, as self-proclaimed 
hegemony over everything under the sky (天下, ch. tian xia), and passive 
80 Schottenhammer (2009), ‘Vom Mongolischen’, pp. 370-373.
81 A report of the Ministry of War of the year 1604 states that South China’s coasts must be 
cleaned up from evil people, including private traders from Luzon. See Wade, MSL, http://epress.
nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3135 (accessed 14 March 2013).
82 Kang (2010), East Asia, pp. 110-112.
83 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 215.
84 Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, pp. 504-524; 576-622; Cohen (2000), East Asia, 
p. 221.
85 Brook (1997), ‘At the Margin’, pp. 161-181.
86 Perkins (1969), Agricultural Development, p. 216.
87 For the historiography on this phenomenon, see Huang (1988), ‘Lung-Ch’ing’, pp. 511-581. 
For contemporary scholarship dealing with the historiography on Imperial China’s worldviews, 
see Ge (2010), Zhai zi zhongguo, pp. 116-125.
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participation in external trade were the pillars of foreign affairs.88 China’s 
idea of the world outside its borders is understandable only against the 
Confucian background of tributary relations and formal acknowledg-
ment of the dynasty that was of extreme signif icance to the early Ming 
rulers. According to Wang Gungwu, historian of the Chinese diaspora, 
the ideological construct described above was the reason why Ming au-
thorities limited their efforts geographically.89 Tribute missions should 
ideally adhere to the classical pattern of one mission every three years 
for neighbouring countries and one mission every generation for tribute 
bearers from distant lands. Foreign relations were limited to exchange 
with tribute paying states, whose number increased and became a normal 
means of political interaction. In the course of the f ifteenth century, South 
East Asia increasingly sparked China’s interest and several new tributary 
relations were established.90 Two crucial doctrines determined the history 
of the dynasty: First, the non-interference clause of not attacking countries 
overseas, and second, the maxim that tribute trade should not be exploited 
for economic gain.91
Ming China’s Political Economy
Ming anti-maritime policies stood in sharp contrast to those of previous 
dynasties: The Mongols, for instance, allowed private traders to move 
freely along China’s coasts, before forcing their ever increasing number 
88 Fairbank (1980), ‘Changing Chinese Views’, p. 143; Hamashita Takeshi has demonstrated 
the complexity of Ming China’s integration despite the restricted off icial policies on foreign 
trade and self-imposed maritime bans. See Hamashita (2008), ‘China, East Asia and the Global 
Economy’, p. 18.
89 Wang (1998), ‘Ming Foreign Relations’, pp. 307-308; 311-313: ‘The overseas foreign countries 
like An-nan, Champa, Korea, Siam, Liu-ch’iu (Ryukyu), Western Oceans, Eastern Oceans (Japan) 
and the various small countries of the southern man (barbarians) were separated from us 
by mountains and seas and far away in a corner. Their lands would not produce enough for 
us to maintain them; their peoples would not usefully serve us if incorporated. If they were 
so unrealistic as to disturb our borders, it would be unfortunate for them. If they gave us no 
trouble and we moved our troops to f ight them unnecessarily, it would be unfortunate for us. 
I am concerned that future generations might abuse China’s wealth and power and covet the 
military glories of the moment to send armies into the f ield without reason and cause a loss of 
life.’ This rhetorically interesting quotation is a passage of the opening section of the ancestral 
injunctions.
90 For a concise summary of the scattered discourses of tributary trade, see Kang (2010), East 
Asia, pp. 11-13. Kang distinguished between the functional focus of Fairbank’s thesis and a 
symbolic one as in John E. Wills’s and Keith Taylor’s research.
91 Danjyō (2012), Eiraku tei.
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into government service and sending out diplomatic missions to invite 
foreign traders. In the thirteenth century, coastal ports such as Quanzhou 
(the ‘Zaitun’ of Marco Polo’s reports) – sometimes referred to as the starting 
point of the Maritime Silk Road – became a thriving harbour for spice trade 
and eventually a vibrant centre of trade with South East Asia.92 With the 
maritime trade proscription policy (海禁政策, ch. haijin zhengce) under 
Emperor Hongwu (洪武, r. 1368-1398), the Chinese state f irst sought to 
entirely replace private foreign trade with off icial government-controlled 
tribute trade in 1371. An imperial edict of 1436 banned the construction 
of ocean-going vessels and prohibited maritime activity under the threat 
of death, before the remaining records of Zheng He’s treasure fleet were 
destroyed in 1477.93 Foreign countries willing to trade with China were 
asked to send tribute embassies to the Ming court, where they then had to 
present themselves as subordinates paying tribute to the Ming Emperor.
Tributary trade was f irst and foremost a diplomatic act. Giving tribute 
was considered an act of submission. Its ideological importance expressed 
itself in the Ming Emperor’s formal investiture of local rulers. The ceremony 
itself ref lected the principle of the relationship that ‘was characterised 
as one between a superior and subordinate power’.94 In addition, these 
loyal principalities could hereafter count on China as a protective power in 
the event of an external attack. Hence expensive tribute trade enterprises 
became a long-term investment. Any contact with foreign states was in-
stitutionalised and nothing was left to chance. A number of supervising 
institutions, including the Superintendencies of Maritime Shipping (市舶司, 
ch. shibo si) and the Ministry of Rites (礼部), one of six ministries, as well 
as native off icials guarding the regulations of tribute of the Ming Code, 
regulated the frequency of contact with ‘Barbarian’ states, the number 
of embassy staff and travel routes. At the end of the sixteenth century, a 
further tax-supervising institution was added to the list.95
Whereas only certain commodities were off icially traded by means 
of tributary exchange, the system included an option for less-restricted 
exchange: tribute goods were divided into ‘off icial tribute goods’ (sent to 
the Emperor) and ‘private commodities’ for commercial exchange in the 
Beijing Assembly Hall (北京礼堂) and could be sold at its port of entry 
92 Lin (1987), Ming mo, pp. 38-42, illustrates how Portuguese private traders used Quanzhou as 
market place. For more detail, see the contributions to Schottenhammer (ed.) (2001), Emporium 
of the World.
93 Hansen (2000), Open Empire, p. 383. Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe and the Ming’, pp. 24-78.
94 Hamashita (2008), ‘Tribute Trade System’, p. 15.
95 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, p. 24.
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after the payment of a commission. As a rule, 60 per cent of the cargo 
was bartered with by the Superintendency. The off ice already existed in 
Quanzhou in the Song period.96 Under its supervision, foreign trade was 
possible as long as the rules and rites set up by the Chinese authorities were 
obeyed. In the course of Ming rule these off ices were repeatedly closed and 
re-established, sometimes coming under the control of eunuchs. According 
to the Dongxi Yangkao off icial goods entering China via the tributary route 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century included rhinoceros and water 
buffalo horns, bird nests, tortoise shell, aromatics, decoration, sulphur, 
precious woods, rare minerals, herbs, and fabrics.97
During the course of the sixteenth century, foreign trade policies gradu-
ally changed. According to John E. Wills, in the f irst two decades of the 
sixteenth century ships from South East Asian tributary states were allowed 
to come as often as they wished without regard for limitations of time and 
number specif ied in the regulations of the tribute system, and their trade 
was taxed. They were directed by eunuchs, who were especially interested 
in obtaining rare imports for the palace.98 From the 1530s onwards, trading 
ships other than tribute-carrying vessels were allowed to trade with private 
merchants (e.g. Portuguese) after part of the cargo had been appropriated 
to pay for the import tariff.99 The Ming introduced a system of licensed 
trade based on certif icates (勘合, ch. kanhe, jp. kangō) certif icates.100 These 
certificates were issued in duplicate: one was kept with the Superintendency 
in China, the other with the licensed foreign ship.101 In compliance with 
former tribute trade, the modif ied licence system continued to exclude 
Japan from off icial exchange and functioned until around 1620.102 It helped 
the court to monopolise the sale and distribution of certain products and to 
collect taxes on trade and transportation to a certain extent. At the same 
96 Schottenhammer (2002), Songzeitliche Quanzhou, pp. 88-145.
97 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, pp.  14-15. Zhang (1981), Dongxi 
yangkao, juan 7.
98 Wills (1998), ‘Relations’, pp. 334-335. 
99 Chang (1989), ‘Evolution of Chinese Thought’, pp. 51-64.
100 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, pp. 24-25: The author summarises 
late Ming foreign affairs. She distinguishes three types of maritime trade administration: ‘(1) 
the administration of tribute ships in the traditional sense; (2) the administration of Chinese 
ships sailing overseas from Haicheng in Fujian, which were obliged to pay taxes there; and 
(3) the administration of merchant ships that came to Guangzhou and Macao to trade their 
commodities’.
101 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, pp. 15-16.
102 Blussé (1986), Strange Company, p. 104. For the relaxation of maritime policies, see also 
Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/800 (accessed 3 December 2013).
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time, China’s foreign economy gradually displayed a non-Beijing-centred 
spirit driven by complex dimensions on the local level.103 In terms of internal 
dynamics, various studies have emphasised the gradual integration of local 
production and distribution centres into a larger market. Particular focus 
has been laid on the Yangzi delta.104 It is fair to conclude that the arrival 
of Europeans contributed to a liberalisation of maritime trade in coastal 
China, although that certainly did not happen overnight.
Because the traditional tribute trade framework had become unsus-
tainable by the early sixteenth century, trade relations must be treated 
with caution when drawing conclusions regarding the Manila system. In 
a similar fashion, scholars remain sceptical about the role of tributary 
trade for economic developments, which, according to Takeshi Hamashita, 
remained important for China’s maritime sphere long into the seventeenth 
century.105 Stressing tremendous amounts of smuggling and other forms of 
non-state trade, Gang Deng provocatively speaks of ‘disguised staple trade’ 
in his study on the ambiguous relationship between state and merchants in 
China,106 while David Kang even doubts the tributary trade’s mere existence 
(ironically, despite believing in its stabilising effect).107 Timothy Brook, in 
turn, insists that ‘tribute and trade were able to sustain each other so long 
as state diplomacy and foreign trade did not run into conflict’.108
Repositioning in an Emerging Global World
Recurring inflation and destabilisation of the Ming paper money-based 
monetary system after the 1450s triggered changes in the ownership of 
land. A permanent outflow of copper coins increased the demand for silver 
all over the country.109 Limited domestic resources stimulated demand for 
importing ever-increasing amounts of silver, so that in 1567 the Ming reign 
under Emperor Longqing (隆慶, r. 1567-1572) ultimately suspended the 
off icial prohibition on foreign maritime trade. Emperor Longqing took over 
103 Grove, Selden (2008), ‘Introduction’, p. 7.
104 So (2006), ‘Logiques de Marché’, pp. 1261-1291.
105 Hamashita (2008), ‘Despotism and Decentralization’, p. 29. He argues that by the end of 
the sixteenth century the tributary system was f irmly established as external administrative 
order with a high amount of interdependence from the Ming and its loyal neighbours.
106 Deng (1997), ‘Foreign Staple Trade’, pp. 253-283.
107 Kang (2010), East Asia, p. 13.
108 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, p. 220.
109 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, p. 19: ‘The opening of trade was not a 
reaction to piracy but the consequence of socio-economic transformations inside the country, 
in particular land loss of small peasants.’
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from the decadent rule of cruel Emperor Jiajing (嘉靖, r. 1521-1567), who was 
said to have shown little interest in state affairs. From the 1560s onwards, a 
change in the f iscal system stipulated that in principle all land taxes were 
to be paid in silver. Tax payments were converted into silver (一条鞭法, 
ch. yitiao bianfa, literally ‘single whip’) in the 1570s.110 Between 1550 and 
1645 approximately 7300 metric tons of New World and Japanese silver 
were imported to China. This development motivated scholars of previous 
decades to speak of a ‘silver century’ for the period of China’s large-scale 
imports,111 when the country became globally integrated due to monetary 
transactions based on silver.112
Gradually, maritime trade prohibitions (海禁, ch. haijin) were suspended 
for Fujian province and the policy of opening maritime commerce (开海, 
ch. kaihai) was introduced.113 Cumbersome pirate raids, constant pressure 
on the north-western border and the eventual arrival of the Mongol leader 
Altan Khan in the outskirts of Beijing in 1550 were the main reasons why 
the Ming permitted mutual and visiting trade that would come to exist 
simultaneously with tribute trade practices. As a consequence of the Ming 
government’s new orientation towards foreign trade, 50 licences per year 
were handed out to private merchants for overseas trade with South East 
Asia. In 1575, 100 licences (the number was restricted to 88 by 1589) were 
issued for vessels containing some 20,000 tons of cargo space.114
Hereafter, a minor proportion of the formerly illicit trade activities of the 
South and East China Sea were technically given official approval. Haicheng 
(海澄, a.k.a. Moon Harbor, 月港, ch. Yuegang/Yüeh-kang) near Zhangzhou 
(漳州) in Fujian, a former outlaw entrepôt, was opened for maritime trade 
in 1567.115 In such coastal peripheries, smuggling trade and the construction 
of junks with double masts had flourished for decades. Private merchants 
circumvented the tight restrictions and offshore China’s exchange with 
Siam and Japan prospered. The court was aware of the permanent private 
exchange, but turned a blind eye to it as long as private foreign traders were 
110 Liang (1970), Single Whip Method.
111 Of this amount, Japanese silver totalled between 3622 and 3803 metric tons. Von Glahn 
(1996), Fountain, p. 120.
112 Atwell (1998), ‘Ming China’, p. 416.
113 Chang (1983), ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, pp. 8-12.
114 Jansen (2002), Making, p. 65.
115 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, pp. 223-224; Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 24; Haicheng’s 
eventual opening to maritime trade has been considered crucial for the economic transformation 
of the Fujianese coast.
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hindered from entering the hinterland and social peace was maintained.116 
One exception occurred in 1547 when the court in Beijing ordered a blockade 
of illegal trade in Fujian after a number of former high off icials became 
deeply involved in private trade.117 However, the Fujianese coastal defence 
was weak and dependent on poorly skilled military personnel that lacked 
proper war junks.118
The century-long quasi-rejection of foreign trade is also reflected in the 
Ming court’s failure to turn the pirates of the Southern Seas into merchants, 
a popular strategy within state-building processes in other regions.119 Actors 
of illicit trade networks trying to profit from their skills in less complicated 
systems included outlaws, business people and sailors.120 While the line 
between legal and illegal foreign trade remained blurred, people who simply 
wanted to escape the burden of the strict societal system went with the tide.121 
John E. Wills once remarked, ‘to the Chinese state all these people were 
“pirates”‘.122 By def inition, the interaction, collaboration, and links within 
these private networks are diff icult to trace due to a scarcity of written 
sources and the overlapping levels of business, smuggling and raiding. The 
latter included attacks on Chinese cities with the help of Japanese sailors 
(倭寇, jp. wakō), the archenemies of the Chinese regime.123 The question of 
how these permeable Chinese trading communities merged with Japanese 
wakō, resulting in Sino-Japanese joint ventures, will accompany us through-
out this book. Their network-like structures facilitated transportation and 
communication, most notably thanks to naval collaborations based on an 
elaborate junk trade.124 While the ban on foreign trade for ships of various 
sizes and cargoes was lifted in 1578 and taxation on foreign trade regulated, 
116 Clark (2002), Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 167: ‘There was a direct connection between 
the growth of the local pottery industry and the expanding volume of South Seas trade through 
Quanzhou. Pottery [...] was sent throughout the South Seas trade routes. The Zhufan Zhi, for 
example, lists pottery among goods sent to destinations in modern Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Indochina, and the Malay Peninsula.’
117 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 34.
118 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 14-15.
119 Braudel (1982), Civilization and Capitalism, vol. 2, p. 164; Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, 
pp. 1-57.
120 Ptak (2007), Maritime Seidenstraße, pp. 277-289; Reid (1999), Charting, pp. 1-14.
121 The situation is nowadays often bluntly described as ‘merchants were pirates, pirates were 
merchants’. Mann (2011), 1493, p. 126. 
122 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 34.
123 Wokou (ch.) or wakō (jp.) or wae-gu (kor.) literally means ‘Japanese bandit’. But most of the 
time, these groups had more Chinese sailors than Japanese sailors.
124 For the development of Chinese vessels (junks) and their operations in the China Seas, see 
Kojima (2006), Umi kara mita, pp. 28-29.
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the export of nitrates, sulphur, copper, and iron from China remained of-
f icially prohibited.125 At the end of the sixteenth century, maritime trade 
remained severely controlled with trading regulations, examinations, and 
reports of cargoes and guarantors.126
In this (unstoppable) process of integrating the Chinese economy globally 
via Asian port cities, the interplay between silver and silk cannot be stressed 
enough. In fact, I dare say Chinese silk played a similarly important role 
as the notorious American and Japanese silver f lows to China. Permanent 
foreign demand for silk was said to have encouraged Chinese peasants to 
give up rice growing for the sake of mulberry cultivation, while others com-
mercialised rice production in order to feed those working in sericulture.127 
Sericulture reached a new level in both quantity and quality during the Ming 
period. Silk weaving, export, and quality increased, and especially skilful 
embroidery, brocade silk, and satin robes became extremely popular.128
Organised smuggling became particularly notorious along the south-
eastern coast around the mid-sixteenth century when wealthy smugglers 
of coastal regions such as Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang were integrated 
into prosperous trade relations in the China Seas and against government 
off icials.129 In that period, the Chinese outlaw Wang Zhi (王直, jp. Ō Choku, 
a.k.a. King of Huizhou to the Iberians) controlled an impressive commercial 
network, including the waters between China and Japan, and attacked the 
Korean Peninsula in 1555.130 Sea rovers and pirates were not the only group 
eroding trade restrictions. Local authorities openly voiced discontent with 
court authorities towards the end of the sixteenth century. For instance, 
Zhang Han, Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi, considered liberal trade 
with South East Asia a mutually beneficial alternative to the practice of 
exchanging silver and silk for Mongolian horses.131 This dualistic seesaw 
of restrictive regulations and unattended loopholes in the last third of 
125 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 40; Tanaka (1963), Wakō to kangō bōeki, pp. 208-209.
126 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3036 (accessed 3 December 2010).
127 Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, p. 420.
128 For a very short introduction to Ming garments, see Mei (2011), Chinese Clothing, pp. 40-43.
129 For a summary of the events, see Mann (2011), 1493, pp. 130-133. See also Deng (1997), Chinese 
Maritime Activities, pp. 88-90, where he discusses the frequency and strength of armed smug-
gling, international connectedness, and support from government off icials and inf luential 
families.
130 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, pp. 211-212; Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 33. Wang Zhi 
had been appointed as ‘special grand coordinator’ with wide authority to wipe out smuggling 
on the Zhejiang and Fujian coasts.
131 Horses were a very important commodity in maritime exchange, especially in Ming tribu-
tary trade. Roderich Ptak has surveyed the logistics and driving forces behind it. He showed 
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the Ming dynasty eventually also benefited other marginal groups in the 
China Seas. The Portuguese presence on Macao, where they had estab-
lished a permanent trading outpost for an annual rent of 500 taels, further 
accelerated regional economic liberalisation.132 Although the Portuguese 
settlement was small – a few hundred Europeans lived among the local 
Chinese and their slaves – and although its political and economic elites 
were heavily supervised by Chinese authorities and trade often interrupted 
by commercial restrictions (as in 1631), the Portuguese played a key role 
in integrating Cantonese trade in the East China Sea.133 In contrast, Fujia-
nese private traders came to dominate South East Asian markets and to 
partially control commercial exchange. Increased trading activity led to 
the emergence of the famous Chinese overseas communities (華僑, ch. 
huaqiao),134 populated by the f irst wave of Chinese emigration to South 
East Asia.135 Huaqiao proto-colonies emerged in major trading centres such 
as Ayutthaya, Melaka (Malacca), and Manila, all essential stopping points 
for European seafarers.136
A few f inal comments on Fujian as the equivalent for local/peripheral 
China in the Manila system are necessary. Tasked with restoring peace 
along the coast, Fujian’s supreme commanders and Grand Coordina-
tors (巡撫, ch. xunfu) enjoyed an unprecedented military and f inancial 
autonomy on the provincial level. Cheng Wei-chung (鄭維中) described 
how they collaborated with locals in order that local mercenaries could 
enjoy the right to levy and reinvest revenue from new taxes independently 
from Beijing.137 Despite its rather distinctive cultural and socio-political 
features, Fujian was not a society def ined by its avoidance of the state, and 
that specif ic ships for the transportation of horses existed. See Ptak (1999), ‘Pferde auf See’, 
pp. 199-223.
132 Barreto (2000), ‘Macao’; Willis (ed.) (2002), China and Macau.
133 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 35 has stated that the date 1557 no longer counts as certain. 
In Chinese sources that date is only found once in relation with the Portuguese acquisition. 
The name of the settlement derives from ‘Amagao’ (Cape of Ama). Ama was a nickname for the 
goddess Mazu.
134 Huaqiao (ch.) or kakyō (jp.) originally refers to Chinese migrants of Han origin including 
Cantonese, Hokkien etc.; It is still used for Chinese ethnicities residing outside China. For the 
historical development of Overseas Chinese communities in South East Asia that gained specif ic 
momentum during the eighteenth century, see Sugaya (2001), ‘Tōshobu’, pp. 211-238.
135 For the economic importance of the sixteenth-century Southern Chinese diaspora, see 
Wang (2008), ‘China Seas’, pp. 7-22.
136 For the Fujianese traders, see Wang (1990), ‘Merchants without Empire, pp. 400-421; Deng 
(1997), Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 160; Pérotin-Dumon (2001), ‘Pirate’, p. 34.
137 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 13-14.
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no tendencies towards separation existed.138 Ng Chin-Keong’s study has 
shown that in rural Fujian agricultural output increased due to innovation 
and the gradual introduction of cash crops such as indigo and tobacco 
in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, despite the region’s 
mountainous topography. Subsequent mid-seventeenth-century growth 
of market relations allowed the Fujianese economy to prosper once foreign 
trade was possible; but only then.139 A lack of serious investment in land and 
competition in the manufacturing sector with other parts of China were two 
factors limiting wealth deriving from intra-village commercial agriculture. 
Moreover, success abroad depended on integrative patterns of domestic silk 
trade, supply, and transportation from sericulture centres in Eastern China.
Azuchi-Momoyama/Tokugawa Japan
Early modern state formation, as one of the key concepts of the Manila sys-
tem, also took place in Japan, even if many scholars doubt whether Tokugawa 
period (1603-1868) and even less so Azuchi-Momoyama period (1573-1603) 
Japan can be considered a state due to the absence of a national judiciary.140 
Since a consolidation of power was still underway at the end of the sixteenth 
century, Japan indeed differed from the two other entities. Nonetheless, at 
the end of the century widespread economic and political transformation 
processes accomplished countrywide unification, while Asian and Western 
rulers recognised Japanese military leaders as central authorities.141
138 For the attitude of different Chinese stakeholders in this regard, see Chang (1989), ‘Evolution 
of Chinese Thought’, pp. 51-64; William Skinner’s theory of complex macro-structural cycles of 
opening and closure of Chinese communities and regions certainly helps to understand Fujian 
during the late Ming period. Skinner (1971), ‘Chinese peasants’, pp. 271-292.
139 Ng (1983), Trade and Society, pp. 9-30: Noteworthy agricultural innovations include terrace 
building for increased rice harvest and the introduction of both sweet potatoes and peanuts 
from Luzon in the late sixteenth century, granting high yield (p. 10).
140 See among others Jansen (2002), Making, p. 60; Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, 
p. 437. Lieberman points out that regional integration and the idea of ‘one state’ in Japan was 
not yet very advanced even in the mid-Tokugawa era. The word ‘kuni’ still referred less often to 
Japan as a whole than to one regional domain.
141 I endorse Michael Lewis on the subject of the Tokugawa central power in foreign affairs, 
when he notes: ‘The bakufu usually spoke for an entire “country” in conducting diplomacy in 
Asia and later with Western nations. Although a few domains at times engaged in “foreign” 
contacts [...] mainly for trading purposes, this was usually done with bakufu permission, or at 
least its sufferance. The fact that regional Asian and Western states recognized that the bakufu 
represented “Japan,” and that domain governments acceded, however passively, to Edo’s right to 
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The century before that was all but stable as civil war ravaged the entire 
archipelago during the Warring States period (戦国, jp. sengoku).142 Dur-
ing the Ōnin War (1467-1477), when two members of the ruling Ashikaga 
family (leaders of the Ashikaga 足利 a.k.a. Muromachi 室町 shogunate, 
1336-1573) struggled over succession to the shogunal title, two camps of 
major regional lords (守護, jp. shugo, a.k.a. constable daimyō) emerged 
in central Japan. Many shugo, who were traditionally based in Kyoto, left 
the capital and returned to their provinces where they battled to increase 
their individual influence. In a period of political fragmentation and social 
unrest both smaller local lords (大名, jp. daimyō) and local organisations 
grew stronger. With the breakdown of both shogunal and imperial power at 
the beginning of the sixteenth century, huge parts of Japan came under the 
control of several warring local lords (戦国大名, jp. sengoku daimyō), who 
managed to subdue large contingents of warriors into vassals.143 Economic 
advancement in certain regions, such as the Kinai area on Western Honshū, 
was a further by-product of these political shifts that led to a heterogeneous 
net of influential stakeholders and supra-regional corporations,144 as well 
as Buddhist military elites.145
In the second half of the sixteenth century, Oda Nobunaga (織田信長, 
1534-1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉, 1536-1598), and Tokugawa 
Ieyasu (徳川家康, 1542-1616) eventually overcame power struggles within 
the military-feudal system thanks to clever military strategies and the 
economic strength of their domains.146 The Oda-Toyotomi hegemony and the 
formative period of the Tokugawa shogunate both overthrew older ruling 
set “foreign policy” further attests to the emergence of a new center of unprecedented political 
authority.’ Lewis (2009), ‘Center and Periphery’, p. 431.
142 The Warring States period was a time of warfare and social disruption. The main character-
istic of the period was local autonomy that enabled local lords to extend their territorial power 
by vassalage/land tenure. For a history of the political and economic turnover, see Nagahara, 
Yamamura (1981), ‘Sengoku Daimyo’, pp. 27-63.
143 Souyri (2001), World Turned Upside Down. Although his work has sometimes been criticised 
for being not empirical enough and providing too little evidence, it ranks with good reason among 
leading scholarship in Japanese anthropology. For influential regional families such as the Oda, 
Shimazu, Gohōjō, Uesugi, Takeda, Imagawa, and Mōri, see Ōishi (1991), ‘Bakuhan System’, p. 12. 
144 They were often comprised of commoners, bandits, and free peasants active in economic 
or village affairs, as well as urban communities and pirates. For further details, see Kade Troost 
(1997), ‘Peasants, Elites, and Villages’, pp. 91-109.
145 The Honganji branch of the True Pure Land Sect and the Lotus Sect achieved great distinc-
tion by gaining control on the local level. Also known as 浄土真宗, jōdo shinshū (jp.). Asao (1991), 
‘Sixteenth-Century Unif ication’, pp. 40-96. Elisonas (1991), ‘Christianity and the Daimyo’, p. 331.
146 Ōishi (1991), ‘Bakuhan-System’, pp. 6-18.
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principles and reunif ied the country.147 Technically speaking, however, the 
civil war continued (although with longer periods of peace) until the end of 
the summer campaign at Osaka in 1615 that marked the beginning of more 
than two hundred years of the Pax Tokugawa (天下太平, jp. tenka taihei), 
mainly understood as a framework for early modern growth.148
Oda Nobunaga extended his power from Shiba in Owari province 
(present-day Aichi prefecture) by defeating Imagawa Yoshimoto, lord of 
the Tōkaidō area, in 1560.149 After proclaiming his loyalty to the Ashikaga 
Shogun, he moved into Kyoto and built a castle at Azuchi in 1576. 150 From 
there he launched his campaign to unify the country. Until his assassination 
by a vassal in 1582, he partly accomplished the disempowerment of militant 
Buddhist forces (一向宗, jp. ikkō shū).151 After having unified vast parts of the 
country, he proclaimed his intention to conquer China (天下統一, jp. tenka 
tōitsu) in 1582. He was also the f irst central ruler who took up communica-
tion with Europeans and negotiated with Christian missionaries – most 
likely because of his fascination for European weaponry that had proved to 
be advantageous for his military campaigns.152 Moreover, historians claim 
that European missionaries served as a welcome counterbalance to strong 
Buddhist ikkō sects.153
As early as 1567, Oda Nobunaga passed an order for free markets 
and guilds that technically legalised earlier trade practices of powerful 
daimyō.154 In addition, he introduced a uniform grain measurement, which is 
considered the f irst step towards national economic growth.155 The process 
of standardisation of weights and measures was just one of Nobunaga’s 
initiatives completed by his successor Toyotomi Hideyoshi (r. 1582-1598), 
who avenged Nobunaga’s murder before defeating his own opponents across 
the archipelago. In 1584 Hideyoshi subdued Tokugawa Ieyasu, who sought to 
extend his power from the Mikawa region (also in modern Aichi prefecture), 
in 1585 Chōsokabe in Shikoku, the Shimazu in Kyushu in 1587, and the 
147 Hayami (2004), ‘Introduction’, p. 1.
148 Iwahashi (2004), ‘The Institutional Framework’, pp. 85-104.
149 Owada (1989), Okehazama.
150 Azuchi and Momoyama stand for the castles in which the two unif iers resided.
151 Such as an association on Mt. Hiei or the ikkō sect that had been active throughout the 
country. See Ooms (1985), Tokugawa Ideology, pp. 21; 35-39.
152 In this context, it bears mentioning that Japan became the only early modern gun-
manufacturing country in East Asia. For the introduction of rif les and weapons into Japan and 
Nobunaga’s early successes, see Varley (2007), ‘Oda Nobunaga’, pp. 105-125.
153 Hayami (2004), ‘Introduction’, p. 2.
154 楽市楽座令 Rakuichi rakuza rei (jp.). Iwahashi (2004), ‘Institutional Framework’, p. 92.
155 Ōishi (1991), ‘Bakuhan-System’, p. 13.
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Gohōjō of Odawara (Kanagawa) in 1590.156 Becoming imperial regent (関白, 
jp. kanpaku) in 1585, Hideyoshi could henceforth count on the patronage 
of the imperial court in Kyoto. Acting in the name of the Emperor (天皇, 
jp. tennō, a.k.a. 内裏, jp. dairi, in many Iberian sources referring to the 
imperial palace in Kyoto), he was eventually appointed lord of the lords 
(太閤, jp. taikō), underlining his military strength in 1592. Although these 
titles did not provide him with a legitimate position for acting as central 
ruler, he issued numerous decrees aimed at economic and social reforms 
as primus inter pares between 1582 and 1598. With the help of the military 
class and by reinforcing the neo-Confucian idea of four castes, samurai, 
farmer, artisan and merchant (士農工商, jp. shi-nō-kō-shō), later simplif ied 
to a distinction between warriors and peasants, Hideyoshi established f irm 
control over a stratif ied society. Only the top samurai caste was entitled 
to use weapons, following the so-called sword hunt edict of 1588 in which 
Hideyoshi prohibited private warfare.157 When Toyotomi Hideyoshi passed 
away in 1598, his life-long opponent, Tokugawa Ieyasu, another vassal of Oda 
Nobunaga, seized the opportunity to rise to power by succeeding Hideyoshi 
as dominant leader over vast parts of the unif ied Japan.158
Political Economy – Tokugawa seiken
In the long run, the Toyotomi-Tokugawa regimes managed to eliminate 
opponent regional centres and installed f irm control from bases in central 
Honshu. Despite being traditionally portrayed as counterparts, Hideyoshi’s 
and Ieyasu’s politics reveal astonishing parallels: they both focused on 
turning Japan into a maritime player, on monopolising foreign trade, and 
eagerly redefined Japan’s relations with China. In addition, several of Hidey-
oshi’s unfinished state-building projects such as the yield system (石高, jp. 
kokudaka), a means for taxation of farming based on land measurement 
and f iscal reforms in the 1590s, as well as the separation of warriors and 
peasants in the status system (身分, jp. mibun) were eventually realised by 
the Tokugawa shogunate.159
156 For a more detailed description of Hideyoshi’s efforts to secure absolute power, see Asao 
(1991), ‘Sixteenth-Century Unif ication’, pp. 53-55; Asao (2004), Toyotomi, Tokugawa no seifu 
kenryoku.
157 Umi no katanagari (maritime disarming), see Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 2.
158 Hall (1991), ‘Bakuhan System’, pp. 130-145.
159 On how the war and innovations in the tax system transformed the Japanese state in that 
period, see Nakabayashi (2012), ‘Rise of a Japanese Fiscal State’, pp. 380-381. For more elaborate 
Tokugawa economic reforms, see Robert Bellah’s classic Tokugawa Religion. He argues that Ishida 
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Tokugawa Ieyasu enforced law and order throughout the country and 
established his political supremacy based on the shogunate system of rule 
(幕藩, jp. bakuhan).160 Accordingly, individual rights and political freedom 
of the daimyō had to be curtailed in favour of the predominance of the 
Shogun. In all these years, the preeminent authority of the Emperor, with 
his divine lineage similar to the Chinese emperors, formally stood above 
any other stakeholder in the country. Although weakened by various factors, 
in reality the Emperor was a crucial factor for improving Ieyasu’s power 
base inside the country. In 1603, three years after the Battle of Sekigahara 
in which the Tokugawa warriors and allies defeated their opponents, the 
western army of Ishida Mitsunari (石田三成), the Emperor granted Toku-
gawa Ieyasu the title Great Barbarian-Suppressing General (征夷大将軍, 
jp. sei’i taishōgun).161
Being accepted to the independent position of Shogun laid the foundation 
for the political framework that would back his power. Marius Jansen has 
pointed out the importance of keeping the court in Kyoto out of all military 
affairs.162 In theory, Ieyasu administered the policy of direct land holdings 
(天領, jp. tenryō) on behalf of the Emperor, which covered about one-f ifth 
of Japan, including the major cities.163 Thereafter, Edo was chosen as the 
shogunal residence and new military capital. Together with numerous other 
castle towns all over the archipelago, it hosted an emerging merchant class 
and boosted the domestic economy, which benefitted from other reforms, 
such as the minting of a national currency.164 In a further step, Ieyasu turned 
the shogunate into a hereditary off ice: After only two years in off ice he 
passed the title of Shogun to his third son, Hidetada.165 Nonetheless, Ieyasu 
continued to pull the strings as retired Shogun (大御所, jp. ōgosho) from his 
residence in Sunpu 駿府, in today’s Shizuoka prefecture. In 1613, relations 
with the court were regulated by a set of decrees, including instructions for 
court off icials and the restriction of the Emperor’s military involvement.166 
The Emperor was widely deprived of his political powers and his duties were 
Baigan’s efforts in co-opting merchant productivity and eventually revitalising merchants was 
instrumental for seventeenth-century economic growth in Japan. 
160 Ōishi (1991), ‘Bakuhan-System’, p. 22.
161 The term stands for ‘barbarian-subduing general’.
162 Jansen (2002), Making, p. 35.
163 Izumi (2011), Tokugawa bakufuryō, pp. 3-30; Flath (2000), Japanese Economy, p. 23.
164 Tamai (2013), ‘Shiro shitamachi’, pp. 27-46.
165 The system of primogeniture was established to avoid future dynastic conflicts. Hall (1995), 
‘Bakuhan System’, pp. 164-165. 
166 Jansen (2002), Making, p. 36.
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restricted to symbolic and ceremonial tasks, such as assigning era names 
(年号, jp. nengō) and cultural obligations.167 For the years prior to 1615, the 
presence of Hideyoshi’s underage son and his mother overshadowed the 
Tokugawa regime by continuing to claim their right to govern the country 
and were therefore kept prisoners in the Castle of Osaka. Tokugawa manoeu-
vring power remained limited until they eventually defeated the Toyotomi 
loyalists in the previously mentioned Battle of Osaka of 1614-1615.168
By introducing an all-state economy, the Tokugawa regime reorganised 
political administration and consolidated the domestic economy, largely 
based on the Kanto-Kyoto axis.169 Subsequent reforms were further backed 
by neo-Confucian principles of morality.170 By 1600, after having seized 
the lands of 91 daimyō who had opposed him prior and during the Bat-
tle of Sekigahara, Ieyasu and his clan controlled over a quarter of Japan’s 
agricultural production.171 Mining was another source for shogunal revenue. 
Bullion mines throughout Japan, confiscated by Hideyoshi as part of his 
economic consolidation program, were increasingly exploited under the 
Tokugawa. In the 1610s, they had access to 50 gold mines and 30 silver mines, 
of which the mines of Iwami, Ikuno, and Sado were the most productive.172 
The Tokugawa gained control over the silver and copper that was ref ined in 
Nagasaki.173 These commodities would help them to become an important 
player on the Asian market at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
Once unquestioned leaders of the tenka and the largest landholder in the 
feudal state, the Tokugawa required the remaining 250-odd daimyō, who 
167 Japanese historians have argued that pre-modern Japan was politically characterised by a 
separation of authority and power between the tennō and the ruling warrior class. Takagi (2003), 
Shogun kenryōku.
168 For a comprehensive account on the establishment of the Tokugawa reign and the conflicts 
with Hideyoshi’s party, see Hall (1995), ‘Bakuhan system’, pp. 149-161.
169 Ōishi summarises the key elements of the bakuhan system, the Tokugawa polity that was 
f irmly consolidated by Tokugawa Iemitsu, as follows: ‘manipulating daimyo, managing the 
imperial court, controlling foreign relations, and sacralizing the Tokugawa legacy’. Ōishi (1991), 
‘Bakuhan-System’, p. 22; Sakudo (1989), ‘Search of the Origins’, p. 40.
170 A new branch of secular intellectuals, most famously Hayashi Razan, who served the Bakufu 
as advisor for more than 50 years until his death in 1657, propagated teachings of neo-Confucian 
morals. For a concise summary see Ooms (1985), Tokugawa Ideology, pp. 63-79.
171 Reischauer et al. (eds) (1973), Japan, pp. 81-85.
172 Totman (1995), Early Modern Japan, p. 69.
173 The export of huge amounts of Japanese silver led to bottlenecks in Japan’s domestic supply 
and in 1688 eventually to an export prohibition. As a consequence, copper export increased 
during the eighteenth century. For Dutch participation in this lucrative commerce, see Shimada 
(2005), ‘Intra-Asian Trade’.
tHe CoMPArAtIve FrAMework 75
ruled their individual domains, to swear alliance to the Tokugawa.174 Those 
daimyō did not only differ according to the size of their domains (藩, jp. han) 
and annual income, but also by prestige and influence. Both direct vassals 
(譜代, jp. fudai), who descended from Ieyasu’s retainers before Sekigahara, 
and the old-established Tokugawa clan members of Owari (western part of 
Aichi prefecture), Kii (around present day Wakayama and Mie prefecture), 
and Mito (Ibaraki) enjoyed greater political influence than ordinary vassals 
outside these areas (外様大名, jp. tozama daimyō).
Restricting power on the local level was by nature the most important 
step towards effective central rule for the Tokugawa lords, who were only 
the dominant leaders of the tenka (天下, here referring to the whole country) 
and largest landholder in the feudal state. Measures included that daimyō 
were no longer allowed to deal with foreign powers, nor could they build 
new fortif ications or undertake military action without authorisation. 
Instead, they had to commit their resources to the Bakufu by supporting 
construction projects or submitting information.175 Most daimyō realised 
the advantages of the new system in terms of political and economic 
security, and came to terms with it by f inding ways to retain considerable 
autonomy.176 Further intrinsic principles of the bakuhan order included 
the alternate attendance (参勤交代, jp. sankin kōtai) of all daimyō after 
1634. This measure required every daimyō to spend alternate years in Edo 
and to leave his family as hostage behind when in his own domain and has 
been regarded a further reason for economic, institutional, and intellectual 
growth on a countrywide level.177
On this account, common labels like ‘centralised feudalism’ or static 
absolutism are ill suited for the bakuhan. Historian John Whitney Hall 
emphasises strong uniformity in social, economic, and religious matters 
under Tokugawa rule as evidence for national entity.178 In contrast, recent 
174 Fukaya (1981), Bakuhansei, pp. 2-5.
175 Hall (1991), ‘Bakuhan System’, p. 147.
176 Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, p. 442.
177 Sakudo (1989), ‘Origins’, pp. 33-34; Yamamoto (1998), Sankin kōdai.
178 The concept has been heavily debated among scholars and is no longer considered state-of-
the-art. Hall (1991), ‘Bakuhan System’, pp. 128-182. Hall argued that Japan was not a feudal system. 
However, given that domestic political structures of Tokugawa Japan play no particular role here, 
I use it for pragmatic reasons. For a discussion of the topic and more accurate concepts, I refer to 
Lewis, ‘Center and Periphery’, pp. 431-432. See also Ikegami (1995), Taming of the Samurai. Hayami 
(2004), ‘Introduction’, pp. 18; 22; 31, describes how this error occurred: Rai Sanyo argued in the 
early nineteenth century in a popular history book that the traditional Japanese system was 
that of hōken polity. During the Meiji restoration, the term hōken was translated to ‘feudalism’ 
by Western historians. Hayami Akira criticised describing the Japanese rural order as feudal, 
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scholarship, for instance research by Mark Ravina, has challenged the 
notion of a centralised Tokugawa Japan that set the policies for religion, 
taxation, and commerce for the entire country, by revealing independent 
developments in local domains and shedding light on feudal structures 
based on politico-economic conjunctions.179 While Ravina does not question 
the Bakufu’s monopoly over foreign relations, Robert Hellyer extended 
the decentralisation thesis to Tokugawa foreign relations.180 A similarly 
distinctive dual nature of local-central dynamics also holds centre stage 
for Japan’s integration into the Manila trade.
Repositioning between two Worlds
Despite China’s indirect impact on Japan’s trade and diplomacy and regard-
less of a far-reaching Sinif ication over the centuries since the introduction 
of rice, script, governing institutions, and religious trends from or via the 
Middle Kingdom, the popular image of Japan as China’s little brother did 
not exist in early modern Asia, nor was Japanese identity based on China.181 
Indeed, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu accepted the symbolical title ‘King of Japan’ 
after 1402 and thereupon the Ashikaga shogunate sent 11 off icial missions 
through authorised ships until the middle of the sixteenth century.182 Politi-
cally the Japanese were never really at ease with Chinese leadership over the 
Confucian society in East Asia and during the entire period studied here, 
Japan was reluctant to accept the Middle Kingdom’s claim to superiority. 
In fact, the Japanese habit of placing themselves on the same level as the 
despite admitting parallels of Tokugawa Japan and Europe such as powerful lords who ruled 
over territorial domains and a society in which military and agricultural classes were not yet 
separated. See also Ching (2009), ‘Japan in Asia’, p. 432.
179 For institutional diffusion of power, see among others Ravina (1999), Land and Lordship.
180 See Hellyer (2009), Engaging Encounters, pp. 7-8.
181 In the realm of Japan’s China trade, we must not underestimate the enormous potential 
of indirect contact in port cities. See Okamoto (2008), ‘Foreign Policy’, pp. 35-55. As for the 
common view of Japan as China’s little brother, historians like John W. Hall and George Elison 
shaped that image in the West during the second half of the twentieth century. Elison (1972), 
Deus Destroyed.
182 Kang (1997), Diplomacy and Ideology, pp. 32-33: Although Ashikaga Yoshimitsu desired to 
establish formal relations with Ming China, initially he was not accepted as head of Japan. Only 
after providing an appropriate letter (票, ch. piao) in which Japan accepted Chinese centrality 
and the Chinese calendar for off icial correspondence did the Ashikaga became a tributary of the 
Ming in 1402 and were allowed to send state letters with the title of ‘King of Japan’ (日本国王, 
jp. nihon koku ō). See also Imatani (2000), Muromachi jidai.
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Chinese Emperor dates back to the seventh century.183 For most of history, 
Sino-Japanese relations remained ambivalent.184 Csaba Oláh has shown 
that ‘diplomatic disagreements’ already existed during Ashikaga rule, when 
the warrior class developed a ‘Sino-Japanese diplomatic culture’ of foreign 
exchange.185 The Japanese applied a specif ic procedure when preparing and 
sending embassies to the Ming court, that included diplomatic documents 
and certif icates (勘合, ch. kanhe, jp. kangō), also known as tallies.186 In his 
brilliant study, Csaba Oláh has demonstrated how at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, Japanese envoys became increasingly irritated about 
how they were treated by Chinese off icials.187
Amidst the confusion of the civil wars in Japan, the powerful Ōuchi clan 
seized the tallies from the Ashikaga and thereafter established a monopoly 
on tributary trade with China, which the shogunate acknowledged in 1516.188 
A crucial moment in the process of Japan’s repositioning and breakaway from 
the Middle Kingdom’s system of tribute was the so-called Ningbo Incident.189 
In 1523, when the tribute missions of two different Japanese noble families, 
Hosokawa (細川) and Ōuchi (大内) arrived at Ningbo (宁波, in Zhejiang 
province, 浙江), the off icial entry port for the Japanese, a dispute broke 
out between the two rival groups. When they were consequently denied 
access, several of the desperate Japanese traders and sailors plundered the 
nearby area. Once the Ming court was informed about this violent incident, 
it ordered a suppression of all trade with the Japanese. This incident had 
183 Leading research on these matters has been carried out by Tanaka Takeo. See, for instance, 
the 2005 edition of Zenkindai.
184 See Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, pp. 22-23: According to Chinese 
sources, exaggerated striving for tribute caused the incident. The Japanese were accused of 
being solely interested in trade and profit, and not showing sincere subordination to the Chinese 
Emperor. As a result, trade relations with Japan were suspended until 1539-1540.
185 Oláh (2009), Räuberische Chinesen.
186 The same monks would also draft Hideyoshi’s correspondence with foreign rulers. See Asao 
(1991), ‘Sixteenth-Century Unif ication’, p. 69. 
187 Oláh (2009), Räuberische Chinesen, pp. 55-57: Correspondence between these two parties 
(1539) reveals the very inflexible rules that were applied in dealings with Japanese merchants. 
Other recent research on the development of diplomatic relations in East Asia include Itō (2008), 
‘Japan and Ryukyu’, pp. 79-99.
188 Sugimoto, Swain (1978), Science.
189 Zhu (2013), Xing guan zhong guo. Zhu Lili revisited Sino-Japanese relations within the 
framework of f ifteenth- and sixteenth-century tributary relations with a specif ic focus on the 
actors in thriving port and temple cities.
78 SPAIN, CHINA, AND JAPAN IN MANILA, 1571-1644
a lasting impact on off icial relations: tributary trade ended when the last 
mission was received in China between 1547 and 1549.190
During the following decades, a newly awakened self-conscience in 
diplomatic relations that was expressed in advances towards the Ming 
and entirely new Japanese diplomatic adventures in South East Asia grew 
in conjunction with the warlords’ success in centralising Japan.191 Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi provoked China with his infamous invasions of Korea in 1592 
and 1598 (文禄の役, jp. bunroku no eki, and 慶長の役, jp. keichō no eki 
in Japanese sources and the Imjin/Chouyu War in Korean and Western 
sources, discussed later). Long before, the revival of pirate raids (labelled 
late wakō activity in Japanese historiography) determined off icial trade 
with the Ming. It reached its peak when unemployed warriors who were 
well trained in the use of weapons and experienced at sea after Nobunaga’s 
success in maritime battles raided the China Seas in the 1560s and 1570s.192 
We may therefore say that these groups show overlapping features with the 
Spanish hidalgos, equally characterised by a high level of independence, a 
strong will and a high degree of adaptability to unfamiliar surroundings 
and unexpected circumstances. For several decades, the notorious wakō 
remained the main agency of pre-modern Japan’s maritime integration 
before Hideyoshi passed a law against privateering in the South China Sea in 
1588, also known as ‘sword hunt at sea’ (海の刀狩り, jp. umi no katana-gari), 
a term coined by Nagazumi Yōko.193
Japan’s debut in early modern maritime trade was only one step away 
from welcoming foreign traders on Japanese soil. Portuguese merchants 
f irst landed on the island of Tanegashima in 1542/43 in Southern Kyushu, 
where an annual festival still celebrates the meaningful encounter with 
the Europeans and their peculiar weapons. The f irst ambitious Jesuit mis-
sionaries of the Estado da Índia, including the Basque Francisco Xavier 
(born Francisco de Jasso y Azpilicueta, 1506-1552), followed in the year 
1549.194 After initial setbacks, dedicated missionaries managed to gain a 
190 Lidin (2002), Tanegashima, p. 41. In 1549, a delegation sent by Sakai merchants for tributary 
trade was prohibited access to the tributary protocol by Chinese off icials. ‘Three new great 
merchant ships were about to set sail to the South for Great Ming China. Also, about 1,000 
young men, sons of rich families of the Kinai area and of the area West of Kinai, set out to be 
merchants.’
191 Mizuno (2004), ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, p. 121.
192 Hashimoto, Yonetani (2008), ‘Wakōron no yukue’, pp. 80-90; Tanaka (1963), Wakō to kangō 
bōeki. 
193 Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, pp. 2-3.
194 For a synthesis of their spiritual work in Japan, see Takizawa (2010), Historia de los Jesuitas.
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foothold on the archipelago.195 They benefited not only from the political 
instability and support from disintegrating Kyushu daimyō, but also from 
their close ties to merchants in other Portuguese trading posts in Asia. 
Trade with foreign nations had become very appealing to local lords such 
as the Shimazu clan of Satsuma, of whom some had sponsored wakō trade 
in previous decades.196 The fact that major ports for wakō operations, such as 
Hirado, also came to play a crucial role in subsequent peaceful trade speaks 
for both flexibility and continuity of private commercial structures. Thus 
it cannot be stressed enough that not all private traders from Kyushu and 
Fujian were malicious pirates,197 but rather skilled entrepreneurs, who, for 
instance, guided Francisco Xavier and his fellow Jesuits to Japan on board 
a Chinese wakō junk.198
Along the lines of this flexible maritime exchange in Kyushu, trade with 
the ‘Southern Barbarians’ (南蛮, jp. namban) emerged under European and 
Kyushu daimyō participation.199 Portuguese and Spanish merchants were 
dubbed ‘Southern Barbarians’, because they arrived from the south.200 Ky-
ushu silver enabled prominent f igures such as Arima of Shimabara, Ōtomo 
of Bungo and Ōmura of Hizen to collaborate with wakō, Portuguese, and 
towards the end of the century, also with Spaniards from Luzon. Within 
a few years, missionary bases emerged in Yamaguchi, Kyoto (Miaco to 
the European friars), and Funai before the fathers of the Society spread 
over large parts of Kyushu where several daimyō were baptised: Ōmura in 
1562/63, and the ‘King’ of Bungo, Ōtomo Yoshishige, followed as convert 
in 1578. To reap the benefits of the Macao trade with the Portuguese, the 
195 Shimizu Yūko has shown how large the number of baptised Christians was already during 
the 1590s: Shimizu (2010), ‘16seiki’.
196 The area stretches from Hakata in Kyushu to Korea. The abundance of Ming porcelain 
on tiny islands such as the Goto archipelago is a telling indication for thriving exchange. For 
centuries, the islands served as smuggling and wakō centres.
197 For the context of pirates’ global economic importance, see Anderson (2001), ‘Pirates and 
World History’, pp. 107-124.
198 An early observation by Charles R. Boxer suggests that wakō were not just pirates, but often 
operated as free merchants. Boxer (1953), South China, p. xl; For an overview of the heterogeneous 
wakō phenomenon, see Elisonas (1991), ‘Christianity and the Daimyo’, pp. 321-326.
199 The term was apparently only used for the trade that emerged after the arrival of the Iberians 
at the midst of the sixteenth century and not for earlier exchange with South East Asian traders 
via the Ryukyu network.
200 The term developed strong cultural connotation in the course of the seventeenth century 
and also served as distinguishing marker for Protestant Europeans, who became known as 
‘red-haired people’ (紅毛人, jp. kōmōjin) at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
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daimyō of Arima, Harunobu, also became a baptised Christian.201 This 
reflects the Jesuits’ strategy to seek converts in the ruling class in the fashion 
of cuius regio, eius religio. Rivalry among these local lords benef ited the 
Europeans in the early decade: Prospects of regular access to trade with 
China granted the missionaries from Goa and Macao support of the lords 
from Kyushu. In 1580, the Jesuits received Nagasaki as a permanent base 
from Ōmura Sumitada, the f irst noble convert to Christianity, who was 
known as Dom Bartolomeu in European sources.202
After Hideyoshi had defeated the Shimazu of Satsuma in 1587, a powerful 
domain in Southern Kyushu and technically subordinated the entire island, 
he would become more closely involved with European issues and in the 
process aware that Christian missionaries and converts interfered with 
his political agenda. Ironically, Hideyoshi granted free trade to Portuguese 
merchants before he released a ban on Christianity and proposed the friars’ 
expulsion (伴天連追放, jp. bateren tsuihōrei) in July of the same year.203 
Given the chronology, the motivation behind these acts was f irst and fore-
most politico-economically motivated and only secondly anti-Christian. 
Moreover, while foreign merchants remained unaffected, most Jesuits found 
a way to remain in Japan. Following the incorporation of Kyushu into one 
centralised Japan, Nagasaki, originally a domain of the Society of Jesus, 
was placed under direct control of the Toyotomi administration as a direct 
landholding (直轄領, jp. chokkatsu ryō) belonging to Hideyoshi that passed 
to the Tokugawa Bakufu after 1600 and assigned to the Nabeshima clan in 
1588. As such it remained an important setting for the growing overseas 
trade.204
Despite its island character and geographical location, Japan was a late 
bloomer in maritime development. Needless to say that individual early 
seafarers, who operated in surrounding waters, possessed a solid knowledge 
of navigational winds, and the Chinese compass was widely used. China 
was an inward-oriented country to a large extent, and so the ruling elite 
had shown little interest in encouraging its people’s presence on or control 
of the surrounding waters, neither in navigational nor in political terms. 
201 For the daimyō’s involvement with Jesuit missionaries on Kyūshū, see Pacheco (1971), 
‘Europeans in Japan’, pp. 52-55. See also Kirsch (2004), Barbaren aus dem Süden, pp. 53-60.
202 Elisonas (1991), ‘Christianity and the Daimyo’, pp. 321-326.
203 Anti-Christian laws: バテレン追放令, jp. bateren tsuihō rei, 24 July 1587 respectively 19 June 
(the Japanese original in the Matsura Monjo is dated ‘month 7’). See Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 
(2006), Nihonshi shiryō, p. 43.
204 Kisaki (2005), Kinsei gaikō.
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This explains why navigation was limited to coastal shipping until the 
arrival of the Europeans.
The Tokugawa initially kept an open mind towards maritime trade, 
as long as they could manage to monopolise it.205 The most prominent 
measure taken by the Tokugawa in that respect was licensed trade based 
on vermillion-seal passes (朱印状, jp. shuinjō) holding the seal of the 
Tokugawa shogunate, a system f irst tested by Hideyoshi.206 Apart from 
their diplomatic character, the licences aimed at restricting Japanese foreign 
trade to authorised merchant ships.207 During the active years between 1604 
and 1635, the shogunate issued a total number of 356 licences to Japanese, 
Chinese, and European traders and captains for trade between Japan and 
South East Asian destinations.208 Allocation was relatively simple in Ieyasu’s 
time: Daimyō, private individuals, and temples allocated shuinjō. Eventually 
shuinjō trade was limited to a small number of shogunate-loyal merchants 
in later years. In total, 43 passes were issued for Chinese captains, 38 for 
Europeans, and 259 for Japanese, who carried an average crew (including 
merchants) of 225 men.209 This was not only a means to guarantee the ruling 
nobility a share in lucrative foreign transactions but also to protect Japanese 
maritime trade against unfair competition on the sea. Until the year 1613, 
Manila was one of the most popular destinations.210 Among the earliest 
issued vermillion-seal passes, 4 out of a total number of 29 were for trade 
205 Hoping the lay brothers would help to integrate the Japanese more directly into the Manila 
system, Ieyasu originally showed a welcoming attitude towards mendicant missionaries.
206 Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, pp. 2-5; Gonoi (2008), ‘Betonamu’, p. 45. Japanese researchers 
have furthermore found a record in the seventeenth-century-drafted, 16-volume Nagasaki shi 
(長崎志) that indicates that Toyotomi Hideyoshi made an early attempt to control foreign trade 
by distributing licences to selected traders from Nagasaki, Kyoto, and Sakai.
207 Murai (2013), Nihonshi.
208 Gonoi (2008), ‘Betonamu’, p. 46.
209 Jansen (2002), Making, p. 19; He was also reported to have been in favour of Manila. See ARSI 
Jap/Sin 32, f. 3: ‘Que es el que tiene a cargo los negocios de las Filipinas, y el que las ha favorizado 
siempre antes.’ ARSI Jap/Sin 32, ff. 3 v-4: ‘Para que el sobre que le guardesse una provisión que 
en su lengua llaman xuyri, y por otra lengua chapa por lo cual el dicho Taycosama daba licencia 
para que los españoles libremente pudiessen andar por sus reinos, así por la mar, como por la 
tierra.’
210 Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 41; Jansen (1992), China in the Tokugawa World, p. 19. To get 
an idea of scope and scale of the vermillion-seal trade we have to consider that 29 licences were 
issued in the f irst year already. Until the abolition of the system in 1635, 350 permits had been 
issued, interestingly enough, 43 were granted to Chinese and 38 to European captains and 
merchants.
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with Manila.211 It will be worth keeping in mind that trade activities between 
Japan and the Europeans in fact increased after 1615, at a time when the 
role of the Spanish had already become peripheral. Within the next two 
decades the English and Dutch established permanent trading factories on 
Hirado and trade with Macao also increased in volume.212
The yarn allotment (糸割符, jp. ito wappu) was a further mercantilist 
measure of the shogunate, which felt encouraged by its connected history 
with China and the Iberians. In order to extend control over silk imports, the 
Tokugawa shogunate demanded the leading merchants of Kyoto, Sakai, and 
Nagasaki in 1603-1604 to form a thread guild that was joined by traders from 
Osaka and Edo a few years later. Selected Japanese silk dealers thereupon 
bought silk exclusively from Portuguese or Chinese brokers in bulk for a 
previously f ixed price before distributing it to local merchants. While the 
system hindered foreign traders from bargaining and from creating too 
close ties with the local people,213 in turn wholesale bargaining created a 
new class of Japanese brokers and powerful middlemen.
Over the decades of increasing exchange with several trading nations 
and experimenting with various commercial practises, Japanese maritime 
trade became standardised and gradually came under state control by 
means of shogunate off icials in the 1620s. In the late 1630s, an entirely new 
trading period that was no longer ad hoc and excluded Iberian merchants 
began.214 Portuguese trading ships were banned from landing in Japan, and 
all Portuguese residents, 287 Portuguese and their wives, were expelled 
to Macao in 1636. In 1641, Dutch East India Company (VOC) merchants, as 
the single remaining European trading nation in Japan, had to close their 
trading factory in Hirado and were ghettoised – as were Chinese merchants 
– in Nagasaki. Nevertheless, regular voyages of Chinese, European, and 
Siamese trading parties to Japan show that Japan remained a ‘signif icant 
strategic fact in East Asia’ for several decades.215 A real change in foreign 
trade in terms of exported goods and trading volume only occurred towards 
the end of the seventeenth century, when the shogunate, worried about an 
ongoing outflow of silver (the shogunate eventually prohibited the export of 
211 Japanese in Manila and in Ayutthaya were extremely influential in regional trade thanks 
to the silver-silk axis with China and thus challenged policymakers and other merchants on 
site. Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 49.
212 Totman (1995), Early Modern Japan, pp. 141-142; Shimada (2005), Intra-Asian Trade, pp. 5-21.
213 See Atsushi, Kobata (1978), ‘Edo Shoki’, p. 130.
214 Oka (2001), ‘Great Merchant’, pp. 37-56.
215 Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy, p. 5.
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silver in 1668),216 gold and copper to China, introduced import-substitution 
programmes, the greatest of all being domestic sericulture.217
Encountering the Other
Next to being a thriving commercial area, sixteenth-century China Seas 
offered opportunities to encounter, study, and analyse the ‘other’, overcome 
stereotypes and broaden horizons. Yet history has shown that areas that 
functioned like cultural melting pots often had contrary effects. Spanish 
perceptions of the ‘other’ had many facets and served several political 
agendas. Overseas such perceptions were encouraged through intentional 
othering of religious opponents and uneasiness about obvious cultural, 
political, and moral differences. In Asia, the ‘others’ included the autoch-
thonous population (sp. indios or naturales), Muslim moros, chinos (a.k.a. 
sangleyes), as well as Dutch corsarios or other ‘heretics’; to a lesser extent, 
Jewish merchants and traders from other European countries and the 
surprisingly large number of Basques in the Philippines also represented a 
marginal group with a measure of stereotypical attributions.218
Individual sensitivities often ref lected a broader political trend. The 
political motto of Charles I (V), ‘plus ultra’, was still a valid marker of impe-
rial Spanish foreign policies at the end of the sixteenth century. The ultimate 
goal for all operations overseas was simply to gain control.219 The strong 
notion of Christian superiority and Eurocentric self-aggrandisement were 
rather commonly found in Hispanic dealings with the ‘other’. What made 
Hispanic aggressive expansion possible was early knowledge gathering, 
illustrated by the huge number of chronicles published in the early decades 
of colonialism.220 For the Roman Empire as for the Middle Kingdom, the 
imperial ideology was based on ‘civilisation’, for the Spaniards it was the 
Catholic faith.221 Although China and Japan did not hold centre stage in 
216 Yamamura, Kamiki (1983), ‘Silver Mines’, pp. 329-362.
217 Jansen (1992), China in the Tokugawa World, p. 39.
218 Borja (2005), Basques. Even though not directly relevant for the present study, I consider 
it worth mentioning that famous colonial actors during the early colonising period of the 
Philippines, including Juan Sebastián Elcano, Miguel López de Legazpi, Domingo de Salazar, 
and Martín de Rada, were native Basques. 
219 Mahoney (2003), Colonialism, p. 2: ‘In modern world history, colonialism is marked by a 
state’s successful claim to sovereignty over a foreign land.’
220 Spanish chronicles related to the Philippines are listed in the introduction of this book.
221 Elliott (1989), Spain and Its World, p. 9.
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Hispanic imperialism, they were certainly areas of major concern. Both 
were not entirely new to the Spaniards, due to Marco Polo’s accounts of 
Cathay and Zipangu and the Portuguese presence in Asia for decades.222 
Both countries were f irst and foremost considered important areas for 
continuing the spread of Catholicism. Their high degree of civilisation was 
often highlighted and they were instantly favoured as permanent busi-
ness partners in the Far East.223 Hence, the incorporation of the Philippine 
archipelago into the Catholic world was also of a strategic nature: Luzon 
would serve as the Spanish missionaries’ gateway to China and Japan.224
In the case of Ming China the issue of off icial wakō policies has shown 
that the regime could use an unlawful counterpart for the sake of upholding 
sovereignty. The image of the ‘other’ was effectively constructed. ‘Barbarian’ 
was a well-established umbrella term for people of non-Chinese origin 
and a flexible concept with numerous nuances, which did not necessarily 
have pejorative connotations. The idea of being in the centre (中華, ch. 
zhonghua) was of utmost relevance for interpreting activities of others.225 
According to the ideology of the Middle Kingdom, the world was divided in 
concentric circles of Barbarian states (華夷, ch. hua’i, jp. ka’i).226 Historian 
Geoff Wade has studied the impact of rhetoric and images in elite Chinese 
222 Jesuit descriptions (i.e. the records of Luís Froís, Alessandro Valigano, or João Rodrigues) 
dominated the information f low about Japan in the second half of the sixteenth century. 
Thereafter Spanish laymen such as Bernardino de Avila Girón, Rodrigo de Vivero y Velasco, 
and Sebastián Vizcaíno and Northern European merchants such as William Adams, John Saris, 
and Richard Cocks contributed to travel accounts as described by Cooper (1965), They Came to 
Japan, pp. 99-100; 119: ‘If Frois was the chronicler of stirring events and Cocks the recorder of 
daily life, João Rodrigues was par excellence the exponent of Japanese language and culture.’ 
With regard to other Europeans in early modern Japan, Cooper’s work has shaped the view of 
uncouth Europeans who encountered a high civilisation in Japan.
223 See for instance Yonei (2010), ‘Kirishitan Jidai’, pp. 179-196.
224 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 105 (1600), Pedro de Acuña informed the King 
about regular communication with Chinese and Japanese in Manila: ‘Estando como están las 
Islas Filipinas tan apartadas y remotas, y rodeadas de tantos y tan grandes reinos de inf ieles 
con la entrada y comunicación que tienen en Manila los Chinos, y Japonés e inteligencia de los 
naturales se puede recelar que aliados con los de la tierra podrían intentar alguna novedad a 
que son inclinadas y porque la mayor seguridad y fuerza que puede tener la tierra es la población 
de españoles.’
225 Kang (1997), Diplomacy and Ideology, pp. 8-12; 14. ‘Ethnocentric ideologies manifested in 
this Chinese world order […] Once tributary relations were established with China, tributary 
states used the Chinese era names and China offered abundant presents.’
226 For an illustration of the Chinese worldview, see Morris-Suzuki (1996), ‘Frontiers of Japanese 
Identity’, p. 48. See also Kang (1997), Diplomacy and Ideology, pp. 7-34. Kang analysed the 
establishment of Tokugawa sovereignty in foreign relations, tackling the dichotomy between 
practical and theoretical issues.
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representations of the outside world and has concluded that it displayed a 
remarkable degree of consistency.227
Beyond a doubt, Zheng He’s voyages expanded Chinese awareness of the 
outside world as books such as Xiyang chaogong dianlu by Huang Xingzeng, 
which was drafted in the early 1520s (but not printed), show. This work is 
based on travel accounts of Zheng He’s companions on the Great Voyages, 
such as Ma Huan.228 Focusing on the Western Ocean, he described places 
as far west as Hormuz and traditionally referred to the Indian Ocean as the 
‘West’ and everything east as the ‘East’. Luzon is strikingly not among the 
countries he described.229 According to Chinese geographical understand-
ing, Luzon and Pangasinan were located in the Eastern Ocean (東洋, ch. 
dongyang), from where tally (tributary) trade missions had sporadically 
been sent to the Middle Kingdom.230 During the Ming period a new catego-
risation came into existence: ‘South’ or ‘South Seas’ (南洋, ch. nanyang), 
roughly indicating what we understand today under the terms the South 
China Sea and the South East Asian archipelago.231 Thus, from a broader 
angle the Philippine chiefdoms were of little signif icance to the Emperor of 
China.232 During the sixteenth century, a combination of lax border policies 
and the unexpected arrival of offensive Europeans challenged traditional 
Chinese perspectives of foreigners. Thus contact with the Franks (佛郎机, 
ch. folangji), as the Portuguese were described in Chinese sources, and the 
Dutch, descriptively called red-haired Barbarians (ch. hong-man-fan), had 
an altering effect.233 Despite off icial information gathering policies, Ming 
China’s dealings with foreigners were mostly a local affair in the ports of 
coastal provinces such as Quanzhou and Guangzhou. It is noteworthy that 
knowledge of ‘others’, particularly the Europeans, was less readily available 
than it was in Spain or in Japan. Circulation of knowledge differed for a 
couple of reasons: Few foreigners lived within the borders of the Chinese 
state, and Chinese contemporaries hardly ever published their experiences 
abroad.234
227 Wade (1997), ‘Some Topoi’, pp. 136-137.
228 Huang (1982), Xiyang chao; Sonnendecker (2005), Huang xingzeng, http://www.diss.fuberlin.
de/diss/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDISS_derivate_000000003095/0_Sonnendecker-
gesamt.pdf (accessed 29 March 2012).
229 Hamashita (2008), ‘Despotism’, p. 32.
230 Zhang (1981), Dongxi yangkao, 4.7, p. 3.
231 Hamashita (2008), ‘Despotism’, p. 31.
232 Junker (1999), Raiding, p. 36.
233 Zhang (1982), Ming shi ou zhou; Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji.
234 See Lehner (2011), China in European Encyclopedias, pp. 73-76, on the formations of knowl-
edge and on how knowledge was promoted. He distinguishes between hypotext and hypertext in 
86 SPAIN, CHINA, AND JAPAN IN MANILA, 1571-1644
Encounters with Europeans were characterised by ambivalence and 
recurring restrictions long into the Qing period. Although the Manchus 
are considered less hostile to foreign trade as their predecessors, they were 
still deeply mistrustful.235 Despite the opening of Macao to the Portuguese 
(海禁, ch. haijin) was still considered an effective measure. After the arrival 
of the Spaniards in Manila, several Chinese captains refused to take Span-
ish friars as envoys back to Fujian in the 1570s as a consequence of severe 
border controls and a general suspicion towards Christians in their home 
country.236 The Dongxi yangkao is particularly interesting when it comes 
to Chinese perception of the folangji and the people from the South Seas 
(ch. yi or fan). Drafted under the presumption of a universal civilisation, a 
signif icant part of the piece covering the Philippines offers useful accounts 
on the Chinese settlements there.237 The folangji are signif icantly featured 
with animalistic characteristics, and emphasis is placed on the important 
role of monks, who are portrayed as senior advisors of the ruling class.238 
As far as information on the Portuguese of Melaka was concerned, off icial 
Ming views were largely incorrect.
How Japan’s policymakers perceived the outside world correlated with 
the political identity building of the new ruling elite. The outside world was 
initially viewed through the China lens with occasional references to India 
as the origin of Buddhism. A three-countries theory, including Japan (我朝, 
jp. waga chō), China, Korea, and South East Asia (震旦, jp. shintan, or 唐, jp. 
tō), and India (天竺, jp. tenjiku), determined the Japanese worldview prior to 
first direct contact with the Europeans.239 For instance, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 
who had access to previously gathered information, was well aware of the 
size of China and its maritime affairs. He also understood that wakō were 
in regular contact with Chinese merchants in Sakai and Hyogo.240 By the 
middle of the sixteenth century, geographical knowledge broadened, as 
the process of the creation of East-West ideas, explaining that ‘European accounts on China may 
be regarded as hypotexts. Texts produced as in the course of perception, learned communication, 
and further dissemination can be seen as hypertexts.’ 
235 Darwin (2007), After Tamerlane, p. 92. For later and foreign trade ghettos in Macao and 
Canton and common restriction practices, see Van Dyke (2005), Canton Trade, pp. 6-13.
236 AGI Patronato 1, 1-2, 24. Cf. Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 95.
237 The work was republished in 1981. Zhang (1981), Dongxi yangkao, 12 vols, juan 4, deals with 
the Philippines, juan 5 with Japan, juan 7 includes the overview of import taxes.
238 http://www.upf.edu/materials/huma/central-historia/xinamon/docums/seglesdoc/folanji.
htm (accessed 15 May 2013).
239 See Toby (2008), ‘Sakoku’, pp. 184-210. Toby based his arguments on the analysis of early 
modern illustrations of foreigners. This paragraph is largely based on Toby’s explorations.
240 Boscaro (1975), 101 Letters of Hideyoshi, p. 45.
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China’s role in cultural policies diminished. Politically, the Chinese ideal 
became increasingly attractive. Despite the geographically misleading 
denomination as ‘Southern Barbarians’, Europeans were recognised as 
coming from a very distant place. Upon the arrival of ‘black ships’ (黒船, 
jp. kurofune) in Japan, both central rulers and local daimyō were curious 
to f ind out more about these potential negotiating partners.241 After the 
Europeans were initially pressed into familiar categories and labelled as 
coming from India (jp. tenjiku), the Japanese worldview gradually changed 
from the ‘three-countries’ to a ‘many countries’ view.242 With Tokugawa 
rule, a new age of understanding the outside world and categorising the 
‘other’ began. Tokugawa off icials actively collected information on foreign 
countries, particularly about potential diplomatic and commercial partners. 
Furthermore, government off icials such as Ishin Sūden kept accounts of 
communication with foreign countries and their people.243
During the transformative period discussed here, the political idea of 
a homogeneous Japanese culture became a unifying element and a factor 
for legitimising power.244 As a result, engaging with strangers from the 
West paved the way for early modern Japanese nation building based on 
proto-nationalistic accounts of the outside world. The most prominent tool 
in that respect was a fabricated state ideology based on the Land of the 
Gods-Writ (神国, jp. shinkoku) and the attempt to create a model of Japan-
centrism similar to the Chinese concept of the Middle Kingdom.245 In theory, 
the ideology dated back to the ninth century, when it was implemented to 
defend Japanese independence with regard to China and Korea.246 Before 
the Tokugawa shogunate institutionalised the idea of a mandate of heaven 
(天命, ch. tianming, jp. tenmei) for the Emperor, or ‘Son of Heaven’ (天子, ch. 
tianzi, jp. tenshi), it served the Ashikaga shogunate and Hideyoshi as powerful 
propaganda in communication with foreign nations.247 The basic idea of the 
241 For the Manila Galleon, we have an example of autumn 1601. Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), 
Tsūkō ichiran, 179/567. The f irst kurofune to enter Japan was a Portuguese nau that anchored in 
Nagasaki in 1571. Thus the beginning of the Macao-Nagasaki trade is dated to that year. Originally, 
they were even believed to come from India, as Ronald Toby has shown in a fascinating article. 
Toby (1994), ‘Indianess’, p. 326.
242 Toby (2008), ‘Sakoku’, pp. 187-191; Arano (2005), ‘Kinsei nihon’, pp. 21-52; Miyoshi (2010), 
‘Sankoku kara’, pp. 172-177.
243 Kisaki (2005), Kinsei gaikō, pp. 15-26.
244 Watanabe (2010), Nihon seiji, pp. 12-30.
245 For shinkoku see also Souyri, World Turned Upside Down, pp. 7, 135-136; Totman (1982), Japan 
before Perry, pp. 104-105; Hudson (1999), Ruins of Identity, pp. 236-242.
246 Murai (2013), Chūsei nihon, p. 147.
247 See Laver (2011), Sakoku Edicts.
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concept was to place Japan on top of a hierarchical system of states. In addi-
tion, it served as a counterbalance against the rapid spread of Catholicism.
Despite measures such as the anti-Christian edicts of 1612 and 1614, 
described in later chapters, and shinkoku propaganda, foreign powers’ unfet-
tered influence worried Japanese rulers, and trade restrictions eventually 
followed. In 1633, the shogunate introduced its own law on maritime restric-
tion (海禁, jp. kaikin).248 In historiography, the combination of anti-foreign 
propaganda and strict maritime control encouraged the view of a ‘closed 
country’ (鎖国, jp. sakoku).249 Restrictions were based on f ive consecutive 
edicts issued between 1633 and 1639; it goes without saying that the actual 
term ‘closed country’ was not in use then. These regulations included a ban 
on leaving Japan, a ban on intermarriage between Japanese and foreigners, 
the prohibition of Christianity and eventually ended commercial interac-
tion with Portugal, Spain, and England. Economic and cultural exchange 
with the outside world was granted to the famous Dutch outpost Dejima, 
a man-made island off the port of Nagasaki that was initially built for the 
Portuguese in 1636, as well as to regular visits of Chinese, Koreans, and 
Ryukyuans to Tokugawa Japan, all of which were strictly regulated by the 
shogunate.250 Similar to the Chinese model, interaction with the outside 
world became strictly limited to specif ic ports. Satsuma served as the gate 
for Ryukyu merchants, Nagasaki for Chinese and Dutch traders, Tsushima 
248 Thanks to the works of Arano Yasunori, Ronald Toby, and others, historians of early modern 
Japan widely accept that the shogunate’s foreign restriction policies did not aim at a def inite 
closure of the country. Mizuno Norihito brilliantly summarised the different scholarly opinions 
on Tokugawa Japan’s state diplomacy. See Mizuno (2004), ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, 
pp. 109-110; Arano (2005), ‘Kinsei nihon’, pp. 21-52. Seventeenth-century propaganda oscillated 
between ‘expel the barbarians’ (攘夷, jp. jōi) and ‘open country’ (jp. kaikoku). Yamamoto (1999), 
‘Sakoku’, pp. 20-35.
249 The def inition of the concept itself dates back to Engelbert Kämpfer’s written accounts on 
Japan (translated to Japanese in 1801). Kämpfer, a German physician in service of the VOC, visited 
Dejima, Edo, and other parts of Japan in the 1690s during the Dutch monopoly as European 
traders in Japan. Cf. Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy, 4; 13: Toby’s study furthermore tells 
us that at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Japanese intellectual and Nagasaki Dutch 
interpreter Shizuki Tadao picked up Kämpfer’s interpretation of a closed country for defending 
Japan’s commercial status quo. An unpublished translation circulated privately until the 1850s. 
However, the term ‘closed country’, with its increasingly negative connotation, was only coined 
in the in later centuries, when a Japanese scholar translated Kämpfer’s surprisingly positive 
accounts in his late-seventeenth-century treatise (f irst published in 1727) on the ‘isolation’ of 
Japan.
250 Iwao (1953), ‘Kinsei Nagasaki’. He provides charts showing that between 1600 and 1660 about 
one-third of ‘Chinese’ ships coming to Nagasaki were from South East Asia. Between 1660 and 
1680 only one-fourth came from the Chinese mainland.
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for Korea and Matsumae for exchange with the Ainu of Hokkaido.251 Exam-
ining the image of foreigners in early modern Japan, Ronald Toby argues 
that during the seventeenth century East Asians were deliberately depicted 
as foreigners and considered exotic.252
Concluding Remarks
Understanding sovereignty as the central government’s sphere of influ-
ence, including political economy, information gathering, and the power 
to mobilise people according to the ruler’s will, Spain, China, and Japan 
displayed both similarities and differences. Spain’s active expansion and 
its rulers’ power to move people differed particularly from China.253 Japan 
at least on the surface resembled Spain. Focusing on the early years of 
triangular contacts in Manila, similarities in foreign policies were closely 
linked to concerns of governance in pre-modern Spain, Japan, and China. 
All three pre-modern states had an interest in controlling foreign trade, 
either for the sake of enriching their treasury or for the sake of guarding 
their territorial borders. Yet a strong state accomplished more than just 
keeping trouble out; it ultimately succeeded in creating cooperation with 
its society and transformed or unif ied it for the benefit of gaining access 
to prof its from foreign trade. All forms of state intervention should be 
understood as regulating and controlling measures, not as restrictions or 
total prohibitions.254
251 In terms of these restrictive policies it will be interesting to note that they were tightened up 
in 1715, when trade with the Chinese and Dutch (limited to two vessels from Batavia annually) 
was def ined in a catalogue of laws known as 正徳新例, jp. shōtoku shinrei. Thus the initial 
‘maritime ban’ had a comparatively f lexible character. A period of conservative economic 
thought followed, promoted by the famous bullionist advisor Arai Hakuseki, who warranted 
against exporting precious metals.
252 For the controversial case of the Kingdom of Ryukyu, see Lewis (2009), ‘Center and Periph-
ery’, pp. 424-443; Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy, p. 48; See also Watanabe (2007), ‘Ryūkyūjin 
ka wajin ka’. The article discusses the sensitive issue of Ming off icials who confused Japanese 
with Ryukyuans. For the Tokugawa Bakufu it became important to stress the ‘foreignness’ of 
Ryukyuans. Next to inventing a certain ‘foreignness’ as necessity for their tributary status, a 
further question has been raised: How did Ryukuans see themselves and what was their feeling 
of belonging based on? See Watanabe (2012), Kinsei ryūkyū, pp. 2-3.
253 I refer to a recently edited volume by European economic historians, Yun-Casalilla, O’Brien, 
Comín Comín (eds) (2012), The Rise of Fiscal States.
254 Stern (2014), ‘Companies’, pp. 177-195. He argues that early modern mercantile enterprises 
usually needed of backing of the state.
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Despite striking cultural differences, Spain, China, and Japan shared vari-
ous political features. One of them was the policy of creating foreign enclaves. 
The Spaniards created ethnic settlements outside the city walls of Manila, 
the Japanese sealed off Dejima in the Bay of Nagasaki and the Chinese sealed 
off Macao, just offshore from Guangdong province, for the very same reason: 
to ensure that foreign traders would not pose a threat to the social order. 
Yet, while all three pre-modern states tried to restrict free interaction with 
foreign merchants, potential economic advantages were just too big to fully 
forgo them: Proto-global processes made it impossible to shut off an economy 
or people entirely. More striking similarities abound in the sphere of foreign 
trade that should ideally be in the hands of the central authorities. Control, 
limitations and bans were omnipresent, yet occasionally relaxed, while in 
particular Spanish monarchs more regularly offered rewarding commercial 
opportunities to their subjects. Questions of what states did for their merchants 
and whether central governments should be considered an encouragement or 
an obstacle to successful connections will be examined below.
Religion was a political tool that helped to organise the state. Despite 
rational governing concepts, rulers of all three states claimed to have special 
relations with a divine power, a useful tool when claiming identification as 
the universal ruler. Spiritual support, religion, and philosophy were used and 
abused to satisfy imperial designs and legitimisation. Japan was rooted in a 
trinity of moral Confucianism, mythical Shinto, and metaphysical Buddhism 
as functionalist units of deities and an imperial tradition of the tennō. China’s 
ideological framework was also rooted in a trinity: Buddhism, local traditions, 
and strong Confucian concepts shaped the famous ‘Son of Heaven’ dogma. 
Early-seventeenth-century Spain was less complex in its religious devotion as 
the only accepted belief was the Roman Catholic faith. Their desire to spread 
the word of their God for political reasons was supported by the Papacy and by 
close political and spiritual ties to Rome. Nonetheless, the Spanish monarch 
understood his role as defender of the faith, not as impersonator of the divine.255
255 Grafe (2014), ‘Polycentric States’, p. 250.
Part II
Cross-cultural Encounters in the Philippines

2 The Foundations of a Global Stage
Y como esta tierra es tan nueva y sea de trata como pimpollo.1
The Early Modern Philippines
The Philippines were, according to the abovementioned quote by Governor 
General Santiago de Vera (r. 1584-1590), as fragile as a f lower bud. De Vera’s 
credo became a motto for the early decades of the Spanish period. The 
colonisation of the Philippines differed in many respects from what were 
seemingly similar projects in the Americas. In Asia, Spanish colonisation 
had less drastic demographic and ecological effects. Nonetheless, the ap-
plication of similar administrative patterns as in the New World created 
a picture of a ‘coercion-intensive state’.2 Indeed, early conquest under 
Legazpi and his men did not differ much from what had happened in the 
Americas: soldiers were stealing, raiding, and exploiting the natives, as 
criticised by the Augustinian friars Martín de Rada and Diego de Herrera.3 
Yet, in contrast to leyenda negra scholarship, the local population of the 
Philippines experienced more humane Spanish colonising methods. John 
Crossley has emphasised that Philip II, strongly influenced by the teachings 
of Bartolomé de las Casas, was determined to prevent a repetition of the 
bloody conquest of Mexico.4 The strong impact of the church was another 
distinguishing feature of historical treatises on the Spanish Philippines. 
They state that the islands were f irst and foremost a Catholic project 
because the colonisers’ religion had greater effect on the population than 
their language, their institutions, or even their food.5 As a matter of fact the 
1 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 
1587.
2 Tilly (1990), Coercion, p. 19; Daus (1983), Erfindung des Kolonialismus, p. 56: ‘Härteste Aus-
beutung nach unten und schamlose Unterschlagung nach oben waren die institutionalisierten 
Begleiterscheinungen.’
3 AGI Filipinas 84, n. 9, ‘Carta de agustinos sobre situación en Filipinas’, 8 June 1576. Martín 
de Rada complained that Spanish soldiers and off icials did not observe the kings’ instructions 
for peaceful conquest, collected tribute from the indigenous people and gave them a hard time 
in general.
4 Crossley (2011), Ríos Coronel, p. 10.
5 On the question why Castilian was never established as an off icial lingua franca in the 
Philippines, I refer to Phelan (1955), ‘Philippine Linguistics’, pp. 153-170. See also Rafael (2005), 
Contracting Colonialism; Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas.
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archipelago was far less Hispanicised than certain regions of the Americas. 
Many imperial goals were never accomplished, which made giving up the 
colony a permanent option of various Spanish governing bodies. In 1647, 
after almost one hundred years of active colonisation, Philip IV (r. 1621-1665) 
concluded that their colonial efforts in the Philippines were ineff icient and 
that the conversion in the Far East was nothing but a disappointment.6 The 
Philippines remained under Spanish rule only because they never were a 
purely Spanish project.
The positive reputation the islands enjoyed among friends and foes alike, 
regardless of whether these had actually set a foot on Philippine soil or simply 
judged based on hearsay, had roots in Manila’s character as a cross-cultural 
arena. There were always enough influential supporters in favour of the 
colony’s future as part of the Spanish territories. Ríos Coronel, for example, 
named evangelisation, political reasoning in connection with trade with 
China and Japan, and the need to secure Portuguese India as important 
reasons not to abandon the colonial project in Asia.7 Such propaganda was 
necessary due to the widespread view in Spanish governmental circles that 
the colonial effort in the Philippines was a heavy f inancial burden. Against 
a background of silver f lowing out to China, numerous petitions to give up 
the colony reached the Spanish King, because it was nothing but a losing 
deal for the royal treasury.8
The Islands in Pre-colonial Times
Approximately one to two million people with different languages, life styles, 
customs, traditions, and physical appearance inhabited the archipelago by 
1550. After f irst contact with the autochthonous population, the Spanish 
divided them into two groups, indios and moros, thereby disregarding their 
heterogeneous origins.9 The distinction was based on religious beliefs: 
Moros were Muslims and indios members of local tribes of Polynesian 
6 Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, pp. 43-44.
7 See Part 2 of Ríos Coronel’s Memorial of 1621, translated by John Crossley, http://www.csse.
monash.edu.au/~jnc/Rios/1621Memorial.pdf (accessed 15 June 2014).
8 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 4, n. 52, ‘Carta de Ronquillo sobre armada de Carrión contra Japón’, 1 July 
1582. In this letter to Philip II, the Governor invoked the King to abandon the Philippines for 
causing nothing but def icits.
9 The word ‘Filipino’ was not in use as generic term in the early modern period but only 
emerged during the nineteenth-century national movement. The term usually refers to the 
mestizo civilisation born in the Philippines. For the semantic development and historical 
denominations, see Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 5; Zaide (1949), Philippines, pp. 6-8.
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origin worshipping native deities.10 In terms of the language diversity, 170 
languages and dialects survived over the years. Many of them, including 
the eight major tongues (Cebuano, Tagalog, Hiligaynon, Waray, Ilocono, 
Pangasinan, Bicolano, and Kapampangan) show a dominant influence of 
the Austronesian language tree. Since Tagalog, with its Malay, Chinese, 
and Sanskrit loan words, became the historic lingua franca of colonial 
Manila, it also forms the basis for today’s national language – Pilipino.11 
Literacy was not widespread in the pre-colonial Philippines, contrary to 
polemics in early Spanish chronicles (e.g. Pedro Chirino’s).12 Indeed, early 
Spanish observers were impressed by the natives’ use of writing skills, their 
Baybayin script to be precise. The script consists of 20 letters comprising 
syllabary for only three vowels and no letter for ‘r’, and showed Arabic and 
Sanskrit influence.13
Islam had arrived on the islands from regions of present-day Malaysia and 
Indonesia around 1380. First the Sultanate of Sulu was founded under Sharif 
ul-Hashim, a second followed under Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuan in 
Maguindanao, from where Islam spread north to Mindoro Island, Maynila, 
and Batangas. The archipelago’s native population lived together in the 
barangay (conventionally, even if etymologically incorrectly, translated 
as village), a socio-political unit of between 30 and 100 families under the 
rule of a petty chief (tl. datu, meaning ‘leader’ rather than ‘ruler’).14 Not only 
were these villages constantly competing with each other,15 decentralisa-
tion and the limits of subsistence agriculture further hampered growth in 
pre-Hispanic times.16 According to Philippine historians, a datu ruled over 
common people (tl. tao) and was the only person who could accumulate 
wealth because theoretically everything belonged to him. A datu possessed 
10 Chronicles and other publications made ethnical stereotypes spread quickly in Europe at 
the end of the sixteenth century. See, for instance, Carletti (1966), Reise um die Welt, p. 110: ‘Die 
beiden Stämme sind recht unterschiedlicher Art. Das trifft sowohl für ihre Sitten und Gebräuche 
als auch für ihren Körperbau und ihre Bewegungen zu. Die moros haben häßliche Körper und 
Gesichter, sind dunkelbraun und haben eine träge und feige Gesinnung. Die anderen aber sind 
von schönem, kräftigem und stattlichem Körperbau. Ihre Hautfarbe ist heller, und im Umgang 
mit Waffen sind sie gewandt.’ For Spanish descriptions of the indios and their rites, see Morga 
(2008), Sucesos, pp. 290-291. 
11 Barrón (1992), Mestizaje, pp. 101-103.
12 Francia (2010), History, pp. 39-40; Scott (1984), Prehispanic Source, pp. 35-43.
13 Examples can be found in Juan de Plasencia’s Doctrina Christiana, printed by woodblock 
in Tagalog in 1593.
14 Crossley (2011), Ríos Coronel, p. 11.
15 Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 5; Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 67.
16 See Doeppers (1972), ‘Development of Philippine Cities’, p. 770.
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political, military, and religious power and his distinguished appearance 
depended to a large degree on his charisma.17 Similar to other pre-colonial 
South East Asian domains, servitude and slavery were common across the 
islands and often resulted from debt bondage, judicial punishments, inherit-
ance, and capture in warfare.18 The traditional social hierarchy included a 
datu, a non-chief elite, commoners, and slaves.
Maritime people had been attracted to the Philippines long before lucra-
tive interregional trade flourished in the Spanish colony. During several 
periods in history inhabitants of the archipelago participated in Asian 
long-distance trade. Although reliable written data is scarce, evidence for 
commercial contacts with China exists for the tenth century, when Chinese 
and Muslim trading networks connected the South East Asian archipelago 
with the mainland.19 The f irst secured Chinese record is part of the off icial 
Song Shi and dates back to the year 972, when people from Ma’i (probably 
located on the southern coast of Mindoro20) are mentioned together with 
other Barbarian tribute bearers, whose trade passed through Guangzhou 
(Canton).21 In 982, traders from Ma’i brought goods, including pearls and sea 
and forest products, to the Superintendent of Guangzhou. In 1001, the King 
of the city-state of Butuan, named Kiling, sent two tribute missions of gold 
to Beijing.22 The superintendent of maritime trade and customs inspector 
in Quanzhou, Zhao Rugua (趙汝适), includes detailed descriptions of Ma’i, 
which he located north of Borneo, in his Zhufan Zhu (諸蕃志, Chu Fan 
Chih, An Account of the Various Barbarians) of 1225. Accordingly, they had 
brought beeswax, pearls, tortoise shell, medicinal betel nuts, and cloth. In 
return, they received porcelain, iron pots, lead, iron needles, and coloured 
glass beads.23 Archaeological evidence furthermore backs a long history of 
trade with incoming Chinese junks in the regions of Pangasinan, the coast 
of Lingayen Gulf from Bolinao (Zambales) to Balaoan (La Union), and the 
17 Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, p. 28.
18 Junker (1999), Raiding, pp. 131-137.
19 For pre-Iberian Muslim and Chinese trade routes between Borneo and Luzon, see Ptak 
(1992), ‘Northern Trade Route’, pp. 38-41.
20 Scott (1991), Boat Building, p. 23; Scott (1984), Prehispanic Source Materials, pp. 65-68; 71-73.
21 For Chinese references to the Philippines, see Scott (1984), Prehispanic Source Materials, 
pp. 65-77.
22 Scott (1984), Prehispanic Source Materials, pp. 65-67. Envoys from Butuan entered Chinese 
records as Lihiyan and Jiaminan. See also Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, pp. 35-36.
23 William Henry Scott translated Zhao’s record. Scott (1984), Prehispanic Source Materials, 
pp. 68-69. Another Chinese off icial, Wang Da-yuan 汪大淵, composed a treatise 125 years later, 
Daoyi zhilüe 島夷志略 (Description of the Barbarian Isles), which included accounts on trading 
nations from several islands that form part of the modern Philippines.
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delta of the Agno River.24 From China’s Song period onwards, people in 
Pangasinan used porcelain jars for wine, and according to an early Span-
ish account in the sixteenth century, even ordinary people were wearing 
Chinese silk and cotton garments.25
Miguel de Loarca’s bold statement that ‘people of Pangasinan were more 
intelligent due to their contact with Chinese, Japanese and Bornean mer-
chants’ comes to mind.26 It not only summarises Spanish stereotypes but 
also encourages speculation about the significance of Chinese and Japanese 
traders before the arrival of the Spaniards. In the case of Japan, commercial 
contacts certainly did not evolve before the sixteenth century. As for China, 
when the Ming dynasty rose to power a ruler of Luzon responded to their 
diplomatic initiative by sending a tribute mission in 1373.27 Following the 
promotion tours of Zheng, the smaller kingdoms of the Philippine archi-
pelago began to send tributary missions to the Middle Kingdom in the early 
years of the f ifteenth century.28 According to the Ming Shi, Emperor Yongle 
sent an off icer with orders to establish Chinese suzerainty in 1405.29 Henry 
Scott claims that the Muslim ruler of Mao-li-wu on Mindoro visited China 
in 1405.30 The little that is known about direct interaction between Mindoro 
and China is that petty rulers soon lost interest in this demanding foreign 
trade pattern and stopped sending tributary missions to China.31 In the 
meantime, Chinese private maritime ventures started to arrive regularly 
in Visayas, Luzon, Pangasinan, and Mindanao.
24 For pre-Hispanic relations between China and ‘Lüsong’, see Wang (1970), ‘China and 
Southeast Asia’, p. 375.
25 When the Chinese-speaking father Bartolomé Martínez was shipwrecked on the coast 
nearby he was able to baptise 20 Chinese traders he found there. Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 248.
26 Cf. Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 248.
27 Scott (1984), Prehispanic, Source Materials, p. 67.
28 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/1599 (accessed 18 July 2013).
29 BR 34, p. 189; Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, p. 16: ‘The Ming annals mention 
that in the second year of his reign, the Emperor (Yung Lo) sent an Admiral Cheng Ho to Luzón 
to establish Chinese suzerainty over the island. Cheng Ho’s f leet of 60 vessels thrice attempted 
to reduce Luzon and the neighboring islands to vassalage. However, this attempt at dominion 
was discontinued after the death of Yung Lo and his admiral.’
30 Scott (1981), Boat Building, p. 23.
31 One of the most illustrious descriptions of pre-Hispanic interactions between the archi-
pelago and East Asia and how it allegedly contributed to the archipelago’s pre-Spanish economic 
history comes from the advisors to the US Chamber of Commerce of 1905: See Regidor, Jurado, 
Warren, Mason (1925), Commercial Progress, pp. 6-8. Their peculiar narrative stressed Chinese 
and Japanese contributions to the development of certain modes of production such as breeding 
f ish or working in metals. For the origins of Chinese interest in the islands, see also Von den 
Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 291. 
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The Arrival of the Spaniards
As a consequence of Ferdinand Magellan’s discovery of the passage from 
the Atlantic to the Pacif ic Ocean in 1520-1521 in the service of the Castilian 
Crown, the f irst group of Spaniards landed in the Visayas, the central region 
of today’s Philippines. The Portuguese explorer himself died in battle on the 
island of Mactan, ironically before being able to f inish his journey around 
the world.32 Yet not the Islas San Lazaro, as his expedition corps called the 
realm at f irst, but the nearby Moluccas (Spice Islands) caught the Spaniards’ 
fancy. The original target of exploring and gaining territory had overtones 
of the hegemonic dispute between the Castilians and the Portuguese that 
dated back to the beginning of the European expansion in the Atlantic. 
Magellan’s arrival in Cebu (also in the Visayas) shook the newly established 
balance of power between the two Iberian sea powers, who could not agree 
in whose sphere the Moluccas were located. Mathematicians, cartographers, 
and Crown off icials came into action but a f irst attempt to solve diplomatic 
disputes in Badajoz and Elvas in 1524 failed. In the meantime the Habsburg 
court under King Charles I (V) quickly commissioned further expeditions. 
A delegation led by Fray García Jofre de Loaysa set out to explore the Pacif ic 
in 1525. For a large percentage of the crewmembers, this adventure ended in 
a disaster even before reaching the Strait of Magellan. Under the command 
of Hernando de la Torre, 127 men eventually reached the Moluccas. However, 
the Portuguese from Melaka, a permanent Lusitanian trading colony in 
Malaysia since 1511, thwarted Spanish disembarkment.
A similar project, initiated by Hernán Cortes in New Spain fuelled ten-
sions with the Portuguese even further.33 A bilateral treaty was eventually 
concluded and signed on 22 April 1529 in Zaragoza. The imaginary line of 
the Treaty of Tordesillas was virtually extended to the Pacific and laid down 
297.5 leagues to the east of the Moluccas. The Portuguese received exclusive 
rights to take action in the Moluccas and the Spanish Crown abandoned 
her claims on the Moluccas in return for 350,000 ducats and the right to 
colonise what a few years later would be named the Islas Filipinas in honour 
of the Habsburg heir to the Spanish throne.
32 It was Magellan’s naval commander Juan Sebastián Elcano who completed the f irst world 
circumnavigation.
33 Hernán Cortes, in 1526 Governor and Captain General of New Spain, claimed that Spain 
should broaden its inf luence across the Pacif ic. Charles I provided him with a royal charter 
(cédula) dated 10 June 1526. See the articles in the following compilation: Martínez-Shaw, Alfonso 
Mola (eds) (2008), Ruta de España.
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Conventionalising the Pacif ic as Spanish Lake (lago español)34 or mare 
nostrum, like the Romans used to call the Mediterranean,35 the Spanish 
Crown organised further explorations in the ‘new’ ocean.36 A Mexican 
viceroy keen on direct access to the spice trade commissioned Ruy López 
de Villalobos’s expedition in 1542-1543, sailing with six ships from Navidad, 
New Spain, to Mindanao, and Leyte. Local hostility and a shortage of food 
supplies obliged the explorers to abandon their attempts to found a colony 
and to prepare the ground for a future Christian mission. Seeking sanctu-
ary on the Moluccas, they f inally surrendered to the Portuguese before 
Villalobos died in Amboina in 1546.37
For decades Castilian explorers failed to establish a return route (torna-
viage) to New Spain as an alternative to the Cape Route, which had been 
reserved for the Portuguese since the Treaty of Tordesillas. King Philip II 
had explicitly listed the establishment of a ‘return route from the western 
isles’ that he deemed ‘fairly short’,38 as a condition for future intervention 
in the East. Andrés de Urdaneta, who had not returned to Spain from the 
Loaysa expedition for 11 years until 1536, was able to lay the foundation 
for the trans-Pacif ic trade by establishing a feasible return route free of 
Portuguese interference on the galleon San Pedro in 1565.39
On 8 May 1565, Miguel López de Legazpi’s expedition founded the city of 
San Miguel from where Legazpi started the conquest or ‘pacif ication’ of Ce-
bu.40 In light of assaults by the indigenous population, he deemed it impos-
sible to follow the King’s instructions to avoid bloodshed. Continuous strug-
gles, conspiracies and a Portuguese attack in September 1568 persuaded him 
to move the colonial centre to the northern island of Luzon.41 The following 
year Legazpi, who was originally not equipped with the necessary order to 
34 Steinberg (2001), Social Construction of the Ocean, pp. 62-65; Such views, however, have 
lost ground in modern scholarship. To the contrary, the historical Pacif ic is nowadays widely 
understood as open, centreless space, where peoples, goods, and ideas moved rather unrestrict-
edly. See Matsuda (2006), ‘The Pacif ic’, pp. 758-780.
35 Gaynor (2007), ‘Maritime Ideologies’, p. 55.
36 Steinberg (2001), Social Construction of the Ocean, pp. 75-84.
37 Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 200; Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas, pp. 51-52.
38 Cf. Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 201. 
39 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 181: Heading towards the northeast, Urdaneta and his crew 
arrived on the 39th degree. From there they crossed straight to the coast of California on the 34th 
degree from where they would continue southwards and f inally reached the port of Navidad on 
1 October and Acapulco on 8 October the same year. See Macías Domínguez (2003), ‘Presencia 
española’, p. 35; See also Spate (1979), Spanish Lake, pp. 104-106.
40 Díaz-Trechuelo (2003), ‘Legazpi’, p. 49.
41 According to Spanish sources, a f leet under the command of Gonzalo Pereira supported by 
war prahu from the Moluccas led an unsuccessful attack. 
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conquer or colonise,42 was appointed gobernador general of the Philippines, 
and f inally received a royal charter that gave him the title adelantado and 
the right to found cities and distribute trusteeships (encomiendas)43 among 
his people.44 Following Urdaneta’s nautical achievement, the f irst group of 
Spanish and Mexican merchants and soldiers arrived with military supply 
in Cebu. When Spanish conquistadores spearheaded by Martín de Goiti 
and Juan de Salcedo reached the far more attractive Manila Bay in 1570 for 
the f irst time, they burned Muslim Maynila in a battle and left again. The 
following year Legazpi returned with 27 vessels and Visayan support to the 
Maynila area. In the meantime, local Muslim rulers had rebuilt the town 
but only to once again accept defeat on 3 June 1571.45
The Castilian Territorial Model
Land Seizure and Regional Administration
After the victory in Manila, Spanish rule gradually extended over Luzon 
and partially over the Visayas, while large parts of the rest of the islands 
remained outside of the Spanish sphere of influence throughout the entire 
colonial period.46 Manila offered particularly favourable conditions for a 
permanent settlement, a productive hinterland, a considerable number of 
inhabitants, a strategic position, and existing trading structures.47 After 
having outwitted the Muslim ruling elite, the Spaniards began systemati-
cally to suppress the independent barangay in order to enforce Spanish 
authority.48 The use of a divide-and-conquer (divide et impera) strategy and 
the implementation of colonial policies, which included the establishment 
42 Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas, pp. 58-59.
43 Encomienda refers to the labour system that was employed in the Spanish overseas colonies 
in the Americas and the Philippines. It was a sort of feudal right granted by the King to the 
colonial elite to obtain tribute or service from the native population in exchange for protection 
and indoctrination.
44 Written in the cédula real of 14 August 1569 that reached the Philippines at the end of the 
same year.
45 Francia (2010), History, p. 59.
46 This study does not allow looking at early colonising efforts in detail. For a concise overview, I 
refer to Gorriz Abella (2010), Filipinas antes de Filipinas. The author summarises and re-interprets 
the far-reaching studies by early Spanish reports by Miguel de Luarca, Santiago de Vera, and 
Pedro Chirino.
47 Villiers (1987), ‘Portuguese Malacca’, p. 44. 
48 Villiers (1987), ‘Portuguese Malacca’, p. 45.
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of permanent bases with political, military, economic, and religious centres, 
helped to impose Spanish rule. Unlike the Portuguese in Melaka, who used 
the existing structures of the Muslim outpost, the Spaniards built a new 
network of cities in the Philippines, all of them dependent on the central 
government of Manila.49 Nonetheless, even if Spaniards were the nominal 
rulers of the Philippines Spanish colonial rule in sixteenth-century South 
East Asia remained characterised by a very fragile power structure at the 
periphery of influential actors.
Early centralising measures failed due to the disunity of the population 
and ethno-linguistic differences. As was often the case with imperial-
ist constructs, ethnic heterogeneity proved originally favourable to the 
Spaniards. It enabled them to manipulate the situation by initiating wars 
between the local tribes and collaborating with antagonistic local lead-
ers, the aforesaid divide-and-conquer strategy. Although the majority of 
the Spaniards believed in destroying traditional structures for the sake 
of minimising indigenous resistance, after the conquest they had to rely 
on a mediating native elite and its existing socio-political organisations. 
Moreover, for the purpose of consolidating their rule it was necessary to 
grant special rights to the natives in urban centres, which ultimately assured 
the survival of their traditional culture. Datu who deliberately brought their 
people into Spanish settlements received the reward of being appointed 
gobernadorcillos. Natives who collaborated with the Spaniards were often 
given the task of demanding tribute from the local population and therefore 
enjoyed certain privileges and formal authority over the others, which gave 
them an opportunity to enrich themselves.50 These practices created a new 
class with principalía status.
Towns or pueblos were managed by native principalías, often under 
the strong influence of a parish priest. Provinces and municipalities, in 
turn, were administered by the mostly Spanish-born so-called alcaldes-
mayores.51 The administration of the Manila region was divided among 
alcaldes. Inhabitants of the municipal quarters were legally and off icially 
considered subjects of the local alcalde, who functioned as political off icial, 
49 For Portuguese Melaka, see Pinto (2006), Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka.
50 For a synopsis of the lives of indigenous population under Spanish rule, see Newson (2009), 
Conquest and Pestilence. Newson argues against the common belief that the indigenous suf-
fered a demographic decline, although to a less lethal extent than in the Americas, the reason 
being the complicated transport and communication networks that left many regions of the 
archipelago largely unaffected by Spanish conquest. For Spanish direct interaction with the 
native population, see Alatas (1977), Myth of the Lazy Native.
51 Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 134.
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military leader, and f inancial manager. The off ice was an easy source for 
revenue and consequently enjoyed great popularity. For the same reason 
the off ices and their distribution mostly among Spaniards constituted a 
very controversial matter, and over the years accusations of corruption 
f illed hundreds of court pages.52
Spanish economic structures did not directly affect the subsistence of the 
natives, and the pre-Hispanic political organisation of cabezas de barangay 
continued to serve social order more than decisions of the Manila govern-
ment did.53 Social and juridical matters were also subject to bargaining. 
Consultation of public opinion, interrogation, and questionnaires were 
typical tools of a reasonably democratic colonial administration between 
Hispanic and indigenous agencies. Inhabitants of the nearby Tagalog region 
were furthermore integrated into Spanish affairs by supplying Manila 
with necessities. We may conclude that this experience of administrative 
bargaining and constant compromising between the Spanish ruling elite 
and various indigenous agencies created an important condition for the 
development and maintenance of cross-cultural relations. Even if we accept 
that the role the colonial state played was comparatively strong, there is 
no way of denying that Manileños and surrounding peoples shaped and 
reshaped foreign maritime relations.
Regardless of economic dependence on foreign trade, politics were 
primarily based on the land-oriented encomienda system, without paying 
much attention to a region’s specific conditions. The encomienda was a ‘well-
def ined institution in which the holder performed certain governmental 
duties and in return received tribute’.54 After having been introduced in 
the Americas by the early conquistadores, it developed into a genuine tax 
resource for the Spanish Crown, funding both administration and exploita-
tion of the new territories.55 In the year 1576, an off icial count listed as many 
as 143 encomenderos in the Philippines, yet with limited rights. Between 
1574 and 1576, the monarch rejected two requests for further encomiendas 
52 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 95: ‘Es cosa muy notario [...] 
no se les paga a los alcaldes del Parián cosa ninguna sino solo el aprovechamiento que tienen 
de las tiendas de los dichos sangleyes que de ellas la pagan al dicho alcalde cada mes dos reales 
[...] vienen a montar un muy grueso salario y a los dichos alcaldes ordinarios ni de la real caja 
ni de los dichos sangleyes se les da cossa ninguna.’
53 Larkin (1972), Pampangans.
54 Schwartz, Lockhart (1989), Early Latin America, p. 92.
55 In recent years research has focused on the socio-political dynamics behind the system. 
Subrahmanyam (2007), ‘Holding the World in Balance’, for instance, stresses the dynamics from 
below in the spread of royal policy in the Spanish colonies.
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and grants.56 In combination with collecting indigenous tribute, alcaldes 
mayores and gobernadorcillos were granted major competences as heads of 
the indigenous communities.57 Although missionaries had long criticised 
the encomienda system for exploiting and abusing indigenous labour, their 
number grew.58 In 1591, 270 encomiendas forced 668,000 natives to work for 
the colonial economy.59 Upset by a growing rich land-owning class with 
the potential to undermine political power, they soon imposed restrictions 
and furthermore promoted the cultivation of agricultural products and 
thereby hoped to boost exports, although it never materialised.60 Private 
encomiendas were gradually confiscated and, at the beginning of the sev-
enteenth century, the colonial government appointed off icials and priests 
instead of encomenderos to administer the indigenous people. However, 
these reforms did not change the social welfare of the locals.61 In the long 
run, friar estates were not a perfect solution either.
By and large, Iberian colonisation-cum-evangelisation followed the 
doctrines of Tomas of Aquin and Francisco de Vittoria, which stipulated 
that force was only justif iable when the sovereign of a territory refused 
conversion of the people living in his realm.62 Vittoria’s claim ‘that under 
the law of nations Spaniards had the right to trade with them and preach 
Christianity’ became the basis for famous debates between Las Casas and 
Sepúlveda in Valladolid in 1550-1551. Similarly, in the Spanish Philippines 
indigenous people were theoretically only forced into a tribute relationship 
after they had had the opportunity to hear the gospel. The entire process, 
ironically referred to as ‘pacif ication’, forced the indigenous people to pay 
tribute. As indicated earlier, friars were the f irst to advocate better social 
conditions of the local population under Spanish rule, long before the 
56 Kamen (2012), Spain’s Road, p. 202; De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 13: ‘In the 1580’s, the area 
within f ive leagues [approx. 20 kilometres] of Manila was divided into four private encomiendas 
with a total population of 3,500 and one Crown encomienda with a population of 4,000.’
57 For a detailed description of the colonial administration, see Von den Driesch (1984), 
Grundlagen, pp. 268-270; His study reflects common narratives of contradictory views on how 
the indigenous should be dealt with.
58 Bishop Salazar as ‘Las Casas of the Philippines’. Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, 
p. 196.
59 Nuchera (1995), Encomienda, p. 178; Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 21. For other prevailing 
problems, see Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 6.
60 Hausberger (2008), ‘Reich’, p. 352.
61 Yun-Casalilla, Comín Comín (2012), ‘Spain’, pp. 234-244.
62 Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, pp. 200; 264-265.
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Audiencia decreed in 1598 that ‘Indians’ must not only be treated better 
but also instructed in the Catholic faith as ‘free vassals’.63
Another matter for constant debate was whether tribute should be paid in 
cash or kind. Although often paid in kind, it ‘forced the colony to produce for 
the market’.64 Thus, especially during periods of inflation, the system caused 
much hardship.65 Rates were not f ixed but varied depending on the prosper-
ity of a region. The clergy warranted against increasing indigenous tribute 
that would throw a large number of indigenous into slavery for not being 
able to afford higher taxes. Although slavery was generally forbidden based 
on the maxim that a Christian must not own anyone, a maxim introduced 
to the Philippines by order of the King in 1583, occasional exceptions were 
made for moro slaves.66 Slavery moreover continued to exist in indigenous 
circles since it was impossible to wipe out a socio-economic system that 
had functioned for centuries.
The average annual tax rate was changed to between 4 and 6 reals at the 
end of the sixteenth century.67 Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1560-1623), 
procurador general and advocate of the rights and the well-being of the 
native population, carried out a thorough investigation of their living condi-
tions, published in his 1621 memorial to the King.68 He concluded that the 
indigenous population paid 2 reals annually.69 Tribute was always a burden 
for large parts of the indigenous population, but was particularly high dur-
ing the armed maritime conflict with the Dutch from 1610 to 1640.70 This 
was also a period when food became scarce, because peasants had to leave 
their farms as they were forced into labour, often for shipbuilding.71 With 
63 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, pp. 53-54. The Manila synod of 1581-1582 and 1586 was 
launched to solve growing dualism in handling interactions with the indigenous population. 
The event took place under the chairmanship of Bishop Salazar. The outcome had only limited 
effects on the politics and justice on the archipelago.
64 Alonso (2003), ‘Financing the Empire’, p. 80.
65 Alonso (2003), ‘Financing the Empire’, pp. 71-79.
66 Newson (2009), Conquest and Pestilence, p. 7. Regardless of the off icial policy, random sources 
frequently mention house servants whose exact status remains unclear to the historian.
67 De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 19; Nuchera (1995), Encomienda, pp. 135-200.
68 An English translation is available online thanks to the efforts of John N. Crossley, http://
www.csse.monash.edu.au/~jnc/Rios/1621Memorial.pdf (accessed 4 April 2014).
69 Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 232; Based on such contemporary accounts, the 
historian Leslie Bauzon even calculated that by 1619 the Spanish government owed the Filipino 
people one million pesos due to forced labour and unfair trade policies. See Bauzon (1981), Deficit 
Government, p. 43.
70 Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 174. Financial data illustrate high military expenses 
during the same period; p. 157; See also García Fuentes (1980), Comercio español con América. 
71 Crailsheim (2014), ‘Las Filipinas, zona fronteriza’, pp. 141-149.
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an ever-growing unproductive population that required food, substantial 
shortcomings led to rising prices of commodities and goods.72 The US-
trained Filipino historian Leslie Bauzon has illustrated the f inancial misery 
of the Spanish Philippines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, con-
cluding that the Filipinos were largely ‘paying for their own colonisation’.73 
Bauzon furthermore argued that the colonial economy was dependent on 
f inancial aid from New Spain, the so-called situado real.74 Deriving from 
the treasury of New Spain, this imperial approach signif icantly helped to 
fund the colonial government by transferring financial surpluses.75 Between 
1610 and 1640, the situado included the ad valorem tax collected from the 
Manila Galleon trade in Acapulco, as well as 40 ducats per ton collected in 
Acapulco, and amounted to an annual average of 300,000 pesos.76
Table 1 Indigenous Tribute 1584-160477
Year











Three types of high off icials administered the colony: (1) the Governor 
General, (2) the judges and f iscals of the Supreme/High Court (sp. Audien-
cia), and (3) the Archbishop and the bishops.78 The hierarchical structure 
72 Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas, p. 125; Nuchera (1995), Encomienda, pp. 188-212.
73 Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 46.
74 Meaning subsidy, income, or appropriation. A general fund created to support ‘non-self-
supporting Spanish imperial outposts’. It was ideally raised from the returns from the Manila 
Galleon trade and freight duties in Acapulco. Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, pp. 56-60.
75 The system was not exclusive for the Philippines, but generally applied to help regions with 
perennial def icits. Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 9-10.
76 Alonso (2003), ‘Financing’, p. 80; Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas, p. 108; Cosano Moyano 
(1986), Filipinas y Su Real Hacienda.
77 Source: AGI Contaduría 1200-1206, cf. Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 166.
78 Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 6.
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of governing institutions had proven their eff iciency in Spain and Spanish 
America. The Governor General acted on behalf of the King and held execu-
tive authority in the Philippines. His far-reaching competences covered 
judicial and administrative affairs as well as military duties as captain 
general. Acting as royal vice-patron his relationship with the church in the 
colony equalled the King’s back in Spain. Financial matters were usually 
taken care of in the Governor’s weekly meeting of the Council of the Royal 
Treasury (Junta de Real Hacienda). The average tenure of a governor was 
short and many candidates saw this job as part of a tour of duty (royal 
authorities’ cursus honorum) prior to a more prestigious post on the other 
side of the Pacif ic, rather than building a permanent residence in Manila 
– even though this often remained a remote dream for many.79
Established in 1583, following the intervention of Gabriel Ribera, envoy 
of Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa to Spain in 1582, the Audiencia 
was set up as court of appeal, with a board of oidores (judges). Being in 
charge of civil and criminal affairs, entitled to intervene in both state 
and religious affairs, and even entitled to take over the government in the 
absence of the Governor, members of the Audiencia enjoyed undisputed 
political influence.80 In addition to the Audiencia, city councils (cabildos) 
were established in the major colonial centres.81 As a general rule of royal 
control each Audiencia consisted of senior off icials sent from Spain. They 
should not develop too close ties to the region they were working in. A 
peculiarity that illustrates the fragile character of Spanish rule was the 
abolition of the Audiencia between 1589 and 1595.82 Its failure has been 
explained with a general unpreparedness for the situation in Manila, plus 
an unf itting personnel and undef ined laws. Reopening the Audiencia 
after seven years was both a decision to keep the Philippines a part of the 
Overseas Empire and a clear initiative to demand serious commitment 
from the Spanish settlers to the colonial project in the East. The King urged 
Governor Tello de Guzmán and the judges to collaborate in creating a stable 
79 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, pp. 32; 195-197. In the later period of our study the average 
time in off ice amounted 4.5 years, until 1609 it was only 3.5 years. For a list of Governors see BR 
17, pp. 285-312.
80 AGI Patronato 25, r. 2, ‘Expediente sobre gobierno Islas Filipinas’, 1583; In the year of its 
establishment Governor Vera and three other auditors became the supreme organ for decision-
making in colonial matters. See Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, pp. 99-119.
81 Hausberger (2008), ‘Reich’, p. 350.
82 Alonso Sánchez, an ambitious Jesuit, whose scheming will receive more attention in 
subsequent chapters, was one of the driving forces behind the temporary abolishment of the 
Audiencia.
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government in light of growing trade with China.83 Control over colonial 
off icials was thereafter secured by the institution of the residencia – a 
body that scrutinised evidence for potential corruption and fraud against 
the Crown at the end of each off icial’s term in off ice, as well as occasional 
visits by inspectors (visitadores).
Spanish spiritual conquest went hand in hand with ecclesiastical ad-
ministration.84 In 1579 Philip II established the f irst diocese in Manila, 
the Dominican Domingo de Salazar was chosen as the f irst Bishop. Before 
his arrival, Augustinians controlled correspondence with the King and 
informed him about the needs of the islands. The Manila Synod of 1581/2 
was the f irst systematic step in that direction, being launched to solve grow-
ing dualism in handling interactions with the indigenous population. The 
outcome had only limited effects on politics and justice in the Philippines.85 
With the foundation of further dioceses, such as Nueva Segovia (Cagayan) 
under its f irst Bishop Miguel de Benavides in 1595, Manila was promoted to 
an archbishopric. Before long, the far-reaching political powers of the clergy 
caused friction with the civil government. The latter harshly criticised that 
‘ecclesiastics and religious quietly take away from and add to the instruction 
at will, and without the supervision of the Governor and the ecclesiastical 
superior, contrary to his Majesty’s orders’.86 Deciding which areas would be 
designed as joint agendas and in which f ields prelates and bishops were not 
to meddle with the government was a complex matter. The Crown aimed 
at keeping the bishops from overusing their power of excommunicating 
government off icials and also at limiting the secular power of ordinary 
priests by prohibiting their active participation in foreign trade.87
Within the Overseas Empire, the Philippines were subordinate to the 
Viceroyalty of New Spain and strictly speaking it was only after 1821 that 
the Philippines were ruled directly from Spain. Nevertheless the Philippines 
were not exclusively treated as a dependency of New Spain, or a colony 
under the auspices of another colony, as often proclaimed in historical 
83 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 79.
84 Hausberger (2000), Für Gott und König; The Spanish Inquisition had not been off icially 
introduced in the early decades and no independent tribunal existed in the Philippines. Mexico 
was responsible for religious control or heretic trials. Yet that did not mean that the Philippines 
would have been spared religious intolerance: revisionist work has dug up shocking inquisition 
f iles on Filipino cases in Mexico, crushing the narrative of a bloodless conquest of the Philippines.
85 Camuñez (1980), Sínodo. 
86 BR 10, p. 80. A quote by Antonio de Morga.
87 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 80.
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writing.88 In fact, the Crown tried hard to restrict the growing power of 
the Viceroy. In 1607 Philip III (r. 1598-1621) issued a decree ordering his 
highest representative in Mexico to ‘give aid to the governor and captain 
general of the Philippines in whatever may occur’ and to send him the 
necessary amounts of arms, men, munitions, and money for the conserva-
tion and management of those islands.89 The King’s intervention has to be 
understood in the context of lingering Dutch naval aggression in the China 
Seas. With regard to the question of the role of Mexico, it is particularly 
crucial to distinguish between financial and political agendas. Regina Grafe 
and Alejandra Irigoin argued in 2008 that ongoing internal struggles over 
who would f inance overseas politics characterised colonial reality in the 
Spanish Overseas territories, emphasising that any ‘legislative initiative 
[...] was subject to influences from multiple players’.90 Their assumption 
holds major relevance for the Philippines: Both the colonial authorities of 
the Philippines and their Mexican colleagues ultimately had to bend to the 
wishes of the Habsburg monarch. Yet, since colonial staff did not always 
feel obliged to carry out missives from above, I agree with Leslie Bauzon 
that ‘the Philippines were practically independent and self-suff icient in 
the consideration of matters purely political in nature’.91 Royal orders were 
ignored in places far away from central control.92 Several scholars have 
suggested that the Spanish administration indeed worked according to the 
principle se obedece, pero no se cumple (‘one obeys but does not comply’), 
a tactic that naturally invited conflict, and was all too present in such 
geographically remote place.93
Secular and Ecclesiastical Administration
Prospects of spreading Roman Catholic Christianity in the region was 
without any doubt a fairly strong imperialist impulse behind the colonisa-
tion and friars were often regarded as particularly reliable colonisers. The 
Catholic mission has often been ideologically linked to the spirits of the 
88 Among others by Villiers (1987), ‘Portuguese Malacca’, p. 53.
89 Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 10.
90 Grafe, Irigoin (2008), ‘Bargaining’, pp. 178; 204.
91 Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 8: ‘The only years during which the Philippines colonial 
regime can be said to have been subordinated to the viceregal government of Mexico were those 
from 1565 to 1583 and between 1589 and 1595, when no audiencia existed.’
92 Nuchera (1995), Encomienda, p. 188.
93 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620; Phelan (1960), ‘Authority and 
Flexibility’, p. 59.
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crusades and occidental f ights against Islam. Although the Roman Catholic 
faith is indeed the most visible heritage of the Spanish colonisation, I would 
not go as far as nineteenth-century American historian Edward G. Bourne, 
who stated that the Philippines were ‘more of a mission outpost than a 
colony’.94 During the early colonial period, friars were easily lured to the 
Philippines: Eager to work in the promising f ields in China or Japan many 
aimed to use to use the Philippines as a way station but these hopes were 
mostly dashed by reality and doors to China and Japan were kept shut. 
Even so, any off icial Spanish action in Asia also has to be regarded in the 
context of regular endeavours to spread and protect Catholicism globally. 
The King initially hesitated before f inally decreeing on 8 June 1585 that 
passages to China were prohibited for any Spanish missionary without 
explicit permission given in the Philippines to enter China for conversion.95
Collaboration with Catholic missionaries was conveniently institution-
alised through the patronato real, an agreement between the pope and the 
Spanish Crown that gave the Spanish monarch and colonial authorities power 
over the clergy and churches in the colonies.96 In return for Rome’s support, it 
was the King’s duty to provide financial support and protection to the church 
in its overseas possession and to pay the friars’ passage to the Indies.97 In the 
Philippines, clergymen often depended on the favour of willing encomenderos 
for covering missionary expenses,98 which to some degree made them ‘salaried 
employees of the Spanish Crown’, as Luis H. Francia has termed them.99 The 
situation changed once Catholic priests had found profitable ways to sustain 
themselves in form of friar estates, where they virtually governed absolutely.
Catholic friars’ governance had far-reaching effects on the indigenous 
population. With a desire to translate the Christian gospel and occidental 
values into local languages, clerics early on showed interest in learning 
indigenous languages. Juan de Plasencia was one of the f irst friars to master 
Tagalog, determined to integrate the indigenous into the colonial society.100 
94 Bourne (1907), Discovery, Conquest and History. Both John Leddy Phelan (1959) and Vicente Ra-
fael (1993) have extensively studied forms of syncretism and so-called Philippine ‘folk Catholicism’.
95 BR 25, p. 137. 
96 Lach, Vankley (1993), Asia, vol. 3,book 4, pp. 202-204. Pope Leo X granted the Jus patronatus 
to the Portuguese Crown in 1514; For the religious orders’ contribution to the administration of 
Manila see AGI Filipinas 77, n. 15; 1602; see also Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, pp. 108-110.
97 Lach, Vankley (1993), Asia, vol. 3, book 4, p. 200.
98 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 110.
99 Francia (2010), History, p. 64.
100 Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, pp. 29-30. His early efforts in collecting material on the Tagalog 
language and producing material for the conversion of the native population are part of Plasen-
cia’s legacy.
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In their function as the educating class, the clergy took care of moral issues 
such as guarding the residents against forbidden gambling and indulging 
in immoral practices that were common among the Chinese.101 Nonetheless 
it is hard to deny the double standards and blackmailing tactics behind 
charitable work. On the one hand, the native population was often lured into 
moving into church estates by being promised titles and presents, and if that 
did not help, friars sought the help of soldiers. On the other, missionaries 
were of utmost economic and social importance for infrastructure projects 
such as building roads, bridges, irrigation canals and dams, introducing new 
plants from New Spain and Europe, and for providing for social welfare by 
running orphanages and hospitals. They were the only source of organised 
education and the f irst to found schools and universities. Needless to say, 
only a small percentage of the native population benefitted from the like.102
Despite the friars’ undisputed importance as Spanish colonisers, in the 
long run, Catholic celibacy hindered active integration of indigenous com-
munities.103 Early on, they were requested to employ a more bureaucratic 
approach to accelerating indigenous acceptance of Spanish rule across the 
archipelago. Implemented jointly by church and state, resettlement programs 
(reducciones) from barangays to newly built towns with a church in the cen-
tre should serve religious submission for better access to work force and more 
efficient taxing. In social terms, the all-encompassing power of the friars was 
particularly harmful to women and their important social status alongside 
their healing practices in the pre-Hispanic traditional society. Since religious 
administration was an entangled political issue, baptism determined the 
status and treatment of the settlers from East Asia.104 Economically speaking, 
however, conversion to Christianity was not a requirement for a fruitful life in 
Manila. The majority of migrants from China did not convert to Catholicism 
and kept their status as sangleyes infieles, as we shall see later.
101 Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas, pp. 102-104.
102 Filipino historian Vicente Rafael has claimed that Catholicism was the integrating element 
for the Filipino nation and that especially conversions of Tagalogs accelerated that process. 
See Rafael (1993), Contracting Colonialism, pp. 6-19. Phelan (1959) analyzed the f ilipinisation of 
Catholicism in Hispanization of the Philippines. The f irst school for indigenous children opened 
in 1589 in Manila (San Ignacio) and was run by the Jesuits. A university was added in 1621. The 
oldest university of Manila is Santo Tomás, a Dominican establishment of 1611. See Barrón (1992), 
Mestizaje, p. 108.
103 Hausberger (2008), ‘Reich’, p. 353. See also the articles in Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, Delgado 
Ribas (eds) (2011), Filipinas un País entre dos Imperios.
104 Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, p. 53; Francia (2010), History, pp. 67-69; Junker 
(1999), Raiding, Trading.
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Between 1575 and 1596, a total of 454 members of mendicant orders 
reached the Philippines.105 As soon as the strategically gifted Dominicans 
obtained the Episcopal See in Manila power struggles with the Augustin-
ians, as the f irst Catholic order on the archipelago, became obvious and 
with the arrival of the Jesuits debates on who used the better proselytising 
methods did not come to a halt anymore.106 The government of Philip II 
felt impelled to intervene on 27 April 1594: Doctrines were unif ied for the 
entire colony in order to avoid confusion among the natives107 and the orders’ 
competences were geographically divided.108 Only in the Tagalog provinces 
around Manila were all the orders represented. This measure both increased 
clerical power in the countryside and affected the linguistic development 
of the archipelago since friars could concentrate on the language(s) of 
their realms. However, with the exception of Tagalog most efforts were 
ineff icient, as John L. Phelan concluded.109
Table 2 Catholic Friars in the Spanish Philippines110
Time of first arrival







105 Lach, Vankley (1993), Asia, vol. 3, book 4, p. 202.
106 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. ccxlix: In 1625, archbishop Don Fray Miguel García 
Serrano requested from the King to assign the entire missionary work exclusively to the Jesuits. 
107 Chirino (1969), Relación de las Islas Filipinas, p. 20.
108 Phelan (1955), ‘Philippine Linguistics’, p. 154.
109 Phelan (1955), ‘Philippine Linguistics’, pp. 158-159. In order to facilitate the spread of the 
gospel among the native population, four different printing presses were established: the Do-
minican press in 1593, the Franciscan press in 1606, the Jesuit press in 1610, and the Augustinian 
press around 1618.
110 Data is based on De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 9: The f irst four Jesuits who arrived in the 
Philippines in 1581 from Mexico travelled at the King’s expense and were given additional 
1500 pesos for their journey. They left Acapulco on the galleon San Martín, the same vessel on 
which the f irst bishop of Manila travelled. The passengers of that year’s Manila Galleon are 
representative and underline the political importance of evangelisation at that time: Next to 96 
off icers, about 100 passengers including Domingo de Salazar and his secretary, Fray Cristóbal 
de Salvatierra, eighteen Augustinians and six Franciscans and the four Jesuits were on board.
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In terms of religious practise, the Philippines did not differ much from 
other colonial stages: Christian belief blended with native religious rites, 
and the longer the engagement the more hybrid forms of worshipping and 
celebrating emerged.111 The native society had to no other means than 
understanding the new religion through familiar concepts.112 What is more, 
the Spaniards did not succeed to integrate the entire population. While the 
Igorotes north of Luzon resisted all evangelisation efforts,113 Islam remained 
the biggest challenges for the new ruling elite. Backed by the Sultanate 
of Sulu, a f ierce enemy of the Spaniards, Islam was disseminated in the 
southern Philippines, where Muslim datus united against the Spanish.114
Crown Monopolies: Overseas Spain’s Political Economy
It goes without saying that a territorial colony of a size and scope of the 
Philippines was not easy to maintain and caused considerable f inancial 
drawbacks in the long run.115 During the whole period, Spain failed to make 
the islands self-suff icient and struggled with expenditures higher than 
income. In 1584 the colonial government spent off icially 41,231 pesos and, 
had pending bills of 30,000 pesos, while only 30,000 pesos had entered the 
royal treasury.116 Between 1608 and 1637 expenditure exceeded income 
twice; under these circumstances the colonial government was perma-
nently indebted to the people and the church organisations of Manila such 
as the Hermandad de la Misericordia (est. 1594). Alonso, who criticised 
Bauzon’s established study for not using primary sources, argued – based 
on analysing contaduría data – that after initial low income the royal 
treasury annually gained an average of 560,000 pesos between 1604 and 
1648, coinciding with increased military spending due to conflicts with the 
Dutch.117 Records of 1611 confirm that declining income from indigenous 
111 See Parker (2013), ‘Converting Souls’, pp. 55-71.
112 According to Vicente Rafael the Tagalog society viewed Christianity through cultural lenses 
of ritual debt. On religious authority and clerical privileges, see Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State 
and Society, p. 50. 
113 See Scott (1974), The Discovery of the Igorots. 
114 Reid (1993), ‘Islamization and Christianization’, pp. 151-179; See also Majul (1973), Muslims 
in the Philippines, pp. 107-316; Saleeby (1976), Studies in Moro History.
115 See Phillips (2000), ‘Growth and Composition’, p. 98; Alonso (2003), ‘Financing’, p. 64.
116 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 110.
117 Alonso (2003), ‘Financing’, p. 70.
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taxation was compensated by licence fees collected from incoming Chinese 
merchant ships.118
Next to military expenses embassies to neighbouring countries were 
f inancially challenging.119 By 1608 costs incurred for diplomatic exchange 
had gone up to 6000 pesos but were cut down to 1500 pesos the following 
year.120 Even if placed in context of a peak in diplomatic exchange with Japan 
(discussed in depth in the following chapters), these numbers are telling. 
It would be wrong to understand them as mere expenses in the sense of 
spending with no return; instead they are a sign of Spanish adaptation to 
the prof itable framework of East Asian diplomacy and trade. They were 
classif ied ‘extraordinary expenses’ and reasonably considered a necessary 
means to ‘maintain friendship’, in other words peaceful trade relations with 
China, and in particular with Japan.
Table 3 Revenues and Spending of the Manila Treasury in 1611121
Revenue in pesos Expenses in pesos





Situados 10,904 war expenses 41,209
extraordinary revenue 172,208 Factory 86,782
Almojarifazgo 31,725 Doctrines 14,980
trade fines 1,445 Sailors 6,196
Justice fines 407 wage labour 14,220
tenth in gold 2,888 Mercies 1,687
ecclesiastic tenth 33 Loans 27,056
Loans 6,556 Jurisdiction 367
refunds 368 war with the Moluccas 40,947
Silver from New Spain 295,776 balance 131,914
Freight 4,170
Sold offices 2,320




118 AGI Contaturía, leg. 1609 fols. 464 & 464v; cf. Alonso (2003), ‘Financing’, p. 72.
119 Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, pp. 43-45. In 1580, these embassies cost the Philippine’s 
treasury 1500 pesos.
120 Cf. Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 83.
121 AGI Contaduría 1609, fs. 464-464v, cf. Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 157.
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Philip II’s secretary Juan de Ledesma’s memorandum of the Council of the 
Indies of 1586 neatly summarises the economic dilemma. He stressed that 
the royal treasury had spent more than 3,000,000 pesos on the discovery, 
settlement and maintenance of the Philippines, whilst only 12 pesos were 
levied on one tonelada of export and import.122 Early on, a remarkable gap 
existed between political theory and economic reality. Very different from 
his two direct predecessors (Gonzalo and Diego Ronquillo were active 
investors in the trade between Peru and China), Governor Santiago de Vera 
(r. 1584-1590) exhibited a surprisingly conservative economic understanding. 
In the year 1586, he claimed that colonisation should be encouraged by the 
abundance of a country’s natural resources as well as the good prospects for 
future discoveries, not by the profits of commercial exchange. Therefore, he 
concluded, trade with China had to be stopped.123 As we will see, trade with 
China did not come to an end, nor was the monopoly off icially abolished; 
in fact, after 1587, Vera himself became a great supporter of triangular trade 
relations.
Mexican merchants were particularly interested in keeping good trade 
relations with China.124 In the 1590s, Spanish off icials commonly believed 
that integrating the hinterland and its people would help to improve the 
economic situation of the Philippines. Yet, during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries only 10 per cent of exports leaving the Philippines 
were of native origin, mostly harvested forest and sea products.125 Measures 
aiming to prevent the outflow of silver pesos to China remained the most 
prominent economic policy, resulting in a strictly controlled Manila trade.126 
The Manila Galleon regulations of the years 1593 and 1604 (discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter) have to be considered against this background.127 
The perception of the economic possibilities of the Manila market was also 
a matter of biased, public discourse fuelled by the idea that liberalisation 
would cause high expenditures either for Madrid or Mexico City. Indeed, 
in sharp contrast to the Portuguese Estado da Índia, the Philippines were 
122 Santiago de Vera in a letter to Archbishop Moya y Contreras, Manila, 20 June 1585 cf. De la 
Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 643.
123 Ratif ied by the King in June 1586. BR 6, pp. 297-298.
124 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, pp. 118-119.
125 Legarda (1999), After the Galleon, pp. 101-145. The end of the galleon trade and export of cash 
crops changed the number to 90 per cent after 1840.
126 Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 11-14.
127 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 30.
116 SPAIN, CHINA, AND JAPAN IN MANILA, 1571-1644
not maintained merely through prof its from maritime trade.128 Here, of 
course, the question arises how feasible it is to compare the Philippines as 
territorial colony with a trading post.129 The Crown did not provide much 
support for the few Spaniards who traded in Manila, let alone invested 
in creating institutions for the trans-Pacif ic trade. In light of this off icial 
attitude the Philippines may have lacked the same ideological rank as the 
colonies in the Americas. The fact that the metropolis had shifted important 
issues of f inance and human resources to the viceregal authorities is just 
one example for their negligence of the Philippines.
Crown intervention undeniably had an inhibitive impact on foreign 
trade. Yet it must not be overlooked that Manila trade grew rapidly, largely 
beyond the Crown’s supervision. Fully aware of these dynamics the Crown 
consequently aimed at channelling prof its from the colonial economies 
to the motherland.130 Control was pursued with the help of expanding 
functions of the Casa de Contratación in Seville. In fact, the Crown aimed 
at monopolising the entire Manila trade since the very day when Legazpi 
established a customhouse (real hacienda) right after the foundation of 
Manila.131 An ad valorum tax on both imports and exports, the almojari-
fazgo, was established for all Spanish colonies.132 In Manila it was collected 
from Chinese and Portuguese traders, initiated by Governor Ronquillo 
de Peñalosa in 1581 as a 3 per cent tax on in- and outgoing Chinese com-
merce that netted about 30,000 to 40,000 pesos a year during the 1590s.133 
128 Subrahmanyam (2007), ‘World in Balance’, pp. 10-11. For the organisation of the Portuguese 
realms in Asia with the largely autonomous Estado da India that f inanced the enterprise with 
customs, taxes and other tributes, see Feldbauer (2005), Portugiesen in Asien, p. 82: ‘Was die 
Portugiesen so zäh verteidigten, war keine Kolonie im spanisch-lateinamerikanischen Sinn.’ 
They only had sovereign power over Ceylon, the Moluccas, Goa and the coastal region of Gujarat. 
129 See, among many others, Gipouloux (2009), Méditerranée Asiatique, pp. 144-148; 160-161. 
However, most scholars who praise the f irst outpost empires in Asia overlook the fact that the 
Portuguese came under totally different conditions, with different aspirations, and were in 
many cases only successful until the Dutch arrived with more elaborate means of coercion.
130 Burkholder, Johnson (2001), Colonial Latin America, p. 146; Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, 
p. 90.
131 Mahoney (2010), Colonialism, pp. 37-38; AGI Filipinas, 339, l. 1, f. 41v, ‘Petición de cuentas 
detalladas de la Hacienda de Filipinas’, 4 June 1572.
132 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 6, n. 43, ‘Carta de Ayala sobre ventas de of icios, encomiendas’, 29 June 
1589. The Leyes de Indias (Laws of the Indies) are a set of commands and decrees for the overseas 
territories. Originally passed by the Catholic Monarchs, the Laws of the Indies have often been 
considered an ineff icient instrument to assert real authority in the New World. However, in 
economic terms they helped to levy revenues (such as the quinto real) in the name of the king.
133 Cf. Ollé (2006), ‘Formación’, p. 41; Cf. Deng (1997), ‘Foreign Staple Trade’, p. 266. The Chinese 
contribution to the almojarifazgo is also listed in AGI Contaduría 1204, f. 199v.
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Mainly imposed on luxury goods, it was quickly promoted as a safe source 
of revenue and a backup in case of failing encomienda policies. In 1609 
the almojarifazgo changed from 3 to 6 per cent in 1609.134 Pierre Chaunu 
calculated for the period between 1600 and 1640 that almojarifazgo rev-
enues annually ranged between roughly 17 and 27 per cent of the royal 
treasury (caja real).135 Supervision and trade control began with Spanish 
soldiers inspecting the junks from Fujian before anchoring in Manila Bay. 
No merchant was allowed to step on the mainland before the registration 
of all the merchandise had been concluded. In the seventeenth century a 
judge ( juez de visitas), often together with a clerk (escribano) and a resident 
Chinese or Chinese mestizo as interpreter, replaced the ordinary soldiers. 
This pattern of port control became a lucrative business for the inspectors 
who had the chance to enrich themselves through bribery.136
The Pillars of the First European Capital in the East
What has not been mentioned yet, promising trade relations with China 
were the strongest impetus for Legazpi and his followers to found the co-
lonial capital at the site of Manila; the initially small trading port offered 
optimal conditions for foreign trade with East and South East Asia and 
guaranteed supply from outside.137 Within a few years Manila transformed 
into a European colonial city with native elements. Before long the city 
would be replete with typical Spanish colonial features such as parallel 
and perpendicular straight streets, a cathedral, and government build-
ings made of stone in the centre. Urbanisation has often been regarded 
as a major accomplishment in Spanish colonial settings and the key in 
understanding Spanish imperialist success. Towns and cities eff iciently 
accelerated centralisation and control through the colonial architecture of 
power, resettling the native population, which could also be interpreted as 
effort to keep ethnic groups ‘governmentally, ecclesiastically, socially, and 
134 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 6, n. 43, ‘Carta de Ayala sobre ventas de of icios, encomiendas’, 29 June 
1588. Data collected by Ríos Coronel in 1621. Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, pp. 232-233. 
For the year 1626 the same author listed only 22,000 pesos.
135 Chaunu (1960), Les Philippines, p. 92.
136 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 36-49.
137 Illustrated in the foundation document by notary Hernando Riquel, 19 June 1572. Cf. Díaz-
Trechuelo Spinola (1959), Arquitectura Española, p. 7. Three years later, on 20 June 1574, Manila 
received the title insigne y leal and in 1595 cabeza de Filipinas, capital of the Philippines. Its coat 
of arms composed of half lion and half dolphin with a castle and a crown as imperial symbols 
was created in 1596. See also BR 9, p. 211. 
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spatially separate’.138 Spanish architecture was unsuitable for the climate, 
f ires and earthquakes that destroyed large parts of constructions made of 
ill-suited traditional materials such as reed and local wood, jeopardising 
early Spanish urban planning. 139
In any newly founded city of the Overseas Empire, a municipal govern-
ment (sp. cabildo municipal, or city council) oversaw the development and 
administration of the new community. Carla Rahn Phillips has stressed 
the importance of ‘municipal identity’ for the organisation of any Spanish 
colonial society.140 The municipal government was Manila’s f irst governing 
institution and linked the overseas community and the metropolis to each 
other. During the early years, the small cabildo of Manila of only two mayors 
(sp., alcaldes) and a varying number of municipal councils or aldermen 
(sp., regidores), one alguacil mayor (judge in charge of peace and order), 
and a clerk, met twice a week.141 Being in charge of guaranteeing the city’s 
supply cabildo members were instructed to collaborate with native and 
Chinese residents.
Vicious Demographic Circles
Early modern reports on living conditions in Manila create a confusing 
image: While many settlers seemed unhappy and disillusioned, the outside 
world envied their prospects of allegedly easy access to huge profits.142 In 
reality, the tedious migration across the Pacif ic and the high mortality rate 
138 Doeppers (1972), ‘Development’, p. 769; Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 65: ‘Just as writers on 
Southeast Asian urbanism seem inclined to ignore or to give only passing reference to the pivotal 
role of hispanized towns and cities in facilitating the early transfer of a Great Transformation 
nurtured in Iberia to the Philippines, so have they failed to adequately depict the revolutionary 
impact of Spanish resettlement programs in inaugurating the colonial urbanization of Filipinos 
before most Western power had even acquired a tenuous foothold in lands to the east of the 
Cape of Good Hope.’
139 Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, p. 53.
140 Burkholder, Johnson (2001), Colonial Latin America, pp. 85-91; Phillips (2007), ‘Organization’, 
p. 78.
141 Díaz-Trechuelo (2003), ‘Legazpi’, p. 51. For a list of all alcaldes and regidores see Merino (1980), 
Cabildo, pp. 120-124. Jurisdiction lay in the hands of alcaldes ordinarios, who were usually not 
part of the municipal government.
142 For a general study of the Philippines’ demographic development, see Merino (1980), Cabildo, 
pp. 35-36. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the number of Spaniards in the whole 
colony including soldiers amounted to some 2200, at best. Three hundred households were 
registered in Manila. In the same period already more than 20,000 Chinese lived in the area 
around Manila, despite the off icial order from Spain that their number must not exceed 6000.
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of Spanish settlers made circumstances in Manila difficult: the entire colony 
suffered from a shortage of willing, well-educated settlers and Manila would 
indeed not have survived without input from China. Yet, this must not be 
overrated. Urban history research has made it clear that no major city in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century was able to reproduce its population 
without external help.143 A permanent surplus in the male population was 
another factor shared by many cities, including Manila.144
One of the earliest accounts we have is a record of Governor Francisco 
Sande (r. 1575-1580), who counted 500 Spaniards in the entire colony in the 
year 1576.145 In 1581, the city hosted between 300 and 400 Spaniards, of whom 
only 50 were adult females. Of around 1000 new Spanish settlers who were 
sent from New Spain to colonise the archipelago in 1585, 800 were garrisoned 
in Manila.146 About 20 years later, Governor Tello (r. 1596-1602) estimated 
that 1200 Spaniards lived on the islands, lamenting the lack of military men 
in Mindanao and Cagayan.147 Forty per cent of the Manila Spaniards at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century were encomenderos and more than 30 
per cent soldiers or ordinary citizens.148 In the 1620s, 2400 men and women, 
including some mestizos, were registered in the Manila parish.149 In 1637, 
more than 65 years after the foundation of the city, Manila only counted 150 
households.150 Due to a dearth of Spanish women, the Spanish-indigenous 
mestizo population grew rapidly. Comparatively speaking, these numbers 
were not so much smaller than the Spanish population of Peru in the f irst 
40 years of colonial rule, however in the Americas it grew at a much faster 
pace during the following century.151
143 Knittler (2000), Europäische Stadt, pp. 37-38.
144 Knittler (2000), Europäische Stadt, pp. 43-44, lists garrison cities, university cities, and 
port cities as well as ecclesiastical centres as places with signif icant male overpopulation. For 
demographical data and a general lack of women in Hispanic realms, see the pioneering work 
of Boyd-Bowman (1973), ‘Patterns of Spanish Emigration’, pp. 580-604. 
145 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 3, n. 23, ‘Carta de Sande sobre jornada de China’, 2 June 1576.
146 Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 46; Iaccarino (2008), ‘Manila as an International Entrepôt’, 
p. 77.
147 AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 7. n. 61, ‘Carta de Tello sobre posible ataque de Japón’, 19 May 1597.
148 Merino (1980), Cabildo, pp. 35; 57-58; for a list of the Spanish citizens in Manila see ibid., 
documental supplement: pp. 77-119.
149 Cf. Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 38.
150 Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 14.
151 Mahoney (2010), Colonialism, p. 67: 2000 in 1536 and about 5000 in the 1540s but already 
about 8000 by 1555. Even though the situation in certain places in the Americas seemed more 
favourable to the Spaniards, one should in general not overestimate the number of Spanish 
settlers. John Elliott, who based his estimations on the emigration statistics by Peter Boyd-
Bowman, speaks of 240,000 settlers for the sixteenth century and 400,000 for the seventeenth 
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While the number of colonists from Spain was stagnating, people from 
Southern China began to arrive in large numbers. By the year 1600, hundreds 
of Fujianese and Japanese merchants would not only supply the Spanish 
colony, but also settle in large numbers around the walled Spanish city, and 
thus became the real colonial settlers of the Manila Bay area.152 The follow-
ing numerical data has to be regarded as approximate, often exaggerated for 
various political reasons. An early account by Juan Ramón Bautista states 
that after the devastating f ire in Manila of 1583, 2500 Chinese were waiting 
in Cavite to trade with the Castilians. Curiously, the number of Chinese is 
mentioned directly after a petition for f inancial and military support for the 
hard-pressed colony. According to a letter of Santiago de Vera to the King 
in 1589, 4000 Chinese lived permanently in and around Manila.153 The size 
of the Chinese community was usually f luctuating along with economic 
prospects and reached 30,000 in peak years.154 A resident of Manila noted 
in 1614 that during March and July, the period of the Manila Galleon trade 
( feria), about 16,000 Chinese (including hibernating and visiting merchants) 
lived in Manila while between 8000 and 9000 were permanent settlers.155 
Registers of licence fees (or poll taxes) for the Chinese sangleyes give us a 
more accurate estimation of the size of the Chinese community. In 1621, there 
were over 21,000 licensed Chinese residents in Manila and approximately 
5000 who were unlicensed.156 The Chinese community came to dominate the 
majority of the business sectors, ranging from retail to the building and the 
service industries.157 By way of a macro-regional comparison: In Nagasaki 
the number of Chinese is reported to have increased in ten years from 20 to 
2000 in 1618.158 The number of Japanese residents in Manila rose steadily too. 
Evidence for their rapid increase, including the frequently quoted number 
of 3000 Japanese settlers in the year 1606, can be found in various sources, 
century – the lion’s share coming from Andalusia and Extremadura. See Elliott (1989), Spain and 
Its World, p. 11. In this context the migration f igures according to Magnus Mörner are of interest 
(cf. Burkholder, Johnson [2001], Colonial Latin America, p. 201) counting 104,610 people in the 
period between 1501 and 1600 and 74,000 during the f irst 25 years of the seventeenth century.
152 See among others Igawa (2007), Daikōkai jidai; Ōishi (ed.) (1986), Shuinsen.
153 Cf. Díaz-Trechuelo (1959), Arquitectura, p. 11; Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas.
154 Pastells (1925), Catálogo, p. 265. 
155 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 96; For the institution of 
the ‘feria’, see Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 37-58.
156 According to a letter of Governor Fajardo y Tenza to the King, 21 September 1621. Cf. Mu-
rakami (1917), ‘Japan’s Early Attempts’, p. 468.
157 Santamaría (1966), ‘Chinese Parián, p. 90; See also Brook (2008), Vermeer’s Hat, p. 170.
158 Cf. Jansen (1992), China in the Tokugawa World, p. 9.
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including Japanese ship registers.159 Many passengers were Japanese and a 
remarkable number settled in the urban surroundings.160
Elsewhere I will analyse the wavering attitude of the metropolis towards 
the ever-growing number of Chinese and Japanese in Manila against the 
background of a stagnating Spanish population. Chinese and Japanese 
immigrants were certainly less marginalised than members of different 
Filipino tribes and an integral part of the city and its society. A trend that 
reminds us of the study by Carla Rahn Phillips where she has detected a 
similar phenomenon with regard to Africans in the Spanish Americas.161 
Needless to say that as ‘others’, they constantly faced constraints, discussed 
in detail later.
Towards Manila’s Global Integration
What justif ies calling early modern Manila a global enterprise are the 
manifold contributions of geographically dispersed actors and agencies 
that turned it into a thriving melting pot of people, cultures, and ideas. 
Despite their differences, when meeting in Manila they acted in concert 
when transforming it. While individual settlers, disconnected from their 
native states, did so actively at the end of the sixteenth century, political 
units chose a far more passive way. Referring to Japan and China, Henry 
Kamen called it ‘the tolerance of the two major powers in Asia’.162 Shimizu 
Yūko, in turn, stressed that misleading interpretations of Hispano-Japanese 
relations result from using the state as model of analysis. Instead she urges 
a focus on the actual actors, such as friars and merchants.163
Other researchers suggest thinking of Manila as an entrepôt rather than 
a failed capital of a territorial colony. Spanish historian Manuel Ollé has 
159 Murillo de Velarde, Historia, libro 18, cap. 20: ‘En noviembre de 1606 había en Manila mas 
de 3000 Japoneses pues se fuja allí este numero como limite en que debieran en cerrar los gob-
ernadores a esta población extranjera.’ Murillo de Velarde was an eighteenth-century chronist, 
whose compilation is based on letters between the Philippine domains and missionaries from 
China and Japan to Manila. With regard to the number of Japanese immigrants, Gonoi Takashi 
calculated that an average of 236.5 people travelled on board of merchant junks from Japan to 
destinations in South East Asia between 1593 and 1633. Gonoi (2008), ‘Betonaumu’, p. 51.
160 See an anonymous report on early trade relations between Japan and Spain. Tōyō 
Bunko,’Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 15; Iwao (1937), Nanyō nihonmachi, pp. 292-300.
161 Phillips (2007), ‘Organization’, p. 82.
162 Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 206. The number of factual and spelling mistakes in the 
chapter on the Philippines could be taken as indication for the obvious disinterest in this area.
163 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon.
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argued that the multicultural setting of the China Seas hindered the initially 
pursued territorial model. Using the entrepôt thesis as a way to understand 
proto-globalisation, he argued that the city stopped ‘acting according to 
the logics of territorial domination’ and instead ‘respond[ed] to the mer-
cantile logics of the region’.164 For me this explanation is not suff icient: the 
incontrovertible limits of mercantilism have to be emphasised in light of 
the ambivalent balance of power between the state and the market in the 
colonial setting; in particular, when taking into account that mercantilism 
is nowadays no longer understood as ‘top-down, state-building enterprise’, 
but rather ‘a product of the private and public pleading [and] lobbying’.165 
Against that background, attention has to be paid to Manila’s colonial urban 
context under the presumption that in early modern South East Asian 
market economy, the state existed because of trade, not trade because of 
the state.166
In essence, understanding Manila merely from the logic of being part 
and parcel of the emerging world economy falls short in many respects167: 
First of all because the territorial model did not lose signif icance during 
the period of my study, nor in later decades. Regardless of the importance of 
foreign trade for the survival of the colony, high-ranking Spaniards preferred 
strong military command to liberal trade. The Jesuit friar Juan José Delgado, 
who spent over half of the eighteenth century in the Philippines, insisted 
that the ‘islands need disinterested military governors, not merchants; 
and men of resolution and character [...], not students, who are more f it to 
govern monasteries than communities of heroes’.168 The constantly felt need 
for displaying military strength has often been explained as a result of the 
proximity of Japan and China. Such a view not only misinterprets East Asian 
164 Ollé (2006), ‘Formación’, p. 27: ‘Este inicial optimisimo se vería transformado a las pocas 
décadas en un estrategia defensiva, con rápida construcción de murallas, con adopción de 
una posición pasiva y receptiva, que convierte a Manila en un entrepot, una ciudad de enlace, 
que no actúa ya según la lógica de dominación territorial importada de América sino según 
la lógica mercantil de la región, con captura de plazas clave, que marcaba las interacciones de 
competencia y rivalidad entre comunidades mercantiles en el sureste asiático.’
165 Stern (2014), ‘Companies’, p. 178.
166 The Melaka sultanate is a typical example for a South East Asian mercantilist state that 
dealt with commerce and movable wealth more or less in the way traditional agrarian states 
did with real estate. See Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 2, p. 205. Abu-Lughod (1989), Before 
European Hegemony, p. 303.
167 For Asian and European contributions to flourishing Southeast Asian port city communities, 
see Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, pp. 1-57.
168 Delgado (1892), Historia, pp. 212-215. Delgado f inished his ethno-history in 1751. Cunningham 
(1919), Audiencia, p. 228.
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foreign policies but also overlooks aggression from neighbouring Muslim 
communities, the long years of Dutch attacks, and the Spaniards’ own 
unwillingness to give up its claims on the Moluccas.169 Expeditions from 
the Philippines to the Spice Islands, including claims on Tidore, continued 
until 1662. In the context of European hegemonic battles on the Asian 
stage, the Philippines moreover served as stronghold for America against 
Asian forces.170 Second, similar to other port cities such as Hoi An in modern 
Vietnam or Ayutthaya in Thailand, Manila attracted Japanese and Chinese 
traders as a ‘neutral setting’.171 With Japan’s debut in maritime commerce 
in South East Asia such neutral settings were booming.172 Ultimately new 
forms of connections and trans-regional exchange of new qualities and 
quantities prospered.
169 AGI Patronato 24. r. 61 ‘Cartas a los capitanes mayores de Macao, Ambon, Molucas’, 1582; 
AGI Patronato 47, r. 21, ‘Relación de las islas Molucas’, 1606.
170 Crailsheim (2014), ‘Las Filipinas’, pp. 139-141.
171 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 121.
172 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 211.
3 The Trilogy of Triangular Trade
Junk Trade, Trans-Pacif ic Trade, and Provision Trade
Manila greatly mattered to everyone who traded there. It was the point of 
commercial contact between the economies of seventeenth-century Europe and 
China, and once silver was f lowing, not even a massacre could break the contact. 
Each side brought to the table what the other one wanted to buy and could 
afford, and took from it what it could use.1
The Manila System
Thus reads an enthusiastic account by China historian Timothy Brook in 
his study on the characteristics of global trade in the seventeenth century. 
His overall positive evaluation echoes the views of many sixteenth-century 
observers.2 What sounds like the description of a market economy ‘Mecca’, 
without any government intervention, indeed reflects some of Manila’s free 
market-like structures, as an entrepôt for an entirely new type of commerce 
– the trans-Pacif ic exchange that at the same time enabled and encouraged 
Sino-Japanese direct exchange. As the title of this chapter suggests, the 
focus lies on the galleon trade and Manila. In the manner of global history 
trade patterns are painted with a thick brush, presenting the background 
image for detailed case studies on connections with China or Japan in the 
subsequent chapters.
Contemporary historical discourse on mercantile exchange in Manila has 
created the illusion that silver was the only driving force behind sixteenth-
century commercial exchange. The fame of the Manila Galleon is indeed 
closely linked to enormous amounts of world silver that eventually ended 
up in China. Silver f lows arguably even converted Ming China into the 
strongest economy of the time.3 This discourse, which spread on behalf 
1 Brook (2008), Vermeer’s Hat, p. 170.
2 Chinese literati Xu Guanqi (1562-1633), promoter of an open-door policy and translator of 
Matteo Ricci’s work was one of the sixteenth-century admirers of the dynamics of exchange in 
Manila. Cf. Zhao (2013), Qing Opening, p. 52. For a similarly enthusiastic evaluation see Alfonso 
Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2011), ‘Era de la plata española’. For the impact of silk imports on the late 
Ming economy see Li (2005), Wan Min.
3 For an overview of the debates see Atwell (2004), ‘Another Look at Silver’, pp. 467-491. As for 
the thesis that China was the ultimate benef iciary, I refer to California School scholars such as 
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of Sino-centrists and California School scholars, however, has at least two 
shortcomings: First, it degrades Manila to nothing more than a way station 
to China and second, it categorically denies benef its for Spain or other 
nations involved.4 While the present study argues in line with the reasoning 
that American (mainly Mexican) silver f lows were the backbone of the 
Manila market during the last decades of the sixteenth and the first decades 
of the seventeenth centuries a comparative view on exchange patterns 
additionally aims to debunk previously described contentions.5
Starting with scale, we should keep in mind that at the end of the sixteenth 
century Manila was ranking among the primary ports in South East Asia, 
measured by trade volume and the number of Asian ships calling at the port.6 
Since the 1570s, several dozen Chinese junks annually carried silver back to 
Fujian. Observing their successful bargaining, the Dominican friar Juan de 
Medina called the Chinese traders in Manila ‘dear friends of silver’ and their 
business deals with the Spanish the ‘richest and most opulent of any known’.7 
Referring to China as ‘silver’s prison’, he can even be called the first ‘silver-sink’ 
theorist.8 That said, even if the Spanish had nothing to offer but silver, it was 
precisely what China needed most, right after the Single Whip Reforms turned 
tax payments and wages into silver, as we have seen elsewhere.9
Andre Gunder Frank. For a synthesis of the ideas of the California School, whose research tends 
to downplay human agency, see Vries (2008), ‘California School’, pp. 6-49. The article discusses 
the danger of overlooking institutional differences between China and the West. I endorse 
his critique and add that much of the confusion about Manila comes from that very omission.
4 Prakash (1976), ‘Bullion for Goods’, pp. 159-187.
5 I use Wallerstein’s def inition that classif ies a market as ‘both a concrete local structure 
in which individuals or f irms sell and buy goods, and a virtual institution across space where 
the same kind of exchange occurs. How large and widespread any virtual market is depends 
on the realistic alternatives that sellers and buyers have at a given time.’ Wallerstein (2007), 
World-Systems Analysis, p. 25.
6 AGI Filipinas, 339, l. 1, f. 41v, ‘Petición de cuentas detalladas de la Hacienda de Filipinas’, 
4 June 1572.
7 Medina (1630), Historia, p. 86. The seventeenth-century author furthermore criticised the 
Spanish for being bad businessmen: ‘Y si los españoles no fueran tan arrojados, es cierto que el 
trato les hubiera salido más barato y los chinos no hicieran lo que quieren de ellos.’
8 Medina (1630), Historia, p. 69: ‘De suerte, que no me engañaré en decir, que el reino de la 
China es el más poderoso que en el mundo hay, y aún le podemos llamar el tesoro del mundo; 
pues allí se aprisiona la plata y se le da cárcel perpetúa.’ For the ‘silver sink’ narrative, see 
Flynn, Giráldez (1995), ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon”‘, p. 201-221; as well as Frank (1998), ReOrient, 
pp. 131-165; The ‘silver sink’ theory is closely linked to the ‘silver junkie’ discourse by L. Eastman 
introduced by Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 245. Oidor Gaspar de Ayala claimed in 1584 that 
every year the Chinese take all the money in the city with them. See Gil (2011), Chinos, 66.
9 Schottenhammer (2007), ‘East Asian Maritime World’, p. 19; Li (2007), ‘Song, Yuan and Ming’, 
pp. 124-128; Ming (2005), ‘Monetization of Silver’, pp. 27-39.
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Records of contemporary off icials suggest that the outflow of silver – 
based on the Manila Galleon trade – amounted to 5,000,000 pesos (127,800 
kg) in peak years. Richard von Glahn calculated that silver entering China 
from Manila amounted around 584,000 kg between 1572 and 1600, or roughly 
21,000 kg annually.10 While he admits that the actual trade volume was by 
far higher due to smuggling and unregistered trade, he puts exaggerated 
high numbers into perspective.11 By way of contextualisation one should 
keep in mind that between 1500 and 1800, 80 per cent – or 150,000 tons – of 
the world’s silver was mined in Latin America, of which an annual average 
of 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 pesos (25,000 to 50,000 kg) was shipped across 
the Pacif ic.12 In comparison, Artur Attman has calculated that an average 
of 150,000 kg left Europe towards Asia annually by land and sea and via 
manifold channels during the seventeenth century.13
On a micro level it will be crucial to analyse what was driving Japanese, 
Castilian, and ultimately Portuguese traders and intermediaries when 
quenching late Ming China’s thirst for silver. At this point it seems that in 
particular the role of Japanese trade can highlight the system’s complex 
transactions.14 Governor Tello (r. 1596-1602) reported in 1598 how the royal 
10 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, pp. 124; 137-138.
11 The reason why so many different estimates exist for the trans-Pacif ic silver trade lies in 
the scarcity of precise sources and records. Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 138, presumes that 
‘the actual scale of silver imports [from the Philippines] to China could easily have been three 
or four times as great. Most of the reports from Manila in the 1620s and 1630s estimated the 
volume of silver exported to China at roughly 2 million pesos (51,100 kg) annually.’ He also speaks 
of more conservative estimates of 1.5 million pesos (38,325 kg) annually.
12 Chuan Han-Sheng’s comparative analysis for the seventeenth century confirms that 50,000 
kg were shipped across the Pacif ic and ended up in China after a short stop in Manila. See Chuan 
(2001), ‘Arbitrage’, pp. 241-260. See also McCarthy (1993), ‘Between Policy and Prerogative’, p. 178. 
For more observations from early modern Manila, see BR 20, pp. 51; 69-70.
13 Attmann (1986), American Bullion. A number of contradictory estimates exist. According 
to off icial accounts from Acapulco for the 1580s and 1590s about three tons of silver bound 
for Manila were registered in an average year. In the 1620s, the off icial amount of silver had 
increased to 20 tons a year, and eventually settled around 10 tons. For the entire galleon trade, 
off icial records speak of about 700 tons of American silver carried to Manila. A synthesis of 
silver circulation debates including Earl Jefferson Hamilton, Dennis O. Flynn, William Atwell, 
Niels Steengaard, John J. TePaske, Han-Sheng Chuan, Ward Barrett, and others can be found in 
Alfonso Mola, Martínez-Shaw (2011), ‘Era de Plata Española’. Alfonso Mola and Martínez-Shaw 
criticise the f igures put forward by Flynn and Giráldez as far too high and those of TePaske as 
too low, while considering Han-Sheng Chuan’s estimations most reasonable. The quantities 
of American silver sent to China according to Chuan are as follows: 1598: 1,000,000 pesos; 
1601: 2,000,000 pesos; 1602: 2,000,000 pesos; 1604: 2,500,000 pesos, 1620: 3,000,000 pesos; 1633: 
2,000,000 pesos.
14 Andaya (2004), ‘Interaction’, p. 5.
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f inances suffered from Chinese visiting merchants, who gained more 
than 100 per cent within ten days in Manila.15 Even the situado-subsidy 
sent to the Philippines from Mexico often ended up in China, missing its 
actual purpose of supporting the colony. For Spanish settlers of Manila, 
seeing riches passing in all directions, the galleon trade soon became a 
mixed blessing. Nonetheless, fellow Castilians on the Iberian Peninsula 
were in no different situation. In the midst of all the debates about the 
outf low of silver and whether it should be taken as sign of decline or 
result of wrong institutions one tends to forget that those trading silver 
got plenty in return, from valuable luxury goods to desperately needed 
tax revenue.
Extending the comparative focus to Lusitanian Macao (1557-1997) helps 
tracking the characteristics of the Manila trade. Although a substantial 
comparative study between the two ‘Eastern pearls’ is not achievable, 
occasional references to the situation in Macao shall help us to understand 
the characteristics of the Manila trade.16 Macao’s closeness to China and 
the special contract that permitted the Portuguese access to the Chinese 
market and the annual off icial voyages to Nagasaki are signif icant ele-
ments of the privileged Lusitanian position in East Asia. As the centre 
of the Jesuit mission in the East and as the hub for communication of 
the Estado da Índia, the small island furthermore manifested its cross-
regional inf luence. Given the relative closeness between Manila and 
Macao, commerce, at times authorised, at times clandestine, existed 
during the entire colonial era and was equally essential for both Iberian 
strongholds. Nevertheless, Luso-Spanish rivalry and mutual suspicion 
more than once harmed the trading climate in the China Seas. A further 
crucial element for comprehending the dynamics of this global silver trade 
is Japan’s exclusion from off icial Chinese trade, and that China – time and 
again – renewed prohibitions on maritime trade, most famous under the 
early Qing reign.17
15 BR 10, p. 179.
16 Luke Clossey also mentioned the high potential of comparing Macao and Manila. Clossey 
(2008), Salvation and Globalization, p. 169. For a detailed analysis of Macao’s global economic 
integration in later centuries see Van Dyke (2011), Merchants. As a matter of trivia, the f lattering 
attribute ‘Pearl of the Orient’ has in fact been used both with regard to Manila and Macao.
17 Zhao (2013), Qing Opening, p. 35. When Chinese maritime trade was re-opened under 
Emperor Kangxi in 1684, large amounts of silver started to enter the country again.
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How It All Began
The galleons’ annual passage between Acapulco and Manila provided the 
Spanish colony in the Philippines with silver and necessities, in addition to 
new settlers, missionaries, colonial off icers, and royal orders. The galleon’s 
lonesome journey across the Pacif ic to Acapulco was – with sailing times 
of up to a year – the longest of its era, and ironically the Philippines’ only 
bridge to both the American and European mainland. For the mainly Spanish 
passengers and their Asian staff on the eastward route, the journey was a 
particularly dramatic adventure. Weather conditions and perilous currents 
were one challenge, shortage of supply (often for the sake of more cargo space) 
another. In certain periods English or Dutch attacks posed an extra risk.18
During its f irst decade, Manila Galleon-based trans-Pacific trade showed 
a largely unrestricted, laissez-faire structure under the patronage of the King 
in Madrid. In 1577 the Viceroy of Mexico, Martín Enríquez de Almanza (r. 
1568-1580) uttered his concern regarding the Nao de China, as it was com-
monly referred to in Hispanic circles. Those were the days when relatively 
free trade with China was possible.19 Relative openness in the early, testing 
phase of the trans-Pacif ic galleon trade can be seen in the fact that the 
Crown tentatively sanctioned voyages between Lima and Manila in 1579. 
The following year Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa (r. 1580-1583) 
sent the f irst ship with spices and other luxury goods from Manila to Cal-
lao in Peru; a second was to follow in 1581 with merchandise from several 
Asian regions.20 Only one arrived, however. Ronquillo, a member of a rich 
merchant family from Segovia with strong connections to Peru, not only 
earned cheers for his initiative. Critique came from Mexico and Spain and 
the way he defended his step implies that he was aware of empire-wide 
disapproval of direct trade between Peru and the Philippines. Although 
signif icant parts of the cargo consisted of Chinese merchandise, including 
silks, porcelain, pepper, and cinnamon, he claimed the main purpose for the 
dispatch was mutual support in artillery.21 When the Atlantic trade lobby 
in Spain intervened, the King issued a series of propitiatory decrees to stop 
18 Most of the data on the Manila Galleon come from the standard literature: Schurz (1985), 
Manila Galleon. For recurring losses, see McCarthy (1995), ‘Spectacle of Misfortune’, pp. 95-105; 
MacLeod (1984), ‘Spain and America’, p. 354. MacLeod compared the passage with trips to the 
moon in our time. 
19 AGI Mexico 20, n. 1, ‘Carta del Virrey Martín Enríquez’, 19 October 1577.
20 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 9 (1582).
21 AGI Filipinas 6 (20 July 1580), AGI Patronato 263, n. 1, r. 2 (28 May 1581) cf. Iwasaki Cauti 
(1992), Extremo Oriente, pp. 32-34.
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direct commerce between Manila and Callao in 1582, as it would seriously 
harm commerce in the Americas.22 Yet, before the royal charter (cédula; 
dated 11 June 1582) could reach Lima, Roquillo’s ship, the Nuestra Señora de 
la Cinta, had been dispatched for a long-anticipated mercantile mission from 
Peru to Manila and China. These developments have to be understood under 
the pretext of a quintessentially mercantile society in Peru, whose members 
often maintained close personal links with the Spanish residents of Manila. 
An attempt to send a ship from Lima to China by Martín Enríquez in 1583 
(then already Viceroy of Peru) failed.23 After a ship from Peru laden with 
silver, had arrived in Macao in 1590, the Crown took more rigid measures. 
The trip of that vessel is the strange tale of Peruvian trader Juan de Solís, 
who arrived in Macao via Panama with 6000 ducats and determined to 
buy silk straight from the Chinese brokers, before he ended up in Satsuma. 
What he had not anticipated was Portuguese opposition; nonetheless, his 
fearless f ight for free trade that made him report Portuguese intrigues to 
the authorities in Manila after his money had been confiscated in Macao 
and nasty clashes with Jesuits and Portuguese merchants had followed in 
Japan.24 Eventually even Toyotomi Hideyoshi interfered in the intrigues 
against the Peruvian merchant and ordered the Portuguese in Japan to 
return the 6000 ducats they had confiscated from Juan de Solís.25
In the meantime, Spanish merchants in the Philippines also accentuated 
the need to prohibit direct commerce between America and China for 
the survival of the colony.26 Although merchants from New Spain were 
subsequently banned from building factories in the Philippines, independ-
ent attempts to circumvent Crown intervention persisted. As a result, trade 
restrictions between Peru and the Philippines had to be reissued in the 
years 1593, 1595, and 1604, and eventually again in 1640 when in theory 
all trade between the two American viceroyalities was prohibited.27 In 
22 BR 8: 316-318; BR 17: 29, 33-34, 41-44; Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, pp. 21-54.
23 Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, p. 127; Six years later in 1589, João da Gama, a Portu-
guese merchant, sailed at his own expense from Macao to Acapulco (ibid., p. 66).
24 Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, pp. 127-139.
25 RAH Cortes 9/2265, f. 170, ‘Sumario de un processo que se hizo en el Japón el año de 1592 
a instancia, del regimiento de Amacao, ciudad de Portugueses en la China’. Cf. Iwasaki Cauti 
(1992), Extremo Oriente, pp. 131-133.
26 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 7, n. 47, ‘Carta de Audiencia de Filipinas sobre sublevaciones’, 13 July 
1589.
27 Yuste López (2007), Emporios Transpacíficos, p. 123.
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1626, Governor Tavora sought royal permission for reopening direct trade 
between Manila and Peru but did not succeed, yet in vain.28
With regard to the Manila trade, their were also other incentives to 
strictly def ine the trading route: Urgently needed revenues, such as the 3 
per cent almojarifazgo that government authorities collected from merchant 
ships in Manila and Mexico, and an additional cargo charge (anclaje; intro-
duced in Manila under the governorship of Francisco Sande (r. 1575-1580) 
in the style of Macao’s anchorage tax) of 12 pesos were meant to support 
the non-self-sustaining Philippines.29 This made the Manila Galleon the 
third royal grant after encomienda and situado. Any loss – for instance, 
when ships failed to make their annual voyage from Mexico – would hit 
the colonial economy badly.30
In strictly economic terms there was also a fear (even if hard to compre-
hend in the twenty-f irst century) that the American colonial market would 
be flooded with Chinese goods on expense of precious metals. Hence the 
Crown implemented the so-called permiso as regulatory mechanism to 
f ix the value of Asian goods shipped annually from Manila. Proclaimed 
by Philip II on 11 January 1593 and confirmed in a series of later decrees, it 
moreover established the maximum carrying capacity of off icially only 300 
tons per galleon.31 In addition both the amount of silver sent from Acapulco 
(as not more than 1,000,000 pesos annually) and the number of galleons to 
two per year were strictly def ined.32 In most years these restrictions were 
nothing but political theory. Supply and demand dominated the galleon 
28 AGI Filipinas 329, L.3, ff. 144r-145v, ‘Respuesta a Tavora sobre comercio con Peru’, 24 De-
cember 1627.
29 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 9 (1582). Other sources speak of a practice of 
collecting a higher amount of tax from Chinese traders based on the Recopilación de Leyes de 
Indias book 8, title 15, law 21. Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, p. 31, speaks of up to 
10 per cent of the total value. BR 8, pp. 316-318. A quantitative study should also consider that 
new f iscal measures were introduced in Mexico at that time; the alcabala, a general sales tax of 
2 per cent in 1575 that doubled to 4 per cent in 1636 is the most famous example. See McAlister 
(1984), Spain & Portugal, p. 363.
30 Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 53; Ayer (ed.), Manila mal governada: ‘Daño muy considerable 
que se haré en las islas es permitir que los sangleyes chinos llevan todos los años para China 
casi un millón en plata podiéndose modif icar tanta saca con que lleven mitad engendros o que 
los españoles sean mercaderes que entonces quedara la mas de la plata en tierra y no como se 
experimenta que no viniendo un año la nao de México no se halla un real en todos las islas.’
31 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 292; Borah (1954), Early Colonial Trade.
32 For the two royal decrees of early 1593, see Spate (1979), Spanish Lake, pp. 161-164; BR 8, 
pp. 316-318; BR 17, pp. 29, 33-34, 41-44.
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trade: the following decades vessels carried between 700 and 2000 tons 
across the Pacif ic.33
After King Philip II had personally commented on the economically 
harmful participation of rich Mexican merchants in the galleon trade, 
boletas (passes) were issued with the intention of equally dividing cargo 
space amongst the citizens of Manila.34 Yet before long these regulations 
turned into a monopoly of a few liquid businessmen from Mexico and gov-
ernment off icials who managed to acquire enough boletas for the passage 
of their merchandise.35 Here too, the supervising Audiencia judges were 
accused of corruption and unfair collaboration with Chinese merchants.36 
Ultimately dependence on the galleon trade limited the Manileños’ 
scope of intervention so that the boleta system in fact only undermined 
Spanish control.37 The system, nevertheless, was eff icient enough to keep 
unwelcome competition to a minimum. When the Florentine merchant 
Francesco Carletti (1573-1636)38 visited Manila in 1596/97 in the course of 
a private circumnavigation, he was clearly surprised by the diff iculties 
he and his father faced to get permission for their enterprises. This shows 
that foreign trade at Manila was heavily restricted for non-Asian visitors.39 
The main reason being English privateers preying on Spanish vessels40 
33 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 162. 
34 The monarch’s concerns are expressed in Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589). 
For regulations, see Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 265; Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, 
p. 61: ‘These were valuable and were given to the recipient purely because he was a Spaniard.’
35 Villiers (1980), ‘Silk and Silver’, p. 74.
36 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620; see also Bauzon (1981), Deficit 
Government, p. 14: Archbishop Santibañez concluded in a letter to the King in 1599 that the 
Spanish colony in the Philippines would not survive without the galleon trade.
37 Merino (1980), Cabildo, pp. 54-56: ‘It caused an uncontrollable speculation on the part of 
the capitalists of Nueva España, who were using the boleta, through their agents in Manila, to 
import goods from China at an enormous prof it, to whom they paid up to 8 or 10 per cent of the 
capital invested.’ The most important commercial lawsuit tried by the Audiencia dates back to 
the year 1656 when several residents of Mexico were excluded from galleon trade. Cunningham 
(1919), Audiencia, pp. 114-115.
38 Francesco D’ Antonio Carletti. See also Colla (2005), ‘Shonin Carletti’.
39 Carletti (1966), Reise um die Welt, pp. 108-119.
40 See Elizalde Pérez-Grueso (2008), ‘Filipinas’, p.  122. In early November 1587, Thomas 
Cavendish captured the 600-ton Manila Galleon Santa Anna off Cabo San Lucas in California, 
where he took its cargo of 122,000 silver dollars. Paradoxically Cavendish’s ship was too small 
to carry the entire cargo he had captured from the Spaniards. As a consequence, the colonial 
government listed English Protestant corsairs among the biggest threats for the Philippines in 
the 1590s. See Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589). For reactions in Manila, see 
AGI Filipinas 34, n. 79, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre el corsario inglés Cavendish y otros 
asuntos’, 25 June 1588. 
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and fear of Dutch attacks. In comparison with East India Company mer-
chants, who enjoyed not only relative freedom in foreign trade, but also 
the opportunity to choose legally between commerce and privateering, 
Spanish traders were clearly disadvantaged.41 One of the few times that 
royal intervention was eff icient was in preventing the establishment of 
an independent chartered trading company based on private capital.42 
Being bound to the law of the Crown, merchants sailing on Spanish ships 
could only choose between lengthy negotiations or committing crimes 
against the state. Last but not least weather and typhoons should also be 
taken into consideration as worthwhile explanation for the general decline 
thesis with regard to the larger context of cross-regional connections of 
the galleon trade.43
Restrictions failed to work on Mexican merchants, who either exclusively 
controlled silk distribution in Mexico or travelled to Manila, enriching 
themselves in the fashion of treasure f leet brokers on the Atlantic. Much 
to the royal authorities’ regret they neither settled, nor invested in Manila 
but eventually opted to return to more comfortable areas in the empire, 
leaving behind creed, hatred, and the spirit of symptomatic competition 
within the Spanish Overseas Empire, as an account by Governor Tavora 
shows:
Everyone knows how much money is brought to the Philippines each 
year, just as everyone knows that most of this money belongs to the 
people in Nueva España and elsewhere. This is the real reason why 
prices are so prohibitive here in Manila and so low in Nueva España, 
despite the prof its of so many middlemen. The truth is that when, after 
a period of two years the accounts are settled, very few of us have made 
some prof it, and in many cases not even the investment is recovered. 
This is the reason why we are always forced to dig into our capital to 
pay for living and other expenses and why our wealth is dwindling, as 
is well known.44
41 Pérotin-Dumon (2001), ‘The Pirate’, p. 35.
42 Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, pp. 12-13. 
43 Warren (2012), ‘Weather, History and Empire’, pp. 183-220.
44 Account by Governor Niño de Tavora in 1623, cf. Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 56.
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South China Sea Trade in the Sixteenth Century
A Vast ‘Chinese’ Network
We have learnt earlier that Chinese merchants were anything but passive 
carriers of silk, lured to Manila by precious metals. Manila was not the only 
option. Vital multiethnic networks had shaped the commercial nature of the 
silk and spice trade in the South China Sea region for centuries. Alongside 
f ifteenth-century developments on the Maritime Silk Road Chinese trade 
became globally connected.45 Multiethnic trading networks technically 
connected the Philippine archipelago via Chinese private maritime ven-
tures and Muslim trading networks with the China Seas and the Indian 
Ocean.46 The fluid identity of these merchant groups confused early Spanish 
observers as a report from Mindanao, quoted by Scott, illustrates: ‘boats 
from Borneo (Brunei) and Luzon are called Chinese junks in these islands, 
and even the Moros themselves are called Chinese, but in fact Chinese 
junks do not reach here’.47 In addition, Ryukyu merchants linked Japan 
internationally with coastal and insular South East Asia, including Java and 
Palembang, since the 1450s.48 During the sixteenth-century Sino-Japanese 
trade embargo the Ryukyu network connected the economies of China and 
Japan and stimulated Japan’s integration in Asian trade.49 It is not unlikely 
that merchants from Ryukyu even managed to connect to Manila’s silver 
trade in second half of the sixteenth century.50
In the macro region, an undef ined mix of tally trade and private en-
terprises flourished in entrepôts like Melaka, Ayutthaya, and Cantonese 
45 Reid (1999), Charting, pp. 7-8; Ptak (2007), Maritime Seidenstrasse, p. 168; Zhuang, Zheng 
(1998), Quanzhou pu die hua.
46 Muslims from Mindanao and Sulu made regular visits to Manila in order to buy Chinese 
silk. ‘Their monopoly of silk, both raw and f inished, their numerical superiority of vessels, their 
long experience in South East Asia and their geographical nearness gave the sampan traders 
an initial advantage which the Europeans did not have in the earlier phase of the Western 
expansion.’ See Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 166.
47 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 86.
48 The last ship from Ryukyu was sent to Siam in 1570. Maritime activities of Ryukyu merchants 
and formal diplomatic exchange of the period are well documented in the Rekidai Hōan, a source 
analysed in detail by Chinese and Japanese historians alike. For an overview see Uchida, Takase, 
Ikeya (eds) (2009), Ajia no Umi.
49 Okamoto (2008), ‘Foreign Policy’, pp. 35-55. 
50 Hamashita (2011), ‘Lidao Boan’, pp. 124-125; see also Hui (1996), Overseas Chinese Business 
Networks.
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and Fujianese coastal centres such as Quanzhou.51 Spice trade had turned 
Quanzhou into a multiethnic, hybrid trading port during the rule of the 
Mongols, who favoured loyal Muslim merchants of various places of origin, 
including Persia and South East Asia. Handicraft industries f lourished 
since the Song period and stimulated overseas trade and shipbuilding and 
Quanzhou even benefitted from silk deliveries from the neighbouring silk 
dye centre of Zhangzhou.52 On the one hand, Quanzhou suffered the effects 
of Chinese hostility against Muslims and gradually lost its significance after 
the Ming’s rise to power and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
off icial Chinese tally trade had declined dramatically.53 On the other hand, 
private and contraband traders were able to circumvent Ming foreign trade 
restrictions (海禁, ch. haijin). Families from Guangdong, Fujian, and Zheji-
ang province, among others, made decent livings as secret traders outside 
China’s off icial trade relations with Barbarian states. Some of them were 
Sinicised Muslim merchants, others local Fujianese or Cantonese who went 
south in order to escape the strict Ming bans. A record in the Ming shi clearly 
states the existence of a colony of Fujian people on Luzon before the arrival 
of the Spaniards.54 Scholars have arrived at two conclusions from this record: 
First, that vivid maritime trade of Quanzhou or Zhejiang during the Song 
and Yuan period showed a certain degree of continuance in the form of 
junk trade in the Nanyang.55 Second, it underlines off icial China’s suff icient 
awareness of such developments.56 Whereas the f irst aspect reshapes the 
view of the commercial conditions that enabled Iberian (and later Northern 
European) traders to participate and eventually f ill niches, the second – in 
stark contrast to despotism and decline during the later Ming period – is 
51 For the development of f lourishing exchange in the region, see Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, 
pp. 2-17.
52 So (2000), Prosperity; Ng (1983), Trade and Society, pp. 12-13.
53 For an overview of Muslim networks in Quanzhou, see Donoso (2011), Islam, pp. 190-213.
54 Laufer (2001), ‘Relations’, p. 65; Ming shi chapter 323. Boxer (2004), South China, p. xl: ‘Itin-
erario del P. Custodio Fr. Martin Ignacio de Loyola, in: Real Academia de la Historia’, Madrid, 
Col. Muñoz, no. 297, ff. 86-163. This Spanish document claims that in ancient times the islands 
were subject to the ‘king’ of China who deliberately gave them up at some point. Guerrero (1966), 
‘Chinese in the Philippines’, pp. 15-16, made a similar claim referring to the same source. 
55 For sampan vessels, see Van Tilburg (2007), ‘Vessels of Exchange’, p. 42: ‘Originally, the term 
comes from the Chinese language, meaning three (san) boards (ban), and describes a small 
simple skiff. The authoritative Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea def ines these craft as 
‘typical small and light boat; […] the coastal sampan [is] f itted with a single mast and junk-type 
sail.’ East Asian maritime history research has contributed to a better understanding of very 
open and active exchange patterns. See Hayasaka (ed.) (2013), Bunka toshi.
56 Clark (2002), Community, p. 167.
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a telling indication for Ming China’s potential to monitor the seascape 
during times of closure.
Fujianese junk traders coming to Luzon in large numbers enjoyed a 
reputation as gifted businessmen, able to adjust their strategies to local 
requirements. They earned respect for their knowledge of market and 
customs conditions in all major ports.57 From their home country they 
shipped in particular silk and porcelain. Both raw and manufactured silk 
were distributed inside China from the manufacturing areas of Suzhou, 
Hangzhou, and Nanjing; Fujian has its own porcelain production but 
also benefitted from its closeness to Jiangxi (江西) province, home to the 
historical pottery production of Jingdezhen (景徳鎮市).58 Their merchant 
network based on kinship ties spread over the entire seascape and made 
them the best-connected merchants of the commercial clan system (公司, 
ch. gong si, also meaning ‘company’ in modern Mandarin). It is absolutely 
crucial to understand that those fuelling the f irst Chinese diaspora in 
South East Asia remained connected with their homeland in Fujian. The 
Fujianese commercial network enabled smooth exchange, due to mutual 
business confidence.59 Thoroughly established strong bonds with relatives 
and their hometowns (關係, ch. guan xi) gave them a major advantage in 
any type of transaction outside imperial China. In a recent study, Anthony 
Reid discussed the far-reaching connections of Overseas Chinese huaqiao, 
emphasising their Sino-Southeast Asian identities, as well as their strong 
pre-Hispanic link to Luzon. According to the New Zealand-born historian, 
people active in maritime trade at the beginning of the sixteenth century 
belonged to one of four different groups: the Malayos of Melaka, Jawi, Jawa, 
or Luzones who, most strikingly, all had Chinese ancestors.60 Traders called 
Luzones referred to Sino-Southeast Asian elites from Brunei and Manila, 
indirectly integrated into trade with China via Melaka and Siam prior to 
the arrival of the Spaniards.61 Reid stresses the Chinese element of maritime 
traders arguing that
57 Lockard (2010), ‘“The Sea Common to All”‘, p. 225.
58 Iaccarino (2008), ‘Manila as an International Entrepôt’, pp. 71-81.
59 Chang (1995), ‘First Chinese Diaspora’, pp. 105-120.
60 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, pp. 49-56; 86 discussed huaqiao identity and their historical 
role as ‘other’. 
61 Tomé Pires (Suma Orientalis) also describes this region, referring to the Luzones as ‘robust 
and hardworking, but possessing no more than 200-300 ships for trade with Borneo and Malacca 
[...] Luzon lies ten days beyond Borneo, has plenty of foodstuffs, wax and honey, and enjoys 
inter-island trade and direct Borneo purchases of local gold’. Cf. Scott (1984), Prehispanic, p. 84.
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managing China trade was diff icult if not impossible for those unfamiliar 
with Chinese dialects, written Chinese and the habits of local off icials and 
brokers. The Luzones who played a role in both the Manila-Melaka and 
Melaka-China trade around 1500 are easiest to understand as successors 
of those who managed the Brunei-Manila-China trade 80 years earlier.62 
Considering the relatively large amount of Muslim traders among them the 
Spaniards at f irst probably categorised these traders as Moros.
Integrating Manila
Hamashita Takeshi has opposed Fairbank’s thesis that Ming and Qing 
changed signif icantly under European impact, arguing instead that the 
rest of the world adapted to China as the centre. If Manila followed that 
contention it could only have adapted to a passive China.63 Victor Lieberman 
has also underlined that Ming China indirectly coordinated production in 
South East Asia and even in Japan to some extent, in addition to transfer of 
nautical and metallurgical technologies, ceramics and textile products.64 
When the Chinese economy prospered at the end of the sixteenth century 
and developed further in the seventeenth this was to a certain extent also 
thanks to notable contribution from Manila. Hence, Manila and China’s 
integration into global trade mutually influenced one other.65
During the f irst half of the sixteenth century, incentives would also 
emanate from Japan. Once the Muromachi Bakufu’s tributary status was 
not renewed by the Celestial Empire, after the tributary mission debacles 
of 1523 and 1542/43 off icial trade with China had to be circumvented. Soon 
piracy and smuggling carried out by merchant adventurers, the wakō 
mentioned above, re-emerged.66 In less abstract terms it meant that foreign 
commerce laid in the hands of Chinese and Japanese private merchants 
and pirates, who often enjoyed support and protection from daimyō (local 
62 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 86.
63 Hamashita (2008), ‘Tributary Trade’, pp. 12-19.
64 Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, pp. 419-420.
65 While Flynn and Giráldez have suggested that the silver traded with China should be 
considered a commodity rather than a currency, we f ind ample evidence for the use of silver as 
currency. See, for instance, Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 11-21. Chaudhuri made 
similar claims for India. Conclusions are based on the accounts of David Ricardo, who proposed 
considering silver a so-called high cost commodity. Chaudhuri (1978), Trading World, pp. 100-104.
66 Many of them were prof icient with European f irearms and experienced at sea, especially 
after Nobunaga’s success in maritime battles.
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lords).67 Although it has been argued that ‘classic’ wakō raids had come to 
an end in the 1560s, thanks to Ming trade relaxations in the China Seas 
there is evidence that coastal authorities remained on alert, not surpris-
ingly, since Japan remained unaffected from China’s licensed maritime 
trade.68 Japanese pirate traders with their ability to switch between raiding 
and trading, continuously upset the Ming authorities.69 Wherever private 
Chinese commercial activities increased outside imperial supervision the 
wakō joined in. Arano Yasunori has stressed the flexibility of such commu-
nication networks in the South China Sea, which prospered at the junction 
of tally trade to illegal private trade and benefitted from a well-functioning 
transport network, which he calls wakō-teki jyōhō.70 For example, in 1589 
the Fujian Grand Coordinator (巡撫, ch. xunfu) Zhou Cai reported: ‘The 
coastal residents of Zhang-zhou go to trade with the various fan. The major 
traders illicitly link up with the Japanese yi who spy on our coasts.’71 The 
same writ furthermore indicates that these illicit trading networks were 
linked to the Manila trade.72 Namban trade between Macao, Manila, and 
Japan would have been unthinkable without allied Japanese and Chinese 
clandestine maritime activities.73
Piracy was not only a profit-seeking enterprise but also a socio-economic 
phenomenon. First, as indicated above, local authorities sponsored many 
of these enterprises. Hence, the Spaniards were not all wrong when they 
67 Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, pp. pp. 420-428. Okada, Katō (1983), Nichiō kōryū. 
A long-anticipated survey by Oka Mihoko brought to light the close ties between missionaries 
and European traders. Oka (2010), Shōnin. 
68 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, p. 224.
69 See Ming-shih, ch. 322 of the 1779 edition. Cf. Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. xxiv: ‘The “wa” 
(Japanese) were shrewd by nature; they carried merchandise and weapons together, and ap-
peared here and there along the sea-coast. If opportunity arrived, they displayed their weapons, 
raiding and plundering ruthlessly. Otherwise they exhibited their merchandise, saying that they 
were on their way to the Court with tribute. The south eastern coast was victimised by them.’
70 Arano (1987), ‘Nihongata ka’i’. 
71 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/2675 (accessed 17 November 2013).
72 ‘Pirates’ importance for the growing commercial exchange between the Philippines, China 
and Japan has recently been illustrated by Igawa (2010), ‘At the Crossroads’, pp. 74-84.
73 Maehira (2008), ‘Minchō no Kaiken’, pp. 61-76; AGI Filipinas, 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera 
sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587. The existence of a settlement of Japanese 
sojourners in Cagayan, on the northern edge of Luzon, which according to contemporary records 
hosted the unlikely number of several hundred Japanese, also proves the existence of early links 
between Japan and Luzon. See Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 245-247. See also Pastells (1925), Historia 
General, vol. 1, p. 294: He mentioned a report by Legazpi of the late 1560s, in which the Governor 
claimed that Japanese came together with the Chinese on the same trading vessels and went as 
far South as Mindoro.
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referred to them as corsarios.74 Second, many illegal seafarers landed in 
Manila, driven by their struggle to survive. An account by Padre Juan de 
Medina, based on hearsay and f irst published in 1630, illustrates the fate of 
the Fujianese immigrants’ in China. It suggests that overpopulation forced 
people to live on the sea. Joint enterprises with other seafaring groups would 
have guided these floating people to the Philippines as soon as they got wind 
of easy gains or a better living.75 In the fashion of promoting a glorious life 
under Christian rule, the Catholic father insisted that roaming around the 
South China Sea would make their lives a misery, but once they came to 
Manila they were assured a prosperous future.76
In essence, the complex combination of lawlessness and lack of central 
power stimulated the development of f lexible commercial networks that 
changed the nature of regional trade and Manila before the establishment 
of regular commerce with Mexico or Spain.77
The Spanish settlers of Manila initially welcomed the incoming traders, 
and happily enjoyed the benefits of commercial shipping within the flexible 
structures of Fujianese and Japanese maritime networks.78 Dissatisfaction 
about products of mediocre quality was only an issue during the early 
years of Spanish presence. Once the Chinese merchants came to realise 
the purchasing power of the emerging Manila market they adapted to the 
demand there:
They do not bring to sell the silks and beautiful things that they take to 
Malacca. They say that, if there were any one to buy them, they would 
74 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 6, n. 61, ‘Carta de Vera sobre pobreza de la gente de guerra’, 26 June 1586.
75 BR 10, pp. 212-213: ‘On account of suspicion which arose a long time ago regarding the 
Chinese, and because the Japanese pirates brought Chinese pilots and seamen, I made some 
investigations [with] Alonso Sauyo, governor of the sangleyes, but nothing of importance was 
discovered.’
76 Medina (1630), Historia, pp. 68-69. In fact, Padre Medina just as Timothy Brook (2008), 
Vermeer’s Hat, p. 170, relates a popular narrative of seventeenth-century China. For the original 
see Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 244. Censor Yüan-ch’u described the situation in 1639 as 
follows: ‘sea is the paddy land for the Fukienese [...] the poor joined the sea bandits and connected 
to the overseas barbarians’. BR 7, p. 214.
77 Nakajima (2007), ‘16seikimatsu no fukken’, pp. 55-92.
78 Upon his arrival in Manila, Legazpi informed Philip II about the Chinese calling on ports 
in Luzon. AGI Filipinas 6, r. 1, n. 7, ‘Carta de Legazpi sobre falta de socorro y descubrimientos’, 
23 July 1567. See also BR 3, p. 181: ‘The Chinese have come here on trading expeditions, since 
our arrival, for we have always tried to treat them well. Therefore during the two years that we 
have spent on this island, they have come in greater numbers each year, and with more ships; 
and they come earlier than they used to, so that their trade is assured to us.’ Miguel López de 
Legazpi moreover mentioned that Japanese frequented the islands.
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bring all we wanted; and so, since trading with the Spaniards, they bring 
each year better and much richer wares. If merchants would come from 
Nueva España, they might enrich themselves, and increase the royal 
customs in these parts – both through trade and through the mines, the 
richness of the number of which are well-known to us.79
Chinese private traders shipped ever-growing numbers of Chinese products 
and bartered them with American and Japanese silver.80 Depending on 
monsoon conditions, a sea journey from Fujian took between ten and fifteen 
days.81 Before long, Spanish traders and royal authorities in Manila feared 
that dealing with the Chinese would be unprof itable, since the Chinese 
only gave cheap quality silk and ceramics in return for silver.82 The 2000 to 
4000 ducats gained from the anchoring fee were not enough to bring growth 
to the settlement. Reacting to Manila’s residents’ complaints, the King’s 
councils in Spain came up with the idea of abolishing direct trade with the 
Chinese at Manila by no longer exporting silver from Mexico.83 Needless 
to say, this step was never undertaken. Yet it shows that other factors than 
off icial Spanish trade policies kept Manila trade alive.
Last but not least, through its attractiveness the galleon trade triggered 
change in Chinese and Japanese central regimes’ attitudes towards for-
eign trade and related exchange.84 The huge number of trading passes or 
licences for Manila issued in both China and Japan reflect shifts towards 
more foreign-trade-oriented political economies in both countries. It is 
noteworthy that the Spanish Crown also intended to distribute licences 
among the settlers of the Philippines for inter-Asian trade but the plan was 
79 BR 3, p. 182.
80 For the goods and commodities traded in Manila in the early trade with China, see Ch’en 
(1968), Chinese Community, pp. 78-83. For Japanese silver, see Sugaya (1998), ‘16 seikigo no 
supeinryō’, pp. 21-47. 
81 Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 161; For the number of Chinese junks anchoring at Manila, 
see Chaunu (1960), Philippines, pp. 149-192: 1581-1590: 102, 1591-1600: 119, 1601-1610: 290, 1611-1620: 
49, 1621-1630: 73, 1631-1640: 325, 1641-1650: 162 (including Macao). The journey of 400 Spanish 
leagues (approx. 1600 km) from Manila to Nagasaki took about 15 to 20 days. AGI Filipinas 6, r. 
7, n. 110, ‘Carta de Pedro González Carvajal sobre su viaje’ 1594.
82 BR 6, pp. 279-280: The Spanish at Manila regretted that only a very small amount of the 
silver sent from the Americas stayed in the Philippines, while the settlers of Mexico complained 
about the bad quality of Chinese silk products that would cause price drops for their own silk 
manufactures.
83 AGI Filipinas 339, l. 1, f.332v-333v, ‘Prohibición del comercio entre China y Nueva España’, 
19 June 1586.
84 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, pp. 167-215. Wills (2004), ‘Contingent Connections’, 
pp. 167-203. See also Elvin (1973), Pattern of the Chinese Past, pp. 217-225.
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never implemented.85 Beginning with the boletas for the Manila Galleon, 
trade licences issued by a central authority became the symbol for the shift 
from private maritime trade to exchange under the control of the state.
Integrating the Manila Galleon into South East Asian Trading 
Networks
Indigenous Participation and the Origins of Sino-Japanese Trade in Luzon
A few words have to be said about the role of indigenous Filipinos’ role 
in cross-cultural trade under Spanish colonial role. As already indicated, 
certain native groups were well integrated in foreign maritime trade with 
visiting East Asian traders by exchanging domestic products, including 
gold, wax and deerskin, followed by sappan wood and honey.86 Laura Lee 
Junker’s study has stressed that during the f ifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries, Philippine chiefdoms were intensifying their participation in long-
distance maritime trade. To the ruling elite it presented a welcome source 
for luxury goods, such as Chinese silks, which next to locally produced 
status goods, including decorated earthenware, served as the distinguishing 
element for a datu’s spiritual rule.87 Although it goes without saying that 
indigenous foreign exchange suffered from Spanish interference with the 
islands’ economy, two aspects should be taken into consideration when 
drawing a general picture. First, in several regions separated from Manila, 
pre-Hispanic exchange continued without major interruption. Pangasinan, 
a region rich in game, for instance, continued to entertain direct foreign 
trade relations. Yet only a small share of the population was logistically able 
to participate and benefit from foreign exchange.88 Second, during the entire 
Spanish period, the indigenous population of Luzon had access to Chinese 
merchandise and at times acquired it in exchange for American silver.89 In 
this regard it helps to recall that many natives served as intermediaries and 
benefitted from indigenous integration into the colonial society. In fact, that 
development had far-reaching consequences. When merchants and crafts-
men in Luzon no longer considered manufacturing a viable option, it not 
85 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 22 (1589).
86 Agoo (La Union) close to Cagayan was an emporium for the exchange of Igorot gold. 
87 Junker (1999), Raiding, pp. 122; 193.
88 See Scott (1984), Barangay, p. 248; Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 347.
89 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 294. For a revision on the classic view that the 
natives had no access to silver, see Cruikshank (2008), ‘Silver in the Provinces’, pp. 124-151.
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only forced them into making a living as day labourers but also discouraged 
export-oriented production. We may therefore conclude that flourishing 
triangular trade harmed the traditional structures of Philippine society in 
various aspects.
There is moreover no denying that the Spaniards, in imperial fashion, 
sought to place any form of lucrative indigenous trade under their own 
control. For instance, once they got wind of gold resources in Bicol (in today’s 
Camarines Norte province) in the south of Luzon, gold mining and distribu-
tion were quickly placed under Spanish supervision and Villa Ferdinandina 
was founded.90 A further lucrative trading good locally produced in Luzon 
was deerskin. After the 1570s large amounts of leather were exported to 
China, Mexico, and Japan and in the seventeenth century up to 80,000 
deer were annually hunted for that purpose.91 Deerskin was highly valued 
in Japan’s leather manufacturing (for shoes and samurai armour) and trade 
between the indigenous population and Japanese traders continued into 
the seventeenth century before Japan replaced Philippine deerskin imports 
with Taiwanese ones.92 Some research suggests that as a result of over-
export, deer became almost extinct on the Philippines.93 In any case, in 
light of uncontrollable Sino-Japanese competition for these export products, 
Spaniards urged a ban on the export of deerskin.94 In a similar fashion 
Chinese consumers were accused of causing ecological harm to the island by 
loading their ships with too much lumber and thus causing wood shortages 
in Luzon.95 Recurrent Spanish restrictions on direct exchange between the 
Chinese and the indigenous reflect sentiments of economic rivalry and the 
colonial elite’s disapproval of cooperation between East Asian traders and 
indigenous people.96 The elite’s uneasiness regarding the local populations’ 
participation in Sino-Japanese trade was closely connected to a stubborn 
belief in the laziness of the indigenous population. In particular in periods 
of silver shortness, the Spaniards in the Philippines blamed the Filipinos 
for spending money without much consideration. Critics of free trade were 
moreover convinced that if the ‘Indians’ had been more active in agriculture 
90 AGI Filipinas 27, n. 6, ‘Carta del Cabildo Secular de Manila sobre Conquista’, 17 July 1574.
91 Okada, Katō (1983), Nichiō kōryū.
92 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 251; Oka (2010), Shōnin, p. 109.
93 Jansen (1992), China in the Tokugawa World, pp. 20-21. Deerskin was the principal trading 
good from Siam to Japan.
94 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589).
95 BR 10, p. 84.
96 Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 64.
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and cotton weaving there would have been no need for the Chinese to come 
to the Philippines, and American silver would stay on the archipelago.97
In fact, the role of the American market for Chinese luxury items was 
far more essential than petty exchange in and around Manila. Signif icant 
amounts of silk and porcelain shipped from Manila to the Americas pro-
foundly changed consumption patterns in the Spanish overseas economy 
and production patterns in Asia. Together with cargo registers of the Manila 
Galleon, archaeological f indings illustrate the high demand for Chinese 
earthenware in the Americas.98
Fujianese Trade with Manila
In light of the huge number of Fujianese traders travelling to Manila annually, 
it still stands to question if and how these private merchants and licensed silver 
carriers were integrated in the galleon trade. In a way official Spanish policies 
set that trend. King Philip II commanded in January 1593 that his vassals 
should no longer go to China to buy merchandise there, and further decreed 
that if the Chinese wanted to sell goods, they should come to Manila at their 
own risk.99 Ironically only one year after the Spanish Crown had forbidden 
trade in China, Dasmariñas complained about the Chinese dictating the rules.
They do not permit us […] to go to their country, nor may a Spaniard go 
thither to invest one real – a custom entirely contrary to the freedom of trade. 
Therefore in order to avoid other undesirable results, I have decreed that 
Chinese traders shall not live here under the pretext of being merchants.100
97 BR 8, pp. 81-85.
98 The Yuchengco Museum in Metro Manila hosted an exhibition of Zhangzhou ware discov-
ered in the Philippines. The exhibits cover blue-and-white items of Fujian manufacturers that 
were produced especially to meet European demand. The Spanish galleon San Diego sunk in 
the year 1600 due to a military clash with the Dutch navigator Olivier van Noort off the coast 
of Manila and was excavated in 1991. See Desroches, Casal, Goddio (eds) (1997), Schätze der San 
Diego. For the f irst Dutch-Castilian sea battle in Philippine waters, see Schmitt (ed.) (2008), 
Indienfahrer, vol. 2, pp. 224-229. Research by Nogami Takenori from the Arita Folk and History 
Museum furthermore stressed the widespread use of Japanese porcelain in the Philippines, as a 
newly excavated collection in southern Cebu shows. Introduced at the Latin American Seminar, 
Kyoto Foreign Language University, 26 February 2014.
99 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 49 (1593): ‘Y mandar de que adelante ninguna 
persona trate, ni contrate en parte alguna de China ni por cuenta de los mercaderes de los dichas 
islas se traiga ni pueda traer hacienda alguna de aquel reino a ellas sino que los mismos Chinos 
las traigan por su cuenta y riesgo.’ Together with the pancada the rule was off icially abolished 
in 1696 but most of the time successfully circumvented by private traders. See also BR 25, p. 137.
100 BR 8, p. 274.
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Soon after the opening of Yuegang (Haicheng) in 1567 and thus many years 
before the above-mentioned royal decree, a remarkable number of off icial 
Chinese traders came to Manila. Some researchers speak of 30 permissions 
every year for ships from Yuegang to Luzon. According to Spanish data, an 
average of 30 to 40 ships of 100 to 300 tons each arrived every trading season 
during the peak years between the 1590s and the 1610s.101 In combination, 
the numbers indicate that by around 1590, the bulk of Chinese junks sent 
to Manila were licensed ones and when annual silver imports were carried 
out with off icial sanction between Manila and China.102
With regard to silver imports to China data presented by Richard von 
Glahn suggests that before 1600 China imported on average 46,600 kg of 
silver per year, of which about 60 per cent came from the Iwami mines of 
Japan that were opened in the 1530s.103 The rest originated from mines in 
the Americas and primarily entered via Manila. Merchants engaging in 
East Asia’s silver trade in Asia’s sixteenth century benefitted from diverging 
silver-gold ratios in Spain, China and Japan, known as arbitrage in economic 
history. Due to a devaluation of silver in relation to gold, in 1566 and 1608, 
the silver–to-gold ratio was 12:1 in the Castilian Empire, in China it rose from 
5.5:1 to 8:1. In the 1590s the value of silver was still about twice as high in 
China as in other regions.104 While the present study aims to analyse neither 
long-term economic development nor the beneficiaries of arbitrage deals, 
some general explanation patterns and research f igures will be helpful.105 
The opening of Yuegang (1567) and the foundation of Spanish Manila (1571) 
are popular starting points. The later date moreover coincided with the 
beginning of annual Portuguese intermediary trade on the Macao-Nagasaki 
route, which created a permanent Portuguese foothold in Japan.106
101 Remarkably, some Manila Galleons were of the same size (300 tons).
102 Ming shi, Biography of Luzón, juan 323, 8730, Deng (1997), Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 265 
on the Manila market: ‘The Chinese readjusted their operation by sailing to Manila more ships 
in 1575, 1580, 1596, 1599, 1620 and 1631.’ See also Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 119.
103 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 134.
104 The ratio data is based on a famous report by Pedro de Baeza of the year 1609 in which he 
also described arbitrage practices based on an alleged abundance of gold in China; Cf. Boxer 
(1970), ‘Plata es Sangre’, p. 461. See also Atwell (1998), ‘Ming China’, p. 404.
105 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, pp. 53-54, acknowledged that the Seville archives are a 
disappointment when it comes to the quantities of traded goods in Manila. I can only agree and 
have no choice but using Chaunu’s f igures, despite the criticism of changing collection practices.
106 For a recent synthesis of the Macao-Nagasaki trade, see Loureiro (2011), ‘Macau-Nagasaki 
Route’, pp. 189-206, in which he divides the commercial interaction of the kurofune into four 
stages, analysing the varying success of the enterprise. For prices of the Luso-Japanese trade 
in these decades, see AGI Patronato 46, r. 31, ‘Memoria de mercaderías de nao portuguesa: de 
China al Japón’, undated. 
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A lot has been written about prof itability and popularity of the 
Portuguese-Japan trade, whose main winner was the capitão moro or 
capitán mayor with gains of about 10 per cent of the entire cargo sold.107 
Strong Portuguese interest in keeping the Castilians out of Japan and China 
determined patterns of silver trade in the macro region. While they failed in 
Japan, for China they achieved that the Spanish did not receive ‘their Macao’. 
For instance, in 1575 two Augustinian friars Rada and Marín made attempts 
to settle in Amoy, a garrison since the early Ming. As we shall see later ar-
rangements for the ‘Chinese enterprise’ under the governorship of Francisco 
de Sande failed, due to the opposition of the Habsburg monarch, who did 
not want to endanger fragile Iberian relations.108 Before long Fujianese 
traders themselves – unhappy about the arrival of two Portuguese ships 
in Manila during the trading season – invited Governor Santiago de Vera 
in 1587 to build a Spanish trading outpost in ‘Chincheo’ (Yuegang).109 That 
year more than 30 ships came from China and Macao, laden with horses, 
cattle and other merchandise, which were all sold very cheaply. Many 
were from ‘Chincheo’, equipped with Ming licences.110 Archival records 
suggest that Japanese traders were also involved in arbitrage deals. About 
1575, Juan Pacheco Maldonado reported to Philip II that Japanese vessels 
visited Luzon every year for the purpose of exchanging silver to gold.111 This 
backs the neutral trading spot thesis and underlines Manila’s potential in 
enabling Japanese traders to circumvent Portuguese intermediaries as well 
as Chinese trade prohibitions. Time and again, the anti-Japanese regulations 
of Macao turned into Manila’s comparative advantage. Manila became the 
only port in the region that provided a free, liberal market for independent 
merchants from China and Japan.112 In 1614 the Governor of Guangdong and 
107 Disney (2009), History of Portugal, pp. 182-191. 
108 AGI Filipinas 339, l. 1, ff. 80r-82r, ‘Instrucciones de gobierno a Francisco de Sande’, 29 April 
1577. The royal government informed Sande that it wished to maintain friendship with China 
instead of conquering it. For the failure of Rada’s and Loarca’s missions to Southern China, see 
Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 64. Martín de Rada’s own account (AGI Patronato 24, r. 22, ‘Fray Martín 
de Rada a S. M. sobre la jornada de China’, 1 April 1576) of the journey that includes various details 
on China would thereafter serve European writers as important source for China studies. 
109 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 75, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general’, 26 June 1587.
110 The term ‘Chincheo’ was common among European traders to refer to the main port from 
were Fujianese traders left for Manila. Historians have been debating whether it referred to 
Zhangzhou 漳州or Quanzhou 泉州 but it is now commonly accepted that it refers to Yuegang. 
Ptak (2005), ‘Image of Fujian’, p. 307. AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey 
sobre situación, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
111 BR 3, pp. 295-303.
112 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 335. The commodity is referred to as chokidan. Tax was collected from 
the Japanese merchant Leon Mangobeo, who sold steel in 1617. He paid 2 pesos 2 tomin and 69 
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Guangxi introduced a new set of regulations for the Portuguese settlement, 
requiring that Macao must not harbour Japanese, the purchase of Chinese 
(i.e. slaves) was forbidden, and other regulations on anchoring of ships, the 
payment of duties in Canton, and restrictions on new constructions should 
altogether ensure ultimate Chinese sovereignty.113
To briefly recap, instead of becoming direct intermediaries like the Portu-
guese or later the Dutch, the Spaniards provided an advanced framework for 
continuous visits from the Chinese and Japanese: a port of call. In doing so 
the colonial government not only saved overhead costs but was furthermore 
able to skim off money from incoming trade.









We have heard that the Manila Galleon off icially did not ship more than 
1,000,000 pesos annually across the Pacif ic. Chinese goods brought to Ma-
nila during the same period must have valued some 1,300,000 pesos.115 In 
1598 Governor Tello informed the King that junks carried between 800,000 
and 1,000,000 pesos back to China every year and added that merchants 
earned more than 100 per cent during a ten-day stay.116 However according 
to data generated at the Archivo General de Indias, annual income based on 
almojarifazgo only amounted 23,000 pesos.117 This explains off icial records 
on Chinese traders who came to the island and did not register properly.118
grano per picul. The Japanese captain Luis Melo who brought 173 silver bars the same year, paid 
for 3 real each bar, for normal gold the same tax as the Chinese 224 pesos.
113 Zhang (2013), ‘Curious and Exotic Encounters’, p. 67.
114 Cf. Kang (2010), East Asia, p. 132.
115 TePaske (2001), ‘New World Silver’, p. 444.
116 BR 10, p. 179.
117 Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 44.
118 For instance: Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 71 (1594).
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Irregular Beginnings and Institutionalising Attempts of Hispano-
Japanese Exchange
Scholars inspired by Iwao Seiichi’s research on early modern Japanese trade 
in South East Asia have emphasised that adventurers from Japan frequented 
Cagayan and the Pangasinan region – geographically perfectly located for 
the Japanese – even before the arrival of the Spaniards.119 The existence 
of an outpost of Japanese sojourners in Cagayan, on the northern edge of 
Luzon, backs this claim. According to contemporary records, this Japanese 
settlement around the castle in Aparri hosted 600 residents who traded 
weapons for gold (from Igorot) under the command of their pirate-captain, 
Taifusa (also: Taifuzu).120 When the Spaniards discovered the settlement 
in 1581, they concluded that this illegitimate Japanese camp at Puerto de 
Japón – as they called it – had to disappear.121 The following year, Governor 
Ronquillo de Peñalosa urged a military intervention, which resulted in 
around 200 Japanese deaths and Japanese defeat at the hands of Captain 
Carrion.122 That Cagayan was more than just a temporary wakō hub and 
that Spanish fear of further attacks were not just hysteria or propaganda 
will become clear later.
Despite being considered illicit traders or even pirates, Japanese were 
allowed to support the Spanish community in Manila with goods. An 
eyewitness reported that Japanese settlers from Cagayan came on friendly 
trade missions to Manila to sell their weapons. Governor Vera stated that 
prosperous trade relations could be of further benefit for the archipelago, 
while being afraid of their skilled use of weapons.123 Iwao Seiichi’s survey 
stressed that the pre-shuinsen trade settlements (f irst in Cagayan and later 
in Manila) were almost exclusively based on private trade.124 During the 
early decades they did not act in the name of any Japanese authority. That 
119 Igawa (2007), Daikōkai jidai, p. 252.
120 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 245-247; See also Borao (2005), ‘Colonia de Japoneses’, pp. 25-53. 
121 The term was probably coined by Miguel de Loarca who reported that Japanese traders 
visited Pangasinan regularly for trade. Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 250.
122 Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, pp. 23-24; Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 246; AGI Filipinas 6, r. 4, n. 
49, ‘Carta de Ronquillo sobre franciscanos, poblamientos’, 16 June 1582.
123 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 75, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general’, 26 June 1587; 
AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587. 
In his second report, Vera mentioned a letter of Gaspar from Hirado. Maria Grazia Petrucci’s 
research embeds this sort of business arrangements in a broader South East Asian context. 
Petrucci (2010), ‘Pirates, Gunpowder and Christianity’, pp. 59-72.
124 See Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 249. Vigan (美岸, Bee-gan), the original toponym of the settlement, 
is etymologically reminiscent of Southern Fujianese merchants and is a telling indication for 
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foreign authorities, such as Ming off icials or Spanish colonial personnel, 
labelled them Japanese only served as distinguishing feature from Chinese 
sojourners. However, both behind the ‘Chinese’ trader and private Japanese 
merchants various identities could be found. The latter came to Luzon under 
the patronage of Kyushu daimyō, from Satsuma, Higo, Hirado, Nagasaki, and 
Hakata. Some of them flirted with Christianity, while others, such as Katō 
Kiyomasa (加藤清正), an ardent follower of the Buddhist Nichiren sect, just 
feigned interest. The year 1587 can be regarded as the beginning of off icial 
Japanese participation in triangular trade, as an account by Francisco de 
Vera, the incumbent governor, shows.125
Although Spanish vessels travelled to Japan prior to the period of li-
censed trade, written records are diff icult to locate.126 What is certain is 
that private enterprises were usually carried out in collaboration with the 
Portuguese.127 We know from fragmented evidence that individuals such 
as Bernardino Avila Girón, Pedro González de Carvajal, or Antonio Duarte 
sailed to Japan from Manila between 1592 and 1596, and also temporarily 
settled in Nagasaki. From its very beginning and far into the seventeenth 
century many of these private commercial projects were linked to provi-
sions trade.128 Prominent examples included Alonso de Ulloa and Francisco 
Maldonado in 1602; Captain Nicolás de la Cueva in 1603 and 1604, Captain 
Juan Rodríguez Bermejo in 1605, Captain Francisco Moreno Donoso in 1606 
and 1607, Captain Juan Bautista de Molina in 1608, Captain Juan de Cevicos 
in 1610, and Captain Domingo Francisco in 1612 and 1613.129
The nature of Japanese trade in Manila changed essentially with 
the introduction of the Shogun’s vermilion-seal trade (朱印船貿易, jp. 
shuinsen bōeki). From the point of view of private namban trade it meant 
Sino-Japanese collaboration in Illocos and Cagayan during the sixteenth century. For details 
on the expulsion, see Borao (2005), ‘Colonia de Japoneses’, pp. 25-53.
125 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 
26 June 1587.
126 Filipinas 6, r. 7, n. 110 ‘Carta de Pedro González de Carvajal sobre su viaje a Japón’, 1594.
127 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 275.
128 It should be emphasised that Japanese, Chinese, and Spanish ships were involved in that 
missions: ‘El Santiago el Menor, que el año pasado envié a Japón, trajo pólvora, balas, hierro, y 
clavazón, de que teníamos gran necesidad para los almacenas reales, a causa de lo mucho que 
se gastó en la guerra de los sangleyes; también trajo cantidad de harinas particulares, que fue 
grandísimo provecho, y se cobró de f lete a razón del tercio o cuarto, con que se suple un pedazo 
del gasto de navío.’ Cf. Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 447.
129 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 303-313.
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an elite attempt to cut, re-channel, and even usurp individual prof its.130 
Starting in 1601, Tokugawa Ieyasu sent a letter to the Governor of Manila, 
introducing his wish for regular trade both with Luzon and New Spain.131 
Three years later, Ieyasu and Pedro Bravo de Acuña (r. 1602-1606), who 
had followed Francisco Tello as Governor of the Philippines, standard-
ised trade between the two islands: three ships per season and mutual 
protection by law for the merchants and their property.132 The following 
year a further agreement between the same parties determined that four 
Japanese ships could enter Manila Bay, while Spanish traders also received 
off icial permission for four ships to do business in Japan annually.133 This 
institutionalisation of foreign trade in the form of merchants operating 
under Tokugawa licences led to an increase of the Japanese commerce 
volume with Manila.134 Acuña’s statement that Japanese ships ‘provided 
with the seal of the emperor [were] warmly welcomed’ conf irms that 
Tokugawa foreign trade regulations initially brought a stabilising effect 
on the Manila market.135
At the heyday of Japanese participation in the Manila trade, Japanese 
shuinsen merchants benef itted from catering to the luxury needs back 
home as well as from serving the daily needs of the Spanish community.136 
So, before long, Spanish authorities feared Japanese dominion. Aiming at 
the restriction of Manila-based Japanese trade, a law enacted on 25 July 
1609 required that Spanish vessels should exclusively carry merchandise 
between the two countries.137 The plan never materialised.
130 Nakajima Gakushō provides us with thorough research on Kyushu-Fujian-Luzon trade and 
gives particularly enlightening details on Japanese warlords’ participation in the 1590s, showing 
that regular foreign trade relations were established before the Tokugawa reign. Nakajima (2008), 
‘Invasion of Korea’, pp. 145-168.
131 Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 66-67.
132 Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 202-209; AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 175, ‘Copia de 
carta del obispo de Japón al governador sobre Dayfu Sama’, 1601.
133 For off icial trade agreements, see Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 46; 62; Hayashi 
et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/569 and 571. Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, p. 95.
134 Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 41; Jansen (1992), China in the Tokugawa World, p. 19.
135 Cf. Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, pp. 15-16.
136 Schurz has stressed the importance of silk exports for changing consumption in the New 
World. Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 32.
137 Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, book 9, title 44, law 2 (29 July 1609): ‘La contratación, 
comercio y navegación que hubiere desde las Filipinas al Japón, se hicieron por los vecinos de 
los islas para no dar lugar a que los japoneses vengan a ellos.’
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Commercial Gifts: Peculiarities of Hispano-Japanese Trade
Understanding the full spectrum of the Manila system requires examining 
its intercultural dimension, in other words, why the dynamics of combined 
diplomacy and trade mattered to the Manila market. Therefore, before 
studying trade flows and merchandise, I would like to discuss one peculiar-
ity of triangular trade of the early 1600s. In doing so we f ind that most 
Spanish merchant ships sent to Japan were equipped with presents for the 
Shogun.138 What appears bribery was in fact the hybrid result of overlapping 
European and East Asian traditions, where embassies and gift-giving were 
fundamental for commercial expansion.139 Without them merchants were 
hardly likely to master diff icult trading environments and negotiating pat-
terns. As Adam Clulow explained, it was customary for Europeans arriving 
in Asia to seek ‘access to the highest authority […] by dispatching embassies 
armed with off icial letters and bearing gifts’.140 In this fashion, opportunist 
Spaniards adopted a combination of commercial interaction and diplomatic 
codes in order to secure access to the Japanese market; Since commercial 
gift-giving had a random character, and was applied as opportunity pre-
sented, goods were often simply labelled as gifts.141 The above-mentioned 
private Spanish merchants seemed to have been equipped with sets of gifts 
for high-ranking Bakufu off icials and local lords. Japanese historian Takase 
Kōichiro (高瀬弘一路) has discovered a document of a f inancial off icer 
of Manila of 1607 stating that it was customary to send ships from Manila 
to the Japanese ruler along with an ambassador and highly priced gifts 
138 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, pp. 447-448, quoted a letter of the Audiencia in Manila of 8 July 
1608, which describes regular gift exchange: ‘Cada año se ha enviado un navío, en el cual van 
cartas y un presente de pañolos y algunas piezas de seda, vino y otras menudencias, que todo 
cuesta menos de ochocientos pesos; y es tan necesario esto, que si las cartas no fuesen a esta 
sombra, serían mal recibidas: recíbenlo allá con voluntad, y el gobierno (japonés) he enviado 
cada año cinco de armas, a su usanza, que son de poca defensa y valor, aunque parecen bien.’
139 Martha Chaiklin concluded: ‘The bestowal of gifts to smooth diplomatic negotiations, 
from ruler to ruler, and between envoy and ruler, was a common practice in most parts of 
the world until well into the nineteenth century.’ Chaiklin (2012), ‘Merchant’s Ark’, http://
worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/9.1/chaiklin.html (accessed 13 March 2012).
140 Clulow (2014), Company, p. 26.
141 Avila Girón’s account indicates that early private merchants already followed that practice. 
Girón (1965), Nihon, pp. 270-275. After the 1640s similar practices were institutionalised for the 
Dutch in Japan. One of the pillars of VOC trade with Japan was the annual journey to Edo (hofreis 
naar Edo) where a Dutch delegation offered exclusive gifts to the shogun. For a description of 
the ceremony, see Goodman (2000), Japan and the Dutch, pp. 24-28.
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(valuing between 800 to 1000 pesos).142 Usually gifts consisted of Chinese 
silk, Castilian clothes, and wine; glass items, wax, and earthenware found 
in Luzon were also repeatedly recorded.143 Regardless of being considered 
an inappropriate gift, weapons were commonly sent to Japan. Sending wine 
was likewise not without irony. Exporting wine from Spain (a common good 
on ships to the Americas) was already a trans-Atlantic challenge, due to the 
problematic storage in the unbearable heat. A similar story could be told for 
olive oil that was much in demand for baptism but would arrive rancid.144 
Thus sending these Spanish products to the Philippines was in fact a waste 
of resources and cargo space. Certainly, when Castilian wine reached the 
shogunal court after at least two years of travel it was essentially vinegar. 
Unfortunately we do not know anything about the use of the items in Japan.
Understanding the reciprocal principle of gift bestowal also explains 
why merchants adopted it in the f irst place. The inventory of the f irst 
vessel sent to Manila by Tokugawa Ieyasu shows that this trade pattern 
could be very lucrative for the Spaniards. It listed an extensive range of 
both symbolic gifts and practical goods, including 500 swords, different 
metals and 10,500 blankets. Goods like two toilette mirrors and 30 golden 
folding screens give reason to believe that it was not a standard commercial 
transaction. Apart from exchanging presents, merchants accompanying 
the delegation used the opportunity to barter with local dealers.145 Another 
account by Antonio de Morga that mentioned Japanese folding screens 
142 Takase (2002), Kirishitan jidai, p. 102; See also AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, f. 100r, ‘Petición de 
informe sobre regalo al emperador de Japón’, 25 July 1609. According to Juan de Silva, presents 
for the emperors of China and Japan cost 1633 pesos.
143 For Castilian wine sent to Japan, see Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/575; 
Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 44; 69. AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 51; For an overview of 
gifts sent to Japan on various occasions between 1592 and 1623, see Contaduría 1206 (Caja de 
Filipinas, Cuentas). See also Shimzu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 342-244; Sola (1999), Historia de un 
Desencuentro, pp. 204; 210-211. 
144 Murdo J. Macleod described how church elites lamented over the fact that wine sent from 
Spain had already gone bad when it got to the Americas. Macleod (1984), ‘Spain and America’, 
pp. 334-335; 367-369.
145 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 7, n. 88, ‘Memoria de mercaderías que trae el embajador de Japón’, 1600. 
See also Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, p. 68: Five golden folding screens are mentioned 
in a register on goods sent to New Spain in the year 1612.
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(屏風, jp. byōbu)146 and swords among imports to Manila falls into the 
same category.147
Although such records are not necessarily accurate in quantitative terms 
they doubtlessly shed light on Hispano-Japanese exchange patterns. It 
highlights both the Filipino-Spanish attempt to circumvent royal orders and 
has to be seen as yet another Japanese attempt to put the Middle Kingdom 
system upside down by imitating Chinese practices. As far as Spanish 
contributions – often explicitly improvised – are concerned, tributary items 
listed in off icial Japanese records fall into the category of exotic items; next 
to it we f ind various types of silk and other clothes.148 Silk goods, of course, 
originally came from China and were purchased in Manila, either because 
of the limited availability of other presents or because the Spaniards knew 
what was most appreciated in Japan. When it comes to Spanish perception, 
not all active participants seem to have been aware of their strategic acting. 
In the year 1615 a Spanish envoy to Tokugawa Japan referred to the gifts for 
the Shogun as ‘useless things’ (‘cosas sin provecho’).149 And then there were 
also those Spanish actors who ignored the power of material gesture, for one 
reason or another. If we are to believe one of Alessandro Valignano’s (a con-
troversial Jesuit Visitor to the Estado da Índia) famous polemic pamphlets, 
mendicant orders, especially Franciscans were ridiculed for not bringing 
any gold or silver on their missions to China and Japan.150
The Spirits That They Called – Bargaining on the Spot
While highly symbolic exchange patterns with gifts and gestures were a 
form of trade that happened mainly outside Manila, we now return to com-
mercial exchange on the spot, yet not without being reminded that it must 
not be disconnected from the situation described above. If we are to believe 
Padre Juan de Medina, prior of the Augustinian convent in Cebu, trade with 
146 Some folding screens were sent to Europe and thanks to Habsburg connections even ended 
up in Graz. The Ōsakajō-zu-byōbu is still part of the rich furniture of the Eggenberg Castle. See 
http://www.kleinezeitung.at/steiermark/graz/graz/1484215/index.do as well as http://www.
museum-joanneum.at/upload/f ile/Schloss_Eggenberg[0].pdf (both accessed 23 February 2013). 
It is worth mentioning in this context that exactly the trade relations described here created the 
term ‘Spanische Wand’ for precisely this piece of furniture that became increasingly popular in 
Renaissance Europe.
147 BR 10, pp. 81-85.
148 Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, p. 69.
149 AGI Mexico 28, n. 49, ‘Carta del virrey marqués de Guadalcázar’, 13 March 1617.
150 Cf. Álvarez-Taladriz (ed.) (1973), Relaciones, p. 69.
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China was beneficial for everyone in 1630: not only for those living on the 
islands, but also for the whole of Spain. Because in China, ‘everything and 
as much as desired was available’ and the number of merchant ships was 
uncountable. Father Medina underlined the fluidity of the network and the 
mobility of the merchants who also went to Siam, Cambodia, Moluccas, 
Makassar, and Japan and thus secured Manila’s provisions in everything 
needed, including iron, mercury, silk, rice, pork, gold, and a thousand other 
things that were all exchanged against silver.151
Fujianese and Japanese merchants dominated the most lucrative trade 
branches, while their business deals under Spanish supervision followed 
the logic of constant bargaining ‘on the spot’, as supported by two aspects: 
First, Manila reflected laissez-faire structures despite constant control from 
above. The small number and mostly only light punishments for smuggling 
unregistered goods into Manila, as indicated by Juan Gil,152 furthermore 
emphasises the liberal trade atmosphere. Second, trading conditions were 
often influenced by external developments.153 Numerous records about huge 
possible prof its during the earlier stage stress a minimum of government 
intervention.154 In light of potential Spanish control, customs and other 
taxes that went straight into the caja (colonial budget) calling Manila a 
Sino-Japanese intermediary port falls short. Instead, I suggest speaking of 
a neutral trading spot supported by Iberian merchants and policymakers, 
resembling neighbouring port cities. In addition, I have found that at the 
height of triangular trade, active intermediaries were practically absent 
from Manila. In reality, Fujianese traders dealt with the Fujianese market, 
shuinsen traders with Japan and Spaniards and criollos with Mexico, and 
increasingly after 1610, the Portuguese with Manila and Mexico.155 The 
setup was surely not without critics. Antonio de Morga worried about what 
he referred to as chaotic economic profile. He complained about the lack 
of f ixed laws, high prices of provision and counterfeiting merchants, for 
which he blamed the unfair strategies of Chinese and indigenous Filipi-
nos.156 Moreover, he accused rich Spanish encomenderos and Chinese of 
151 Medina (1630), Historia, pp. 68-69.
152 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 70-72.
153 John Darwin emphasised in his recent book the ‘play of economic and geopolitical sources’ 
as crucial for understanding the dynamics of empires. Darwin (2009), Empire Project, p. 7. 
154 Summarised by Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 11-21.
155 Seijas (2008), ‘Portuguese Slave Trade, p. 21. In the 1630s, the Portuguese kept the Spanish 
colony supplied with merchandise and slaves and the Spanish were willing to turn a blind eye 
to violation of trade prohibitions.
156 BR 10, p. 81.
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manipulating rice prices.157 In any case, limited availability of goods and the 
high level of competition and the unpredictable bargaining process made 
Manila an expensive place. In addition, a saturated market often caused 
price falls, as happened in the 1590s.158 Reoccurring rampant inf lation, 
partially as a consequence of silver in transit, as well as f luctuating prices 
in particular for Chinese silk demonstrate that protectionism failed. Since 
prices on the Manila market were conditioned by the availability of silver, 
the market remained vulnerable to external factors for the entire period of 
our study. Seraf in Quiason has shown how a ‘starved Manila or Acapulco 
market would induce a rise in prices’; in 1628, when off icial Japan had 
already stopped sending vessels to Manila, prices for silk and other Chinese 
commodities increased sharply due to the scarcity of silver coming from 
the Americas – according to one witness up to 400 per cent.159
We may assume that top-notch bargaining in bulk happened at the 
notorious fair of Manila, reminiscent of what Fernand Braudel described 
for late-sixteenth-century Europe, and not yet manipulated by emerging 
merchant capitalism.160 It would not be too far-fetched to trace similarities 
between Fujianese bargaining tactics and elaborate traditions of Chinese 
haggling that can still be experienced today.161 The ultimate example of 
top-down bargaining was the institution of pancada,162 which existed for 
several years with varying success. King Philip II ordered the introduction 
of the pancada system for Chinese merchandise between 1589 and 1591.163 As 
an instrument for wholesale (or purchase in bulk) the pancada f ixed prices 
for Chinese imports based on negotiations in advance. Such a procedure 
was believed to ensure that the Chinese did not cream off the prof its of 
this lucrative exchange and to improve the Spanish merchants’ prof its.164 
The pancada gave rise to a form of collective bargaining prior to the actual 
trade. The captain or head of a Chinese merchant ship bargained with a 
committee of Spanish off icials or merchants (sp., cargaderos de la nao), 
157 BR 10, pp. 84-85. 
158 Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 169.
159 Cf. Quiason (1966), ‘Sampan Trade’, p. 168.
160 Braudel (1977), Afterthoughts, p. 40.
161 Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 45, pointed out that the Chinese were skilful bargainers.
162 Although some sources suggest that pancada was a Manila neologism of unknown origin, 
the term was also used in Macao with regard to Portuguese trade in Manila. See Álvarez (2009), 
Costo del Imperio, p. 65; Souza (1986), Survival of Empire, pp. 58-62.
163 Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 134.
164 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 45 (1593). The suggestion for such policy initially 
came from Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas in a letter dated 20 June 1591; Philip II conf irms his order 
once again in a cédula written on 11 June 1594.
156 SPAIN, CHINA, AND JAPAN IN MANILA, 1571-1644
who represented the municipality of Manila. The f ixed price could not be 
changed once the investment had been placed.165 Any delay in the arrival of 
the galleon increased the opportunity for private merchants to ‘make their 
own deals on the side’, leading to flourishing ‘smuggling and contraband 
trade’.166 Thus by the turn of the century, the pancada was gradually replaced 
by a free market environment, the feria (fair).167 Luis Alonso Álvarez has 
concluded that since the pancada did not stop the drain of Chinese silk to 
the Philippine provinces, encomenderos and the indigenous population 
were the greatest losers of trade with the Chinese because they were soon 
excluded from the Manila market; it is furthermore worth mentioning that 
Álvarez considers the Dominicans, who supported the Chinese residents 
of Manila, winners.168
I would like to add Japanese merchants, thanks to their extraordinary 
purchasing power, as the second winning team in the period between 
1590 and 1610. They took a particular interest in Manila because of the 
easy access to Chinese products, including silk for the Japanese domes-
tic economy.169 Their competition for Chinese silks and their superior 
purchasing power on the Manila market led to sudden price increase 
that negatively affected Spanish performance and the pancada system.170 
Imports from Manila included silk yarn in the amount of 400 to 500 picul 
before 1600, compared to 1000 picul annually from Macao: white and 
raw silk were mainly purchased in Guangdong and directly shipped to 
Japan.171 Before the seventeenth century, the bulk of Chinese silk from 
Manila reached Japan on board Portuguese ships.172 In 1598 the Japanese 
reportedly bought up all silk from China. In light of high quantities of silk 
exports to Japan, the Spaniards feared that too many Japanese traders 
in Manila would cause the silk supplies to New Spain and Europe to 
fall tremendously, and thus directly harm the income for the Crown.173 
165 Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, book 9, title 45, law 34.
166 Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, p. 24. For smuggling, see also McCarthy (1993), 
‘Between Policy and Prerogative’, pp. 163-183.
167 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 356.
168 Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 65.
169 For the unfair practices of Manila Galleon off icials, see BR 10, pp. 81-85.
170 See Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, pp. 74-78; 115, 133.
171 For the larger context of the trade system, see Oka, Gipouloux (2013), ‘Pooling Capital’, 
pp. 75-91.
172 Oka (2010), Shōnin, pp. 99-100. Extensive lists of goods of namban and Portuguese trade in 
Asia including scope and prizes are a particularly noteworthy contribution of her book.
173 Morga (1890), Sucesos, pp. 350-351; Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 334 based on Retana (ed.) (1895-1905), 
Archivo, vol. 3, p. 84. Louis Cullen classif ied the Spanish in Manila among Japan’s competitors 
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Katō Eiichi has pointed out that sixteenth-century Japan’s readiness to 
buy large quantities of silk yarn was linked to the growing market that 
developed in castle towns at that time.174 Thus, occasional silk shortages 
in Manila are not at all surprising.
The comparatively larger effort Japanese had to make to reach Manila 
implies proper gains. The vermillion-seal ship’s principal cargo consisting 
of Japanese silver and everyday commodities was always quickly sold. As 
Chinese high-quality silk was the chief commodity for Japanese brokers, 
my hypothesis is that Chinese silk yarn and other silk products were the 
driving force behind Japan’s efforts in maintaining regular relations with 
Manila. The fact that Japanese trade in Manila was integrated in a network 
of more than ten overseas Japantowns in South East Asia by the 1610s is a 
further reason to speculate about who pulled the strings behind the scenes. 
According to Charles Boxer, the Japanese enjoyed a much greater freedom 
of trade at Manila than the Chinese.175 However, a closer look suggests the 
opposite. Contrary to previous assumptions, they were not exempted from 
paying the almojarifazgo to the royal treasury.176 Nevertheless there were 
times, for instance in 1607 and 1608, when they did not pay taxes because 
they did not bring any goods to declare.177 Moreover direct Sino-Japanese 
barter certainly offered ways to avoid tax payment. The arbitrary attitude 
of Manila authorities who tended to make decisions without the King, 
jeopardised Hispano-Japanese trade relations. Finding out about untaxed 
trade with Japan, the Spanish monarch accused colonial authorities of 
trying to enrich themselves illegitimately and called for moderation.178
Provisions Trade
The above-mentioned quote by Juan de Medina clearly hints that private 
traders and brokers from China and Japan were taking care of the material 
for Chinese silk. See Cullen (2003), History of Japan, p. 22.
174 Katō (1976), ‘Japan-Dutch Trade’, p. 45.
175 Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. 73. Contaduría registers show that off icials in Cavite regularly 
collected almojarifazgo from Japanese mercantile vessels.
176 Around the year 1600, 218 tributes were collected from Japanese households in Manila. BR 
27, pp. 79; 135.
177 AGI Filipinas 29, n. 94, ‘Carta de los of iciales de la Real Hacienda de Filipinas’, 14 July 1607. 
178 AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, ff. 97r-98r, ‘Ordenes sobre comercio con China y Japón’, 25 July 1609; 
as well as a petition drafted the same day: AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, f. 100r, ‘Petición de informe 
sobre regalo al emperador de Japón’, 25 July 1609.
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welfare of Manila before and after the restrictions of 1593. Merchandise 
brought to Manila from Hirado by a Sino-Japanese crew in the year 1593 
included tuna, ham, 300 bags (picos) of f lour, 20 of copper, 1600 blankets, 
and three sets of catanas. The goods had to be declared before the Governor 
and his clerk.179 One product was particularly crucial: f lour. As important 
staple nutrition on the Manila Galleon and for Spanish soldiers stationed 
in the region, it furthermore enjoyed great popularity among the settlers 
who had processed it into bread in one of Manila’s many bakeries. Being 
easily available in Southern Japan, wheat flour enabled even smaller lords 
to participate in foreign trade.180 The f irst cargo from Hirado, which arrived 
at Manila in 1587, registered wheat alongside salted f ish, weapons, silk, 
and handicrafts.181 Governor Acuña stressed in 1604 the importance of the 
arrival of a private flour cargo, together with munitions, gunpowder and 
signif icantly also many gifts as sign for friendly relations, from Japan.182 
Next to occasional supplies from Japan, Fujianese traders were the ones 
ensuring the colony’s survival. Spanish authors ranking from missionaries 
to the King in Spain described how Chinese settlers fed Manila by providing 
bread, pork, chicken, and f ish for virtually everyone for little money.183 Food 
cargoes became a vital part of the Manila system. Such convenient imports 
allowed the Spaniards, in a way similar to the socio-economic conditions 
in the Americas, to focus on less tedious, non-producing tasks.
Private traders from East Asia moreover took initiatives to provide 
arms and other materials for munitions due to the Spaniards’ constant 
need to defend and occasional desire to expand their political influence in 
the region.184 As examined above, cargoes from Japan also often included 
traditional weapons, swords and military supplies, such as iron, iron bullets, 
179 A catana is a traditional Japanese sword. Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 49-50.
180 For Japan, see Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/566; See also Okada, Katō (1983), 
Nichiō kōryū, pp. 227-228.
181 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 18, ‘Carta de Acuña sobre temas de gobierno’, 15 July 1604: ‘Con el 
emperador de Japón [...] se tiene toda buena correspondencia y también con sus vasallos que 
aquí vienen a contratar y el dinero que hacen de los harinas, jamones, atún, yerro, clabacon, 
armas y otras cosas que traen a vender lo llevan empleado en cueros de venado que los hay de la 
tierra y mercaderías de China como siempre lo han hecho este año por aver sucedido la perdida 
de la nao de Macan han traído algunos dineros y hecho empleo de ellos.’
182 Cf. Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 62-63.
183 BR 7, p. 228; For a detailed list of goods, see Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, 
p. 23; Japanese and Chinese f lour was sold for 16 reals per quintal while the same amount of 
f lour shipped from New Spain cost 80 reals (BR 18, p. 179).
184 Gorriz Abella (2010), Filipinas, p. 101. 
tHe trILogy oF trIANguLAr trADe 159
saltpetre, copper, and nails.185 Moreover hemp for ropes and sails was also 
imported from Japan.186 Both in 1586 and 1587, Japanese ships with weapons 
arrived in the Philippines.187 At times, Spanish ships were sent to Japan to 
buy necessities. One such example is a vessel of 1608, whose cargo consisted 
mainly of raw silk. In Japan, colonial off icials and merchants bought iron, 
saltpetre, hemp, f lour, and blankets for the Manila warehouses (reales 
almacenes) with the returns from silk trade.188 Iron shipped to the islands 
from China and Japan was another such necessity that helped the Spaniards 
to cut down on their expenses. Being mainly used for nails for shipbuilding, 
25 pounds (11.5 kg) could be bought for 8 reals, whereas nails from New Spain 
cost more than twice as much.189 Fujian, being rich in raw materials such as 
wood or iron, supposedly catered to similar Spanish needs.190
Japanese historian Maehira Fusaaki (真栄平房昭) carried out a 
survey on weapon transport in the China Seas. At the beginning of the 
seventeenth century weapons ranged from traditional Japanese swords 
to manufactured European-style rifles. The latter found a ready market in 
Fujian, despite the Ming prohibition on purchasing f irearms191, and were 
likely to be carried back by Fujianese traders from Manila. As regional hub 
for military supply Manila’s reputation soon spread to Japan. During the 
war with Korea (1592-1598) Katō Kiyomasa (1561-1611), one of the Japanese 
senior commanders, sent ships to Manila to acquire Chinese copper and 
saltpetre.192 Trade in saltpetre (potassium nitrate) – the most important 
gunpowder substance – reflects the ambiguous roles of certain agencies of 
the Manila trade.193 Successfully used as chemical explosive in China since 
the Song period, European history was determined by both a constant need 
and chronic shortage of the nitrated salt. In China, export was historically 
forbidden, the Ming notoriously feared to arm potential enemies.194 Albeit 
such prohibitions, Antonio de Morga declared that Chinese captains and 
merchants should be ordered, under penalty of imprisonment, to bring 
saltpetre, iron, copper, and other metals, which they had until then refused 
185 Morga (1966), Firipin shotō, pp. 391-392.
186 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 163.
187 BR 7, pp. 96-105; Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 248.
188 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 448.
189 BR 18, pp. 175-176.
190 Van Dyke (2005), Canton Trade, p. 15.
191 Maehira (2008), ‘Minchō’, pp. 61-76.
192 Nakajima (2008), ‘Invasion of Korea’, p. 156. For Katō Kiyomasa’s correspondence with the 
Governor of the Philippines, see Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 82-83. 
193 Saltpetre functions as oxidizer, while sulphur and charcoal are used as fuels.
194 See Needham (1986), Science and Civilisation, p. 126; Souza (1986), Survival of Empire, p. 76.
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to bring. Indeed, private merchants found ways to supply the Spanish Pacific 
over the years.195
Being part of intra-Asian junk trade, only few ships were exclusively 
dedicated to transporting provision to Manila. Provisions trade was well 
integrated into the bargaining system, however under special conditions. 
His Majesty had ordered that no custom duties must deter Asian traders 
from selling their goods in Manila and provisions were hence excluded from 
any trade regulations, including the almojarifazgo tax.196 This certainly was 
an incentive for smaller traders to visit the city and encouraged others to 
stay and to help colonising the archipelago.
There were times when external influences harmed the smooth system. 
For instance, when the Dutch François de Wittart kidnapped three richly 
laden Chinese merchant ships on their way to Manila during the trading 
season 1609/10 before being defeated by a fleet led by Juan de Silva offshore 
Manila in April 1610.197 Over the years multifaceted supply patterns ensured 
the maintenance of the colonial infrastructure. In years when the Fujian-
Manila route was interrupted, Fujianese merchants sent ships from Japan 
or Taiwan.198 In addition, the Portuguese of Macao also happily f illed in 
as intermediary carriers. Their efforts date back to the 1580s when they 
supplied Manila with construction material from China and saltpetre from 
Siam.199 In periods of plummeting Chinese supply the Spaniards actively 
encouraged other South East Asian rulers to provide them with military 
supply. For that very reason embassies were dispatched to Cochinchina, 
Camboya, and Siam around the year 1628, when triangular trade relations 
had been in its last throes.200
Various historians have found strong evidence for Portuguese traders’ 
signif icant role in provisions trade. John Villiers found that African slaves, 
Indian cottons, spices, amber, ivory, precious stones, toys, and curiosities 
from India, Persian and Turkish carpets and gilded furniture made in Macao 
were shipped on Portuguese ships to Manila.201 A more recent study by 
195 Filipinas 34, n. 24 ‘Relación de las cosas que se han de enviar a Filipinas’, 1578; AGI Filipinas 
29, n. 33, ‘Carta de los of iciales reales sobre varios asuntos’ (1580).
196 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 71 (1590); BR 7: 89; Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 50-52.
197 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 91.
198 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 100-108.
199 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 
1587.
200 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 6, ‘Carta de Niño de Tavora sobre materias de gobierno’, 1 August 1629.
201 Villiers (1987), ‘Silk and Silver’; For the slave trade, see De Sousa, Beites Manso (2011), ‘Os 
Portugueses’.
tHe trILogy oF trIANguLAr trADe 161
Amélia Polónia and Amandio Barros on individual networks and Iberian 
agents in trans-Atlantic trade revealed that Portuguese were albeit con-
tinuous prohibitions an integrative part of the system.202 The Portuguese 
kept the colony supplied with merchandise and slaves and the Spanish 
were willing to turn a blind eye to violation of trade prohibitions. Oka 
Mihoko’s and Lúcio de Sousa’s research on Portuguese slave traff icking 
from Japanese and Chinese points of origin leaves no doubt that after slave 
traff icking became forbidden in Macao, Manila became the new transit 
port from where Chinese, Japanese, and Korean slaves were shipped to 
other continents.203 Their f indings have great potential for future studies 
on the nature of slavery and servitude in the Spanish Philippines, under 
the pretext of protecting the native population versus reoccurring Moro 
slave raids in Luzon and Visayas.
Connections between Manila and Macao
When employing the lens of longue durée the impact on China’s economy of 
several hundred Iberians in Asia might have been marginal. Yet American 
and Japanese silver f lows to China sustainably changed global economic 
connections of the pre-globalised world and many individual actors thrived 
as silver-gold intermediaries between China and Japan.204 The assertion 
that the Ming dynasty collapsed under the pressure of increased military 
spending and decline in silver imports from Japan and Manila between 
1635 and 1644 has been heavily debated over the past three decades.205 We 
will not be able to fully grasp the complex nature of the silver trade without 
looking at both the ideological background and changing Japanese and 
American consumption patterns. While both Japan and Spain provided 
silver bullion for China, the Ming, ironically, looked down at her suppliers, 
constantly mocking that they brought nothing but silver in exchange for 
high-quality Chinese manufactures.206 Silk and ceramics production were 
indeed not yet similarly advanced in the Iberian realms. Japan used to 
earn similar disapproval from China. Indeed, although manufacturing 
202 Polónia, Barros (2012), ‘Commercial Flows’, pp. 111-144.
203 De Sousa (2013), ‘16-17 seiki’, pp. 229-281.
204 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 131.
205 Atwell (2004), ‘Another Look’, pp. 467-491; Moloughney, Xia (1989), ‘Silver and the Fall’, 
pp. 51-78.
206 Cf. Murai (1997), Umi kara mita, p. 164; Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji, pp. 81-83.
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techniques had advanced by 1600, costs for domestic products exceeded 
Chinese imports by far.
Late-sixteenth-century Japanese silver exports to China are commonly 
associated with the Macao-Nagasaki route. The annual ship from Macao 
usually left China in June and returned in March. For several months up 
to 200 Portuguese stayed in Japan, where they willingly spent money and 
enjoyed themselves.207 Compared to the Spaniards of Manila, a much higher 
number of Portuguese visited Japan.208 Some of them belonged to the mili-
tary Order of Jesus and, as a rule, they were known for their inappropriate 
behaviour. They benefitted from the privileges of knighthood: A royal letter 
of appointment (alvará) was the necessary patent for the so-called capitan 
moro to carry out the Macao-Japan journey; it was the most important 
document of the Portuguese maritime empire in Asia during the sixteenth 
century.209 The same lucrative silver business secured the Jesuits’ foothold in 
Japan. Padres of the Society of Jesus actively participated in Sino-Japanese 
arbitrage trade based on an agreement between Alessandro Valignano and 
Macao-Nagasaki silk traders in 1578. That deal, for which they would later 
receive the approval of Superior General Claudio Aquaviva, Pope Gregory 
XIII and the royal off icials in Macao and Goa, won the Society 100 of the 
96,000 kg of silk sent annually and was possible thanks to a fairly liberal 
royal church patronage known as padroado.210 What is more, over the years 
the Jesuits were often the ultimate beneficiaries of Portuguese trade with 
Japan: as cross-cultural brokers their skills were often indispensable for 
Luso-Japanese business deals; the Jesuits ensured gains of Christian mer-
chants in Nagasaki in order to secure the future of their own missionary 
work.211 This was a stark contrast to Spanish mendicant friars active in 
Japan after 1590.
Luso-Spanish tensions differed geographically, depending on the exter-
nal setting: The Portuguese in the Moluccas, their weakest spot, showed 
themselves far more tolerant than their countrymen in Macao. Occasionally 
they would even ask the Spaniards for help. In 1582 the capitan mayor of 
207 Hesselink (2012), ‘Capitães Mores’, pp. 14-15.
208 Macao’s sudden growth and the enormous profits of its resident merchants as intermediaries 
in the off icial Macao-Nagasaki trade have always been undisputed. Chaunu (1962), ‘Manille et 
Macao’, p. 579; Gipouloux (2009), Méditerranée Asiatique, pp. 142-143.
209 Hesselink (2012), ‘Capitães Mores’, pp. 8-9: The position was popular among Melaka captains, 
casados (Sephardic Jews), and Cantonese merchants.
210 Boxer (2002), Portuguese Merchants; BR 10, pp.  192; 198-201; De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, 
pp. 55-56.
211 Hesselink (2012), ‘Capitães Mores’, p. 2.
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the Moluccas, Diego de Azambuza, asked for 1000 men to assist f ighting 
the ‘Rey de Ternate’ and Manuel Pereira de Villasboas visited personally to 
the Philippines to ask Ronquillo for support. Yet, the Governor could not 
afford to commit himself fully to supporting the distressed Portuguese.212
Macao, as an informal Portuguese trading centre, was an entirely dif-
ferent story. According to Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto, Macao’s secret was
a strategy of accommodation to the diverse interests of the local elites, 
the expectations of the consortiums of Portuguese-Chinese-Japanese 
merchants, the positions and politics of the Crown, the interest of the 
Portuguese nobility in the King’s service, the aspirations of the Company 
of Jesus in China and Japan, and f inally the reservations, oscillations, 
and expectations of the provincial authorities of Guangdong and, above 
them, of Beijing.213
Although the separation of two overseas zones remained in effect after-
wards, the implementation of the personal union between Portugal and 
Spain in 1580/81 was a new boost to Manila-Macao relations, economi-
cally speaking, with more success than with regard to evangelising. The 
Spaniards being well aware of the restrictions for their overseas territories, 
hoped their situation in the Far East would improve thanks to coopera-
tion with the Portuguese; any sign in that direction, in return, made the 
Portuguese suspicious of losing their independence.214 Although Macao 
appealed to Goa and Lisbon to keep the Spaniards out of their spheres of 
interest, Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, one of the richest merchants in Macao, 
inaugurated the Manila-Macao route in 1583/84.215 Before long Portuguese 
merchants sailed between Nagasaki and Manila, carrying Asian as well 
as European goods between the two trading centres.216 Politically speak-
ing, less pragmatic Portuguese of the Estado da Índia feared to lose their 
autonomy. In particular in Japan and China, the Portuguese made great 
efforts not to lose their undeniable comparative advantage to the Spaniards, 
or that is at least what Manila Spaniards sensed:
212 Cf. Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, p. 95.
213 Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, p. 16.
214 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade.
215 Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, pp. 17-18.
216 Álvarez-Taladriz (ed.) (1973), Relaciones, pp. 11-13. In 1596, for instance, Portuguese Vasco 
Diaz’s ship carried Franciscan friars to Japan.
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If any of the Spaniards who went to that land received ill-treatment at 
the hands of the Chinese, it was due to the evil reports of us which the 
Portuguese spread among them, warning them to be aware of Castilians 
as a people addicted to stealing and seizing foreign kingdoms; and who 
as they had become masters of Nueva España, Peru and the Philippines, 
would strive likewise to obtain China.217
In the meantime, Macao had acquired full city status with a municipal 
council, or Senate Council, as the representative body of Macao in 1585.218 
The ruling Portuguese there were, unlike in Goa, not fidalhos but mainly 
merchants acting as agents and spice brokers. This special character of 
the outpost limited Crown intervention.219 In the early 1600s the Portu-
guese residents from Macao insisted on access to trade with Manila due 
to decreasing returns from trade with Japan. Arguing that as ‘vassals of 
the same king’ they should be entitled to contracts with Manila and with 
other parts of the Spanish Empire.220 In 1608 the Crown off icially allowed 
Macao-Manila trade for provision and protection.221 From the turn of the 
century until the 1620s, Portuguese vessels carried merchandise between 
Manila and Nagasaki/Hirado and Manila and the Moluccas.222 This became 
particularly important when Dutch raids intercepted Fujianese-dominated 
trade in Manila. Thus, during the Dutch offensive of 1620, nine ships from 
Macao (seven Portuguese, one Spanish, and one Japanese), three vessels 
from Japan, one from Melaka, seven from India and one from Cambodia 
arrived in Manila in support of the distressed Spaniards.223
While the scale of Portuguese commercial activity in Manila increased 
in the 1620s, trading conditions remained unstable. A silver crisis occurred 
in Ming China when silver exports from Spanish America and Japan into 
China decreased dramatically.224 George Bryan Souza claimed that officially 
taxed Portuguese imports may even have surpassed mainland Chinese 
217 BR 7, p. 216. See also Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30, XI. For the activities of 
Portuguese traders, see De Sousa (2010), Early European Presence. 
218 Barreto (2006), Macau. For Valignano’s involvement, see Moran (1993), Japanese and the 
Jesuits.
219 Villiers (1987), ‘Silk and Silver’.
220 Seijas (2008), ‘Portuguese Slave Trade’, p. 21.
221 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 95.
222 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 155: Estimated Portuguese investment in Asian Trading, 
ca. 1600-1620.
223 Cf. Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, p. 28.
224 For the debate on the Ming-Qing transition on whether there is a connection between 
the decline in silver f lows into China and the Ming-Qing transition, as well as the Ming-Qing 
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imports in the 1620s, while a substantial value of goods traded in Manila 
continued to come from Portuguese carriers in the following decade.225 
James C. Boyajian’s study explains that the Manila trade was one more 
‘prof itable avenue of Asian trade’ for the especially resourceful and mobile 
casados.226 In particular, the Nuevo(s) Convertidos’ (Jewish converts) eco-
nomic potential in the East, as discussed by Boyajian and Lúcio de Sousa, 
deserves special mention. What is more, the Portuguese global network even 
drew merchants from Seville, who increased their investment in the Manila 
Galleon trade in the 1620s, closer to Asia.227 In the following decades agents 
were sent from Seville to Manila to handle China trade for the Portuguese 
New Christians in Asia.228 With what Juan Gil calls the ‘hour of Macao’ a 
very different trading age had begun in Manila.229 This Portuguese trade 
in Manila peaked when Dutch f leets in the Strait of Melaka disturbed 
trade with India and Fujianese shipping suffered from the chaotic years 
before the fall of the Ming dynasty in the 1630s. The Spaniards still little 
appreciated the Portuguese contribution. Following a series of complaints, 
17 articles were issued in 1632 for the purpose of prohibiting Portuguese 
trade at Manila.230 Yet, a few years later the Portuguese crisis in South East 
Asia, including the end of Macao-Japan trade in 1635 and Melaka’s fall to 
the Dutch in 1641, connected Lusitanian traders even closer to Manila: in 
1640 half of Manila’s imports by value came from Macao.231 Interestingly, 
wars from 1619 to 1689, see the different standpoints of Flynn, Giráldez (2002), ‘Cycles of Silver’, 
pp. 391-427.
225 Souza (1986), Survival of Empire, p. 83.
226 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 64.
227 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 239. The author introduces the merchant Antonio 
Martins d’Orta who received in 1629 in Seville on the annual f leet from America a shipment 
of Chinese silks, pearls, musk, and amber valued at 200,000 cruzados. Other Mexico agents 
of Boyajian’s study, active in Manila in the 1630s, include Sebastián de Jaureqí and Francisco 
Fernandes Pereira (both sent by Amaro Dias of Mexico City), as well as António and Sebastão 
Vaaz d’Azevedo; Francisco da Silva and Manuel de Granada represented Simão Vaaz Sevilha in 
Manila in the 1630s and 1640s. Manuel Baptista Peres of Lima also invested in the Manila trade 
through Simã and others in Mexico.
228 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 240. 1630s: António Soares was dispatched to Manila 
to handle China trade for New Christian merchants. New Christians in Manila maintained 
direct contact with New Christians in Macao and Goa. Jorge Dias de Montoia resided in Macao 
during the 1630s and 1640s and traded with his brothers Franciscan Dias de Montoia and other 
New Christians of Manila and Melaka. Francisco da Silva from Manila invested in the Far East 
in conjunction with his in-laws Manuel and Gaspar da Costa Casseres of Goa and Cochin. 
229 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 95-98.
230 Spate (1979), Spanish Lake, p. 228.
231 According to observations recorded in Domingo Navarette’s travel accounts and translated 
by Charles Boxer (1975), p. 91: ‘Macao [...] throve so much with the trade of Japan and Manila, 
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the period between 1631-1636 saw the peak of multiethnic trade, with an 
increased number of other European and South East Asian trading vessels 
registered in Cavite.232
A few examples highlight what was different about the Spanish path, 
which did not follow the trail of arbitrage prof its. Looking for explana-
tions why the Spaniards did not benefit f inancially from trade with East 
Asia, an early-seventeenth-century Spanish observer believed that the 
Portuguese advantage laid in denying the Japanese access to their market 
in Macao, while the Spanish allowed the Japanese to buy directly from 
Chinese merchants.233 The constant presence of a relatively large number 
of Japanese and Fujianese in Manila was not the only difference within the 
Castilian model. Unlike the Portuguese, the Castilians never developed 
institutionalised inter-Asian trade. Moreover Spanish performance on the 
Asian maritime stage differed from other Europeans by a minimum use of 
coercion in order to enforce trade deals.234
The quantity of Japanese silver ending up in China was high. As a result 
of intensif ied mining in Iwami and other Japanese mines, output increased 
signif icantly.235 Through transactions with foreign traders in Macao and 
Manila, primarily Japanese silver, ref ined by the haifuki (cupellation) 
method ended up in China.236 During the active shuinsen trade period 
(1604-1636), when in certain years more than 30 Japanese vessels sailed to 
South East Asian trading hubs, they carried as much as 30,000 to 40,000 
that it grew vastly rich, but never would vie Manila, nor is there any comparison between the two 
cities for all their analogies. I f ind as much difference, in all respects betwixt them, as is betwixt 
Madrid and Vallecas, and somewhat more, for the people of Manila are free, and those of Macao, 
slaves to the Chinese.’ Soon after the end of nominal Spanish rule over Portugal, the Spanish 
Crown once again decreed in protectionist fashion that Portuguese were no longer allowed to 
enter Manila. AGI Filipinas 330, l. 5, ff. 14v-15r, ‘Orden sobre comercio de los portugueses con 
Manila’, 10 December 1652.
232 Muntaner (2012), ‘Ports, Trade and Networks’, p. 266.
233 Cf. Gil (2011), Hidalgos y Samurais, p. 236.
234 For instance, in 1641, when the VOC had f inally succeeded in seizing Melaka it introduced 
measures to make it the leading trading centre of the wider region by forcing merchant ships 
to pass the strait by use of maritime violence. See Clulow (2010), ‘European Maritime Violence’, 
p. 77.
235 Nagazumi Yōko calculated that during the shuinsen trade period a total of 2000 tons 
(2,066,556 kg) of Japanese silver was exported. While shuinsen transported 843,000 kg, Portu-
guese ships carried 650,700 kg to Macao, Chinese junks 343,860 kg and Dutch ships 228,996 kg. 
Cf. Murai (2013), Tomi to yabō, p. 23.
236 It is believed that the technique was introduced to Japan from Korea in the 1530s and ref ined 
with Portuguese aid in following decades. Nanbanbuki was an improved liquidation process 
used in ref ining of gold and silver. See Souza (1968), Survival of Empire, p. 48.
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kg of silver annually. Following export prohibition by the Bakufu in 1609, 
inferior quality coins also began to circulate.237 In the peak years between 
1615 and 1625 silver exports even reached the formidable value of 130,000 to 
160,000 kg. Neither private Chinese merchants trading in Japan, nor Spanish 
in Manila controlled such high amounts at any time, not to mention that 
Japan’s export volume increased after the rupture with Spain and again 
after the expulsion of the Portuguese.238
Concluding Remarks
The aim of part II of this book was to outline Manila as centre for triangular 
trade between 1571 and 1644 from the perspective of connected histories. 
As such, early modern Manila remained a challenge for all parties and 
participants. The Castilians, for instance, aimed at creating a more liberal 
atmosphere from time to time – but in doing so never overcame their ad 
hoc attitude. At the turn of the seventeenth century after the pancada 
system was abolished, merchants in Manila rejoiced in almost unrestricted 
commerce for several years before reinforced royal restrictions brought 
about a sudden end. Crown intervention hindered economic developments 
and numerous laws caused only moderate return to the colonists. Spain was 
the only early modern European trading nation granting the Japanese direct 
access to their market and at the same time they were the only early modern 
European trading nation that did not establish permanent or temporary 
factories in Japan or China.
The Chinese inability to pull the strings in triangular trade by channel-
ling gains made in Manila into their home economy is as striking as the 
fact that they did not send their own ships to the Americas: a bold step that 
the Japanese were keen to take as we shall see hereafter. For the Japanese, 
the greatest challenge was a combination of structural problems and bad 
timing. Speaking of timing it seems noteworthy that the peak of Japanese 
trade in Manila was around 1607 and thus occurred several years before 
the peak of Japanese maritime trade in South East Asia.
With regard to Manila’s multilayered dynamics as a system, Manila did 
not connect as a core of a semi-dependent periphery but triggered lasting 
global impact in various parts of the China Seas and the Pacif ic. The fluidity 
of the system allowed rapid change and led to the parallel existence of 
237 Asao (1991), ‘The Sixteenth-Century Unif ication’, pp. 60-63.
238 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 63-67; 328-330; Hellyer (1639), Defining Engagements, pp. 51-71.
168 SPAIN, CHINA, AND JAPAN IN MANILA, 1571-1644
protectionist commerce and laissez-faire exchange. While the Manila Gal-
leon trade was a Crown monopoly, in reality this monopoly was not as strong 
as the word suggests, but instead left plenty of room for triangular exchange 
at a neutral spot. As one of the consequences, cheaply available Chinese 
commodities enabled all classes and ethnicities to change consumption 
patterns. And yet, when measuring Manila’s signif icance for early modern 
global trade, merchant interests were not the exclusive stimulus for Manila’s 
development. The main challenge for Spain’s political economy was reacting 
to well-established, century-old concepts (i.e. tributary trade) that could not 
be easily outsmarted by mercantile protectionism. Spanish legacy suffers 
from the fact that the majority of contemporaries and historians alike 
assess its performance by success and failure of the state and blame the 
latter for applying unfit mercantilist policies. Mercantilist or governmental 
control institutions were not a Spanish invention: the shuinsen trade and 
the Chinese Superintendency serve as equivalents of the Atlantic system 
or the Manila Galleon trade.
It is furthermore crucial to focus on how trade was driven by market 
demand; logically not all trade policies were introduced by the central 
government. The market in Manila illustrates how these forms of proto-
capitalism flourished. Merchants became the wealthiest class in Spanish 
colonial towns. Unlike in the Spanish Americas, where off icial Castilian 
traders monopolised Atlantic trade, in Manila Asian traders did so to a 
remarkable extent. The latter’s reluctance in enhancing their political posi-
tion and reinvesting it in their home economy (both aspects are discussed 
in more detail in the following chapters) can only be understood in the 
embedded nature of the Manila system: When things became too rough 
other attractive port cities were easily found. It also points to the unag-
gressive atmosphere of these triangular relations: while contemporaries 
in Manila were not fully interested in the actual dynamics of trade with 
China, Fujianese lacked interest in starving out Manila.
The ultimate aim of this comparative study is to undermine the myth 
of a monopolising Spain, a backward, uninterested Japan and an agrarian, 
isolationist, or even despotic China. For more in-depth reflections on their 
political economies it will be necessary to shift analysis to state competition 
and discuss why the three states failed to take advantage of the location’s 
obvious qualities and whether off icial and unoff icial encounters, foreign 
policies, power relations and political interaction jeopardised the city’s long 
run commercial development.
Part III
Zooming Out: Local, Central, and Global Connections

4 Triangular Foreign Relations
Intercultural Diplomacy in the South China Sea
Manila-centred triangular trade between China, Japan, and Spain was not 
only imbedded in the interplay of trade and diplomacy, but also depended on 
a whole range of contingent external factors, casually described as foreign 
relations. A growing number of studies, including Zoltan Biedermann’s study 
on Portuguese diplomacy in Asia, has created an awareness for diplomacy 
as a means of (re-)determining globalised foreign relations in recent years.1 
Although embassies are regarded as essential instruments of expansion, 
little attention has been paid to the concept of ‘ambiguity’ for understanding 
intercultural encounters on a political level in a period when ‘practical and 
symbolic values’ controlled diplomatic exchange.2 On its most basic level, 
‘information-gathering, representation and negotiation’ determined the 
outcome of intercultural diplomacy between different political cultures that 
still lacked a uniform etiquette. In most cases they were the f irst state-level 
contacts beyond culturally similar neighbouring countries.3 While direct 
Castilian contact with Japan and China were entirely new in the history 
of diplomacy, relations between China and the West were not.4 With the 
spread of European influence over South East Asia the number of undefined 
and unsettled political and economic claims increased. This new type of 
Eurasian dealings asked for mutually suitable rules, which in a way became 
models for the early modern regional international system.5 Given that the 
establishment of European rule over Philippine territories coincided with 
governmental changes in China and Japan it seems only logical to question 
how contact with the Iberians affected diplomatic encounters.
The focus essentially shifts to reciprocal processes of commercial rela-
tions and diplomatic triangular foreign policies, instead of revisiting a 
mere Iberian impact or outdated narratives of an arrogant West versus 
1 For some aspects of an interpretative framework, see Watkins (2008), ‘Toward a New 
Diplomatic History’, pp. 1-14. Over the past decade, researchers have shown that there was no 
such thing as straightforward diplomacy for the Europeans in Asia. See also articles in Suzuki et 
al. (eds) (2013), International Orders; Barbour (2003), Before Orientalism; Hevia (2009), ‘Ultimate 
Gesture’, pp. 212-234; Clulow (2014), Company, pp. 26-30.
2 Biedermann (2005), ‘Portuguese Diplomacy in Asia’, p. 15.
3 Black (2010), History of Diplomacy, p. 14.
4 Most prominent are Franciscan missions to China in the thirteenth century. See Arnold 
(1999), Princely Gifts, pp. 43-54.
5 For regional international systems in Asia, see Suzuki (2009), Civilization and Empire, and 
on the sixteenth-century East Asian world system, Murai (2012), Sekaishi, pp. 22-27.
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an ignorant rest.6 Several examples of diplomatic protagonists’ accom-
plishments prove the opposite. That said I should also caution against the 
occasional revisionist tendency to exaggerate smooth communication while 
lumping together all types of interaction.7 While it is commonly accepted 
that maritime merchants quickly developed an informal working vocabu-
lary that permitted mercantile communication via a lingua franca (often in 
form of pidgin languages), f inding a mutually comprehensible language for 
formal communication was far more complicated. Unsurprisingly, sufficient 
information for evaluating official acts of communication that involved par-
ties or speakers from different social, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds 
is scarce. Government off icials and diplomatic advisors were f irst and 
foremost interested in safeguarding the political realm against potential 
risks from outside and to guard against potential military aggression or 
unreliable knowledge.
One major challenge to such diplomatic encounters was a partial un-
derstanding of the protocol, for instance with regard to the question of 
establishing equality and maintaining friendly relations.8 On the one hand, 
while in sixteenth-century Europe, ‘parity’ or ‘eye level’-communication 
happened between two inter pares parties, such practices were absent in 
China and Japan.9 On the other hand, the elaborate symbolic culture of 
Asian nations strongly affected Europeans, who were often fascinated with 
distinct ceremonial.10 Yet while European trading nations in Asia were 
commonly desperate to adapt, adopt, accommodate, or even blend in, they 
failed to understand implicit non-European diplomatic circuits. At the same 
time striking similarities existed: Spain, China, and Japan did not differ 
6 Takase (1977), Kirishitan jidai; Shimizu (2013), ‘Iberia inpakuto’.
7 In his recent book Adam Clulow stressed that diplomatic relations were not a straight-
forward process and smooth negotiations remained an illusion. He furthermore argued that 
all Europeans arriving in new Asian ports sought ‘access to the highest authority’, usually by 
sending off icial letters and bearing gifts. Clulow (2014), Company, p. 26.
8 When the doctrine of encounters on an equal level spread with the Peace of Westphalia 
in Europe, the idea of equal negotiating parties differed largely from our present notion of 
equality of the same bilateral rights granted to every nation-state regardless of size or economic 
power. Only after the Congress of Vienna of 1815, when diplomatic language became European, 
would diplomacy include the correspondence between equal states. For the development of 
modern European diplomacy, see Black (2010), Diplomacy, introduction, chapters 1 and 2. See 
also Hamilton, Langhorne (2011), Practice of Diplomacy; For China, see Shin (2006), Making of 
the Chinese State.
9 Biedermann (2005), ‘Portuguese Diplomacy in Asia’, p. 26.
10 Auslin (2004), Negotiating with Imperialism, p. 4; Antje Flüchter’s theoretical approach – in 
particular, her ideas on the circulation of political knowledge between Asia and Europe has 
been very inspiring. For more details, see Flüchter (2008), ‘Sir Thomas Roe’, pp. 119-143.
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much when it came to the representation of the sovereign and the basic 
requirement that only the head of the state should perform diplomacy.11
What Spain, China, and Japan furthermore had in common, were ideolo-
gies resting on feelings of being superior to the outside world. Spaniards 
were spurred on by the alleged cultural hegemony of the Catholic Church. 
A complex body of thought positioned China into the centre of the universe 
and above other civilisations, whom they called and considered Barbarians. 
The Middle Kingdom ideology (中華思想, jp. chūka chitujo; 中國中心主義, 
ch. zhongguo zhongxin zhuyi) was incompatible with other claims of sov-
ereignty.12 Since Japan was mostly reluctant to fulf il its imposed duties as 
a Barbarian state within the Sino-centric world, historians even like to 
picture the Japanese as the counterpart of the Koreans, who enthusiasti-
cally subordinated themselves to the Ming.13 Japan’s disobedient reputation 
developed further in the course of the seventeenth century, when Tokugawa 
foreign advisors fabricated a progressive model of international relations 
based on Chinese neo-Confucian ideology, combining it with restrictive 
foreign relations principles and ensuring Japanese sovereignty.
Diplomatic Shifts between Japan and Ming China
Introducing China’s traditional Middle Kingdom system and tributary trade 
concept in chapter 1 it has been mentioned that Japan as close neighbour 
and member of the ‘Chinese character-sphere’ (漢字圏, jp. kanjiken) has 
played a particular role in China’s international relations of the time.14 
In a nutshell, Japanese international relations were exclusively def ined 
from Japan’s status vis-à-vis China, the ka’i (jp. 華夷) worldview, which 
defined China’s position as Middle Kingdom surrounded by Barbarians.15 
11 China, Korea, and Japan used state letters (国書, jp. kokusho) for off icial correspondence. 
The three states shared a mutual understanding of the importance and special character of the 
document. Tanaka and Ishii stated that a kokusho has to carry the name of the central ruler, 
while dates are ideally written according to the traditional Chinese calendar. They furthermore 
argued that Ieyasu employed kokusho to legitimise his position as unif ier over Japan via foreign 
diplomatic correspondence. See Tanaka, Ishii (2009) Taigai kankeishi, p. 280. Based on the 
concept of jinshin ni gaikō nashi 人臣に外交なし (ch. renqing wu waijiao) as part of the Ming 
diplomatic protocol a kokusho could only be sent from a central ruler or monarch to another.
12 Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, p. 329. The author emphasises the Habsburg King’s claim for ‘sover-
eignty over the Old World as well as the New’. 
13 Toby (1984), State and Diplomacy, p. 139.
14 Tanaka (ed.) (1995), Zenkindai, p. 19; 33; Danjō (2013), Eiraku tei, pp. 226-221.
15 Kang (2010), East Asia, p. 50.
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Sino-Japanese tensions within this century-old setup, closely entwined 
with Korea, had undeniable consequences for the Manila system after the 
rupture of 1523 and 1549, respectively.16 Speaking of Japan’s role in tributary 
trade with the Middle Kingdom, it is crucial to remember that Japanese rul-
ers did not manage to establish diplomatic relations after the f inal tributary 
trade mission (kangō bōeki 勘合貿易) in 1541 until 1871, when Meiji Japan 
signed a friendship treaty with the Qing.
Both Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa rulers desired to reopen formal dip-
lomatic relations with China, or at least to be duly recognised by the latter. 
At the same time they displayed intentions to turn Japan into a regional 
maritime power and to redef ine their position within the Sino-centric 
world: a rejected and deeply offended Hideyoshi was eager to impress the 
Ming court with his military power between 1592 and 1598.17 Japanese 
historians have stressed how Hideyoshi’s large ego and warrior mentality 
determined his inconsiderate behaviour in foreign relations.18 Unwilling to 
subdue to the Ming, Hideyoshi turned his back to the traditional Chinese 
system. A new understanding of the world stressed the superiority of Japan. 
Its establishment already dated back to the time of the preparation for the 
Korea invasion. Early on he expressed his outspoken interest in conquering 
Ming China (唐国, jp. tōkoku as he called it) in a correspondence with the 
King of Korea.19 In 1591/92 he demanded tribute and subordination from 
the rulers of Taiwan and Luzon. We note that Hideyoshi’s foreign relations 
were characterised by new diplomatic methods based on older ideology.20
In its totality, Hideyoshi’s progressive foreign relations have often been 
considered a manifestation of his aspiration to challenge China’s hegemony 
in Asia.21 The invasion to Korea that will later be examined in detail backs 
that hypothesis.22 After the King of Korea had thwarted Hideyoshi’s plans 
to invade China, the latter launched an invasion with around 160,000 men. 
In May 1592 they overcame a militarily unprepared and poorly equipped 
Korean army and took Pusan, Seoul fell in June. Only when marching to-
wards Pyongyang did Japanese troops encounter major resistance. On the 
naval side Hideyoshi had to cope with massive losses thanks to the tactics 
16 Hashimoto (2011), Chūka, pp. 244-256.
17 Swope (2009), Dragon’s Head, p. 230.
18 Asao (1993), Tenka; Hideyoshi’s large ego, which is believed to originate from his low birth, 
ref lected in his custom to stress his grandness with the presence of big items.
19 See Murai (2013), Tomi to yabō, p. 51.
20 Murai (2013), Tomi to yabō, pp. 25-32.
21 Cohen (2000), East Asia at the Center, pp. 183-215.
22 Fujita (2012), Hideyoshi to kaizoku daimyō.
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of Yi Sun-sin (李舜臣), a Korean royal messenger, who outsmarted the 
Japanese navy with the use of turtle boats. He successfully cut the Japanese 
supply lines, giving the Korean population some breathing space before 
Ming China sent an army in support – as they were acting as protectionist 
power of their loyal Chosŏn vassals.23
Although during this infamous attempt to conquer China through Korea, 
Japanese troops never reached the Chinese mainland, the Ming court grew 
nervous. The Ming court not only offered rewards for the head of Hideyoshi 
and his generals but also invested in intelligence activities in Japan.24 Here 
China’s maritime periphery assumed a political role: The Governor of Liang-
guang (两广 = Guangdong and Guangxi) and Fujian, and ultimately even the 
King of Ryukyu dispatched spies. A record in the Veritable Records (Ming 
shi-lu) of Emperor Shenzong (神宗, a.k.a. Wanli) moreover stresses the 
trans-national impact of Hideyoshi’s hostilities. It proposed to inform the 
Portuguese of Macao about ‘the aggressive purpose of Japan, and convince 
them to assassinate Hideyoshi for a reward’.25
During the 1592 peace negotiations with the Ming the Japanese side 
clearly prioritised reopening tributary trade relations (勘合貿易, jp. kangō 
bōeki). What appears ambiguous to the contemporary observer was not the 
case for Japan at the time. Since no clear distinction between diplomacy 
and trade existed, nothing spoke against having it both ways. This suggests 
that the nature of East Asian foreign relations provided more room for 
interpretation than commonly believed. After the f irst Japanese defeat in 
Korea, Hideyoshi’s diplomatic solution included a list of bold conditions for 
his surrender to the Ming. In the year 1593 Hideyoshi’s naval troops leader 
Konishi Yukinaga (小西行長, 1558-1600),26 one of the so-called ‘Christian 
23 Swope (2009), Dragon’s Head, pp. 286-288.
24 Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 248. The author summarised Ming China’s considerations 
on how to pacify the Japanese. Suggestions included studying them well, getting their superior 
weapons such as canons, and trading with them. Zheng Jiexi has located evidence for a Ming 
attempt to assassinate Hideyoshi. Chinese information gathering about Japan consisted of 
three elements: the tribute system (based on information delivered by Korean and Ryukyu 
merchants), intelligence gathering by Chinese private merchants, and communications on the 
battlef ield. Information was certainly also collected in places like Manila and Nagasaki. Zheng 
(2010), ‘Wanli jiki’, p. 344.
25 Ming-shi lu, 242, 20 November Year 19.
26 Konishi Yukinaga was a later-born son of a merchant family of Sakai. He entered Hideyoshi’s 
service at a young age and was baptised in 1584. For his merits during Hideyoshi’s Kyushu expedi-
tion in 1587, Konishi Yukinaga was rewarded with the southern part of Higo province including 
the island of Amakusa. The representative of the Ming demanded that Konishi Yuskinaga’s vassal 
Naitō Jōan (1550-1626) should be sent as envoy to Beijing. Fighting alongside Toyotomi loyals 
in the Battle of Sekigahara, Konishi Yukinaga was defeated and eventually killed by members 
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daimyō’ forged a letter suggesting that Hideyoshi was interested in being 
invested as King of Japan, following the example of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 
(足利義満).27 They did so in all conscience for the sake of a successful peace 
treaty with the Ming arguing that the re-establishment of tribute relations 
would be in the best interest of both parties. The following year Konishi 
Yukinaga even claimed that it was the disobliging behaviour of the Koreans 
regarding Japanese attempts to revive tributary relations with the Ming 
that led to the armed invasion.28 Konishi’s scheme was successful and the 
Ming issued a traditional Chinese document of investiture (冊封, jp. sakuhō) 
addressed to Hideyoshi.29 The arrival of an embassy of the Ming court in 1596 
with the intention of off icially acknowledging him as ‘King of Japan’ under 
Emperor Wanli’s edict, however, upset Hideyoshi. Although he accepted the 
sakuhō, he was furious that the Ming Emperor had not considered any of his 
other peace conditions.30 After chaotic negotiations, he refused to become 
a vassal of the Ming Emperor and strongly opposed the title ‘king’ because 
it implied that the Japanese ruler was inferior to the Chinese Emperor.31
Eventually Hideyoshi’s sudden natural death settled the situation in the 
region. The war ended in a huge debacle for the Japanese and in great human 
losses on all side. For Korea various sources speak of up to 1,000,000 people 
killed and 80 per cent of the arable land destroyed. Both Kenneth Swope and 
Cheng Wei-chung conclude that the construction of ships had increased in 
Southern China in order to meet the demands for maritime battles and that 
additional taxes on merchants and ships were collected to finance the war.32 
of the Eastern Army (1600). For further details see Nakanishi (ed.) (2014), Takayama Ukon. For 
Julia Naitō and other leading female Christians, see Ward (2009), Women Religious Leaders.
27 Hashimoto (2013), Nihon kokuō, pp. 75-97.
28 Miki (1997), Konishi Yukinaga.
29 Under the pressure of allied Chinese-Korean forces’ military advances Hideyoshi received 
two Chinese envoys in his military headquarters in Nagoya (now Saga prefecture) in 1593. A 
personal letter to his wife indicates Hideyoshi’s illusive view on the relations with China and the 
outcome of the 朝鮮出兵, jp. chōsen shuppei, as the invasion is misleadingly called in Japanese, 
while the more correct term is 朝鮮侵略, jp. chōsen shinryaku: ‘The envoys of the throne have 
come here from the Great Kingdom of the Ming Empire offering peace negotiations, and I have 
given them a note stipulating our conditions. If they agree to them all, I shall accept their apology, 
leave the Great Ming Empire and Korea to act just as such foreign countries please, and then 
make a triumphal return. However, I have given orders to my men to do some construction work 
and other things in Korea, and it will take a little more time to complete this work.’ Cf. Boscaro 
(1975), 101 Letters, p. 56. See also Hentona (2008), Mindai sakuhō.
30 Kitajima (2012), Chōsen shinryaku.
31 Tanaka (ed.) (1995), Zenkindai, p. 19. The two envoys were Xie Yongzu (jp. Sha Yōshi) and 
Xu Yiguan (jp. Jo Ikkan).
32 Swope (2009), Dragon’s Head; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy.
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Recent research has emphasised the world historic importance of these events, 
which harmed Korea’s economic development and jeopardised the future 
of the Ming dynasty. For the Japanese, the invasion had positive economic 
long-term effects. Soldiers transported valuable technological knowledge 
that benefitted, for instance, the domestic ceramic production back to Japan.
Initially Tokugawa rulers aimed at restoring tribute trade relations (朝貢, jp. 
chōkō) with China.33 In the year of the Battle of Sekigahara (1600), a delegation 
was sent to the Ming court aiming at opening trade with Fujian. Emperor 
Wanli did not react to Japanese assaults but agreed on sending merchant ships 
twice a year to Satsuma. However the plan never materialised and chances of 
opening regular trade gradually faded.34 As another token of good will, Katō 
Kiyomasa returned 87 Chinese prisoners of war in 1602. Even though the first 
Tokugawa rulers where interested in distancing themselves from Hideyoshi 
and his political rhetoric, they could not accept a subordinate status towards 
the Ming either. In fact, Tokugawa Ieyasu challenged the primacy of the Chi-
nese world order in terms of state-to-state relations. Three letters addressed 
directly from the Bakufu, signed by Minamoto Ieyasu as Privy Minister or 
Minister of the Interior (内大臣, jp. naidaijin), were sent to the Ming court. 
Significantly none of them were styled as formal kokusho (国書, official state 
letter), a necessary condition within the Chinese diplomatic protocol.35 In 
addition, presumptuous diplomatic operations by local Japanese lords puzzled 
Ming authorities. In 1603 the Shimazu Clan sent a mission inviting Chinese 
merchants to several ports in Kyushu. After the Shimazu had subdued to the 
Tokugawa, the Bakufu attempted to re-establish diplomatic relations with the 
Ming via Ryukyu, now under nominal control of the Satsuma daimyō.36 Ry-
ukyu became another issue in Sino-Japanese relations, even if the Ming court 
maintained tributary relations with the Okinawan rulers on the surface.37
While off icial Sino-Japanese negotiations eventually failed, the number 
of private Chinese, who had secretly travelled to Japan and of whom many 
operated on shuinsen, increased rapidly.38 Being a welcome alternative 
33 Kang (1997), Diplomacy and Ideology, p. 85.
34 Saishō no Shōkokuji 西笑相国寺 consulted the Zenrin kokuhōki 善隣国宝記 when preparing 
the letter for China. The 1600 letter to China left Japan on a ship of Satsuma merchant Torihara 
Sōan 鳥原宗安 together with Chinese war captives and envoys including Mao Guoqi. See Mizuno 
(2004), ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, p. 118.
35 Katō (1986), ‘Bahansen, Shuinsen, Hōshosen’, pp. 120-134.
36 Watanabe (2012), Kinsei ryūkyū, p. 3.
37 Jansen (1992), Making, p. 86; For the complex role of Okinawa in Chinese-Japanese relations, 
see also Suzuki (2009), Civilization and Empire.
38 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa’, pp. 512-513.
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to trade that depended on tedious diplomatic relations, Ieyasu actively 
sought to strengthen ties with Chinese merchants for the sake of direct 
access to Chinese silk production.39 And yet, commercial exchange was not 
easily detached from the traditional diplomatic framework, as the following 
episode shows. In 1611 a certain Zhou Xingru (周性如), probably a merchant 
from Nanjing who f irst landed on the Goto Islands and was then ordered 
to Sunpu, suggested during a visit to Edo to ask the Grand Coordinator 
of Fujian, Chen Zizhen (陳子貞), to issue a kangō. Ieyasu ordered Honda 
Masazumi (本多正純) to have an off icial letter offering licences (shuinjō) 
for trade with Nagasaki prepared.40 Two letters were thereafter drafted: 
one by Sūden and one by neo-Confucian scholar Hayashi Razan (林羅山), 
neither was signed by Ieyasu or Hidetada.41
Regardless of the diplomatic debacle, the project failed, when Fujianese 
authorities noticed that Chinese people travelled to Japan despite the strict 
ban.42 Cantonese authorities severely pressed the Portuguese Senate Council 
regarding 96 Japanese who were registered as settlers of Macao in 1612.43 
The following year, Ming China forced the Portuguese at Macao to expel 
them before reviving the law that Japanese must not enter Macao.44 In 1612 
the Ming court in Beijing moreover understood from a visit of a Ryukyu 
mission that the Japanese had no intention to revive formal tributary 
relations but only aimed at unrestricted trade with China. Unwilling to 
accept the Japanese request for equal relations or to grant a modif ication 
of tribute relations, a new ban on China’s east coast (Jiangsu and Zheji-
ang) was issued.45 The Japanese side tried again in 1613 and 1625, but to no 
avail.46 A mix of seemingly careless documentary practices and increased 
self-conf idence towards China overthrew these last Japanese attempts, 
aggravated by advances on Taiwan under the leadership of Murayama 
39 Jansen (1992), Making, p. 85.
40 Honda Masazumi drafted the letter on 16 December 1611; For a transcription of the letter 
in which Honda refers to himself as Fujiwara Masazumi, see Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (2006), 
Nihonshi shiryō, pp. 121-122; Mizuno, ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, pp. 119-120. 
41 Hayashi Razan bunshū in Dai Nihon shiryō, pp. 845-849.The second letter was signed by 
Hasegawa Fujihiro.
42 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 20-21. See also Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō 
ichiran 5, pp. 340-344.
43 Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. 82.
44 Wills (1998), ‘Relations with Maritime Europeans’, p. 351; Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, 
p. 47.
45 Ming authorities recognised that most of the active ‘wokou’ were Chinese. TWYH Ming 
shi-lu min-hai; 106-110. Cf. Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, p. 21. 
46 Asao et al. (2000), Nihon tsūshi, vol. 12, p. 35.
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Tōan (村山等安) in 1616/17.47 This led to further Sino-Japanese negotiations. 
Talks were carried out between Fujianese authorities and the Tokugawa’s 
envoy Akashi Michitomo (明石道友). While the Chinese side requested the 
Japanese to stay away from Taiwan the latter asked not to be persecuted as 
pirates anymore. Despite mutual agreements regarding future commercial 
relations, it was again a dead-end path.48
With regard to the Bakufu’s abuse of diplomatic relations for consolidat-
ing domestic rule, Ronald Toby has attested profound consequences ‘for 
Japan’s approach to international relations’.49 Next to Ryukyu, the Bakufu 
manipulated diplomatic relations with Korea and furthermore intimidated 
the Middle Kingdom.50 Following the rupture caused by Hideyoshi’s inva-
sion, relations with Korea had been restored based on the Treaty of Kiyu 
(1609). The Sō family of Tsushima and Ieyasu’s clever tactics persuaded 
Korea into performing a key part in Tokugawa Japan’s foreign relations after 
1617. Off icially, Korea represented by Chosŏn envoys 朝鮮通信使, was the 
only foreign country accepted directly by the Bakufu in Edo.51 Ceremonial 
embassies from Korea and Ryukyu helped the Tokugawa clan and its loyal 
vassals to maintain a monopoly over foreign trade and served as a useful 
tool for claiming international legitimacy. Both Ryukyu and Korea were 
considered extremely trustworthy members of the Middle Kingdom system 
by the Ming.52 These new diplomatic regulations gave the incentive for what 
Toby calls the Japan-centred Middle Kingdom system (日本型華夷秩序, 
jp. nihongata ka’i chitsujo), which virtually placed Japan at the centre and 
therefore made recognition from China obsolete.53 Over the past years 
Japanese historians have debunked Toby’s strong claim and called for 
limiting the thesis to the ideology inside Japan (日本的型華夷思想, jp. 
nihonteki gata ka’i shisō). In terms of diplomatic exchange similarities 
existed between the Ryukyu embassies and the ceremonial visits of VOC 
representatives after 1634. Yet in the case of the annual homage (hofreis) of 
the VOC general (opperhoofd or Oronda kapitan) to Edo with unimaginable 
47 For more details, see Gaikō shiryō, vol. 6.
48 Zhang (1981), Dongxi yangkao, pp. 250-252; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 21-23.
49 Toby (1985), ‘Contesting the Centre’, p. 349.
50 This topic has been subject to various debates for more than three decades now. While Arano 
Yasunori claimed that Japan did not see itself as inferior to China, Ronald Toby argued that the 
Tokugawa’s concern that tributary relations with Ming China would put their sovereignty inside 
Japan at risk. Iwahashi (2004), ‘The Institutional Framework’, p. 94.
51 The King of Korea usually dispatched an embassy after the inauguration of a new shogun.
52 Ronald Toby (1994), ‘Indianess’, pp. 323-351. 
53 For nihongata kai chitsujo see Arano, ‘Nihongata’, pp. 184-226; Batten (1999), ‘Frontiers and 
Boundaries’, p. 176. Takagi (2003), Shogun kenryōku.
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pomp and solemnity prior to a silent audience with Bakufu authorities, 
subtle differences existed. The trip of the VOC general in fact equalled the 
sankin kōtai visit to the Shogun’s court.54
Sino-Japanese relations changed drastically in the aftermath of the 
Manila system as a consequence of the Ming-Qing transition. Between the 
late 1630s and the 1660s, when the Southern Ming needed foreign assistance 
against the Manchus, they turned to Japan and Portuguese Macao for help. 
Written requests were sent to Edo and the Nagasaki Governor/Magistrate 
(奉行, jp. bugyō). Initially, both the Tokugawa as well as the Shimazu were 
sympathetic, but they eventually sent only ambiguous replies instead of 
viable support.55
Foreign Relations between China and Overseas Spain
The Ming’s idea of how to pursue universal rule differed strikingly from 
that of their predecessors, the conquering Yuan (元, Mongol) dynasty.56 
National security – in the sense of guarding and defending the country’s 
frontiers and domestic stability – remained a major concern for the Ming 
dynasty after the relaxation of maritime trade in the 1560s.57 The interplay 
between diplomacy and trade shaped foreign relations. If, as Wang Gungwu 
maintains, the court at times regarded foreign merchants as trading on 
behalf of their rulers and therefore as diplomatic representatives,58 then 
Sino-Spanish mercantile interaction must have been considered tributary 
trading by Ming authorities. A record of the Assistant Censor-in-chief 
Liu Yao-hui, Grand Coordinator of Fujian, confirms this assumption. He 
noted in 1576: ‘Further, the tribute memorial and local products brought by 
those of Luzón are submitted herewith.’59 While off icial China considered 
early Iberians as tributary traders (for the same reason the 1521 embassy of 
pharmacist Tomé Pires failed), the Castilians were unable to see the benefits 
54 These observations date back to Kämpfer’s description of the VOC presence in Japan. For 
more details, see Clulow (2014), Company, pp. 108-114.
55 Cohen (2000), East Asia, p. 213.
56 Allsen (2001), Culture and Conquest, pp.  51-59. The Mongols actively sought allies via 
diplomatic exchange. Their progressive outreach even included papal legates.
57 A report of the Ministry of War of in 1604 states that South China’s coasts must be cleaned 
up of ‘evil people’, referring to private traders from Luzon. Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.
sg/msl/entry/3135 (accessed 14 March 2014).
58 Wang (2003), Anglo-Chinese Encounters, p. 50.
59 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/1020 (accessed 14 March 2014).
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of such distinction and dismissed it as humiliation.60 Unlike the Portuguese, 
who requested permission for off icial tributary trade in Beijing in 1556, or 
and the Dutch, who even occasionally enjoyed tributary status (for instance 
at Guangzhou between 1656 and 1667), the Spaniards never achieved official 
access to the Middle Kingdom, nor were they ever allowed to go to Beijing. 
Precisely the absence of direct bilateral negotiations between China and 
Spain determined the colonial policies of Overseas Spain in Asia.61
Yet, as indicated earlier, a narrow view on diplomatic relations as the 
direct, formal exchange of letters and ambassadors between the heads of 
states (or their representatives) obscures other signif icant facets of off icial 
contacts. For instance, a f irst direct encounter between Ming China and 
the Overseas Spanish Empire dates back to 1574, when a group of pirates led 
by the Cantonese outlaw Lin Feng launched an attack on Manila following 
frustrated attempts to conquer the Guangdong Coast and Hainan Island. 
The story of Lin Feng (林鳳, a.k.a. Limahon in European sources) has mostly 
been presented as a Chinese outlaw attempt to conquer the fledgling Span-
ish settlement. According to European records, the Spanish commander 
Juan de Salcedo and his men fought for Spanish sovereignty: they defeated 
Lin Feng’s pirate force of 70 ships and more than 3000 invaders, before a 
fleet under squad leader Wang Wanggao (王望高, a.k.a Wan Kao, Omocon, 
or Homocon in Spanish sources) was sent from China to support the Span-
iards.62 Scrutinising Chinese records Igawa Kenji discovered evidence for 
Lin Feng’s incorporation into wakō networks, represented by a Japanese 
general called Sioco who also fought against the Spaniards, reportedly killed 
Martín de Goiti, maestre de campo, and his wife before dying in battle.63
The pursue of the ‘Guangdong bandit’, as Lin Feng is called in Chinese 
sources, all the way to Luzon by Ming military forces culminated in the 
f irst ‘treaty’ between Spain and China.64 A common interest in law and 
peace in the South China Sea resulted in a successful joint Sino-Spanish 
initiative of mutual recognition. Off icial China initially approved of the 
measure to burn the ships of Lin Feng, taken by the ‘yi troops of Luzón’.65 
60 Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 68.
61 Vasconcelos de Saldanha (2000), ‘Embassies’.
62 Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji, pp. 76-77. 
63 Igawa (2010), ‘At the Crossroads’, p. 80. For the mysterious Sioco, see Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas 
y el Japón’, pp. 19-20; see also San Agustín (1698), Conquistas, pp. 401-405.
64 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/1013 (accessed 3 April 2014).
65 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/1020 (accessed 11 February 2014). Other Ming 
Chinese terminology which classif ied non-Chinese as Barbarians included 四夷, ch. shiyi, and 
蠻夷, ch. mani.
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The events nourished Spanish hopes to get access to China by establishing 
off icial relations with the Ming.66 Governor Guido de Lavezaris (r. 1572-1575) 
seized the opportunity of having an envoy of the Viceroy of Fujian (the 
high-ranking admiral Wang Wanggao) in Manila in 1575.67 From eye-level 
communication with the help of interpreters Lavezaris concluded that 
the ‘king’ of China was interested in friendship with the Spaniards.68 
We may assume that this was one of the def ining moments of profound 
confusion regarding the friendship concept in the East Asian context. A 
Spanish delegation consisting of two Augustinian friars, Martín de Rada 
and Jerónimo Marín, joined the returning Fujianese off icials to Zhangzhou 
and Fuzhou. They carried Lavezaris’s letter to the Emperor – translated by 
the Chinese Manila merchant Sinsay – soliciting friendship and trade.69 
Before their departure, Governor Lavezaris gave them detailed instructions 
not to mock the religious cult, speak with women or walk alone by night,70 
displaying sensitivity to intercultural contacts. Studied from a broader 
angle, Spanish diplomatic activity shows similarities and continuity to 
66 What shaped this narrative was Governor Francisco Sande’s bold plan in 1576 to conquer 
China with a force no larger than 6000 men, as well as obtrusive attempts by Padre Alonso 
Sánchez to establish missionary posts in China. See AGI Filipinas 6, r. 3, n. 26, ‘Carta de Sande 
sobre corsario Limajón, reino de Taibin’, 7 June 1576.
67 Walter Demel considered the terms ‘delegation’ and ‘envoy’ misnomers in this context. 
Demel (1992), Fremde in China, p. 86: ‘Von den Europäern wurden nämlich auch solche diplo-
matischen Missionen gerne als “Gesandtschaften” bezeichnet, die nicht etwa an den Kaiser, 
sondern nur an einen seiner Vizekönige in den südchinesischen Provinzen gerichtet waren. 
Die erste derartige Mission dürfte jene des Portugiesen Leonel de Sousa gewesen sein, der 1554 
durch seine Verhandlungen in Kanton erreichte, daß der Handelsverkehr mit den Portugiesen 
wieder legalisiert wurde. Im Auftrag des Gouverneurs der Philippinen begab sich 1575 eine kleine 
spanische Delegation unter der Leitung des Augustiners Martín de Rada nach der Hauptstadt 
der Provinz Fujian.’
68 Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, p. 30: ‘El Rey de China haría con nuestros grandes amistad y 
hermandad y se pondrían en lugar donde el Rey vive y en los otros lugares públicos padrones de 
piedra y en ellos escrito la hazaña de los castillas que no se habían querido hacer con Limahon 
antes le avan muerto para hacer bien al Rey de China el cual Omocon como vio al cosario tan 
destrocado y sin esperanza de navíos en que se ir el sabia.’
69 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 12, ‘Copia de la carta de Lavezaris al Rey de China’, 1575: The letter was 
drafted by a certain Sinsay and stated the Spanish commitment to friendly relations with China. 
See also Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, pp. 43-46, where we read about a disappointed Lavezaris, 
complaining about the Ming’s failure to acknowledge the proper status of the Spanish colony in 
the Philippines and accusing Wang Wanggao of having forged the letters, which he took from 
Manila back to China.
70 Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 63.
trIANguLAr ForeIgN reLAtIoNS 183
Philip III’s friendly correspondence with Ieyasu, and similar remarks on 
Cambodia and Borneo.71
Upon their arrival at the Fujianese coast, Chinese authorities reportedly 
treated the Spaniards well and allowed them to trade along the coast, but 
opposed a settlement like Portuguese Macao.72 The two delegates returned 
to Manila in 1576 with an escort of Chinese soldiers and gifts.73 But when 
word spread that the Spanish troops were unable to capture and hand over 
Lin Feng, the Fujianese authorities changed their friendly attitude and 
stopped supporting a Spanish establishment in China.74 The failure of the 
f irst Spanish attempt to form bilateral relations with China is prototypical 
for sixteenth-century approaches in the East. The Spanish advance stresses 
the constant dialectic of evangelisation and conquest in Sino-Spanish 
foreign relations, as illustrated in the choice of envoys.
Three years later a Franciscan friar called Pedro de Alfaro took up the 
‘Chinese enterprise’ (empresa de China).75 Together with a handful of 
Franciscan friars he secretly set out for Zhangzhou. After having been 
distracted from the initial course they landed in Guangzhou only to learn 
that evangelising China was more complicated than previously assumed.76 
Unable to convince the Cantonese authorities, Pedro de Alfaro was soon 
expelled and thereafter tried his luck in Macao, where cold and mixed 
reactions awaited him from the Portuguese.77 The distressed friar eventu-
ally turned to the Philippine Governor, pleading for a retroactive approval 
of his plan.78 Yet an upset Governor Ronquillo decreed instead that no 
friar was ever again to leave the Philippines for China without his licensed 
permission.79 When Alfaro returned to Manila in the middle of 1580, he 
71 BR 27, p. 126.
72 Hsü (2000), Rise of Modern China, 94.
73 Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, p. 325.
74 Boxer (1953), South China, p. xlviii.
75 De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 83. AGI Filipinas 79, n. 5, ‘Carta del francisco Pedro de Alfaro 
sobre China’, 13 October 1579.
76 AGI Patronato 46, r. 11, ‘Relación de viaje a China de Pedro de Alfaro y religiosos’, 1578; AGI 
Filipinas 79, n. 4, ‘Carta del franciscano Pedro de Alfaro sobre su llegada a China’, 12 October 
1579.
77 Mendoza (2008), Historia, pp. 251-253. Being denied off icial permission from the Governor 
they decided to go on their own initiative, before Ortíz eventually backed off. Alfaro managed 
to sneak into Canton with the assistance of a Chinese captain. Montalbán (1930), Spanische 
Patronat, p. 101.
78 AGI Filipinas 79, n. 4, ‘Carta del francisco Pedro de Alfaro sobre su llegada a China’, 12 Oc-
tober 1579.
79 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 4, n. 46, ‘Pregón de Ronquillo prohibiendo salir sin licencia’, 2 March 1582.
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encountered a rather strong lobby, which saw in a conquest of China the 
solution to the Philippines’ f inancial disaster.80
That government intervention did not easily curtail the individual 
missionary zeal will be discussed below. As soon as Spanish missionar-
ies targeted China, the Portuguese Jesuits were on alert. In 1582, Michele 
Ruggieri (1543-1607), a Jesuit from Macao, visited the seat of the Provincial 
Governor of Canton, where he was informed about the violation of Ming 
rules by a Spanish group, led by a Jesuit from the Philippines. Fluent in 
Chinese, Ruggieri, who was later even invited to take up residence in a 
Buddhist temple,81 saved the Spaniards from an awkward situation.82 
Shortly afterwards, Pope Gregory XIII barred mendicants from going to 
China and Japan and restated this privilege to the Jesuits in a papal bull 
of 28 June 1585.83
In the meantime in Spain, a plan was hatched in 1577 to send an embassy 
to Emperor Wanli in the name of King Philip II.84 This diplomatic initiative 
included two letters drafted between 1580 and 1582.85 Juan González de Men-
doza, selected as envoy, was equipped with the letter and diplomatic gifts 
for the ‘king’, Emperor Wanli. With this diplomatic act Philip II explicitly 
sought to secure the Ming ruler’s friendship for the sake of the Philippines’ 
welfare and peace.86 In addition, he insisted on China’s opening to the 
word of God in the future. Since Mendoza himself never set foot in China,87 
Emperor Wanli never received the letters from Spain and if he had he would 
80 Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, p. 60. 
81 Within the next years it became common for some Jesuits to dress and style like Buddhist 
monks. For their short hair and special robes, Buddhist monks were regarded as ‘others’ by 
commoners. See Peterson (1994), ‘What to Wear?’, p. 414.
82 Peterson (1994), ‘What to Wear?’, p. 408.
83 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 102.
84 Ollé (2002), Empresa, pp. 84-88.
85 Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 137. The second embassy consisted of six discalced Franciscans with 
Jerónimo de Burgos as their spokesman. Neither the delegation, nor the letter reached Beijing 
due to a delayed arrival of the friars in Manila. See Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, p. 328. According to 
Hsu a f irst letter was written in 1580 and a second, one year later. 
86 Mendoza (2008), Historia, pp. 149-150.
87 Mendoza (2008), Historia, pp. 259-263. The compendium is based on the eyewitness reports 
of his fellow Augustinian friars, such as Martín de Rada, as well as on reports by Miguel de 
Loarca. Several editions were published in Europe up to the year 1655 and translated into 38 
different languages including Spanish, English, Italian, French, Latin, German, and Dutch. See 
Lehner (2011), China in European Encyclopedias, p. 74.
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probably have rejected them for lack of protocol. Not only the script was 
inadequate and rude, but the gifts were also inappropriate.88
The project is nonetheless telling with regard to Philip II’s diplomatic 
strategy. Philip’s understanding of diplomacy was based on his ancestors’ 
experience on the Mediterranean and to a lesser degree the Atlantic stage.89 
While Philip II, by nature devoted to morality, on the one hand prudently 
warned Mendoza to not offend the Chinese authorities,90 the letters on 
the other hand clearly indicate how Philip misinterpreted his own position 
vis-à-vis the Son of Heaven.91 In this regard, Carmen Y. Hsu has warned 
not to overstate the Crown’s adoption of Chinese standards and Philip’s 
friendly approach, but instead acknowledge his diplomatic and pragmatic 
attempt to gain control in Asia.92 Eventually the embassy failed neither 
because of Spanish over-ambition nor because of Chinese reluctance in 
dealing with the Barbarian visitors but due to a strong anti-Chinese lobby in 
Mexico and the Philippines. At the sharp end ex-Governor Francisco Sande 
(r. 1575-1580) opposed the project as being too costly and to great a risk for 
Spain’s honour. He feared that the Chinese Emperor might misinterpret the 
presents as a gesture of subjugation by the Spanish King and an involvement 
in tally trade, even for mere opportunistic reasons, should be avoided by all 
means.93 Critics f inally succeeded in convincing the Viceroy and the King 
to give up their plans to initiate friendly relations with China.94
88 AGI Patronato 24, r. 51, ‘Carta de Felipe II al Rey de la China’, 11 June 1580. For the register of 
gifts see AGI Patronato 25, r. 3, ‘Memoria de las Cosas que su M/d puede embiar al Rey de Thaibin’, 
1583. According to a record on royal f inances, the King spent 3,880,215 reals on the gifts including 
mainly Iberian cultural goods such as heavy woollen fabrics and f loral velvet, Dutch canvas, 
heavy bedclothes with gold adornments, two Castilian-style suits, Spanish-style leg dresses, a 
doublet, a beret, nightgowns, twelve packsaddles, six sets of horse harness, a Venetian mirror, 
porcelain and glassware, as well as a painting showing his father Charles V with the infant King 
and Virgin Mary.
89 Rodríguez-Salgado (1988), Changing Face, pp. 7; 33.
90 See Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, pp. 326-327.
91 For the letter to Emperor Wanli, see AGI Patronato 24, r. 51, ‘Carta de Felipe II al Rey de la 
China’, 1 June 1580.
92 Hsu (2010), ‘Writing’, pp. 323-344. What I found striking is that the author attributed the act 
of sending lavish gifts exclusively to Philip’s hidden agenda of convincing the Chinese Emperor 
to accept missionaries, without taking into account East Asian traditions of gift-exchange. 
Moreover the author omitted political and economic considerations of the Spaniards in Asia.
93 See Ollé (2002), Empresa, 68. 
94 I found one sound explanation for Sande’s hostile feelings towards China: hurt pride. 
When the Chinese embassy of 1575 was hesitant in handing over the presents intended for his 
predecessor, the late Governor Lavezaris, Sande took it personal. See BR 4, pp. 38-40.
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During his period in off ice Sande developed formidable anti-Chinese 
propaganda full of absurd accusations, which would defend a ‘just war’ 
against the heathen Chinese.95 In combination with inf luential lobbies 
throughout the Spanish empire, his propaganda shook up Manila’s foreign 
relations. Although a small minority a few Spanish individuals repeatedly 
sought to expand the empire by conquering China, Cambodia (the Spanish 
were infamously involved in the struggle for succession in Cambodia in 
1598 – that even lured ex-Governor Luis Pérez Dasmariñas into South East 
Asian geopolitics96), and other regions in the East. Their arbitrary actions 
stand in contrast to the majority of colonial subjects, who respected and 
supported Habsburg Spain’s cautiously defensive foreign policy. The King 
as the head of the Overseas Empire was not interested in adventurous 
expansionism.97 In this regard, historians used to disconnect Governor 
Francisco Sande’s naïve dreams of conquering China from the historical 
context and misinterpret off icial Castilian policies.98 The fact that King 
Philip II expressively prohibited an armed invasion, and nipped any bold 
venture in the bud, essentially to avoid costly conflicts with the Portuguese, 
has been widely ignored.99
The issue of a Spanish military intervention in China, the empresa de 
China, is closely linked to the controversial Spanish Jesuit padre Alonso 
Sánchez, whose two journeys to Southern China between 1582 and 1584 
further affected Spanish reputation in Asia.100 On his f irst trip to Guangdong 
in March 1582, he took the opportunity to inform the Portuguese of Macao 
95 A guerra justa was declared just or holy by the pope, for instance, a war of defence of the 
patrimony or dynastic claims for a Christian purpose. See Rodríguez-Salgado (1988), Changing 
Face, p. 27. With regard to China some Spaniards considered a military expedition a liberation 
of miserable and lost souls. See Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, p. 43; See also Morga (2008), 
Sucesos, pp. 219-220.
96 ARSI Phil 15, ff. 143-146: Spanish soldiers led by Blas Ruiz de Hernán González and the 
Portuguese Diogo Veloso entered Cambodia and Laos, where they became involved in struggles 
for succession. A coup with some revolting Cambodian nobles failed despite military support 
from Filipino-Japanese auxiliary forces that had been sent from Manila, and some of the Spanish 
generals lost their lives. See Zaide (1949), Philippines, pp. 284-286. Dasmariñas’s support armada 
shipwrecked on the way to Cambodia. He eventually spent more than a year along the Cantonese 
Coast and in El Piñal, much to the Macao Portuguese’s disapproval.
97 Morga (2008), Sucesos, pp. 74-77.
98 Boxer (1953), South China, pp. 241-310.
99 Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, p. 19. For his plea to the king, see Torres-Lanzas 
(1928), Catálogo, vol. 2, pp. 47-49.
100 After being expelled from China he f led to Macao (February 1583); from there he returned 
to Manila after Portuguese Jesuits refused to collaborate with their fellow padre from Manila. 
See Ollé (2002), Empresa, pp. 104-106; ARSI Phil 16, f. 21ff. Almost the entire compendium no. 16 
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about the union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns under Philip II.101 
He found support with Governor Diego Ronquillo (r. March 1583-May 1584) 
and even Bishop Salazar.102 On his second mission at the end of 1583 together 
with the Spanish merchant Juan Bautista Ramón, Sánchez was not only 
equipped with a mixed Filipino-Spanish crew and Alonso, a Christian 
interpreter of Bengali origin,103 but he also carried a sealed letter written in 
Chinese, signed by Governor Ronquillo. Horacio de la Costa claims that the 
letter, which was drafted by the captain of a Chinese junk and addressed 
to the Viceroy of Guangdong, moreover ‘accredited Sánchez as ambassador 
with powers to negotiate’.104 Yet he neither accomplished sealing a ‘friend-
ship’ deal for future commerce nor did he receive permission for a Spanish 
trading post on the Chinese coast. After his diplomatic failure in Canton 
he was harshly criticised by the residents and padres of Macao, including 
Visitador Alessandro Valignano. Humiliated by the failure of his China 
project, a frustrated Sánchez reported very negatively about the luxurious 
lives of the Jesuits in Macao, relations with China in general and about 
huaqiao/kakyo residents in Manila during a trip to Spain in 1587.105
In the period of Luso-Spanish rivalry in the East, which was moreover 
characterised by recurring failures to dominate the Moluccas – Philip II’s 
cosmographer and advisor, Giovanni Battista Gesio, assured the King that 
Luzon was strategically as important as Flanders or Italy and that it would 
be a perfect base for reaching out to China and Japan,106 an opinion shared 
by Francisco de Sande, the third Spanish Governor of the archipelago. 
Sande, notorious for downplaying Manila’s economic potential and for 
spreading stereotypes, feared an invasion from China after having been sold 
a European-style arquebus by a Chinese merchant.107 Both Sande and Gesio 
deals with Sánchez’s fund raising and persuading efforts for a Castilian intervention in China 
for the benef it of the Catholic religion.
101 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 21.
102 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 401; In a proposal sent to the King in Spain, Ronquillo even volunteered 
to organise and recruit people by himself. Cf. Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, p. 62.
103 De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 39. ‘Alonso of Bengal had only a smattering of Chinese, but was 
the best Ronquillo could provide.’
104 De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 39.
105 Both Sánchez and Valignano implicated higher authorities in their disagreements; for 
years the debates continued between Claudio Aquaviva and Alonso Sánchez, see ARSI Phil 9. 
Gil (2012), Chinos, p. 121.
106 Cf. Kamen (2002), Spain’s Road, p. 225.
107 Cf. Retana (ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, p. 42: ‘La contratación con los de China es muy dañosa 
para los españoles y para los de estas yslas porque solamente traen hierro que es útil y otra cosa 
no porque sus sedas son falsas y sacan de acá plata y oro y cuanto mas durare la comunicación con 
nosotros sin guerra tanto mas platicos se irán haciendo. [...] Aquí me han dicho indios japones 
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were still driven by the relics of sixteenth-century conquista mentality, 
systematically targeting at territories in the South China Sea. Similarly, 
during the Synod of Manila (1581-1586), Archbishop Domingo de Salazar 
proposed the conquest of neighbouring territories for ‘religious propagation 
purposes’.108 Advocating a guerra justa (just war) against China, Sánchez 
found support for his ideas among intellectuals in various parts of the 
empire, lobbying for the spread of Catholicism, dissemination of occidental 
values, or even further conquest.
Regardless of largely non-violent relations with China and Japan, Spanish 
foreign relations in South East Asia fundamentally rested upon military 
superiority. The primary ‘enemies’ in this period were surrounding Muslim 
rulers, all above the Brunei Darussalam, whose claims on the area around 
Cebu led to conflicts in the later 1570s. Governor Sande’s allegedly peaceful 
initiative of negotiating for an end to Muslim proselytising on Spanish 
territory failed.109 In 1578, a colonial force launched what they called an 
expedition to Brunei, while being known as Castille War (Perang Kastila) 
in Borneon collective memory: In March a Spanish-Filipino mixed force led 
by Sande and supported by two usurping noblemen of Brunei, conquered 
the capital Kota Batu and forced the sultan into exile. Several campaigns 
followed until June of the same year, when a cholera outbreak eventually 
compelled the diminished Spanish force to return to Manila.110 After a while 
trade relations recovered thanks to thriving contacts on a private level.
Anthony Reid has argued that under the pressure of Spanish aggression 
city-states in South East Asia were forced to adopt a more defensive military 
system and develop new trading patterns, often outside the European 
sphere of influence.111 While Manila-centred foreign affairs were marked 
by suspicion and insecurity (which at times was nothing but imaginary), 
a remarkably well-functioning information network within the Spanish 
Overseas Empire developed. As a result, Philip II designed a general plan 
for the Philippines’ relations with her neighbours in 1589 with a primary 
focus on external trade in foreign matters, acknowledging the coming and 
y chinos que los portugueses han llevado allá armas en especial arcabuzes como nosotros los 
usamos y a mi me vendío un chino un montante portugués y así les podrían enseñar el uso del 
artillería gruesa.’
108 Borao (2009), Spanish Experience in Taiwan, p. viii.
109 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 3, n. 18, ‘Carta de Sande sobre jornada de Borneo y pidiendo hábito’, 29 July 
1578.
110 Saunders (2002), History of Brunei, pp. 54-60.
111 Reid (1999), Charting, p. 225.
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going of Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, Siamese, and Malays for commercial 
reasons and expressing need for uniform customs.112
In 1598 the next diplomatic encounter between the Spanish Philippines 
and coastal China – very different from all previous and later encounters 
with the Middle Kingdom – took place. That year Governor Tello sent Juan 
Zamudio to Canton with the target of receiving permission to settle along 
the coast. Curiously, Cantonese provincial authorities gave in to the Spanish 
petition and assigned them to a small island offshore Canton, yet did not 
allow them to enter the mainland.113 The existence of contradictory sources 
on the matter means that it is impossible to identify the exact geographical 
position of what the Spanish referred to as ‘El Piñal’ and where they stayed 
less than two years.114 Tello and Zamudio’s approach was an attempt to get 
similar access to the Chinese market as the Portuguese had in Macao; but 
in doing so they bypassed the King in Spain and violated the royal decree of 
1593. Based on accusations made by the Viceroy of Goa in a letter to Philip 
III, Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto has argued that the Cantonese authorities 
accepted the Spanish because the latter bribed them with silver.115 He 
furthermore convincingly linked the episode to changing Spanish foreign 
relations in the East, under the impact of the Cambodia expedition and 
Japanese aggression in the China Seas. After the foundation of the minor 
foothold on El Piñal, the Spanish petitioned the Cantonese authorities for 
access to the Chinese market. What is noteworthy about their request is 
that they wanted to be treated on the same footing as were the Siamese, just 
as the Portuguese Leonel de Sousa had requested in 1554 before securing 
Macao.116 Boxer writes that the Chinese translations of the Spanish petition 
include arguments in favour of the Spanish and against the Portuguese. 
In reaction, the Portuguese discredited the Spanish with the Cantonese 
112 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589).
113 In China the island was known as Hutiamen. See Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 254, ‘In 1598 the 
Spanish of Manila attempted to establish their trading point in the Canton Estuary. They were 
well received in Canton, spent about 7000 reals on presents, and were told they could establish 
themselves at a place they called El Piñal, the location of which is unknown. The Portuguese 
having failed to persuade the Canton authorities that they should exclude the Spanish, took 
different action, launching an unsuccessful f ireship attack, but desisted after the Chinese 
reduced Macao’s food supply.’ Cf. Wills (1998), ‘Relations’, p. 349.
114 Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, pp. 11-43.
115 Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, p. 22.
116 ‘In 1554, the Portuguese commander, Leonel de Sousa, claimed to have registered a verbal 
agreement with Wang Po, the acting commander of the coastguard f leet permitting the Portu-
guese to trade in Kwangtung on terms similar to those of the Siamese.’ Cf. Souza (1986), Survival 
of Empire, p. 17.
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authorities by describing them as ‘harmful thieves’,117 the same stereotypes 
they had used in Japan in 1596. The El Piñal episode certainly marked the 
peak of Luso-Spanish rivalry, comprehensively since one of its immediate 
effects was a signif icant rise in silk prices in Macao in 1599. Nonetheless, 
the Macanese reportedly traded with a ship from Manila that same year. 
Despite the fact that secret circles in Manila discussed taking similar steps 
again in 1603 and 1609 and despite the legislation of Spanish trade in China 
and Japan by royal decree of 25 July 1609.118 I disagree with those who claim 
that El Piñal was part of a larger Spanish territorial initiative and instead 
argue that El Piñal was nothing but a mercantile project.119
Taking curiosity as an indicator for considerate foreign policies, we 
encounter major differences between China and Spain.120 Ethnographical 
studies carried out by missionaries about power relations and customs in 
East Asia addressed the increasing metropolitan interest in information on 
China and Japan.121 Off icial Chinese interest in improving their knowledge 
of the new rulers of Luzon or the origin of the new Barbarians remained 
limited. Rare off icial Chinese policies oscillated between anachronism and 
ignorance: Whereas formal diplomatic relations in form of tributary trade 
did not exist, coastal bureaucrats occasionally classif ied the new rulers 
of Luzon as tributary partners.122 Late Ming dealings with Luzon were by 
all means unsystematic: The earlier cited Ming shi-lu record of 1576 shows 
that the Chinese state was not entirely sure about the status of Luzon. 
Restrained conduct continued largely unaltered until the end of the dynasty. 
Reactions to urgent events such as the 1603/4 and 1639 ‘Chinese mutinies’ of 
Manila triggered hardly more than conflict-avoiding approaches. But there 
117 ‘Eram ladrones y levantados, y que eran gente que alçauan con los regnos donde entravan.’ 
Cf. Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. 61.
118 BR 27, p. 110. See also AGI Filipinas 329, l. 1, ff. 54v-56r, ‘Orden de tratar sobre la entrada en 
China’, 15 October 1603.
119 Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, pp. 11-43. The author demonstrated that Spanish and 
Portuguese sources on the event ref lect major contradiction as to the question whether the 
Spanish had been granted the right to settle or simply trade there. Similarly, the true objectives 
of the Spanish approach are also disputed.
120 Vande Walle/Kasaya (eds) (2001), Dodonaeus in Japan, pp. 104-105, pointed out that early mod-
ern communication comprised of three elements: information, utterance, and understanding.
121 Luís Froís, who spent many years in Japan, compiled an early ethnographic study on 
Japan. He was the f irst author of a Japanese-Portuguese dictionary and benef itted from close 
contacts with noblemen such as Oda Nobunaga. See Froís (1599), Rebus Iaponicis. Before the 
f irst Vocabulario da Lingoa de Iapam was printed by the Jesuit press in 1604 several unpublished 
manuscript aids to language study circulated among Jesuit missionaries. See Ebisawa (1971), 
‘Meeting of Cultures’, p. 127.
122 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/1020 (accessed 2 December 2013).
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were also times when the Ming authorities intervened: following a Spanish 
commercial initiative to settle on Taiwan, a mandarin was dispatched to 
Manila.123 In reaction to a sudden Dutch expansion in South East Asia, the 
Governor of Fujian also dispatched two ambassadors to Batavia in 1624 to 
discuss recent developments on the Penghu Islands.124
In trying to explain Ming China’s reluctance towards Luzon we have 
to take a look at China’s traditional understanding of the world as tian xia 
(all ‘under heaven’). Chinese self-perception was one of being ideologically 
superior and therefore responsible for the peace and order on earth. In 
this tradition, the f irst Ming Emperor, Hongwu (r. 1368-1398), drafted a 
list of 12 states that were not to be invaded by future generations. These 
states included Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and Luzon.125 An account of the early 
seventeenth century shows that the Chinese court did not even bother to 
clarify the Spaniards’ status. Describing them as Western yi the Chinese 
used to encounter similarities between the people from Luzon and the 
Japanese:
Some Japanese ships drifted to Xiao-cheng in the Fu-jian seas. Naval forces 
pursued them to Zhang-zhou Port and Xian-qi, where 27 yi persons were 
captured. Through interpreters it was learned that they were Japanese 
merchant yi who travelled to foreign lands, and that they had been blown 
ashore by the winds. [...] Also, there were Luzón people and Western 
fan people, some of whom had sold themselves as servants and some of 
whom were returning home on the ship. The Fu-jian Grand Coordinator 
Xu Xue-ju advised and noted: [...] The Western fan are not tributary yi, 
but rather are a rebellious tribe. As to [those persons from] Luzón, in past 
years, they killed almost 10,000 of our merchants. Its people must not be 
treated indulgently. As long as they have no rebellious desires, we cannot 
be too severe on such people.126
This passage summarises off icial China’s ambivalent stance. On the one 
hand, Chinese authorities condemned the savage behaviour of the ‘men of 
Luzon’, on the other they were reluctant to seriously deal with the latter. 
Immanuel Hsü argued that the Chinese did not distinguish the Spaniards 
123 AGI Filipinas 30, n. 12 ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre la expedición a Isla Hermosa’, 4 August 
1628.
124 Cf. Clulow (2014), Company, p. 56, based on Batavian Dagregisters.
125 Cf. Kang (2010), East Asia, p. 98.
126 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3188 (accessed 4 December 2013).
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from the Portuguese, sometimes referring to both as folangji (佛郎機 a.k.a. 
Franks).127 If true at all, it was certainly not the case for all of China. Provincial 
authorities in Guangdong already experienced rivalry between Portuguese 
and Spaniards in the 1580s resulting from an outspoken Macanese opposi-
tion to mendicants from Manila – even if such friction between Jesuits and 
mendicant orders could have been dismissed as religious dispute and not 
necessarily understood as a matter of national politics. In addition to official 
records, private Fujianese and Cantonese merchants clearly distinguished 
between the Portuguese of Macao and the Spaniards of Manila.128 Under 
these circumstances, generic terms such as fanseng (番僧) as well as fantu 
(番徒) for foreign missionaries coming from Luzon were probably used as 
a distinction from falongji used for the Portuguese.129
To sum up, Spanish attempts to establish bilateral relations were con-
stantly frustrated. With regard to Manila private Chinese traders indirectly 
respected Spanish suzerainty and their rules, despite the prevalent dualistic 
nature between popular and off icial discourse in off icial China. As for 
the latter, Sino-Castilian relations were unsustainable. Despite remaining 
outside the Ming’s sphere of interest or influence, a Chinese government 
document of as late as 1631 referred to Luzon as a subordinate country.130 
During the Qing period, Luzon was off icially listed among ‘foreign coun-
tries’, along with Macao, Japan, Siam, Portugal, Spain, England, or France.131
Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Overseas Empire
Irregular Beginnings
Unlike China-related foreign affairs, encounters between Japan and Luzon 
were regular and increasingly systematic.132 Yet, similar to the case with China, 
127 Hsü (2000), Rise of Modern China, p. 95. Pejorative terms and lack of empathy for otherness 
commonly featured all three governments. We may think of the Spanish calling the Chinese in 
Manila sangleyes, or the Japanese referring to the Europeans as namban (Southern Barbarians).
128 Zhang (1981), Dongxi yangkao, vol. 7.
129 Ollé (2002), Empresa, p. 249: A term rarely used for the Castilians residents of Luzon was 
ganxila – a person from the kingdom of ganxilaguo, meaning Castile.
130 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/833, accessed 17 March 2014.
131 Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, pp. 221; 248. Chinese off icials knew as early as in 1604 that 
the Dutch were formerly governed by the Spaniards.
132 In the f irst edition of the Monumenta Nipponica, a well-established journal for studies on 
Japan and the West, we f ind an early historiographical study on the beginnings of diplomatic 
relations between Japan and the Castilians: Bernand (1938), ‘Débuts des Relations’, pp. 99-137.
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diplomatic or semi-official relations started off at the periphery, after the 
Franciscan friars Diego Bernal and Juan Pobre Díaz Pardo landed in Hirado 
in 1582. The island of Hirado had been an important, interregional base for 
maritime trade since the days of the prominent Chinese wakō Wang Zhi, 
introduced earlier. They landed there by chance on the vessel of the private 
Portuguese captain Antonio Garcés.133 At that time Spanish friars in Manila 
had no concrete plans for a Japan mission but exclusively focused on China. 
Fray Pobre returned to Hirado two years later together with the Augustinian 
Francisco de Manrique, again due to an unexpected change on the initial 
course to China.134 Daimyō Matsura Shigenobu (松浦鎮信) welcomed the 
capsized and invited them to stay on the island while waiting for the proper 
seasonal winds. During that time the Spaniards received help to repair their 
vessel.135 Matsura Shigenobu, in Spanish sources often referred to as ‘king of 
Firando’, sought the opportunity to express his desire to establish relations 
with the ‘other’ Iberians and regularly met with the stranded friars. Eventually 
he drafted a letter to the Spanish Governor in Manila assuring him friendship 
and expressed his hope for the future evangelisation of his people.136
Finding themselves both delighted and suspicious about unexpected 
interaction with Japan, the Spaniards were soon to receive more encourag-
ing lines from Japan.137 The same year, Jesuit vice-provincial Gaspar Coelho 
wrote to the Governor of the Philippines asking for support for the Japan 
mission and against the Shimazu of Satsuma.138 In 1586, Ōmura Sumitada 
(大村純忠), the lord of Nagasaki, sent 11 Japanese, who claimed to be Chris-
tians, to Manila.139 The Spaniards learnt about the lack of priests in Japan 
and soon after their arrival a delighted Governor Santiago de Vera reported 
133 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 64, ‘Carta del Pablo Rodriguez sobre el Rey de Firando’, 7 October 1584; 
Uyttenbroeck (1959), ‘Early Franciscans’, p. 128.
134 AGI Filipinas 84, n. 46, ‘Carta del franciscano Juan de Plasencia sobre varios asuntos’, 18 June 
1585.
135 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 64, ‘Carta de Pablo Rodríguez sobre el rey de Firando’, 7 October 1584.
136 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 63, ‘Traslado de carta del rey de Firando’, 17 September 1584. See 
also Dainihon shiryō, 11, 7, p. 595; Nihon gakujitsu fukyukai, appendix 5-6. The letter and the 
presents sent by Matsura were carried on a Portuguese ship.
137 Tremml (2012), ‘Waren sie nicht alle Piraten?’, pp. 144-167.
138 ARSI Jap-Sin, 9, II.
139 An inquiry by Bishop Salazar provides evidence of the visitors. Cf. Kishino (1986), ‘Firipin 
bōeki’, p. 42. According to Johannes Laures, SJ, these early Christian delegates included Don Juan 
de Vera, native of Hakata, Tacaua Niemo and Don Balatsar Garnal, both natives of Bungo, Pablo 
Faranda Ziem, native of Miaco, Jeronimo Batanambe Zemoxero, native of Bungo, Andrés Gon-
zalves Ambraya Yafachiro, native of Firando, Joacim de Vera, native of Bungo, Gabriel Nangano 
Totamon, native of Miaco, Juan Yananguia Guenimoto, native of Sakai, Juan Yamamoto Josogiro 
and León Giminso Ixogiro, natives of de Hakata. See Laures (1941), ‘Ancient Document’, p. 7.
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this promising encounter to the King in Spain.140 As a sign of accepting 
Ōmura’s friendship, the Governor sent presents to the Christian lord and to 
two of the leading Portuguese Jesuits. The fact that the Japanese local lord 
asked for support for the Christian mission in Japan speaks for the Kyushu 
daimyō’s diplomatic skills in dealing with the Iberians: a future Catholic 
mission had potential to increase foreign commerce in the realm.
The following year another vessel from Japan arrived in Manila. It brought 
a letter of Matsura Takanobu (松浦隆信; Shigenobu’s father) from Hirado, 
and was laden with merchandise and weapons to display the commercial 
potential of the Matsura realm.141 Together with the Christian daimyō, 
Konishi Yukinaga, also known as Don Agustín, Matsura Takanobu offered 
to send troops without asking for anything in return. On 26 June 1587, 
Governor Santiago de Vera (r. 1584-1590) reported the good news to the King 
in Madrid.142 Requesting permission to open a trading route between Japan 
and the Philippines, and with the empresa de China in mind, he pointed out 
that the Japanese were enemies of China and therefore offered military help 
at a very low cost. This points at the beginning of Japanese mercenaries in 
South East Asia.143 Right on the day of the arrival of the envoy from Hirado, 
Santiago de Vera made preparations to send the Japanese a letter together 
with presents – which he considered to be of great value, and moreover 
immediately informed the King in Spain.144
The aforementioned dynamics suggest a certain rivalry among the 
Kyushu daimyō when it comes to foreign trade. Competition triggered a 
special interest in Luzon and loose contacts with the Spaniards prospered 
before Japan’s central ruling elite tried to formalise trade relations. A similar 
rivalry eventually also affected central Japanese foreign policies. Between 
1591 and 1593, Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent letters to the Spanish Governor in 
Manila, informing the latter about his enormous power and his intention 
to conquer the Philippines, unless the Spanish paid tribute to Japan.145 The 
diplomatic tensions with China, as introduced above, served as the setting 
140 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 6, n. 61, ‘Carta de Vera sobre pobreza de la gente de guerra’, 26 June 1586.
141 Shimizu (2010), ‘“Sakoku” seisaku’, p. 139.
142 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 
26 June 1587.
143 AGI Filipinas 34, n. 75, ‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general’, 26 June 1587. For 
mercenaries from Hirado in South East Asia, see Clulow (2010), ‘Maritime Violence’, p. 83.
144 Igawa (2010), ‘At the Crossroads’, p. 83.
145 AGI Filipinas, 18B, r. 2, n. 12, ‘Carta de G. P. Mariñas enviando cartas de Japón’, 11 June 1592. 
BR 8, pp. 260-261. Letters were sent to the Philippines in 1591, 1592, 1593, 1597. The f irst three 
letters were similar to the one sent to Taiwan.
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for requesting tribute from Luzon (in those days called Shōryūkyū 小琉球 in 
Japanese sources) and Taiwan (a.k.a. Takasago, 高砂).146 Political scientists 
have argued that this advance should be understood as part of a so-called 
kanpaku diplomacy characterised by Hideyoshi’s expansionist ideas that 
could be interpreted both as attempt to control the Asian sea trade and to 
increase Japan’s political position in Asia, diplomatic encounters with the 
Spaniards have been presented over the centuries as a story of conflicts.147 
What has largely been overlooked is that it was not only statesmen who 
pulled the strings based on handbook conventions in this diplomatic 
communication. Thus, an alternative view on this formal yet improvised 
element in Spanish-Japanese relations is overdue. Transnational diplomacy 
of the 1590s shows a rather off icial character: formal exchange of letters 
and envoys, the participation of central rulers (if only passively, in the case 
of the Spanish sovereign), and, last but not least, impromptu audiences in 
Manila, Nagoya, and Kyoto.
The Spanish answer to Hideyoshi’s f irst advance of 1591 was vague. Al-
though the fear of a Japanese invasion under Hideyoshi and his followers 
(especially under the impact of the growing number of Japanese in the city) 
remained vague, authorities decided to just wait and see.148 Returning the 
delegation by sending the Dominican Juan Cobo as envoy to Japan was 
rather an attempt to win time than an act of submission. What all Spanish 
delegations to Japan had in common was a determination to negotiate. Given 
their limited language and cultural skills they sometimes accomplished 
noteworthy results. The second off icially dispatched envoy from Manila, 
a Franciscan friar called Pedro Bautista, even signed a kind of treaty on 
behalf of Governor Dasmariñas in 1593 on Japanese soil. This agreement was 
the beginning of licensed trade aiming at getting piracy under control and 
strengthening mutual trust. This act was later interpreted as the beginning 
of the short-lived bilateral relationship between Japan and the Philippines, 
in which Hideyoshi was acting as the ruling power of the entire country and 
the Governor of the Philippines represented the Spanish King.
146 Asao et al. (1994), Iwanami kōza nihon tsūshi, vol. 12, p. 42.
147 Previous scholarship has frequently stressed the opposition of Hideyoshi’s aggressive foreign 
relations and Tokugawa Ieyasu’s wise advances to foreign rulers. This tendency dates back to 
contemporary Spanish accounts. Both the volumes of Pablo Pastells, and of Emma H. Blair and 
James A. Robertson give but accounts of failed communication between the two parties. Another 
example is the work of the Spanish Franciscan Lejarza (1961), Bajo la Furia de Taikosama. The 
encounters are more neutrally addressed in Bernard (1938), ‘Débuts des Relations’, pp. 99-137. 
See also Nara, Supein komonjo (1942), and Ogura (1989), Shuinsen jidai, p. iii.
148 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 51; Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 230.
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In the course of the 1590s, a Portuguese intermediary carrier and 
merchant active in the Japan trade named Pedro Goncalves Carvalhais 
(sp. Pedro González de Carvajal), who had travelled to Japan with Pedro 
Bautista, claimed to have received a letter from Hideyoshi addressed to 
the King of Spain. When reporting to Madrid, Carvajal cautioned against 
a potential Japanese attack and stressed that Hideyoshi was desperately 
waiting for an answer from Spain. He claimed to have been chosen by 
Hideyoshi to inform the King about the Japanese ruler’s wealth and might 
and suggested cooperating with the Bishop of Macao in proselytising mat-
ters.149 However, the accuracy of this report is doubtful.150
In 1594, Hasekawa Sōnin (長谷川宗仁), a close confident of Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi (who was present during Cobo’s stay in Japan and also mediated 
between Harada Kiyemon and Hideyoshi), went to Luzon to submit Hidey-
oshi’s letter following the audience with Bautista. He also drafted a message 
for Governor Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, aff irming that Japan would not send 
any military expedition but would maintain peaceful trade relations with 
Luzon.151 This was already the beginning of typical intermediary diplomacy 
between Japan and foreign policy players in Asia: A high-ranking off icial 
(daimyō) would act as the main authority in diplomatic correspondence, 
while he in fact expressed the wish of the Japanese ruler. It was an explicit 
expression of the Japanese ruler’s superiority.152 We have already seen a simi-
lar approach in the 1611 letters to Fujian, described above. In later decades 
Honda Masazumi (本多正信), one of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s senior advisors, 
and Nabeshima Katsushige (鍋島勝茂), daimyō of Saga, fulf illed similar 
functions in diplomatic correspondence with Manila, while the Matsura 
of Hirado took such role in negotiations with VOC off icials.153
Getting back to the events of the 1590s, the next step was sending Jerónimo 
de Jesús to Japan to relate the news that Luis Pérez Dasmariñas had taken 
149 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 7, n. 110, ‘Carta de Pedro González de Carvajal sobre su viaje a Japón’, 1594.
150 The letter ends without a signature or any of the usual formal wishes. 
151 For Hasekawa’s involvement in namban trade see Ōishi (1986), Shuinsen. 
152 See Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku ōfuku, pp. 102-104.
153 Honda Masanobu Sado no kami 本多正信佐渡守 enjoyed Ieyasu’s favour as loyal and 
politically gifted advisor since his time as daimyō of Okazaki. Being Ieyasu’s f irst advisor in 
external affairs he was often involved in dealings with the Spaniards. After Masanobu’s death 
most of his tasks passed on to his son Honda Masazumi Kōzuke no suke 本多正純上野介, who 
had accompanied Ieyasu to Sunpu in 1606. As Ieyasu’s personal minister he was together with the 
gozan monks Genkitsu and Sūden in charge of drafting and distributing licences for maritime 
trade. Shōzaburō Mitsutsugu, a rich merchant from Kyoto, was in charge of Bakufu f inances. 
Mukai Masatsuna Shōgen 向井正綱将監 held the off ice of fune bugyō (jp.) 船奉行 and was 
responsible for maritime trade.
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office as new Governor following the unexpected death of his father in 1594. 
Half a year later (1595), Jerónimo de Jesús informed the Governor in a letter 
written in Satsuma about his impression that Hideyoshi indeed showed 
great interest in conquering the Philippines.154 At the same time Spanish 
mendicants managed to create a foothold in Japan. Supported by Christian 
daimyō Franciscan friars received the right to settle in Kyoto where they 
founded a modest church and a hospital, and soon afterwards a convent 
and a church in Osaka followed.155
In addition to the events outlined above, a series of shipwrecks along the 
Japanese coast constituted early Hispano-Japanese diplomatic relations. The 
f irst major incident fell right into the tensions with Hideyoshi. In autumn 
1596 the Manila Galleon San Felipe capsized on the coast of Shikoku in 
1596 and gave rise to a dramatic episode in the history of early modern 
Japanese-Spanish relations. After losing control over the vessel and seeking 
shelter in Japan, the distressed Spanish captain Matías de Landecho also 
lost control over the cargo of the galleon: Neither the local residents nor 
Hideyoshi himself could resist the temptation of the rich freight of Chinese 
silks aboard. Within days the confiscation of the cargo caused widespread 
social unrest, which stirred up Japan-based Europeans and newly converted 
Japanese. In the midst of these turbulences, Hideyoshi – who had issued an 
unsuccessful ban on Christianity in 1587 – saw that the time was ripe for 
bearing down on the intruding Spaniards and the spread of Christianity. In 
February 1597, one Mexican, one Portuguese, and six Spanish friars, as well 
as eighteen Japanese Christians, were crucif ied in Nagasaki and became 
known as the f irst Christian martyrs on Japanese soil.156 Hideyoshi’s harsh 
reaction points to the hostile atmosphere of namban trade at the end of 
his reign. If we are to believe Landecho’s Christian Japanese interpreter 
Antonio, Portuguese merchants from Macao even added fuel to the f ire. 
They reported to Hideyoshi ‘that the Portuguese were no vassals of King 
Don Felipe who was a bad person, but that the Portuguese had another King 
154 Jerónimo de Jesus from Nagasaki warned his fellow Franciscan brother Francisco de las 
Misas of a possible conquest by Satsuma. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 262. Based on an account of 
Pastells, Iwao reported that the third Japanese ambassador, Hasegawa Sōnin (Pedro Karubaha-
ru), stated in a letter of 1593 that if trade between the two countries was cut off, troops would 
be sent. See Kishino (1986), ‘Firipin bōeki’, p. 43.
155 Pérez (1916), Cartas VI, pp. 216-218; Willeke (1986), ‘Notizen’, pp. 261-271. In Kyoto they 
founded the Iglesia de la Nuestra Señora de los Ángeles and the Santa Ana hospital. The convent 
in Osaka was called Belén and the church Iglesia de San Lázaro.
156 Morga (2008), Sucesos, pp. 78-84.
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with whom Taycosama had [already] made peace’.157 With regard to the San 
Felipe incident researchers have often referred to the role of the Jesuits and 
their reluctance in sharing Asian proselytising territory with mendicant 
friars. Spanish contemporaries, to some extend wrongly, criticised the 
padres for not using their connections in Japan and not stepping in for 
their ‘brothers’.158
When word of the escalation reached Luzon, off icials saw their long-
nourished fears conf irmed and immediately garnered further military 
support from Spain. In principal the colonial government reacted very 
pragmatically to Hideyoshi’s provocation. Without losing time, Governor 
Tello sent his ambassador, Luis de Navarrete, with presents (that famously 
included the elephant nicknamed ‘Don Pedro’) in July 1597.159 On behalf of 
Tello, Navarrete requested the return of the cargo from the shipwrecked San 
Felipe and the bones of the martyrs.160 It was not only that smart diplomatic 
manoeuvre that helped to stabilise trade relations between Manila and 
Japan in 1598, but also Hideyoshi’s death. However, since 100,000 Japanese 
soldiers returned from the Korea invasion, Governor Tello remained on 
alert: A report to the King states that out of a total of 16 merchant ves-
sels calling at Manila that year roughly half of them carried pirates, who 
plundered the natives.161
157 ARSI Jap/Sin 32, ff. 12-14.
158 For a the controversial picture of the events by Franciscan and Jesuit observers and for Va-
lignano’s harsh critique of the Franciscan methods, see Álvarez-Taladriz (ed.) (1973), Relaciones, 
p. 69. During the Tokugawa reign Franciscan friars became important mediators between Japan 
and Luzon. Legally, the Jesuits were right: It was only in 1600 that Pope Clement VII’s Onerosa 
pastoralis gave all mendicant orders the right to enter Japan, yet under the condition that they 
operated via Portuguese India. Pope Paul V removed all restrictions as late as 1608. See Reis 
Correira (2005), ‘Rivalries’. Pope Sixtus V published the brief ‘Dum ad uberes fructus’ conferring 
the right to found missions in the ‘Indias’ and China upon the Franciscans in the Philippines in 
1586.
159 Girón (1965), Nippon, pp. 172-176. Morga also mentioned the elephant. Morga (2008), Sucesos, 
p. 81. Don Pedro prominently features a namban byōbu by the famous artist Kanō Naizen 
狩野内膳, now part of the Kobe City Museum collection. 
160 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 146, ‘Carta de Tello sobre abandono de Mindanao, embajada a Japón’, 
23 June 1598.
161 BR 10, p. 211: ‘But, as it happened that the pirates came after them, as we suspected that 
they were not all of the same understanding and alliance, several investigations were made in 
regard to them, and their commanders arrested, although nothing of importance was found. I 
sent general Don Joan Ronquillo and Captain Joan de Alcega to attack the enemy with a galley 
and a galliot; and although they came within sight of them, they did not effect the desired 
purpose, because their vessels were not suitable, and heavy storms were threatening, I sent 
Captain Gaspar Perez [...]; he had better luck, for, having met with two of the Xaponese ships, 
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In their efforts to unify the country, both Hideyoshi and Ieyasu were eager 
to gain control over Japan’s external commerce. Two aspects of Hideyoshi’s 
international dominance seeking were inherited by Tokugawa Ieyasu and 
remain crucial for the empirical analysis of the following subchapter. First 
the question of an Iberian impact-discourse and second the problematic 
concept of friendly relations (sp. amistad or pt. amizade) within early mod-
ern intercultural diplomatic relations. Because of its frequent use by Spanish 
and Portuguese political actors in and outside Europe it can easily be called 
the ideological backbone of pre-modern Iberian diplomacy.162 Hideyoshi 
also used friendship rhetoric when asking the Spaniards to prove their 
good intentions. Yet, the only kind of friendship between states known to 
Hideyoshi was based on a hierarchical concept of subordination and thus 
meant obediently sending tribute.163
Diplomatic Relations between Tokugawa Japan and the Spanish 
Overseas Empire
Tokugawa foreign policies are conventionally considered as signif icant 
improvement for Japan’s international relations. When Ieyasu took the reins 
in foreign affairs after winning the Battle of Sekigahara (1600), he at once got 
in contact with neighbouring countries. For this reason, post-1598 foreign 
policies have often been regarded as completely different from Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi’s aggressive stance. The number of international negotiating 
partners and letters exchanged with foreign rulers increased dramatically 
during the f irst years of Tokugawa rule. Between 1601 and 1614, 67 off icial 
letters were dispatched to 12 different foreign entities, of which 48 were 
signed by the Shogun.164 At f irst sight, Ieyasu’s foreign policies also settled 
he overcame the one which awaited him, and killed the whole crew. He brought one Xaponese 
of this city here alive, who was executed in the sight of the Xaponese and the Chinese.’
162 The Crowns of Castile and Aragon used the concept of diplomatic relations to consolidate 
power on the Iberian Peninsula and in Europe in the late medieval period, as I have shown 
at a presentation at the Tokyo University Chūseishi Kenkyūkai on 13 December 2013. Disney 
discussed the Portuguese use of amizade in Asia. Disney (2009), History of Portugal, p. 138.
163 For misleading translations of the term ‘friendship’ in the course of the 1590s diplomatic 
correspondence, see Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 3, pp. 56-57; 60. With regard to the 
Japanese envoy Harada on 27 April 1593 he summarised: ‘A lo que el emperador Cambacondono 
mi señor me envía con titulo de embajador a V. S. como a persona que está en nombre del Rey 
Felipe es a pedir y ligar desde ahora en adelante las paces que el estrecho vínculo de verdadera 
amistad y fraternidad.’ For theoretical considerations of terminology and connotation, see 
Fraser (1994), ‘Genealogy’, pp. 309-315.
164 Arano Yasunori speaks of the Tokugawa international debut. See Arano (1987), ‘Nihongata’.
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relations with Luzon. Soon after taking up leadership, he took steps to 
comfort the Spaniards in Manila after several years of distress. Aware of the 
benefits of long-distance trade, Ieyasu soon targeted the Castilians of Luzon 
for collaboration on a trans-national level. Herein lies the major difference 
with Ming China. Early modern Japanese pluralistic Bakufu aspirations 
even included a desire to integrate Japan into trade with Mexico. As far 
as the Manila trade was concerned Ieyasu’s goodwill politics remained 
ambivalent and were hard to match with the already complex off icial 
foreign relations portfolio.165
One of the f irst things Ieyasu did to appease the Spaniards of Manila was 
to issue a new ban on piracy. This was a smart move, which also allowed 
him to reconfirm his interest in direct trade relations with the Castilians. 
Only a few months after Hideyoshi’s death in October 1598, Ieyasu sent 
the Sakai merchant Goro Emon (五郎右衛門) to invite the Spaniards to 
trade in the Tokugawa domain in Kanto. The Bakufu had established its 
headquarters there and founded a new capital in Edo.166 Since nothing 
happened for months, Ieyasu impatiently dispatched the Franciscan friar 
Jerónimo de Jesús Castro, a Portuguese, as envoy to Manila. In an off icial 
letter, conventionally described as kokusho in Japanese sources, Ieyasu 
expressed his sincere wish to establish regular trade with the Philippines 
and New Spain.167 Jerónimo de Jesús returned to Kyoto via Hirado in 1601 
together with the Franciscan friar Pedro Burgillos, who became Ieyasu’s 
third envoy to Manila in 1602. In their audience with Ieyasu in Fushimi, the 
two clergymen not only offered tobacco as diplomatic gift but also formally 
agreed upon regular commercial exchange: each season three Japanese 
trading ships of def inite size should call at the port in Manila.168
Another subject of common interest in those days was f ighting piracy: 
All illicit traders should be rounded up and punished.169 After two Chinese 
165 For a detailed study of the most signif icant events in the short-lived history of early modern 
Spanish-Japanese relations, see Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais. See also my own thoughts on 
the complex matter in Tremml (2009), ‘Global History of Manila’, pp. 184-202.
166 Suzuki (2010), Tokugawa Ieyasu, p. 24.
167 The original letter is reprinted in Asao et al. (1993), Nihon tsūshi 1; Murakami (ed.) (2005), 
Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 198-199; 214. Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, pp. 252-53: Jerónimo de Jesús, 
1600-’embajador’ of the ‘daifusama’ (内府, jp. daifu) had spent some time in Japan between 1594 
and 1598.
168 Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, pp. 86-88. For details on the audience, see Sola 
(2011), ‘Relación de Pedro Burgillos sobre el Japón del inicio de los Tokugawa’, http://www.archi-
vodelafrontera.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/A-PAC03-tokugawa.pdf (accessed 28 January 
2014). 
169 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/570. 
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ships had been attacked by Japanese pirates while loading their cargo in 
the Manila Bay, the Spanish Governor ordered their punishment. Upon 
receiving Tello’s protest against the piratical practices of the Japanese 
people, Ieyasu blamed merchants from Satsuma and put between 50 and 
400 people to death.170 He moreover encouraged the Spanish authorities in 
a letter to execute any Japanese troublemaker and even petitioned them 
to transmit the names of Japanese rebel merchants disturbing the Philip-
pines.171 Desiring that the pirates who used to operate around Luzon should 
be punished without exception,172 he further commanded that the Chinese 
among them were to be sent back to Dai Ming (大明, ch., Great China) since 
they did not have anything to do with Japan.173 Governor Acuña (following 
Tello in off ice in May 1602) approved, calling Ieyasu ‘a just and wise king’ 
(un Rey tan justo y prudente) in June 1602.174 With an increasing number 
of people crossing maritime frontiers rather freely, the legal treatment of 
people from one country coming to or living in another country became 
important for bilateral relations. Several off icial letters sent from Japan to 
Manila granted the Spanish Governor the right to administer justice over all 
Japanese misbehaviour occurring in Manila, according to the local law.175 In 
this regard, Ieyasu, usually eager to underline his superiority, placed himself 
on a par with the Governor of the Philippines. In line with this logic, Spanish 
long-term visitors to Japan would neither be granted juridical freedom 
170 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa’, p. 509. According to a different version, Ieyasu ordered the 
seizure of six ships that had cleared from southern ports of Japan to plunder in Philippine waters, 
and had more than 200 of their crewmembers crucif ied as a warning (it was 100, according to 
Jesuits sources).
171 Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 47; Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/576. AGI 
Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 36, ‘Traducción de carta de Tarazaua Ximono Cami a Acuña’, 1 June 1602. 
Ieyasu’s letter came together with a letter of his vassal Terazawa Hirotaka, called Ximonocami 
in the Spanish sources. Emilio Sola called his style blunt. Ieyasu insisted on an answer on the 
matter of direct trade with New Spain and urged a rapid reply from the Governor in Manila. 
Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, pp. 94-96. For the Japanese original, see Murakami 
(ed.) (2005), Ikoku ōfuku, p. 84.
172 Ieyasu showed generally little tolerance for illicit maritime merchants. During the 30-odd 
years of active foreign policies the Bakufu invited several South East Asian rulers to punish 
misbehaving Japanese merchants according to local law. For Cambodia, for instance, see Kondō 
(1983), Gaiban tsūsho, p. 181; Takeda (2005), Sakoku, pp. 7-27; Kuno (1940), Japanese Expansion.
173 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/570.
174 AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 38, ‘Carta del f iscal Salazar sobre llegada de Acuña’, 20 June 1602: ‘En 
nombre de Dayfusama habia escrito Fray Jeronimo de Jesus al Gobernador de Manila sobre el 
trato y comercio entre japones y españoles, manifestandole haber preso y castigado a los japones 
y sangleyes, que en años precedentes habian ido a hacer daño a Filipinas.’
175 See, for instance, a letter from 1608 in Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 13-14.
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nor extraterritoriality.176 Spanish missionaries and merchants should be 
punished according the Japanese law, while the Bakufu held the right to 
expulse and punish when facing imminent danger.177
If we are to believe the records of the Tsūkō ichiran, Ieyasu also proved 
capable of dealing with unexpected events better than his predecessor.178 
When the Spanish galleon Espíritu Santo on its way to Acapulco was ship-
wrecked in Tosa (Shikoku) in September 1602, the Japanese ruler proved his 
good intentions. Memories and hearsay of 1596, when similar circumstances 
forced the San Felipe to land in that region, were vivid and caused panic 
among the passengers as well as in Manila, once news had travelled back 
there.179 While in Japan, Lope de Ulloa, the captain of the galleon, sent 
his brother Alonso and Francisco de Maldonado with the most precious 
items of the merchandise to Ieyasu in Fushimi. Although the crew of the 
galleon clandestinely fled from Tosa and returned to Luzon, things settled 
peacefully. Ieyasu bestowed Ulloa with a letter addressed to the Spanish 
Governor, in which he emphasised that no Spaniard had to fear losing his 
property in Japan.180 In response to Ieyasu’s letter, Governor Acuña even 
apologised for what happened in Tosa and suggested sending more ships 
from Manila to Japan.181
In 1605, Spanish merchants from Manila received off icial permission to 
send four trading ships to Japan annually as part of vermillion-seal trade 
controlled by the Bakufu. While suspicions remained, most authorities in 
the Philippines came to appreciate the advantages of regular contact with 
Japan. Even the King in Spain deemed stable relations with the Japanese as a 
guarantee for the Philippines’ prosperous future. Being informed about an-
nual supply from Japan and the sympathy of the ‘emperor’ for the Castilians, 
he insisted on maintaining peaceful relations with Japan, for the sake of 
176 Massarella (1990), World Elsewhere, pp. 115-116. In the early seventeenth century English and 
Dutch merchants enjoyed a certain extraterritoriality. The Bakufu decreed in 1613 that crimes 
committed by EIC employees should be punished by the head of the English factory. The latter, 
however, had to obey the Bakufu.
177 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 319.
178 AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 51, ‘Relación de lo sucedido a Lope de Ulloa en la Espiritu Santo’, 
26 July 1602.
179 Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, pp. 19-23.
180 Sola (1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, pp. 97-99. Written concessions handed over to the 
Spaniards and translated by the Portuguese in Nagasaki. See also Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku 
nikki shō, pp. 258-259.
181 Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 253-254; Nakamura (1965), Goshuinsen, vol. 1, 
pp. 235-236 AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 51, ‘Relación de lo sucedido a Lope de Ulloa en la Espíritu 
Santo’, 1602.
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the Castilians in Asia in the light of a possible retaliating attack from China 
after a bloody clash between Spanish authorities and Fujianese settlers in 
1603/4.182 The issue was also tackled during the diplomatic-commercial 
expeditions of Captain Francisco Moreno Donoso in 1606 and 1607, who 
was chosen twice as bearer of presents to the ‘emperor’ of the ‘Reyno del 
Japón’ and whose on the spot negotiations with the Japanese reportedly led 
to a proposed military alliance against China.183 In that period polemics of 
Dutch merchants, Jesuits from Macao, and Franciscans from Manila would 
come to dominate foreign affairs on Japanese soil, where authorities became 
aware of Catholicism.184
A particularly delicate matter was a Spanish attempt to negotiate 
a ‘Dutch-free’ Japan. In his f irst reply to Ieyasu in June 1602, Governor 
Acuña described the Dutch as rioting and rebelling vassals of the King 
of Spain, compared them to pirates and boldly demanded that all Dutch 
should be sent to the Philippines.185 Although similarities to a previous 
Japanese request to send all wakō (pirates) from the Philippines to Japan 
were obvious, Ieyasu ignored Acuña’s allegations and argued that the Dutch 
were very committed to him.186 Ieyasu, knowing the Dutch version of the 
story, counted on their future usefulness and soon equipped them with 
off icial Japanese trading licences: In 1604 a ‘Dutch’ shuinjō was issued to 
Captain Jacob Janszoon Quaeckernaecq, who sailed on behalf of Tokugawa 
Hidetada to Patani.187 A comparative approach shows that Acuña – just as 
Ieyasu – also played double agent since his correspondence with China 
also included anti-Dutch sentiments. In 1606 he remarked in a letter to the 
Viceroy of Fujian:
The penalty imposed on the Sangleys who piloted the two Dutch ships 
that were on the coast of Chincheo was very just. These Dutch are not 
182 Cédula real of Philip III (Segovia, 4 July 1609) to Don Juan de Silva. Cf. Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas 
y el Japón’, p. 51.
183 The accomplishments in foreign relations of the ‘ambassador’ are well documented in AGI 
Patronato 53, r. 24; ‘Méritos y servios: Francisco Moreno Donoso: Filipinas’, 27 April 1620. He 
supported the Catholic mission by building two churches in Bungo with his own money.
184 For a synthesis of the lengthy disputes, see Reyes Manzano (2005), ‘Mitos y Leyendas’, 
pp. 62-63.
185 AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 35, ‘Copia de Carta de Acuña al emperador japonés Dayfu Sama’, 
1 June 1602.
186 Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, p. 26.
187 The important pepper port Patani in present-day Thailand played a crucial role in early 
Tokugawa foreign relations. The sultan of Patani was the f irst recipient of a Tokugawa diplomatic 
letter in 1599.
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friends of the Castilians, but bitter enemies; for, although they are vas-
sals of the king of the Hespañas, my sovereign, they and their country 
have revolted, and they have become pirates like Liamon [Limahon] in 
China.188
The Chinese authorities were unimpressed, not only since the Dutch fell into 
the category of unknown (non-trustworthy) foreign Barbarians. The Dutch, 
the former vassals of the Habsburg King, on the other hand, cautioned the 
Japanese sovereign to guard against Spain’s desire for universal power. 
In an off icial state letter to the Bakufu, Stadhouder Maurits ferociously 
attacked the Spanish King and the Portuguese in 1609 and urged him to 
resist illegitimate claims.189
Shimizu Yūko has stressed how Catholic friars represented Spain in 
foreign relations with the Bakufu and consequently argued against over-
emphasising the role of the state within these special relations.190 Indeed, 
due to their permanent presence – in some cases it is even fair to speak 
of a residential status – in Japan missionaries played leading roles as 
intermediaries and envoys between Manila/Mexico/Madrid and Japan. 
In order to understand their privileged status it is necessary to look at 
how they established themselves. When in 1601 the aforementioned breve 
by Clemens VII was brought to Japan, Spanish friars saw the legitimacy 
conf irmed; in 1602 members of all mendicant orders entered Japan. Yet 
their overall number remained low compared to the Jesuits. When a larger 
group of Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians landed in Nagasaki 
on a Japanese ship in 1602 they immediately followed a similar pattern as 
in the Philippines and clearly divided their missionaries’ territories. The 
Franciscans moved to Kyoto, where members of their order had already 
established a small outpost and enjoyed the favour of Ieyasu; In 1604 
an envoy of the ‘King of Luzon’, Governor Pedro Bravo de Acuña, made 
a straightforward demand: He asked for Ieyasu’s permission for Spanish 
missionaries to evangelise in Japan.191 Although Ieyasu did not make any 
clear concessions, the number of Spanish missionaries arriving in Japan 
increased in the years to come. The missionary f ield was extended to Edo 
and eventually to Sendai. The Dominicans (headed by Francisco de Morales) 
settled in Satsuma, where they temporarily enjoyed the support of the 
188 BR 14, p. 46.
189 For a transcription and translation of the letter, see Clulow (2014), Company, p. 57.
190 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon.
191 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/571 (1604).
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Shimazu clan, and the Augustinians focused on Bungo.192 The Jesuit Bishop 
Luis de Cerqueira pressed the mendicant friars hard to leave Japan soon 
afterwards but the latter endured until 1608, when Pope Paul V off icially 
opened Japan to the mendicant orders from Manila.193 Rome’s blessing was 
not worth much in Japan. The Dominicans lost support from the Shimazu 
family the same year and Father Morales and two other brothers left Bungo 
for Nagasaki, while other Dominicans struggled to found churches in Hizen, 
Kyoto, and Osaka. The Augustinians moved from Bungo to Nagasaki in 
1611-12. Although some of these friars enjoyed Ieyasu’s favour, mendicants 
only spent few safe years in Japan. In 1612 the Bakufu eventually not only 
changed its attitude towards the Hispanic presence in Japan but also lost 
patience with Christians for the f irst time.194
The very issue of direct trade with Japan became a further stumbling 
block in Hispano-Japanese relations. It began with what may be cautiously 
referred to as Ieyasu’s overambitious global projects, establishing a direct 
trading route between New Spain and Japan, f irst in 1599/1601. Yet over the 
years, constructive Japanese suggestions hinting at mutual prof its and the 
prospect of a safer journey for the Manila Galleon did not change Spanish 
determination to deter Japanese merchants from crossing the Pacif ic. The 
Spanish attitude can partly be explained by continuing Japanese pirate 
attacks along the Philippine coast.195 In 1609, the year of Grotius’s publication 
of Mare Librum, a Japanese pirate vessel was overcome and its crew killed by 
the Spaniards. Several sources suggest so much friction with the Japanese 
in Manila between 1605 and 1609 that Spanish authorities avoided pledg-
ing anything that might satisfy Ieyasu’s delicate aspirations.196 Ironically, 
bilateral negotiations reached their pinnacle in the year 1609, as a result 
of an unexpected audience of Vivero y Velasco, retired Governor of the 
Philippines, one of the f iercest critics of the Japanese in Manila while in 
192 Ubaldo Iaccarino summarised names and routes in his doctoral thesis. Iaccarino (2013), 
‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, pp. 71-72.
193 Lach (1993), Asia, vol. 3, book 1, p. 209.
194 Willeke (1991), ‘Franziskanerklöster’, pp. 227-238.
195 In 1604 Pedro de Acuña informed the Spanish King that Japanese pirates were again operat-
ing around Luzon. See Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 102. From a Spanish point of view, 
Japanese and Chinese pirates were one of many risks to the colony’s security in the 1590s that 
resulted in constant vigilance. See Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589).
196 For the original letter sent by Ieyasu in 1609 see AGI MP-Escritura_Cifra 30, ‘Carta original 
del Universal Señor del Japón, Ieyasu Tokugawa (Minamoto Yeas), al duque de Lerma, en la que 
autoriza a los navíos españoles procedentes de Nueva España a tocar puertos japoneses, dejando 
los pormenores del asunto al franciscano Fray Luis Sotelo’, 28 December 1609. For Hidetada’s 
letter dated 4 May 1610, see AGI MP-Escritura_Cifra 31.
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the Philippines,197 with Tokugawa Ieyasu in Japan. Their talks were only a 
short-lived blessing in disguise: the Bakufu agreed to tolerate Spanish friars 
on condition that regular trade would f inally be established between New 
Spain and Japan. For the sake of economic advancement of his nation, Ieyasu 
further requested the services of 50 Spanish miners from Mexico who would 
introduce Western methods of mining silver. To increase the maritime 
capacity of his country, he asked for shipwrights who could instruct the 
Japanese in the construction of ocean-going vessels.198 Given that an anti-
Dutch article was again omitted neither Manileños nor Mexican Spanish 
were in favour of that arbitrary treaty. In particular the Japanese wish to 
enhance overseas trade met no approval.199
The events following Vivero’s shipwreck shed light on a peculiar short-
term cooperation between the Spanish and the English in Japan. The San 
Buenaventura, the vessel that took Vivero and his people back to Mexico 
had been constructed by the Kentish pilot William Adams (a.k.a. Miura 
Anjin, 三浦按針),200 Ieyasu’s closest non-Japanese advisor, conventionally 
regarded an enemy of the Spanish. Next to Vivero and the other castaways 
from the shipwrecked galleon, 23 Japanese merchants under the leadership 
of Kyoto merchant, Tanaka Shōsuke, and Father Alonso Muñoz, as Ieyasu’s 
designated envoy to the court in Madrid, boarded the ship in Uraga (浦賀, in 
present-day Kanagawa prefecture) on 1 August 1610 and landed in Acapulco 
safely three months later.201 William Adams’s generous deed leaves room 
for speculating about regular European cooperation in East Asia and puts 
narratives of hostilities into perspective.202
Demonstrating gratitude and respect for helping his people, the Viceroy 
of Mexico sent an off icial delegation with a letter and gifts to Tokugawa 
Ieyasu and Tokugawa Hidetada. Sebastián Vizcaíno (1548-1624) was chosen 
to head the delegation from Mexico and became known as New Spain’s 
ambassador to Japan. What seemed like a remarkable accommodation of 
197 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/574: He expulsed Japanese merchants with the 
reason that they ‘stay[ed] behind without any special purpose’ and that ‘they do not know what 
they want’, but disturbed the social order in Manila.
198 AGI Filipinas 1, n. 133; ‘Consulta sobre carta de emperador de Japón’, 13 May 1611. Dainihon 
shiryō 12, 6, pp. 658-667; Massarella (1990), World Elsewhere, p. 79.
199 For diplomatic considerations following Vivero’s negotiations with Ieyasu, see AGI Filipinas 
1, n. 133, 13, ‘Consulta sobre carta del emperador de Japón’, 13 May 1611.
200 William Adams became known as Miura Anjin after having been ennobled by the Tokugawa 
as the only European in history.
201 Murakami (1917), ‘Japan’s Early Attempts’, p. 473.
202 In 1616 the same ship crossed the Pacif ic to the Philippines, where the Spanish Governor 
purchased it eventually. Sudō (1968), Fune, pp. 115-118.
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East Asian diplomatic protocol in fact pursued a fairly provocative hid-
den agenda, which I will address later. For now it is suff icient to place 
the episode into the chronology of Hispano-Japanese foreign relations. 
Vizcaíno landed in Uraga on 10 June 1611, from there he continued to Edo, 
met Tokugawa Hidetada on 22 June and was received in audience with 
Ieyasu in Sunpu two months later (on 27 August). In the course of these 
meetings, the parties renegotiated a trade agreement based on friendly 
relations, as well as the future of the Christian mission in Japan. After 
meeting Date Masamune, daimyō of Sendai, Vizcaíno spent almost a year 
with his coastal expeditions before he received negative replies from Ieyasu 
and Hidetada on 16 September 1612.
Zen monk Ishin Sūden, diplomatic advisor of the Bakufu, played a sig-
nif icant role in creating a new culture of foreign correspondence. Not only 
was he involved in communications with the Spanish authorities in Manila, 
but some of his political work became also the backbone of anti-Christian 
legislation and part of a broader concept of foreign relations. Starting 
with the prohibition of Christianity in Bakufu realms in 1612 (禁教令, 
jp. kinkyōrei) the law was extended to Nagasaki and Kyoto in 1613, before 
being introduced all over Japan in 1614. That year, loyal authorities of the 
Bakufu expelled friars and Japanese Christians to Macao and Manila. At 
the beginning of the year 1613 the Bakufu requested Sūden to compose a 
law forbidding Christianity in Japan (commonly known as 伴天連追放令 
jp. bateren tsuihōrei). Legend has it that Sūden drafted its text overnight. 
The idea for such measures did not come overnight. In the past, various 
scandals such as the Madre de Deus/Nossa Senhora de Graça incident of 
1608/9, when the Portuguese attacked a vermillion-seal ship, or the Oka-
moto Daihachi incident, or the incident in which the last Christian daimyō’ 
Arima Harunobu fell into disgrace with the Bakufu for bribery stimulated 
anti-Catholic sentiments.203 In their totality, they affected the nature of 
foreign relations and in particular maritime trade with the Spaniards.
In the long term, Hispano-Japanese bilateral endeavours of the early 
seventeenth century hardly accomplished anything on the state level. Yet, 
despite meagre results, Hispano-Japanese off icial relations show a variety 
of remarkable accomplishments on the micro level. The majority of contacts 
happened during Ieyasu’s lifetime when no embassy was turned away, as 
Adam Clulow remarked.204 The tone in formal correspondence also differed 
203 For Christianity in Japan see Takase (2002), Kirishitan jidai.
204 Clulow (2014), Company, p. 51: ‘Incoming letters that failed to meet the Tokugawa conven-
tions were rejected out of hand while embassies dispatched by rulers with unsettled claims 
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from that of Hidetada and Iemitsu (in off ice 1623-1651), who set more rigor-
ous standards after Ieyasu’s death in 1616. Hidetada’s distinction between 
trade and diplomacy reflects in his strategic dismissing of earlier diplomatic 
advisors such as Itami and Matsudaira, who had been involved in foreign 
trade. Once Hidetada exclusively controlled foreign relations, true anti-
Spanish sentiments surged and became visible in off icial correspondence 
with Manila. Analysing Tokugawa foreign affairs during Hidetada’s term 
as Shogun (1605-1616) we discover that no other country received as many 
letters as Luzon.205
to legitimacy were stopped at Japan’s borders and sent back without an answer.’ As happened 
to Siamese embassies, Jan Nuyts, envoy of the Governor General of Batavia in 1627, and the 
delegation sent by the King of Portugal in 1644. For the latter, see Boxer (1979), Portuguese 
Embassy, p. 205.
205 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki no gaikō; The turning point for direct relations with Spain 
coincided with Diego de Santa Catalina’s visit to Japan.
5 Local and Central Dualism
In the last chapter I portrayed the off icial diplomatic framework for the 
sake of contextualising Manila-based foreign affairs. Foreign relations 
doubtlessly shaped Manila’s early modern development but they often 
existed parallel to private unoff icial encounters. Such unoff icial exchange 
– sometimes in competition with the central government – constituted 
the bulk of early modern cross-cultural contacts and had a far greater 
impact on Manila’s economic and political reality. To be more concrete, 
early Hispano-Japanese diplomatic relations were not initiated by the 
central authority but by local powers and a variety of actors. At the end of 
the sixteenth century Kyushu daimyō were still largely at odds with the 
central elite. Fearing to be cut off from maritime trade they clandestinely 
courted foreign powers. Prof its from maritime trade would eventually 
increase their stance inside Japan. The Matsura of Hirado were the Bakufu’s 
f irst obvious rivals in this respect. By far the largest number of Spanish, 
Japanese, and Chinese ships from Manila called at Hirado around 1600. 
Exchange between colonial off icers with local lords differed both from 
official diplomatic exchange between central authorities (in Beijing, Kyoto/
Osaka/Edo and Valladolid/Madrid/Seville) and from communication with 
private merchants.
Supposing that the key to understanding triangular relations lies in 
disentangling central from local factors, then state formation processes 
and other formative developments will have to be taken into considera-
tion. If we consider the pre-modern state as an actor, we need convincing 
answers to this question: For what purpose and to what extent would 
a central government intervene in functioning patterns of maritime 
commerce and why? Naturally all parties engaging professionally in 
trade had a strong interest in making prof its and therefore based their 
economic decisions on the prevailing circumstances. Considering each 
party’s exact expectations and aspirations helps to reset some of my 
earlier conclusions and to restate them in greater detail. Central gov-
ernments’ intervention ranged from institutionalising, and restricting 
measures and usually occurred when private foreign trade was prof itable 
enough to change a state’s political economy. Thus, the ups and downs of 
Manila-centred triangular relations were not simply a ‘clash of European 
mercantilism with oriental despotism’, as Patricia Carioti once put it.1 
By the mid-sixteenth century, all three countries saw the emergence of 
1 Carioti (2007), ‘International Role’, p. 39.
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state-sponsored enterprises in the shadow of private maritime initia-
tives. When government off icials unhesitatingly abused the intellectual 
property of generations of free-spirited seafaring merchants for introduc-
ing ambivalent control and trade restrictions, tensions were a logical 
consequence.2
Yet, when studying the history of political economies, scholars have 
focused primarily on central powers and the importance of structural 
developments. The majority of these studies have failed to understand 
local and central performances in foreign exchange as connected, mutually 
inspired processes. State and private actors are conventionally placed in 
opposition to each other.3 Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, who 
denied the existence of a global market and an integrated world economy 
prior to the nineteenth century, for instance, argued that there would have 
been a bigger trade boom without the state.4 That would probably have also 
been true for early modern Manila but it does not seem the most relevant 
question in the context of triangular relations. It is more important to de-
centre the state by looking at connections between individuals and groups 
operating beyond state control, while still being indirectly encouraged by 
it. Recent scholarship on maritime politics in Asian waters has picked up 
that approach. The works of Zhao Gang and Cheng Wei-chung explored how 
maritime enterprises outside state control not only dominated import and 
export channels in Southern China but also challenged the Ming and Qing 
courts to react.5 Hence, the Qing opening to the ocean, to use Zhao’s terms, 
is just one example for the logical consequence of reciprocal central and 
local initiatives.6 It would be wrong to view the decisions of early modern 
entrepreneurs from a solely economic perspective of prof it seeking, even 
though profit-related aspects were overwhelmingly assertive. Such a nar-
rative casts aside any political aspect of commercial networks in the China 
Seas.
2 Many historians have discussed the role of mercantilism in Spain and reached controversial 
conclusions. Focusing on arbitirastas, actors, and agencies Regina Grafe most recently stressed 
the notion of contractual monarchy in early modern Spain. See Grafe (2014), ‘Polycentric States’, 
pp. 242-244; Other studies include Kamen (1993), Crisis and Change; Smith (1971), ‘Spanish 
Mercantilism’, pp. 1-11.
3 Flynn, Giráldez (2008), ‘Born Again’, p. 382.
4 Williamson, O’Rourke (2002), ‘When Did Globalisation Begin?’, pp. 23-50.
5 Zhao (2013), Qing Opening; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy.
6 Other studies on the China Seas and new research perspectives feature contributions to 
Nakajima (ed.) (2013), Namban.
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In the realm of overlapping diplomacy and trade we are well advised to 
consider Robert Hellyer’s study on local diplomatic actors of the Edo pe-
riod such as Satsuma and Tsushima, who ‘accomplished foreign relations 
in conjunction with the central Tokugawa authority’.7 Previous diplomatic 
exchange with the Spanish in Manila made use of similar intermediary 
diplomacy, as represented by various actors, including Bakufu off icials 
and senior advisors such as Honda Masazumi. Similarly, Spanish negotiat-
ing practices rarely distinguished between central and local authorities. 
Hellyer’s study demonstrates that foreign relations were divided among 
several actors and included ‘multiple voices and agendas which went 
beyond a single and commonly held ideology of seclusion’.8 The early years 
of relations with Luzon show clearly how local daimyō and the Tokugawa 
equally struggled for recognition, as will be discussed in more detail as 
part of an analysis of the ‘Kanto issue’. The Tokugawa celebrated their 
f irst victory in October 1602 when the Manila Galleon Espiritú Santo was 
shipwrecked: In the course of these events, two Spaniards who had just 
arrived in Hirado from Manila (Nicolas de Cueva and Diego de Guevara) 
used a previously issued written permission by Ieyasu, as warrant against 
the local lord of the Tosa domain, Yamauchi Kazutoyo (山内一豊).9
Manila Trade-related Central and Local Dualism
If institutions really made the difference, how did they affect triangular 
relations? When focusing on the Manila system in its entirety, we note that 
institutional boundaries between local and central were often unclear. As 
we have seen, not all commercial shipping to Manila was state-sponsored. 
In fact, the several dozen Fujianese ships calling at Manila’s port annually 
were exclusively in the hands of private traders – at least as far as f inancing 
and operation were concerned. Most of them were equipped with off icial 
licences but could not count on any f inancial or legal support from the 
government. Circumstances could differ from region to region. While 
Guangdong developed a working system to control trade in Macao (and later 
Canton), Fujian’s bureaucracy f irst struggled with integrating the Manila 
7 Hellyer (2009), Defining Engagements, p. 7.
8 Hellyer (2009), Defining Engagements, p. 11.
9 Cf. Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 81. The literal proof was a letter of invitation 
stating that the Spanish galleons on route to Acapulco were permitted to land at any Japanese 
port without having to fear any harm. For the shipwreck, see Kishino (1974), ‘Tokugawa’, pp. 21-36.
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trade and later with keeping the Dutch at a safe distance.10 Simultaneously, 
the entire coastal region from Xiamen (厦門) to Ningbo experienced a sharp 
increase in private journeys to South East Asia and Japan, where many 
private merchants came to enjoy greater success than average members of 
the state-run maritime projects of Spain and Japan.11 In the case of Chinese 
maritime shipping, trade permits only served as authorisation. By contrast, 
the Manila Galleon as a state-owned enterprise – as well as the vermillion-
seal (shuinjō) – included legal protection and f inancial support. In both 
cases a central government utilised the licences to protect maritime trade 
from both domestic and foreign competition. As a system of controlling 
foreign trade it served to benefit directly from imports.12
For the macro region we may conclude that regular access to the Manila 
market led to far-reaching political changes in all three pre-modern states. 
Initiatives taken by local actors clearly outnumbered operations of the state. 
Politically and economically interrelated attitudes towards Manila differed 
largely among Chinese, Japanese, and Spanish actors and agents. Global 
players were, at the same time, local actors. On its most basic level, a ‘local’ 
actor can be def ined as counterpart of a representative of the central state. 
The latter involved rulers, government off icials, state-sponsored merchants 
and to a certain degree members of the church, whose actions, depending 
on the aff iliation and position, could be bound by instructions of the King 
or the Pope. Local actors are easily associated with liberal trade. As has been 
indicated, central and local factors often overlapped in multilayered interac-
tions. Instead of forcefully disentangling them it seems useful to consider 
hybrid existences. To name a few: regional off icials’ political initiatives 
grew due to increased foreign trade. Thus Fujian off icials, Kyushu daimyō, 
and Spanish authorities alike supported private commercial enterprises 
in Manila while – somewhat ludicrously – acting on behalf of their rulers.
In light of the strong network character of the triangular Manila trade it 
seems strange that ‘classic’ intermediaries were largely absent in the ports 
involved. With the exception of the Portuguese, who occasionally sailed from 
Manila to Hirado and Nagasaki at the end of the sixteenth century and Chi-
nese ports in the 1620s, only native merchants shipped merchandise or silver 
from Manila to their home countries. The absence of intermediaries is closely 
linked to the diversity of the trading parties operating and collaborating in 
10 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 41.
11 As discussed in the f irst chapter of Zhao (2013), Qing Opening.
12 Adam Clulow warrants against the view that the Bakufu was interested in institutionalising 
foreign trade for the sake of benef itting economically. Clulow (2006), ‘Pirating’, p. 76.
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Manila, ranging from pirate-cum-smugglers (wakō), Overseas Chinese (ch. 
huaqiao, jp. kakyō) to licensed Japanese and Chinese merchants, Spanish 
colonial authorities, and random Manila residents of the Overseas Empire. 
This is not to claim that all groups were equally strong or equally successful: 
In Manila huaqiao benefitted from their business acumen, while Mexican 
merchants held a privileged position in the galleon trade. Once Japanese 
foreign trade became restricted to Nagasaki linguistically gifted merchants 
from Southern China (some of them with links to Manila) managed to fur-
ther increase their power by serving Bakufu authorities as tsūji (jp., 通詞, 
off icial interpreters) and supervising the rest of the Chinese communities.13
Hispanic Actors and Trans-Pacific Silk Bartering
Spaniards in different parts of the empire knew about the potential riches in 
South East Asia and intended to tap into their full potential by copying the 
example of Portuguese trade in luxury goods, spices, and precious metals. 
Chinese silk was a convenient option and served the Manila Spaniards as a 
long-distance luxury commodity. While the trans-Pacific silk trade exempli-
fies triangular connected histories, it is striking that the global role of Chinese 
silk has often only been relegated to a brief mentioning. Compared to the 
attention silver has received in recent years it seems particularly imbalanced. 
Taking into account that Chinese raw silk (of which large amounts originated 
from the area around Suzhou, Nanjing, and Hangzhou next to what came from 
an indigenous production in Fuzhou) had a significant impact on the emerg-
ing Mexican and Japanese market and domestic production of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, scholars’ lack of interest is even more surprising.14 
Chinese silk cargoes to Mexico covered various kinds of manufactured silk, 
including satin, brocades, damask, coloured, light and heavy silk fabrics.15
A few decades before the inauguration of the Manila Galleon trade, 
the Overseas Empire’s sericulture and silk manufacturing had achieved a 
13 Carioti (2010), ‘Focusing on the Overseas Chinese’, pp. 62-75. Patrizia Carioti stresses the 
diversity of Chinese migrants to Japan in this period. While the bulk of late-sixteenth-century 
Chinese newcomers could be labelled low-ranking coastal ‘outlaws’, after the 1630s they also 
included refugees from educated classes f leeing the Manchu.
14 For Chinese integration into global silk trade, see Cheong (1997), Hong Merchants. The author 
examined the connectedness of European and Chinese traders in Canton at different stages in 
the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Canton trade.
15 Different types of Chinese silk imports to Manila in the 1580s are registered in AGI Patronato 
24, 66. f. 8, cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 62. They included damask, taffeta, bundled silk thread, white 
silk, brocade, raw silk, and linen. For Chinese silk and Japanese demand as understood in Manila, 
see also Morga (1890), Sucesos, p. 351.
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status as joint project between the motherland and the Mexican colony. Of 
course, under terms favourable for the producing elite in the metropolis: 
While a large amount of silk was shipped from Seville, lower quality 
products were produced locally in obrejas that traditionally catered to the 
needs of the colonial society for European clothing.16 Spain itself possessed 
one of Europe’s most important silk industries of the time. Finished silk 
products were exported from Toledo, Granada, Seville, Valencia, and Mur-
cia. At its height at the end of the sixteenth century, Toledo was reported 
to have employed some 20,000 people in the silk sector.17 Furthermore 
colonial production was partially in Castilian hands since many artisans 
from Castile did not have to pay taxes in the Americas. The church as the 
main consumer of these luxury goods encouraged the development of silk 
weaving in certain regions such as in the industrial centre of Puebla.18
Workers and brokers involved in the trans-Atlantic silk business suffered 
from the trans-Pacific silk flows: Earlier studies have revealed that prices on 
the Mexican silk market increased sharply in the second half of the sixteenth 
century. In 1579, the price of raw silk was roughly seven times higher than 
40 years before.19 Under these circumstances certain colonial entrepreneurs 
were optimistic about the prospects of the silk industry in New Spain on the 
eve of Chinese silk imports. Early profit-oriented considerations included 
sending special cargoes of Chinese silk to Peru with a possible net gain of 
2,000,000 pesos for 1000 picos of raw silk and 60,000 pieces of satin, damask, 
and other valuable fabrics.20 Collecting data from the Spanish and Latin 
American archives, Fernando Iwasaki Cauti has shed light on the different 
types and prices of Chinese silks sent on the notorious 1581 galleon from 
Manila: Silk products, including damask (in bulk), were sold for little more 
than 2 pesos and various other qualities of silk for 10 pesos in bulk.21
Many merchants in Seville, who had a monopoly on the silk trade with 
the Americas relied economically on selling silk to the colonies and thus felt 
uncomfortable about the influx of cheaper and often better quality Chinese 
16 Borah (1943), Silk Raising.
17 Cf. Israel (1981), ‘Debate’, pp. 170-180.
18 Bazant (1964), ‘Evolution of the Textile Industry’, pp. 56-61.
19 Bazant (1964), ‘Evolution of the Textile Industry’, p. 27.
20 BR 19, pp. 304-307. This report deals with speculations about the amount of money that could 
be earned from controlling trade between China and the Americas. For Chinese merchandise 
on colonial American markets, see Mazumdar (1998), Sugar and the Society, pp. 154-155.
21 Cf. Iwasaki Cauti (1992), Extremo Oriente, p. 39.
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fabrics.22 As a consequence a large group opposed the development of trans-
Pacif ic trade, as soon as imports of raw silk, silk stockings, shirts, as well as 
vestments and tapestries for churches and convents, reached the Americas.23 
Han-Sheng Chuan’s study has shown that losses in the silk industry had 
the potential of turning into a fundamental problem for the Crown.24 As 
a result of trans-Pacif ic Chinese silk imports, parts of the silk sector in 
Granada and Valencia even went bankrupt.25 When those living off Spanish 
sericulture started protesting against the influx of cheap Chinese silk during 
a period that coincided with civil protest and high military spending on the 
peninsula, the central government had to take action. Restrictions of the 
galleon trade in the 1580s and 1590s were part of early Crown intervention.26 
Given Spanish information policies it is hardly surprising that early cédulas 
sent from Madrid to Manila instructed colonial off icers on this matter. 
Increasing rivalry over profit should be controlled and curtailed.27
Silver-silk controversies of the early colonial period reflect conflicts of 
interests within the overstretched Spanish Overseas Empire. Metropolitan 
Spanish restrictions and prohibitions were probably a concession to Philip 
II’s newly acquired Portuguese vassals, who saw their privileged position 
in Macao at stake.28 During these early decades of trans-Pacif ic trade, the 
Viceroy of Mexico remained the driving force in promoting the China trade, 
despite protests from his own people. When the Spanish settlers of the 
22 García Fuentes (1980), Comercio español, speaks of a collapse of the Castilian and Andalusian 
silk centres. Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 30.
23 See Ho (1994), ‘Ceramic Trade’. Art historians have made important contributions in that 
f ield. The Metropolitan Museum of Art has even dedicated a small collection to Manila Galleon 
artefacts, including Chinese ceramics and Sino-Chinese sacral art, http://www.metmuseum.
org/toah/hd/mgtr/hd_mgtr.htm (accessed 20 November 2013). The mantón de Manila, still part 
of f lamenco, is in fact a token of Sino-Spanish cultural transfer. The silk shawls are traditionally 
decorated with f loral motives. Chinese landscapes are not uncommon either. A particularly 
fascinating example from the early nineteenth century can be admired in the Museo de Artes 
Decorativos in Madrid, labelled ‘¿China o Filipinas?’ See also http://www.passimblog.com/
de-china-a-sevilla-pasando-por-manila (accessed 27 February 2013).
24 Chuan (1975), ‘Chinese Silk’, pp. 241-260.
25 AGS PTR. LEG. 89, doc. 298, ‘Memorial del Reino pidiendo la prohibición de la importación 
de seda de China y Persia’, August 1617.
26 BR 8, pp. 316-318.
27 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 3 (1577).
28 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 113. A Manila Galleon – directed by Francisco de 
Mercado – stranded in Nanao, an island of Guangdong close to the borders with Fujian in 1583. 
For a comprehensive list of all Manila Galleons including their arrival dates see http://docs.
google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxtYW5pbGFnYWxsZW9
ubGlzdGluZ3xneDoxNzhiZWQ3NDkzNjEwNTA3 (accessed 7 June 2014).
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Philippines petitioned the King in Spain to order the Viceroy of New Spain 
to prohibit trade with the Philippines because of a disturbing silver drain 
to China, the latter, Alvaro Manrique de Zuñiga (r. 1585-1590), wrote a very 
convincing plea in favour of sustaining shipping silver to the Philippines.29 
Yet the situation was more complex. A 29-point declaration of the Council of 
the Indies regarding the future of the Manila Galleon trade in 1586 reveals 
that the secretary of the council was in favour of the Philippines. This means 
that even in Spain a pro-Philippine party, interested in liberal trade with 
China existed, just as it did in Mexico and Manila.30 It also means that the 
gap between theory and reality widened, while debates about abolishing 
trade with China became increasingly complex.31
29 BR 6, pp. 279-280.
30 Cf. Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, p. 115.
31 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 
1587.
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Probably the most interesting feature of the 1593 restrictions was an attempt 
to protect the profits of the Manila Galleon trade ‘from above’.32 That year, King 
Philip II commanded that his vassals should no longer go to China to buy mer-
chandise, but that Chinese were to come at their own risk to Manila.33 Chinese 
merchants were officially prohibited from travelling to Mexico. Robert Reed 
has argued that all these regulations ‘gradually led to a highly institutionalised, 
closely supervised, and extremely restricted trade’.34 Indeed, we have seen 
that prices for selling goods in Manila were fixed and defined in advance by 
means of the pancada system until 1600.35 However, evidence for exactly the 
opposite exists. First, taxes and customs led to different prices and profits for 
each trading party. Second, non-Crown merchants soon strengthened their 
grip on lucrative overseas commerce.36 Within a few years, Mexican merchants 
(mercaderes de plata) dominated the silk trade.37 In that function they com-
peted with Seville-based companies as well as common traders in Manila. 
The effects of Sino-Mexican exchange were indeed problematic for Manila: 
Neither members of the indigenous population nor ordinary Spanish citizens 
(vecinos) were no longer able to purchase silk products. Since the limited cargo 
space on the Acapulco-bound galleons was largely reserved for silk, Manila 
merchants became entirely excluded from trans-Pacific commerce.38 Hence, 
the royal government responded by restricting participation in trans-Pacific 
trade to those Spaniards from Mexico who were willing to settle in Manila 
for at least ten years.39 In addition the Governor designated oidores to inspect 
outbound ships in order to minimise smuggling and to protect passengers 
against ill-treatment.40 It was a half-hearted attempt that above all encouraged 
contraband trade and corruption. Many merchants soon circumvented Crown 
intervention by bribing officials or forging cargo registers.41
32 AGI Filipinas 339, l. 2, ff. 70r-71r, ‘Orden al Virrey de Perú sobre prohibición de comercio’, 
11 January 1593.
33 BR 25, p. 137. 
34 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 30.
35 AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 2, n. 4, ‘Carta de G. P. Mariñas sobre oposición a la pancada’, 31 May 
1592. AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 2, n. 9, ‘Carta de G. P. Mariñas sobre Pedro de Rojas’, 6 June 1592. 
36 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, endnote 19.
37 Lockhart, Schwartz (1989), Early Latin America, p. 152. 
38 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 30 (1589).
39 Ibid.
40 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 158.
41 A galleon merchant’s account neatly summarises the enormous prof it margin of the early 
years: ‘[T]wo hundred of ducats in Spanish commodities and some Flemish wares which I carried 
with me thither [to Manila] I made worth 1,400 ducats there in the country. So I make account 
that with those silkes [sic!] which I brought with me from thence to Mexico I got 2,500 ducats 
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Han-sheng Chuan demonstrated that in 1620, one picul of raw silk was sold 
in Manila for 200 pesos (approximately 3.3 pesos per kg) while the price for 
the same picul was 1950 pesos in Lima.42 He further estimated a 100 to 300 
per cent average profit margin for silk sent from Manila to the Americas.43 
Fear that Chinese goods would swamp the American markets remained alive 
until the late seventeenth century. Even if royal trade monopolies limited 
opportunities of the Manila market, regulations to prevent the develop-
ing maritime linkage between Peru, Macao, and the Philippines, failed to 
intercept Peruvian traders’ commercial participation in Asian trade or other 
forms of competition.44 In terms of the Manila system private Mexican and 
Fujianese merchants’ activities were influential enough to cause social 
change and economic liberalisation in Acapulco, Mexico City, and Puebla.45
Japanese Silk Imports and Macro-regional Consequences
Contemporary visitors from the West detected a silk addiction in Japan and 
observers like Richard Cocks, head of the EIC (English East India Company) 
trading post in Hirado, complained about the Japanese lack of interest in 
wearing broad cloth.46 Fernando de Silva (r. 1625-1626), Governor of the 
Philippines, remarked in 1626 that the Japanese could not live without 
it.47 And still, Japanese shipping to Manila decreased in the second half of 
the 1610s, while Japanese domestic silk production only increased slowly 
in the 1620s and 1630s.48 Despite a thousand-year-old history of wearing 
with the voyage, and had gotten more if one packe of f ine silkes had not been spoilt with salt 
water.’ Cf. Regidor, Jurado, Mason, ‘Commercial Progress of the Philippines’, p. 10.
42 Chuan (1975), ‘Chinese Silk Trade’, p. 256.
43 Chuan (1975), ‘Chinese Silk Trade’, p. 256.
44 AGI Filipinas 339, l. 2, ff. 70r-71r, ‘Orden al Virrey de Perú sobre prohibición de comercio’, 
11 January 1593. BR 25, p. 137. Despite the 1593 regulations the two Peruvian traders, Juan Solís 
and Eduardo Antonio, were still active in Macao and Japan in 1597.
45 Slack (2010), ‘Sinifying New Spain’, pp. 7-34.
46 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 259 (13 November 1613). For the English trading post in Hirado, see 
Fujino (1985), Kyūshū to gaikō, pp. 129-161.
47 Juan de Silva commented on Japanese merchants’ eagerness to buy Chinese silk as follows: 
‘Los japoneses – que no pueden pasar sin seda – han de venir por ella a nuestro puerto trayén-
donos la plata: somos dueños de todas sus contrataciones, Siam, China y Cambodia habiendo de 
pasar por este Estrecho, y así estimarán nuestra amistad y se abriría la puerta a la conversión, 
principalísimo f in de V.M.’ AGI Filipinas 21, r. 10, n. 47, ‘Carta al Rey de D. Fernando de Silva, 
governador de las Islas Filipinas, dando cuenta de la jornada que D. Antonio Carreño de Valdés 
hizo a la Isla Hermosa’, 30 June 1626. Cf. Borao et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, p. 82.
48 For more detail on Japanese silk weaving, see Jansen (1992), China in the Tokugawa World, 
p. 17.
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silk kimonos, sericulture and mulberry growing, Japanese domestic raw 
silk production remained inferior to Chinese products both in quality and 
quantity. The importation of Chinese raw silk was therefore vital to the 
Japanese economy, politics, and culture. The flourishing silk weaving in 
Nishijin (西陣) in Kyoto, for instance, which served the imperial court and 
the warrior class, was heavily dependent on damask silk and white silk 
imports from abroad.49
With regard to the profitable exchange of Japanese silver and Chinese raw 
silk, the Japanese historian Nakajima Gakushō has re-emphasised impressive 
gains made by Chinese and Japanese pirate-smugglers in the late sixteenth 
century before Portuguese intermediaries institutionalised silver-for-silk 
exchange between Macao and Nagasaki in 1580. Nakajima has furthermore 
pointed out that both the Ming and the Toyotomi regimes failed to reap direct 
profits from this exchange of the most precious commodities of their coun-
tries.50 Nakajima indirectly suggests that the lack of regulating mechanisms 
in the second half of the sixteenth century, such as laws that defined and 
institutions that supervised commercial exchange, harmed the pre-modern 
economies of China and Japan. Once private Chinese and Japanese merchants 
found a safe haven for direct exchange in Manila, the Toyotomi regime and 
the Ming continued to be excluded from the profits made there. Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, however, had an explicit interest in monopolising silk imports and 
soon took measures to control foreign trade by issuing licences and after 1589 
he became the largest investor in silk-silver exchange.51 Engaging with the 
Portuguese of Nagasaki and negotiating with the envoy from the Governor 
of the Philippines, Pedro Bautista, in 1593, Hideyoshi’s understanding of 
overseas trade developed and ultimately explains his obsession with the 
cargo of the capsized galleon San Felipe at the end of 1596.52
As for the confiscation of the cargo of the Spanish trading vessel 1596/97, 
the Tsūkō Ichiran reports of namban goods that were stored in Hideyoshi’s 
depots in Osaka while the ship was repaired.53 One of the Japanese interpret-
ers claimed that the Castilian captain wanted to bestow the cargo of his 
ship to Hideyoshi.54 We know today that the rich cargo, of which the value 
exceeded 1,000,000 pesos, helped to f inance Hideyoshi’s last desperate 
49 Hayami (2004), ‘Introduction’, p. 16.
50 Nakajima (2009), ‘Portugarujin’, pp. 41-81.
51 Cf. Iwao (1958), Shuinsen, pp. 14-15; Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, p. 18.
52 Igawa (2010), ‘Sei Pedro Bautista’, pp. 25-44; Álvarez-Taladriz (ed.) (1973), Relaciones.
53 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/567.
54 The freight was later distributed among nobility and allegedly even the tennō received some 
items.
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military interventions in Korea.55 Silk was the main reason for friction 
between different agencies. Thus what happened after the shipwreck of the 
San Felipe was essentially a continuation of Hispano-Japanese bargaining for 
Chinese silk. What has often been overlooked is the geographical surround-
ing – the Spanish ship capsized in Shikoku (Tosa), a region infamous for 
wakō operations. Unlike Kyushu, however, Shikoku domains never became 
integrated in namban trade. Hence we have reason to believe that local 
interest motivated the local daimyō Chōsokabe (長宗我部) to take advan-
tage of the helpless Spaniards after being stranded in Urado (in present-day 
Kōchi).56 The Jesuits’ inglorious involvement in the events moreover hints 
at economic rivalry. The Portuguese, who objected to Japanese-Spanish 
trade, were clearly intimidated by the voluminous silk cargo of the Manila 
Galleon and feared that oversupply would cause prices to fall.57 We may 
conclude that the San Felipe incident was neither religiously nor geopoliti-
cally motivated. It was the result of ‘connected’ economic Luso-Castilian 
and Sino-Japanese competition, which testif ies to the huge quantities of 
Chinese silk being sent to the Americas.
In light of escalating Hispano-Japanese relations one tends to agree with 
Lothar Knauth, who concluded in the 1970s that it was a mix of military 
and commercial interests among the daimyō that guided the Japanese 
southwards.58 As a consequence of Japan’s growing silk trade, the position of 
Chinese traders in Hirado and Nagasaki became increasingly important at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century. A pragmatic Tokugawa Ieyasu then 
insisted on a concentration of Chinese trading ships in Nagasaki in order to 
secure the Bakufu’s direct share in the silk trade. Chinese junk trade in Kyushu 
increased further after 1610, due to special contracts and agreements with 
private traders.59 Direct Sino-Japanese trade in Manila could no longer sustain 
the needs of the inhabitants of the island, nor of the rest of the Overseas 
Empire. In 1609, the Crown intervened. In a disposition to the Governor of 
the Philippines, King Philip III demanded that commerce and navigation 
from the Philippines to Japan should ‘be made by the citizens of the former 
55 Uyttenbroeck (1959), Early Franciscans, pp. 22-33; Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, p. 75.
56 Ubaldo Iaccarino discussed the issue in his doctoral thesis with references to the works 
of Boxer, Álvarez-Taladriz, Laures, Schütte, and Matsuda. See Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y 
Diplomacia’, p. 74. 
57 The Jesuits paid a lot of attention to the issue of conf iscation and who was to take the blame 
for the fate of the 26 Christian martyrs, as interrogations in the port of Nagasaki following the 
crucif ixions show. See ARSI Jap/Sin 32, ff. 6-40.
58 Knauth, Confrontación Transpacífica, p. 21.
59 Oka (2010), Shōnin, pp. 130-135.
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islands, and the Japanese [should] not be allowed to go to the islands’. Freight 
charges should be kept to a minimum.60 In light of Manila’s dependence on 
provision from Japan, the King’s policies did not match the colonial reality.
During the period of political tensions between Edo, Manila, Mexico, and 
Madrid shuinsen trade was partly redirected from Manila to Hoi An, Tonkin, 
and Siam. With a huge number of both resident and travelling merchants 
from coastal China, the Vietnamese port of Hoi An offered similar condi-
tions as Manila.61 After the Tokugawa’s f inal break with the Spaniards, Hoi 
An (ruled by the Nguyen dynasty) became Japan’s primary location for 
silk acquisition abroad. Between 1615 and 1633, Taiwan became another 
source to quench the Japanese thirst for Chinese silks.62 Annual shuinsen 
voyages – encouraged by Chinese traders, who had reoriented to Taiwan and 
Xiamen (Amoy) during unstable times in the China Seas when Dutch ships 
preyed on Fujianese vessels heading for Manila – added a further chapter 
to Manila’s silk narrative. Yet, while unauthorised Japanese mercantile 
activities in and around Manila continued for several years, signif icant 
price fluctuations changed the profit margin on silk yarn.63
Having said that, we should place Manila’s silk trade into an even broader 
context of global consumption and desire. In early modern Manila, theoreti-
cally everyone could afford and everyone was allowed to wear silk. This was 
not the case in Qing China or pre-modern Europe, where dress codes and a 
prohibition on wearing silk existed for certain groups, based on sumptuary 
laws. Silk was attributed to luxury, and often related to China, in most parts 
of the world and for most of the time in the history of clothing. Even the An-
cient Romans talked about the high cost of silk imports and acknowledged 
the draw of this luxury commodity. According to Pliny the Elder, Romans 
spent a hundred million sesterces annually on silks from Seres (China).64 
The example of silk consumption suggests that in Manila rules of class, race, 
and social status followed less rigid patterns than elsewhere.
60 BR 17, p. 50.
61 Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 49.
62 Cheng (2013), Trade, War and Piracy, pp. 21-24; 30.
63 Cocks (1893), Diary, p. 339: ‘Silk at present is not worth so much as it was at the arrival of 
our f leete, yet we have made away most of ours which rested, the presentes being geven out, 
and trusted it out till the next monson; as the Hollanders have donne the like.’
64 Plinius the Elder, Naturalis Historia, vol. 12, p. 84. I have been inspired by the inaugural 
lecture of Thomas Ertl at the University of Vienna, ‘Die Seidenmetapher. Fäden eines sozialen 
Diskurses im europäischen Mittelalter’, 31 October 2012.
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Private versus Shuinsen Trade with Luzon
Of all three countries, the case of Japan provides the best illustration of the 
competition between local and central actors. As we have seen, long before 
the leading Tokugawa elite organised foreign trade, regional competition 
dominated trade with Luzon. Initially, the transitional period of the Warring 
States accelerated early modern economic Japan’s decentralisation. Daimyō 
not only monopolised resources in close collaboration with peasants and 
merchants but also participated in foreign trade. Overseas silk, woods, 
spices, and ceramics offered desired revenue for local investors and enabled 
potential military ventures.65 When during the 1580s trade between Manila 
and Kyushu started to prosper, rivalry between two daimyō, ‘Don Barto-
lome’ (Ōmura Sumitada) of Nagasaki and ‘Don Agustín’ (Konishi Yukinaga), 
spread south.66 Yet neither of them understood how to benefit from namban 
trade as much as Matsura Shigenobu from Hirado did. Matsura not only 
pioneered semi-off icial Japanese trade with Luzon but also managed to 
attract all four seventeenth-century European trading nations and host 
factories of the Portuguese, Dutch, and the English during the 1610s and 
1620s.67 In addition to the events of 1584 and 1587 the Spaniards of Manila 
benefitted from the Portuguese withdrawal from Hirado following hostili-
ties against the Jesuits.68 Although Matsura was never seriously in favour 
of any Christian order, he encouraged Iberian mendicant friars to step into 
his domain.69 Another diplomatic strategy included anti-Ming propaganda, 
which he employed to persuade the Spaniards to serve as middlemen in 
the China trade.70 Matsura Shigenobu’s strategy was successful, given that 
private Spanish merchants – ironically often enlisted on Portuguese vessels 
and Chinese junks – shipped Chinese merchandise from Manila to Hirado 
during the following years.71 At the same time ships from Hirado were 
welcomed in Manila. In the trading season 1591/92 at least four private 
65 Lieberman (2009), Strange Parallels, vol. 2, p. 423; see also Miyamoto (2004), ‘Quantitative 
Aspects’, p. 40.
66 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 
26 June 1587.
67 For Hirado’s outstanding position in foreign trade, see Clulow (2010), ‘From Global Entrepôt’, 
pp. 1-25.
68 Toyama (1987), Matsurashi, p. 168.
69 See Laures (1941), ‘Ancient Document’.
70 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 32, ‘Copia de Carta de Vera al virrey sobre situación, japoneses’, 
26 June 1587. For Kyushu-Hirado relations, see also AGI Filipinas 34, n. 64, ‘Carta de Pablo 
Rodríguez sobre el rey de Firando’, 7 July 1584.
71 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 47-49.
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trading vessels from Hirado were expected in Manila. The hybrid merchant 
Silvestre Rodriguez, a baptised Japanese captain and temporary resident of 
Manila, who participated in the 1592/93 mission to Manila, led one of them.72
Another important ‘glocal player’ was Shimazu Yoshihisa (島津義久), 
daimyō of Satsuma, the leading power in Kyushu at the end of the Toyotomi 
reign. The Shimazu clan was also interested in regular trade with Luzon and 
sent vessels and letters to Manila at a time when the Matsura had already 
stopped doing so.73 Japanese researchers agree that the Shimazu’s short but 
intense participation in early modern trade in the South China Sea was 
a reaction against the unif ication process originating in Honshu.74 The 
Shimazu were eager to remain politically and economically independent 
by maintaining their hold on overseas trade. After an attempt to establish 
official relations with Fujian by exchanging gifts with the viceroys there,75 
an envoy was sent to Luzon in 1601.76 In a letter to the Dominicans of Manila, 
Shimazu Yoshimune warmly invited Spaniards to his realm. A particularly 
notable aspect of his letter is his subtle reference to his suzerainty: ‘I have 
been told by [the Japanese] living there that you are treating those of my 
kingdom well.’77 The passage indicates that the Shimazu as previous allies of 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who did not subdue to Tokugawa Ieyasu until the year 
1603, were able to carry out sovereign foreign policies behind the Tokugawa’s 
back. This further suggests that Luzon and the relations with the Spaniards 
played an important role for political transitions in Japan. However, once 
the Shimazu clan realised the limitations of private initiatives, Shimazu 
Yoshihiro (島津義弘) requested a Luzon-bound shuinjō from the Bakufu 
for merchants of his domain (藩, jp. han) in 1604; He indeed received it soon 
afterwards for a vassal called Yamaguchi.78 With regard to his aspirations 
in China, the Shimazu had to accept temporary defeat. The subservient 
status vis-à-vis the Tokugawa as tozama limited their scope for action. 
72 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 50.
73 Maehira Fusaaki applied a local-central perspective by exploring Shimazu’s trade with 
Luzon as foreign trade at the periphery. Maehira (2004), ‘Kinsei shoki’.
74 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki; Katō (1968), ‘Bahansen’, pp. 120-134.
75 Mizuno (2004), ‘China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations’, pp. 111; 116; Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki 
Tokugawa seiken’, pp. 509-510: In his f irst letter to China in 1600, Ieyasu demanded the restoration 
of tally trade. Yet, instead of personally directing his request to the Emperor, he had his letter 
signed by three daimyō (Terasawa Masanari, Shimazu Yoshihiro, and Shimazu Tadatsune) and 
addressed to the military commander of Fujian province, Mao Guoqi毛国器.
76 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, pp. 509-510. 
77 Author’s translation based on Aduarte (1640), Historia, p. 251: ‘Yo he oído que trataís muy 
bien a los que van ahí deste mi reino, y se les he dicho a los que viven en el, para que lo sepan.’
78 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, pp. 509-510.
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Indeed, the Shimazu’s position was particularly tenuous after 1600. Beaten 
by Ieyasu’s troops at the Battle of Sekigahara, Shimazu Tadatsune (島津忠恒) 
withdrew to his domain in Southern Kyushu and was thereafter – similarly 
to other tozama daimyō such as Tosa – considered a potential opponent 
to the Tokugawa’s centralisation plans.79 Once the Shimazu admitted to 
not being in a position to establish direct trade relations with the Ming, 
they focused on Ryukyu instead. Thanks to Satsuma’s exceptional role in 
foreign relations as overlord of Ryukyu after 1609, they exclusively enjoyed 
indirect access to Chinese products.80 Yet, not being entirely satisf ied, the 
Shimazu tried to circumvent the authority of the Bakufu in foreign trade in 
the years following. For instance, they widely ignored the 1616 edict that all 
Chinese ships were to land at Nagasaki and even employed their own Chinese 
interpreters thereafter.81
Spanish records allow us to contextualise the Kyushu lords’ attempts 
to maintain autonomy. Intended secret collaborations with the Spanish 
in the Philippines date back to the 1590s. Back then, the Spanish regarded 
lords from Kyushu – some of them sympathised with Christianity – as allies 
against potential military threats from neighbouring countries. Governor 
Tello informed authorities in Spain in 1598 that he was friendly with ‘several 
prominent persons’ in Kyushu. He added that ‘the one who [was] most 
friendly [was] the general of Coria [Korea], named Gentio’. Tello claimed 
that this ‘Gentio’, a ‘friend of Christians’ was close in order of succession to 
Hideyoshi. The memo ended saying that communication between Tello and 
‘Gentio’ was secret ‘being without the knowledge of the Conbaco [Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi], who is very hated in the kingdom, because of his great tyranny’.82 
Tello refers here to Katō Kiyomasa, lord of Kumamoto and one of the major 
generals in the Korea invasion, who had sent Gotō Kanbei to Manila in 1597. 
The quote indicates that Spanish off icials were not only aware of internal 
power struggles in Japan but also tried to take advantage of them.83
79 Jansen (2002), Making, p. 53.
80 For Satsuma-Ryukyu relations, see Watanabe (2012), Kinsei ryūkū; Okamoto (2008), ‘Foreign 
Policy’, pp. 35-55.
81 Hellyer (2009), Defining Engagements, pp. 46-47.
82 BR 10, p. 171. AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 146, ‘Carta de Tello sobre abandono de Mindano, embajada 
a Japón’, 23 June 1598. We have reason to believe that Tello refers to a letter he received one year 
earlier. The sender is referred to as Cata Canzuyeno Camidano (Katō Kiyemasa); See AGI Filipinas 
6, r. 9, n. 140, ‘Carta de Tello remitiendo copia de Cata Canzeyuno Camidono’, 13 June 1597.
83 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 175, ‘Copia de carta del obispo de Japón al gobernador sobre Dayfu 
Sama’, 1601. In April 1601 the Jesuit bishop of Japan sent a letter to Governor Tello reporting about 
the Battle of Sekigahara and the remaining resistance against Ieyasu (‘Dayfusama’), especially 
pointing out that opposition from Satsuma posed a major threat to the Christians there.
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Having said that, it becomes more and more obvious that Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu’s eagerness to gain control over Japan’s 
external relations and maritime trade was domestically motivated. Given 
that neither Hideyoshi’s ban on private trade in the South Chinese Sea 1588 
nor the shuinjō system managed to centralise foreign relations entirely it 
is hardly surprising that both unif iers felt uneasy about Kyushu daimyō 
who had made attempts to formalise foreign trade. Ieyasu’s petitioning of 
the Spanish authorities to report unlicensed traders so he could take the 
necessary measures was part of pursuing sovereignty on the sea.84 Rivalry 
furthermore explains the Bakufu’s hesitant behaviour regarding the daimyō’s 
participation in foreign trade. As for Luzon, Matsura Shigenobu was the only 
daimyō to obtain a shuinjō – the rest were reserved for members of wealthy 
merchant clans from Kinai (Osaka, Sakai, and Kyoto) and Kyushu.85 As a 
result, other daimyō sought to hold close ties with merchant families, such 
as Oda, Chaya, or Gotō (who sailed to Luzon in 1604) to secure access to 
the Manila market. An overview of captains and shuinjō holders involved 
in Japanese trade with Manila, painstakingly collected and generated by 
Ubaldo Iaccarino, reveals that over the first year of shuinsen trade, all official 
Japanese shuinjō captains were private Japanese seafarers with Spanish or 
Portuguese aliases, but probably not Christians; this pattern changed and 
leaned more towards the participation of Christians in years to come.86 
Some of them acquired enough wealth to support local construction work 
in Japan, others held important administrative posts that secured their 
influence on foreign affairs by receiving foreign envoys and or assisting 
with diplomatic correspondence. In her study on the impact of Luzon on 
the Tokugawa politics of national seclusion, Shimizu Yūko distinguishes 
between public and private Japanese trade with the Castilians between 1586 
and 1625. Furthermore, she points out that these two forms did not influence 
each other, for they never existed simultaneously.87 Spanish sources, however, 
frequently refer to private Japanese traders operating in Manila, even after 
1604.88 It suggests that loopholes continued to exist. Shuinsen traders did not 
refrain from doing business on the side. Miguel Iloya (a Japanese merchant), 
84 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/570 (1602): ‘What [I] tell your country, in case 
illicit [ayashii] traders from Japan are spotted along the Philippine coast, take their names, 
create a list, and forward it to [Ieyasu], who will take necessary measures. The Spanish should 
not trade with bad people, not even if they are equipped with a [trading] permit!’
85 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, p. 511. Merchants from Hakata were also among them.
86 Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 117.
87 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 309-313.
88 Kondō (1983), Gaiban tsūsho, p. 176.
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for instance, sold mirrors and bells to the value of 1194 pesos.89 Another Japa-
nese vermillion-seal captain, Luis Melo, invested private money in Manila.90
Table 5 Japanese Ships to Luzon91
Year No. of Ships Year No. of shuinsen
1567 1 1604 4
1572 1 1605 4
1575 1 1606 3
1580/81 unknown 1607 4
1582 12 1609 3
1585 1 1610 2
1586 1 1611 2
1587 1 1612 1
1589 1 1613 1
1590 1 1614 4
1591 1 1615 5
1592 1 1616 1
1593 5 1617 1
1599 ≤18 1618 3
1600 2 1619 1
1601 1 1620 2







Private merchants’ fate in local-central competition is vividly reflected in 
the trade of earthenware from Manila to Japan. In the 1580s, some Japanese 
who discovered old Chinese earthen vases in Manila recognised these 
clay jars’ value for the tea ceremony (茶の湯, jp. chanoyu), which enjoyed 
89 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 335-336. Sebastian Ciomon sold 25 tinaja of biscuits for 3 pesos each 
and earned a total 525 pesos in gold.
90 BR 20, pp. 232-233; Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, p. 665. A Japanese merchant, 
f luent in Spanish, called Nishi Luis, a Christian who spent several years in Manila before he 
moved back to Sakai in 1614, from where he continued to travel to Luzon, is a further example. 
See Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 119. Other shuinsen traders include the Chaya family in Kyoto 
and the Hasegawa family of Nagasaki. See Nagazumi (2004), ‘Ayutthaya’, p. 242.
91 Source: Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 49; Shimizu (2010), ‘“Sakoku”‘, p. 139. 
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major popularity within a sophisticated bushi culture. These jars became 
known as luson tsubo (呂宋壷). Wealthy Japanese, including Toyotomi 
Hideysohi, spent substantial sums on utensils for tea consumption. Those 
clay jars, which were believed to be a rare kind that made storing teas for 
several years possible, were no exception.92 Thus when the private Manila 
merchant Naya Sukezaemon (納屋助左衛門), sometimes referred to as 
Ruzon Sukezaemon, shipped a considerable number of tsubo back to Japan 
in the early 1590s he caught the kanpaku’s fancy. Hideyoshi ordered that all 
tsubo had to be sold to his agents in Nagasaki.93 The future Bakufu became 
involved in the year 1599, when private merchants operating on behalf of 
the Shimazu brought back a cargo of 121 tsubo from Luzon; the daimyō of 
Satsuma sent the entire cargo to Ieyasu, who acted as if he had inherited the 
monopoly on tsubo trade from the Toyotomi regime. Thereupon Tokugawa 
Ieyasu banned Satsuma’s trade with Luzon and in tsubo.94
When the Tokugawa demanded the leading merchants of Kyoto, Sakai, 
and Nagasaki to form a thread guild in 1604 in order to set prices for silk 
imports in Nagasaki, the local lords’ obligation to yield to the Shogun’s 
economic policies was implied. This standardisation introduced a new type 
of influential foreign trade merchants, known as goyōshōnin (御用商人).95 
Japanese silk dealers (糸年寄り, jp. ito toshiyori, high-ranking officials of the 
Shogun) bought silk exclusively from Portuguese and sometimes Chinese 
brokers in bulk at a previously f ixed price before distributing it to local 
merchants. The system originally only applied to Portuguese ships from 
Macao, supervised by the Nagasaki bugyō who registered all incoming 
goods after 1606.96 The ito wappu system deprived many foreign traders 
of their foothold in the Japanese economy and asked those who were able 
to defend their position to adhere to the rules dictated by the Tokugawa. 
Price-fixing and supervision harmed the liberal atmosphere of Nagasaki and 
Manila: private merchants’ opportunities to bargain and to have contact 
92 Tokugawa (1986), ‘Luson no Tsubo’, pp. 64-65: According to art historian Tokugawa Yosh-
inobu, luson tsubo served as generic term in the sixteenth century for all Chinese tsubo jars 
acquired by Japanese in South East Asia. He furthermore criticised how media had created a 
misleading picture of tsubo trade during the time of the kingin no hibi-hype, a NHK TV series 
of the 1960s featuring the adventures of maritime merchant Ruzon Sukezaemon.
93 Cooper (1989), ‘Early Europeans and Tea’, p. 116; Hideyoshi’s obsession with the tsubo is even 
recorded in his biography, Taikō ki, f irst published in 1626.
94 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, pp. 508.
95 Yoshinaga (1972), Shiro shitamachi.
96 Gomi et al. (1998), Shōsetsu nihonshi, p. 244. In 1631 the same system was introduced for 
Chinese and 10 years later for Dutch traders. As for the position of Nagasaki bugyō, Hideyoshi 
created the position in 1592 and assigned it to the daimyō of Hizen, Terazawa Hirotaka.
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with local people decreased significantly.97 At the same time the new system 
enlarged the margin for smuggling between China and Japan. Time proved 
the success of the institution: in 1631 merchants from Osaka and Edo were 
allowed to join, while the Bakufu off icially integrated Chinese and Dutch 
merchants in 1633 and 1635, respectively.
During the early years various actors understood how to make use of 
loopholes in the system. When ships from Manila brought Chinese raw 
silk in the years 1605, 1606, and 1612, the Shogun’s merchants bought large 
amounts; brokers from Macao consequently complained about higher im-
port duties.98 Certain private merchants received orders from local lords and 
other off icials. Such tactics were by no means limited to Japan. Spanish co-
lonial off icers used to commission private Japanese, Chinese, or Portuguese 
merchants to provide certain products, such as saltpetre or gunpowder, 
from Japan. Colourful examples include the Japanese merchant Silvestre 
Rodriguez and Li Tan, later ‘captain’ of the Chinese community in Nagasaki. 
Japanese sources also mention a ‘señor’ from Luzon (呂宋ノしんによる), Bar-
tolomé de Medina, who served as a clerk in namban business transactions 
in Japan between 1602 and 1606. Cooperating with Japanese off icials, they 
all enjoyed benefits from the silk trade.99 Within this loose Manila-Kyushu 
axis, compared to Japanese and Spanish traders, unaff iliated Portuguese 
merchants probably made more money on a more regular basis. Portuguese 
residents of Manila Luis Manoel, Antonin Garces, and Jerónimo de Rocha 
were involved in Manila and shuinsen trade, and later moved to Nagasaki.100 
Official shuinsen records leave no doubt that Manila was one of the f irst and 
until 1616 a very important destination for outgoing vermillion-seal vessels, 
with a total number of 34 ships, a number only surpassed by 56 passes for 
Siam. However, after 1616 it degraded to a secondary destination in Japan’s 
foreign trade, outrivaled by Hoi An, Ayutthaya and Taiwan. 101 The Bakufu 
was directly involved in that trade by giving orders for imports.102
97 Honda Masazumi on 3 May 1604. For a copy of the original, see Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 
(2006), Nihonshi shiryō, p. 130.
98 Dainihon shiryō, vol. 12, no. 8, p. 652.
99 Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, p. 90.
100 Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p.  121; Luis Vilango in Cocks’s diary. Other 
Portuguese active in the Manila trade included Jorge Pinto Barbosa, resident of Manila, who 
travelled to Japan with Bautista; and Domingo Pérez (Pires), native of Macao, as well as Vasco 
Diaz.
101 Nagazumi, Shuinsen, pp. 41; 48; Nagazumi (2004), ‘Ayutthaya’, p. 248.
102 Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. 88.
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Along with a decline in private trading operations in the China Seas, mu-
tually benefitting relations with the Iberians started to soar to some extent. 
Controversies increased once the Japanese stood up against the latter. A 
particularly startling incident involved Arima Harunobu’s vermillion-seal 
ship and Portuguese merchants. After becoming stranded in Macao on its 
way back from Cambodia in 1608, its crew got caught in a quarrel with the 
Portuguese and one Japanese crew member was killed.103 Since the captain 
of the vessel carried a shuinjō the insult meant infringing the sovereignty 
of the Shogun, the Bakufu willingly approved retaliation: When the annual 
carrack from Macao arrived in 1610 in Nagasaki, Arima forces destroyed the 
Portuguese vessel Madre de Deus.104 Following the harsh Japanese reaction 
the surprised Portuguese from Macao ratif ied a statement by the Nagasaki 
bugyō forcing them to renew annual commerce on terms dictated by the 
Japanese.105 The incident illustrates the Bakufu’s growing awareness of supe-
riority and was a clear turning point for relations with all Europeans. With 
regard to the Spaniards in Luzon, the Japanese side became increasingly 
suspicions not least because of their solidarity with the Portuguese. Twenty 
years later the Spaniards confirmed Japanese suspicions when assisting 
the Portuguese in a strike against Japanese vermillion-seal traders in Siam.
The shift of control over maritime trade from the periphery to central 
Japan was all but smooth. In his f irst letter to Manila, Ieyasu already 
specif ically invited the Spaniards to send ships to Uraga in Kanto, as part 
of his strategy to turn the region surrounding present-day Tokyo into a 
centre of maritime trade. Yet his plan did not materialise. Against Ieyasu’s 
express wish, Spanish ships continued to land in Kyushu instead of Uraga: 
not for political reasons but rather because of force majeur, in terms of 
insuperable currents. Willing to comply with the Japanese ruler’s demand 
Governor Pedro de Acuña, for instance, dispatched a small galleon, the 
Santiago el Menor, to Kanto in 1602. After an unsuccessful struggle against 
unfavourable winds, the vessel eventually landed in Hirado.106 After Acuña’s 
second attempt of 1603 failed as well, Ieyasu impatiently insisted on an 
explanation. When in 1604 still no Spanish ship had landed in Kanto he 
urged the Franciscan friar Diego Bermeo to investigate the Governor’s 
103 See Boxer (1963), Great Ship, pp. 77-78.
104 See also Clulow (2010), ‘Maritime Violence’, p. 84. In 1610, Arima’s troops attacked the 
Portuguese vessel (Nuestra Senhora da Graça) of Andrea Pessoa and destroyed it on behalf of 
Tokugawa off icials.
105 Murakami (ed.) (2005), Ikoku nikki shō, pp. 54-57.
106 Cf. Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 5, p. 17; Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 450.
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position.107 Yet it could not be helped, not even when a letter of Shogun 
Hidetada made very clear that ships from Luzon were only to enter other 
Japanese ports when bad weather impeded a passage to Kanto.108 By the 
time a ship from Luzon eventually landed in Uraga in 1608 the Bakufu had 
already successfully channelled overseas trade profits via their privileged 
merchants to Edo.109 The Tokugawa elite had abandoned the idea of turning 
Uraga into an international port despite Northern European merchants’ 
efforts in receiving permission for a stronghold in the vicinity of Edo. Unlike 
a few years earlier in the case of the Spaniards, the Bakufu encouraged 
neither the Dutch East India Company (VOC) nor the English East India 
Company (EIC) merchants to opt for Uraga. On the contrary, the English 
had to open their factory in Hirado against William Adams’s insistence on 
Uraga.110 When between 1610 and 1615 delegations to and from New Spain and 
Europe respectively left from and landed in Uraga, the port experienced a 
short period of international shipping.111 Yet at that time, the more glorious 
days of Hispano-Japanese cooperation were already over.
Competition between Beijing and Fujian
Dialectics between central and local actors were not confined to the fledg-
ling Tokugawa Japan but also a feature of dualism between the off icial of 
the unoff icial in Ming China. Merchants, who left their native soil, became 
frontier traders, often linked by a common language, culture, and religion. 
We have reason to believe that the frontier traders, usually embedded in 
a clan system, whose networks were introduced elsewhere in this book, 
obeyed internal rules.112 In the context of the Manila system Chinese dual-
ism hindered both institutional transformation and reinvesting in the home 
economy.113 The differences between Beijing’s off icial policies and actual 
circumstances in coastal regions were, due to disintegration, bigger than in 
107 AGI Filipinas 79, n. 47, ‘Carta del franciscano Diego Bermeo sobre Japón’, 23 December 1604. 
108 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 179/574.
109 Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, vol. 1, p. 450.
110 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, p. 506. The Bakufu’s decision to give up Kanto as 
the centre of maritime trade is striking. It seems a contradiction to assign the small Kanto-based 
peninsula of Miura to William Adams, designating the latter pilot of Miura as a countermeas-
ure to Portuguese black ships’ frequenting Kyushu. See also Tokoro (1989), Komonjo, vol. 6, 
pp. 168-169.
111 Gomi et al. (1998), Shōsetsu nihonshi.
112 Kishimito (2012), Chiiki shakairon, pp. 19-25. Kishimoto Mio has pointed at similarities with 
the system of Magreb traders described by Avner Greif.
113 Chang (1990), ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, p. 74.
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Japan or even Overseas Spain. In 1979, John E. Wills explored this issue in an 
influential paper, arguing that China’s maritime zone remained peripheral 
because of the limited opportunities for positive interaction between profit 
and power at the state level. He claimed that ‘Luzón and Taiwan [were] only 
marginally attractive as entrepôts and sources of a few mineral and other 
natural products, very promising for rice- and sugar-farming colonisation, 
but requiring a very substantial concentration of economic and military 
power to transport colonists and protect them from the natives.’114 Late Ming 
China’s maritime policies might best be summarised as a mix of ‘off icial 
and elite efforts’, as Roy Bin Wong has described them.115 Now, who exactly 
were the ‘Chinese’ counterparts and trading partners of Japanese private 
merchants in Luzon? Lin Renchuan’s study on maritime actors stressed 
the diversity of seagoing enterprises. At the top of his categorisation we 
f ind the feudal type, a cooperation between local nobility with the sons 
of poorer families, who were adopted for overseas trade.116 One merchant 
group equalled a lineage organisation, whose members bore the same 
surname. Merchant capital derived originally from prominent land-owning 
families who tried to monopolise great prof its by sending out relatives or 
servants. Becoming ever richer, the sons of gentry, military families, and 
merchants were able to pass the empire-wide civil examinations based on 
the teachings and interpretations of Confucius.117 Merchants also gradually 
engaged with the literati elite. The same practice eventually led both to 
‘adopting foster children’ and certain forms of slavery.118 It moreover helped 
to circumvent trade restrictions and allowed maritime China a fluid transi-
tion from maritime prohibitions (海禁, ch. haijin) to ‘liberal’ private foreign 
commerce. The second category involved trade with borrowed capital and 
rented ships.119 This practice integrated the entire region into maritime trade 
by interdependency based on the duty to pay back the loan and to declare 
114 Reprinted in Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 19.
115 Wong (1997), ‘Confucian Agendas’, p. 303, where he remarked that ‘no other state in world 
history has ever enjoyed the challenge of creating instruments of local rule over two millennia’.
116 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 186: ‘The rich and powerful families of the coastal 
region of Fukien had large seagoing vessels built illegally and provided venture capital, but sent 
their adopted sons out to sea to carry out the dangerous actual trading. Therefore we call this 
the feudal type of management.’
117 Elman (2002), ‘Rethinking Confucianism’, p. 540.
118 Ng (1983), Trade and Society, pp. 26-29.
119 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 189. The article summarises Lin’s 1980s research 
on the commercial characteristics of Overseas Chinese communities. He connected the ‘sprouts 
of capitalism’ thesis to the local gentry’s struggle against maritime prohibition. See also Lin 
(1987), Ming mo.
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goods from overseas trade.120 Finally, a third, independent type developed: 
traders who were able to engage in trade with their own capital.121
Late Ming sources show that on a local level, even government off icials 
were very much in favour of permitting controlled foreign maritime ex-
change. For the sake of preventing piracy both outgoing and incoming trade 
should be encouraged.122 Fuijianese officials and merchants took progressive 
initiatives and collaborated closely with European merchants, including 
Portuguese, Castilian, and Dutch traders.123 Next to European-dominated 
port cities, illicit trade with Western merchants centred around Penghu, 
also known as the Pescadores – a group of 36 islets off the Western coast of 
Taiwan where the Ming established a patrol post in 1597 after acknowledg-
ing it as constant target of wakō. Lured by huge benef its from overseas 
trade they not only engaged in smuggling but also benefitted from licensed 
trade agreements.124 Attitudes towards European trading partners evidently 
differed at the court in Beijing. The imperial court constantly feared foreign 
trade would corrupt the morals of ordinary merchants and government 
off icials alike. Hesitation about what arrangements should be made in 
Fujian for the Luzon fan and Japanese yi indicate that reforms in off icial 
dealings with foreigners were frequently postponed.125
It has been pointed out elsewhere that the terms ‘Chinese’ maritime 
trader or ‘Chinese’ private merchant merely serve as auxiliary terms, 
whilst categories corresponding to ‘Chinese’ only existed outside China 
at that time. Yet, neither contemporary non-Chinese writers nor Western 
scholarship have paid much attention to the diverse origins of traders from 
China. Taking regional heterogeneity into consideration makes it easier to 
comprehend why Cantonese and Fujianese merchant groups competed 
120 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 191.
121 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, p. 192.
122 Fujian authorities described in chapter 2 of Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy. The Dutch 
would be added to the list of potential threats after 1622.
123 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3169 (accessed 11 March 2014); Ng (1997), 
‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 235: In 1608, Ming local government off icials still complained about the 
dreadful dealings of the taxation supervisor Gao Cai, accusing him of f illing his own pocket’s 
with tax money amounting to 30,000 silver coins collected from illegal trade with the Dutch as 
well as people from Luzon.
124 Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 245: ‘In Luzon, skilled labor was in great demand, and the 
place attracted many Chinese migrants who could easily earn a living there with what they had 
learned at home.’ According to a Ming primary source, ‘evil people’ (chien-min) monopolised 
prof its on foreign trade because of too severe trade restrictions; Cf. Brook (2008), Vermeer’s Hat, 
p. 170.
125 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3191 (accessed 17 June 2013).
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f iercely over foreign trade.126 Accordingly, Fujianese traders (in particular, 
Haicheng merchants) tried to win the Spaniards’ favour for the sake of 
getting exclusive access to trade in Manila. Thus they actively opposed 
Portuguese competition in Manila. Even Spanish off icials recognised 
their envy, as two Portuguese vessels from Macao had arrived in Manila 
in 1587. Some of these Fujianese private traders went one step further in 
their ‘monopolising’ efforts by inviting the Spaniards to establish a similar 
settlement on Fujianese soil along the lines of the Portuguese enclave in 
Macao. Obviously a leading authority of Zhangzhou shared this view and 
was willing to issue licences for the sake of mutually safe and beneficial 
trade.127 This project never materialised due to the brisk change in the late 
1580s and early 1590s. In Yuegang a ship tax known as ‘water prohibitions’, an 
import tax (‘land prohibitions’), and ‘added provisions’, a tax levied on ships 
returning from the Philippines, were collected from incoming and outgoing 
ships. From 1594 onwards, the annual tax earnings in Yuegang ranged about 
30,000 taels.128 Nevertheless, off icial Chinese attitudes towards maritime 
trade remained unstable, regardless of a rather steady number of Fujianese 
junks calling at Manila over the decades. In 1610, the imperial government 
again tried to restrict ocean-going trade and the building of tall-masted 
ships once it came to realise that trading with Japan had become more 
profitable than business in Luzon.129 Yet this did not mean that off icially 
China approved of trade with Japan; hence a comprehensive set of imperial 
prohibitions stood in sharp contrast to regular private Fujianese journeys to 
Nagasaki.130 Chinese traders’ rights as foreign traders manifested in several 
decrees issued against the background of Japan’s demand for raw silk. In 
1616, Ieyasu stipulated that Chinese merchants were to take up residence 
in Nagasaki instead of Hirado. Yet, regardless of the port of entrance (be it 
Nagasaki, Hakata, or Satsuma), merchants on Chinese ships had to report 
126 Local competition between Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, as well as an active controversy 
over Xiamen, were further features of Fujianese trade with Manila, as Lucille Chia pointed out 
at a conference in 2011. Chia (2011), ‘Beyond the Coast’.
127 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 
1587. ‘Junto a nosotros no hacemos también lo mismo en la provincia de Chincheo de adonde 
ellos traen tanta hacienda a esta tierra que si allá estuviese españoles enviarán a esta tierra sus 
haciendas con las cuales y con las que ellos traen no sería necesario que Portugueses viniesen 
aquí.’
128 Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, pp. 196-197.
129 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3205 (accessed 17 June 2013).
130 Li (2010), Qing dai, pp. 26-27. According to Li’s list of Chinese junks in Nagasaki, between 
20 and 70 anchored each year. In some years a certain percentage was explicitly registered as 
‘Fujianese’ vessels.
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their cargo to the Bakufu, which is another indication of an increase in 
state-controlled trade.131 Although Manila lost signif icance as a triangular 
port, silver from Mexico continued to flow in: and so did Fujianese traders, 
even if in slightly smaller numbers and with certain interruptions. Hence, 
the effects of Fujianese relocation must not be overestimated. After the 
peak years of Fujianese shipping in the f irst two decades of the seventeenth 
century, anchorage gradually declined to an average of one-third.132
Maritime Insecurity and Shifts in the Manila System
Over the course of the 1610s, Dutch presence in the China Seas and Span-
ish resentment turned Manila into a focal point of maritime conflicts. 
Notwithstanding Dutch merchants’ inclination to use violence and menace 
to accomplish better trading conditions all over Asia, VOC off icials accused 
the Spanish and Portuguese of generally applying unfair means in East 
Asia in their negotiations with the Shogun.133 Indeed, the arrival of the 
Dutch brought a gradual change to the trading environment of South East 
Asian waters. The Spaniards, in turn, unrelentingly defamed the Dutch as 
pirates (corsario) whenever an opportunity presented itself.134 Maritime 
and geopolitical challenges impinged upon the initially open nature of 
Manila as a trading port. After the f irst incident, the sea battle against 
Olivier van Noort (sp. Oliver de Noord), initially opportunistic Spaniards 
restricted access to Manila in a similar fashion to Seville or Veracruz.135 
After 1609, a general feeling of insecurity spread over the archipelago and 
the Chinese coast. Maritime insecurity lasted for several years.136 In 1615/16 
a Luso-Spanish naval intervention set out for a strike against the northern 
European troublemakers who planned to construct forts around the Straits 
of Melaka. In 1616 Juan de Silva commanded a fleet to Melaka, while the 
Dutchman Joris van Spielbergen arrived off the shore of Manila. Since the 
Spanish commander Juan de Silva died at Melaka the Spanish Armada 
131 Uehara (2006), ‘Shoki Tokugawa seiken’, p. 506; Clulow (2014), Company, p. 145.
132 Chaunu (1960), Philippines, pp. 202-205.
133 Adams (1850), Memorials, p. 25.
134 Spanish propaganda in Asia frequently included the ‘corsario’ discourse during the seven-
teenth century. In addition, inter-imperial correspondence referred to the Dutch as ‘enemigo 
holandés’. 
135 AGI Filipinas 19, r. 3, n. 54, ‘Relación de Morga de la jornada del corsario Noord’, 20 November 
1602.
136 AGI Filipinas 27, n. 124, ‘Petición sobre comercio de Filipinas con China’, 21 July 1621. The 
author of the petition claimed that trade with the Chinese had already stopped for three years 
by then.
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was forced to retreat. In 1620 the Dutch attacked Manila three times and 
blockaded Cavite between January 1621 and May 1622.137
Joint Manila campaigns were feared the most. News of Dutch nego-
tiations for collaboration with Japanese or Fujianese mercenaries further 
poisoned the climate. After an unfortunate sea battle off Manila in 1618, 
the Dutch turned to the English for support.138 In a general council, EIC and 
VOC members – based in Hirado – agreed in 1620 to send ten ships.139 The 
entire project was part of a larger strategic approach that included the entire 
China Sea region. Richard Cocks (1566-1624), head of the English factory 
in Hirado, was supposed to sail to the Chinese coast in advance and look 
out for Chinese junks and take care of them.140 They failed and tried again 
in October 1621, when eight ships were sent to the ‘Manillas’, where they 
attacked passing vessels. Most of the time the Spanish eventually overcame 
the aggressors; sometimes they were supported by Fujianese maritime 
merchants.141 Nevertheless, the Manila system hit rock bottom during an 
Anglo-Dutch blockade of Manila in 1622. Fortunately for the Spaniards, an 
even larger advance failed in 1623 after Maurice of Nassau had dispatched 
13 ships to reach Manila Bay via South America. He ordered an auxiliary 
fleet from Taiwan and aimed at intercepting the galleon trade.142 Dutch and 
English practices of naval coercion damaged Iberian and East Asian trading 
nations alike, yet they did not destroy them: The VOC never succeeded 
in creating a monopoly in trading with the Fujianese, nor in keeping the 
Iberians out. Moreover, cooperation between Northern European trading 
nations was short-lived. Not only were the English reluctant to support 
the Dutch after peace arrangements with Spain, but there was also the 
f ierce rivalry between Dutchmen and Englishmen in Asian waters, which 
escalated in the Massacre of Ambon (1623), when several EIC merchants 
were executed by VOC agents.143
137 Borschberg (2010), Singapore, pp. 137-155.
138 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 171.
139 Ch’en (1968), Chinese Community, p. 126: ‘Governor Dasmariñas made every endeavour to 
build large galleys. This kind of ship was badly needed for the defence of the Philippines to replace 
lost ships, to cruise around the archipelago, to keep away the plundering English privateers and 
Japanese pirates, and thus to maintain the security of the sea routes between the Philippines 
and Mexico.’
140 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 209.
141 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 302.
142 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 36-41.
143 Borschberg (2010), Singapore, p. 61.
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In this rough maritime climate some Fujianese private maritime 
merchants accumulated large sums of silver for further investments.144 
Illegal Chinese merchant magnates such as Li Tan (李旦) or Zheng Zhilong 
(鄭芝龍) collected protection money from other Chinese merchants 
operating in the South China Sea after 1625. They were among those to 
benef it from the system the most, due to their f lexibility.145 Changes in 
maritime commerce therefore were mainly linked to the rise and fall of 
illicit merchant networks.146 Suff icient negotiating skills in Japanese and 
Portuguese enabled Li Tan to advance as sneaky maritime merchant. To 
the Europeans he became known as ‘Captain China’. The title reflects their 
respect for Li’s outstanding organisation skills and power to control.147 He 
accumulated essential knowledge in Macao and Manila, and after falling out 
with the Spaniards he cooperated with the Japanese and the Dutch. Zheng 
Zhilong (or Iquan in Dutch sources), another famous ‘Chinese pirate’, based 
in Taiwan during the late 1620s, was part of Li Tan’s network.148 Eventually, 
Li Tan, whose brother was headman of the Chinese at Nagasaki, became 
the chief of a pirate community in Taiwan, where he died in 1625.149 Having 
inherited the leading position from Li Tan, Zheng Zhilong controlled the 
already impressive number of 120 ships in 1626. In 1628 the Governor of 
Fujian estimated that the same network had incorporated up to 1000 ships.150
In terms of off icial Chinese trade policies, the Ming Court renewed trade 
prohibitions in the second half of the 1620s as a reaction to the aggressive 
forms of trade utilised by the Dutch and an increase in smuggling.151 With 
regard to Japan it is noticeable that trade with the Japanese on a local level 
was not affected. As indicated earlier, private merchants and captains kept 
their business deals with Nagasaki, including Chinese residents there. It is 
moreover noteworthy that local authorities did not consider the Japanese 
in Manila as enemies. Although the ban on maritime trade was reimposed 
at the end of the Ming period, Manila re-emerged a popular destination for 
Fujianese traders after an off icial relaxation of this policy in 1631.152 During 
144 According to Deng (1997), Chinese Maritime Activity, p. 101, ‘ultrafamily business organisa-
tions’ were Chinese maritime merchants’ the key to success.
145 Borao et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, p. x. 
146 The maritime empire of the Zheng has recently gained attention. See among others Hang 
(2010), Between Trade and Legitimacy.
147 Iwao (1985), ‘Li Tan’, pp. 27-83; Andrade (2006), How Taiwan Became Chinese, chapter 2. 
148 Boxer (1941), ‘Rise and Fall’, pp. 401-439.
149 Cf. Slack (2010), ‘Sinifying New Spain’, p. 23; Kuwayama (1997), Chinese Ceramics, p. 16.
150 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, p. 95; Chang (1983), ‘Evolution’, pp. 289-290.
151 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 123.
152 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 124; Elvin (1973), Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 219.
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that period authorities in Manila even received a Chinese delegation, asking 
for the continuation of trade after the interruption caused by Dutch attacks 
on Chinese merchant vessels on their return trip from the Philippines.153 
A random sample of the number of registered ships from coastal China 
shows that in 1607 and 1642, 37 and 34 ships were listed respectively. Yet 
f luctuations were common: 13 ships in 1620 and 8 in 1644.154 By way of 
comparison, the number of only 3 Chinese junks in 1572 had increased 
to 20 ships in 1581.155 While Pierre Chaunu’s f igures indicate that trade 
precipitously dropped after 1640s, William Atwell denies this.156 Given 
that in 1644 the colonial government earned 113,668 pesos (18 per cent of 
the total income) from Chinese licences, a sharp drop in the number of 
incoming ships is indeed hard to imagine.157 Yet 1639 was a good year for 
the mid-seventeenth century: 34 arrivals from the Chinese mainland were 
recorded in Manila’s port registers.158 Off icially sanctioned junk trade may 
have been about half of the total. With the beginning of the Qing dynasty 
in 1644 collapse was inevitable. An average of only seven vessels reached 
Manila in the period 1644-1681 from Chinese ports, f igures that equalled 
those of the 1570s.159 In particular after 1650 the decline of trade volume 
was reflected in the decline in tax income for the colonial government.160
153 San Agustín (1698), Conquistas, p. 265: ‘También llegó otra embajada del Mandarín o Gob-
ernador de la Provincia de Tochen en China pidiendo la continuación del comercio, porque se 
había interrumpido mucho por temor de las correrías que hacían los holandeses, apresando 
los Champanes de China que volvían del comercio de Manila, que es para los Chinos el mas 
acomodado y rico, y para los españoles el más necesario por la variedad de mercadurías que 
conducen el señuelo de la plata que viene de la Nueva España que es el metal que mas estiman 
por no correr en China otra moneda, usando del precio intrínseco de este metal, sin cuño ni 
forma de moneda. Fue esta embajada bien despachada como sobre materia en que tanto se 
interesaba.’
154 Chaunu (1960), Philippines, pp. 222-225. Between 1663 and 1673, 104 registered Chinese 
vessels came to Manila; idem pp. 165, 168.
155 Cf. Ch’en, Chinese Community, 64-70.
156 Atwell (2005), ‘Another Look’, pp. 467-491.
157 Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 234.
158 Chaunu (1960), Philippines, p. 148.
159 Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 1, p. 288.
160 Chaunu (1960), Philippines, pp. 114-115; 123-125: Pierre Chaunu’s f igures indicate a signif icant 
decline in tax income from trade with the Chinese after the 1650s.

6 Local-Central Tensions
Geopolitical Strategies, Intelligence, and Information 
Gathering
Geopolitical Shifts
Over the course of the seventeenth century, politics and geopolitical motiva-
tions overshadowed functioning mercantile patterns in Manila. Yet, such 
unrest was certainly not an exclusive European import to Asia; nor was it 
the result of local Asian reaction to foreign intrusion. On a political level, 
the most outstanding accomplishment of the Manila system was Chinese 
and Japanese emancipation from aggressive European advances in the 
China Seas to that effect that the Japanese eventually dictated terms to 
the Europeans. Yet only those who could live with the new rules survived 
relatively unharmed. The Spaniards were not among them. Thus, the f irst 
part of this chapter tackles the impact of these shifts on Manila. The second 
part, in turn, pinpoints information flows within the broader Manila system 
and seeks to provide answers to the question as to what extent pre-modern 
states managed to benefit from the availability of knowledge.
China: Taiwan and the Zheng
Whereas changes in the China Seas and especially along the Fujianese coast 
and in Japan have been discussed in detail, Taiwan as a ‘backup Luzon’ 
will receive more attention below. Needless to say, explaining Spanish 
interest in Taiwan with typical conquest ideology would create a rather 
misleading picture. From the very beginning, Spanish advances were but 
economic-strategic reactions: First, to the pressure felt by Japanese advances 
under Hideyoshi and later, by the Dutch intrusion. As early as 1596, Spanish 
authorities suggested taking over Taiwan as a countermeasure against 
a suspected Japanese takeover.1 By that time, Taiwan (la Isla Hermosa, 
sp., or la Isla Formosa, pt., as the Iberians called it) was still outside the 
Chinese sphere of political influence.2 Manileños accused the Japanese 
1 Letter of Governor Luis Pérez Dasmariñas to His Majesty, 8 July 1596. Reprinted in Borao 
et al., Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, pp. 18-20. AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 7, n. 65, ‘Carta de Tello sobre 
ataque japonés a Formosa y Manila’, 19 June 1597.
2 Ng (1997), ‘Maritime Frontiers’, p. 238, states that Taiwan was ‘beyond the reach’ for the Ming.
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envoy Harada Kiyemon (原田喜右衛門) of planning to conquer Taiwan and 
feared that such a scenario would bring an end to Chinese trade in the Phil-
ippines.3 Spanish mistrust was strong after word of Harada’s participation in 
plundering Cagayan several years earlier, spread in Manila.4 Governor Tello 
(spurred on by Luis Pérez Dasmariñas’s Sino-phobic expansion mentality) 
feared an enforcement of the Cagayan-Taiwan axis and demanded support 
for a Spanish invasion of Taiwan in 1597.5 With Hideyoshi’s death the fol-
lowing year, the project became superfluous and Taiwan remained off the 
Spanish radar for more than 20 years.
The second period of Spanish Taiwan policies was even further economi-
cally motivated. In the year 1619, policymakers in Manila expressed their 
wish to circumvent Chinese taxes and to make trade with Fujian more 
profitable by establishing a trading outpost in Taiwan.6 Spanish commercial 
interest and a desire to expel the Dutch from Asia were the two strongest 
motivations behind investing in the Taiwan project. Evangelisation of the 
natives came third despite various determined endeavours. Members of the 
Dominican Order, who hoped to use Taiwan as gateway to China f irst and 
foremost pushed the ambivalent matter.7 Once the Dutch had built a small 
fortress on Taiwan and Japanese traders frequented Taiwanese ports, Span-
ish concerns about their position in the China Seas increased even further. 
Licenciado and Procurador General Hernando de los Ríos Coronel and the 
Archbishop of Manila, Don Miguel García Serrano, voiced the necessity 
of taking military steps.8 Not long after, in 1622, the Dutch built a fortress 
on the Pescadores (Penghu) with the aim of receiving off icial permission 
to trade with the Fujianese. The Fujianese Grand Coordinator negotiated 
a Dutch withdrawal from Penghu to Taiwan in 1624 in exchange for better 
trade opportunities within trade between China-Japan.9 This happening 
straight after the peak of Hispano-Dutch naval clashes in the China Seas 
the Spaniards could not afford to lose time. The King f irst nominated 
Juan de Zamudio, who had been sent to Canton by Tello in 1598, for the 
3 Reprinted in Borao et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, pp. 21-22.
4 Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 38.
5 Kuno (1940), Japanese Expansion; Pinto (2008), ‘Enemy at the Gates’, p. 27.
6 Borao et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, pp. 41-48.
7 Their attempts were harshly criticised by the Augustinians Medina (1630), Historia; cf. Borao 
et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, pp. 79, 84, 95, 114-115, 153.
8 His attitude towards the Dutch and how they should be driven away from Asia are well 
documented in his Memorials of 1621. See Crossley (2011), ‘1621 Memorial’, http://www.csse.
monash.edu.au/~jnc/Rios/1621Memorial.pdf (accessed 12 June 2014).
9 Blussé (1981), ‘Sorcerer’s’, p. 93.
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expedition to Hermosa. The arrival of Spanish armed forces in Jilong (基隆, 
also Keelung) in 1626 initiated the Spanish colonisation of Taiwan. Soldiers, 
missionaries, and a few civilians were sent to Taiwan and founded Santo 
Domingo and Jilong as Spanish settlements, administered and f inanced by 
Manila. Conversion of the indigenous and Chinese populations was left to a 
small number of Dominican and Franciscan missionaries.10 Both Christian 
and non-Christian sangleyes from Manila were involved in constructing 
the rectangular, stone-built Fort San Salvador.11 Their services fell into the 
category of paid labour, as was the case with Fujianese mariners and pilots 
who were employed for their local knowledge.12
Although the Spaniards had high hopes to channel Chinese and Japanese 
traders to their bases in Taiwan, such trade prospects proved to be disap-
pointing.13 Moreover, the location of the Spanish fortress in Jilong was all 
but ideal to attract traders from Fujian.14 Initial hopes to lure silk-hungry 
Japanese merchants into the port eventually turned into fears of attack.15 
The f irst cargo of silk and provisions brought back to Manila in 1628 was 
of inferior quality. What was more: Spanish merchants were forced to pay 
almojarifazgo for their shipments to Manila, while the Council of the Royal 
Treasury (Junta de Real Hacienda) even discussed additional transport 
duties.16 Regardless of its eventual failure and decreasing returns, the period 
until 1642 integrated Spanish Manila closer into networks of the China 
Seas: As a consequence information flows and widespread connections to 
Goa, Melaka, and Cambodia increased signif icantly. Eventually, however, 
10 Borao et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, pp. xxvii-xxxii.
11 AGI MP-Filipinas 216, ‘Pedro de Vera, Descripción del puerto de los Españoles en Ysla 
Hermosa’, 1626.
12 For the period of this study and in particular the years of trade with the Zheng, sangley 
infieles, sangleyes cristianos, and mestizos de sangleyes were recorded in large numbers. See AGI 
Contaduría 1230-1237, cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 715-723.
13 AGI Filipinas 21, r. 10, n. 47, ‘Carta al Rey de D. Fernando de Silva, governador de las Islas 
Filipinas, dando cuenta de la jornada que D. Antonio Carreño de Valdés hizo a la Isla Hermosa’, 
30 June 1626. Cf. Borao et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, p. 82.
14 VOC 1092, 1628 II, ff. 404-406, ‘A description of the fortress and the strength of the Spaniards 
in Formosa by David Pessart and Vincent Romejin. Based on the information they obtained from 
some Spaniards in Cambodia’, 10 September 1627. Cf. Borao et al. (2001), Spaniards in Taiwan, 
vol. 1, pp. 91-92. For preparations for trade with China, see ibid., p. 70.
15 AGI Filipinas 21, r. 3, n. 14, ‘Carta de Tavora al rey’, 1 August 1629, cf. Borao (2001), Spaniards 
in Taiwan, vol. 1, p. 138.
16 Cf. Borao et al., Spaniards in Taiwan, vol. 1, pp. 126-129. It happened, for instance, in 1628 to 
the vessel Nuestra Señora del Rosario in 1638. 
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f ierce Dutch harassment and the Zheng’s well-organised maritime violence 
forced the Spaniards to surrender.17
The f irst Chinese proposal for the systematic colonisation of Taiwan 
came from privateers, namely from the above-mentioned Zheng Zhilong in 
1628.18 Based in Fujian province, the Zheng clan controlled large parts of East 
Asian maritime trade from around 1627 to 1683. In addition to collaborations 
with the Dutch in the 1620s, Zheng Zhilong aimed at increasing his power 
by cooperating with Manila Chinese under his pseudonym Nicholás Gaspar, 
the Christian name he received at his baptism in Macao.19 As supreme 
commander of Fujianese military forces he worked as a translator for the 
VOC in Taiwan and after having been involved in long-distance trade in 
Manila and Nagasaki, he eventually became the new pirate chief in 1624.20
Over the course of the Ming-Qing transition of 1644, after the capture of 
Beijing by the Manchu, the Southern Ming (1644-1662) closely collaborated 
with the Zheng. In the f irst half of the 1640s, Zheng Zhilong even planned 
a formal alliance with Japan and sent his naval generals equipped with 
a letter to the Shogun. The letter was rejected by the Council of Elders 
(老中, jp. rōjū).21 A further attempt with a personal letter to the tennō and 
the Shogun was also rejected. Attempts by the Zheng to project sovereign 
power to Luzon by extending their control over the South China Sea 
brought a real change to Sino-Spanish relations and the rise to the power 
of Zheng Zhilong’s son, Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功, a.k.a. Koxinga or sp. 
Cogsen/-ia). The Zheng claimed the right to govern and administer justice 
over the Fujianese trading population in Manila. Consequent events led to 
various direct negotiations between the two parties. In 1656 two Spanish 
captains, Andrés de Ceuto and Pedro de Vera Villavicencio, reportedly even 
signed a peace treaty with a Zheng representative for which the mestizo 
sangley Miguel de Legazpi served as the interpreter.22 In 1662, shortly after 
Koxinga had ultimately defeated the Dutch, he dispatched Vittorio Riccio, 
17 Andrade (2011), Lost Colony, pp. 30-31; Andrade (2006), How Taiwan Became Chinese; For the 
Zheng maritime empire, see Hang (2010), Between Trade and Legitimacy.
18 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 215.
19 On the life of Zheng Zhilong, see Busquets (2007), ‘Los Frailes de Koxinga’, pp. 393-422. In 
Japanese his name is pronounced ‘Tei Shiryū’.
20 For Zhilong and the Dutch, see Blussé (1981), ‘Sorcerer’s’, pp. 95-99.
21 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, p. 134: Zhilong’s naval general Ts’ui Chih sent a message 
(dated 26 January 1646) to the Shogun ‘in which he solicited formal trade and military assistance 
against the Manchus’. See Hayashi, Hayashi (eds) (1958), Kai hentai, vol. 1, pp. 11-14.
22 AGI Contaduría 1233, f. 18v, cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 105.
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O.P. (1621-1685) with a letter to Manila.23 Varying relations with Zheng rul-
ers had determined Riccio’s seven years in Xiamen, before being selected 
as Chenggong’s ambassador to Manila. The bold message reminds us of 
Hideyoshi’s diplomatic strategies.24 By asking for tribute and submission 
to their sovereignty, both Hideyoshi from Japan, Zheng Chenggong and 
later his son Zheng Jing (鄭経) from Fujian/Taiwan applied a model of 
Sino-centred foreign relations to strengthen their position against internal 
and external forces. What is more, both Juan Cobo and Vittorio Riccio 
employed Dominican friars as linguists and cultural mediators.
During the Zheng’s embargo on Fujianese trade with the Philippines, 
frightened Spaniards quickly assembled military support from Mindanao 
and the Spice Islands and even improved the city walls of Manila, by means 
of forced Chinese labour. Together with the general strain, these rushed 
actions fuelled mutual ill-feelings between Spanish and Chinese settlers 
in 1662, ultimately causing the third big ‘massacre of Chinese’ in Manila.25 
Although, this time the colonial government gave the Chinese some time 
to leave the island before they took up arms. As a result, the Zheng showed 
a directness and determination in foreign relations that was unknown to 
both the Ming and the Qing. Unlike the Ming authorities after the 1603 
mutiny (tackled in detail in the f inal chapter), the Zheng vowed to avenge 
the expulsion of their vassals.26 Nonetheless, similar to previous clashes, 
peaceful relations were re-established the following year.27 After Cheng-
gong’s death Vittorio Riccio was sent to Manila a second time, yet upon his 
23 Riccio assured the Spaniards that Zheng Chenggong was indeed interested in friendly 
relations and claimed that all military forces were prepared against the Tartars and not against 
Manila: AGI Filipinas 331, l. 7, ff. 178v-179v. Riccio’s biographical data has comprehensively been 
presented by Eugenio Menegon http://ricci.rt.usfca.edu/biography/view.aspx?biographyID=1377 
(accessed 7 February 2014). See also González (1955), Misionero Diplomático. The Florentine 
Dominican Vittorio Riccio was designated for the Dominican Province Holy Rosary in the 
Philippines. He reached Manila in the year 1648 and was assigned work in the Chinese hospital 
of the parish of St Gabriel in Binondo between 1652 and 1654, where he learnt the dialect of 
Xiamen. The following year, Riccio arrived as part of a Dominican mission with four brothers 
in Fujian and settled in Xiamen, where he took care of Fujianese returnees from the Philippines.
24 AGI Filipinas 201, 85r-88v, ‘Testimonio de la respuesta de Sabiniano Manrique de Lara al 
tirano Cogsenia’, 12 July 1662.
25 AGI Filipinas 201, 1, ‘Expediente sobre el restablecimiento del presidio de Zamboanga’, 
1665/1686 (fols. 109r-111v), 30 July 1663.
26 Referring to the 1762 edition of the Hai-ch’eng hsien chih, Van der Loon stated that 80 per 
cent of those killed were from Haicheng. See Van der Loon (1966), ‘Manila Incunabula’, p. 1; 
However, Zhang Xie’s Dongxi yangkao (1618, 5.5b) does not imply that a large proportion of the 
25,000 victims came from that region. 
27 See Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, pp. 60-61.
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return to China, Zheng leadership had changed again and constant pressure 
from the Qing troops caused turbulent years for Riccio. When he ultimately 
landed on a Dutch ship in Manila, colonial authorities accused him of 
treason and banished him to life in isolation in a convent outside Manila.
After a short break in the China-Manila trade, following Zheng Jing’s 
occupation of Xiamen, the flow of goods and people between Manila and 
Fujian increased again.28 After hearing rumours about an invasion, Gover-
nor Manuel de Leon (1669-1677) sent General Francisco Enriquez de Losada 
together with two interpreters (Francisco de Mendoza and Santiago de Vera) 
to Taiwan to settle things peacefully.29 Maritime commerce recovered only 
for a short period before being restricted by the Manchu regime.
Japanese Advances in New Spain
Just as economic and geopolitical considerations motivated the Spaniards 
and the Zheng clan to improve their positions in the China Seas, certain 
Japanese parties tried to expand further into the Pacif ic. One local actor 
with a peculiar interest in the Pacif ic was Date Masamune (伊達政宗), 
daimyō of Sendai. Being one of the few non-Kyushu-based foreign players, 
he only became active in a period that marked the beginning of irreparable 
tensions between Overseas Spain and Tokugawa Japan. Date Masamune 
clearly aspired to increase the political power of his realm with the help 
of Mexican merchants and Franciscan friars. With Ieyasu’s permission, he 
sent an embassy to Mexico, Spain, and Rome.30 The project marked both the 
beginning and the end of entirely new Hispano-Japanese relations. For the 
f irst time negotiations were spearheaded by the Mexican government and 
Spain (represented by the Duke of Lerma and the Council of the Indies) and 
not the Governor of the Philippines. A Franciscan missionary by the name 
of Luis Sotelo (1575-1624) played a leading role in this plot. Driven by a strong 
desire to establish a Franciscan diocese as a stronghold against the Jesuits 
in Nagasaki he allied with Date Masamune (1566-1646). Date Masamune’s 
collaboration with Luis Sotelo resembles Ieyasu’s earliest off icial foreign 
policies. Although neither of their sovereigns was largely willing to support 
28 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 169-171.
29 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 110.
30 Gonoi (2003), Hasekura Tsunenaga. For the Hasekura mission to Spain, see also Torres-
Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, pp. clxxxi -ccxv. Original records of Hasekura’s embassy were published 
in Spain in 2012: Oizumi, Gil (eds) (2012), Historia de la Embajada.
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their projects a short-time fortune favoured Sotelo’s and Masamune’s debut 
in foreign affairs.31
As f ierce critics of the Jesuits, the Franciscan friars had been mocking 
the Jesuit method of ‘cultural compromise’ and dubious morality (due to 
their direct involvement in trade with Macao since the 1590s). But the frailes 
idiotas, as they were polemically called in disputes on Japanese soil, were in 
fact the only mendicants in Japan who imitated the Jesuit model: in order 
to get support from the influential elite and to protect their stronghold 
on Honshu, they offered help in securing trade with Manila, promised 
assistance for similar arrangements with New Spain, and even brought 
gifts. Luis Sotelo, who was introduced to Date Masamune in Kyoto in 1603 
by the Christian daimyō Gotō Joao, was the most calculating f igure in this 
regard: Close collaboration between the lord of Sendai and the Franciscan 
friar culminated in off icial permission to proselytise in Oshu in 1611 in 
exchange for carrying Date Masamune’s letters campaigning for a trade 
agreement with New Spain across the Pacif ic and the Atlantic.32 Historians 
have stressed Sotelo’s self interest in what looked like a highly professional 
act of trans-oceanic diplomacy. He ignored, for instance, a call from his 
superiors in Manila following rumours of Ieyasu’s serious resentment.33 As 
a matter of fact the f irst anti-Christians edicts, introduced in chapter 4, 
were drafted at the very time of Sotelo’s scheming.
Even if the Date/Sotelo collaboration sounds like the utopia of two minor 
players, it hit the sore spots of both the Japanese and the Spanish central 
governments. In a way it served as follow-up mission to the delegation of 
the Franciscan Alonso Muñoz as the Bakufu’s ambassador to New Spain 
and the court of Philip III in Madrid. Sending Muñoz with state letters to 
the King and Viceroy was the Bakufu’s last serious attempt to establish 
permanent relations with New Spain. We have heard that Viceroy Luis de 
Velasco arranged a mission as a token of gratitude for assisting Vivero, by 
appointing the Spanish military merchant Sebastián Vizcaíno, a famous 
explorer of the Californian Coast, as ambassador to the Tokugawa court. 
Curiously, Velasco also assigned Vizcaíno to explore the legendary ‘gold 
islands’ (Islas Rica de Oro y Rica de Plata) north of Japan.34
31 Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, pp. clxxxii-clxxxiii: The authorities in New Spain and 
Vizcaíno mistrusted Luis Sotelo profoundly.
32 Sotelo’s efforts to establish a Catholic mission in Sendai are summarised by Scipione Amati. 
Amati (1615), Historia.
33 Lach, Vankley (1993), Asia, vol. 3, book 4, p. 212.
34 The strange mission was not unnoticed by other European traders in Japan. Cocks (1883), 
Diary, p. 283. For the Spanish initiative that began with a cédula real to the Viceroy of Mexico, 
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Vizcaíno and his crew landed in Uraga on 10 June 1611. A f irst audience 
with Hidetada followed less than two weeks later. Visiting Ieyasu in Sunpu 
at the end of August, Vizcaíno received an opportunity to discuss certain 
matters directly. Matters addressed included the future of Christian mis-
sionaries in Japan as well as a trade agreement based on friendly relations, 
which implied a trade prohibition for the Dutch.35 Sebastián Vizcaíno was 
probably the worst candidate for the audiences with Hidetada and Ieyasu. 
Much in the style of Lord McCartney in Qing China 180 years later, he was 
unwilling to follow Japanese diplomatic protocol and insisted on meeting 
face to face as was the custom in Spain. Although irritated by such presump-
tuous behaviour, the Japanese eventually acceded to Vizcaino’s request.36
In November the delegation from New Spain continued their journey 
from Kanto to Sendai, from where they started their coastal expedition 
after an audience with Date Masamune. After a lengthy but unsuccessful 
expedition, Vizcaíno received word from Hidetada in September 1612: the 
Tokugawa ultimately rejected Vizcaíno’s demands and the latter was forced 
to seal a deal with Date Masamune and Luis Sotelo. Date Masamune’s vassal 
Hasekura Tsunenaga (支倉常長) would accompany Vizcaíno and continue 
his journey as the off icial envoy to Madrid and Rome. Vizcaíno’s expedition 
was a failure from the point of view of the viceregal government. Not only 
did they not f ind the Islas Rica de Oro y Rica de Plata, they also failed to 
adhere to Viceroy Velasco’s express order not to bring any Japanese to New 
Spain. The letters from the Bakufu were also a disappointment: While 
Hidetada only reconfirmed interest in direct trade with New Spain, Ieyasu’s 
did not beat about the bush regarding Japanese aversion to Christianity.37
When the Hasekura embassy reached Seville in 1614, its mayor was the 
f irst to receive gifts and a letter from the ‘king of Sendai’ (also referred to as 
see AGI Filipinas 329, l. 2, ff. 72r-73v, ‘Orden de descubrir y poblar Isla Rica de Oro y Rica de 
Plata’, 27 September 1608. Another noteworthy episode in Vizcaíno’s biography is his history 
as Manila Galleon merchant in the years 1586 and 1589.
35 For a description of Vizcaíno’s stay in Japan and an overview of the main primary sources, 
see Sola, Tremml-Werner (eds) (2013), ‘Relación’, http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/archivos/
una-relacion-de-japon-de-1614-sobre-el-viaje-de-sebastian-vizcaino (accessed 12 June 2014).
36 Sola (1991), Historia de un Desencuentro, p. 129. Some sources even suggest that he threatened 
he would return to Mexico without meeting the Shogun.
37 AGI Escritura_cifra, 30, ‘Carta original del Universal Señor del Japón, Hidetada Tokugawa 
(Minamoto Hidetada), al duque de Lerma, en la que autoriza a los navíos españoles procedentes 
de Nueva España a tocar puertos japoneses, dejando los detalles del asunto a los padres francis-
canos Fray Alonso Muñoz y Fray Luis Sotelo, que llevan cinco armaduras japonesas de regalo’, 
4 May 1610. 
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‘Rey of Boxu’).38 Further recipients of letters from Date Masamune included 
Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas (1553-1625), as the most important 
advisor of King Philip III and the Pope, who all received the ‘exotic’ envoy 
in audience. Although Date Masamune promised the conversion of his 
entire realm under the condition that direct trade was established between 
Sendai and New Spain, the King showed little interest.39 Spanish authorities 
were intimidated by the unexpected arrival of the Japanese delegation 
and wished for its speedy departure. Tensions grew along with f inancial 
concerns. Disputes about who would come up with the funding for the 
mission’s expenses soon dominated everything.40 After a journey to Rome, 
where the Japanese envoy received all possible ambassadorial honour from 
the Pope and other high-ranking church off icials, the delegation could 
f inally be persuaded to return to Mexico in 1617.41 Their onward journey 
brought them to Manila where Sotelo’s hopes for the necessary support 
were ultimately dashed.42
One may argue that the whole episode had nothing to do with Manila. But 
it did, quite simply by avoiding it. Spanish policymakers, such as Francisco 
Gómez Sandoval de Rojas, f irst Duke of Lerma, would have gone as far 
as trading the Philippines in exchange for complete peace between the 
Netherlands and Spain and direct trade between Mexico and Japan. We 
can only speculate about the incentives behind this ‘betrayal’ of the Philip-
pines.43 While Hasekura solicited closer connections between Sendai and 
New Spain and Lerma negotiated with the enemy, Governor Juan de Silva 
received the last off icial letters from the Tokugawa Bakufu in 1612 and 1613 
in Manila. In the autumn of 1615, New Spain sent one f inal mission under 
38 Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, pp. 308; 399. Ōizumi (2005), Keichō kenō, pp. 239-242. Mas-
sarella (1990), World Elsewhere, pp. 169-171.
39 Gonoi (2003), Hasekura Tsunenaga, pp. 103-107; AGI Filipinas 1, n. 172, ‘Consulta sobre regalo 
y carta para el rey de Boxi’, 1616.
40 See, for example, AGI Contratación 5352, n. 21, ‘Francisco de San Martín‘, 23 June 1616. AGI 
México 28, n. 46, ‘Cartas del Virrey Marqués de Guadalcazar’, 1 December 1616; AGI Filipinas 
37, n. 13, ‘Petición de Mariana de Espina de los gastos del embajador de Japón‘, 20 May 1615; See 
also Rodríguez-García (2005), Armas Japoneses, p. 46.
41 Gonoi (2003), Hasekura Tsunenaga, pp. 200-209.
42 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, p. 318.
43 AGI Filipinas 37, n. 46, ‘Decreto pidiendo información sobre prisioneros holandeses’, 
4 December 1616. ‘Decreto del duque [de Lerma] al marqués de Salinas para que vea el papel 
incluso acerca de la contratación de Filipinas y la Nueva España con la China’, January 1612. Sola 
(1999), Historia de un Desencuentro, pp. 134-136. The Governor, Audiencia, and the City of Manila 
opposed plans to open a direct route between Japan and New Spain 1611: AGI Filipinas 163, l. 1, 
n. 1, ‘Copia de capítulo de carta de la Audiencia de Filipinas al rey’, 16 July 1611. AGI México 24, 
n. 88, ‘Carta de Juan de Silva al rey’, 20 August 1611.
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Father Diego de Santa Catalina to the Tokugawa court.44 Yet the mission 
was no longer received by the Tokugawa in Edo; the humiliated Spaniards 
had no choice but to return to New Spain in autumn 1616, despite a viceregal 
order not to come back before meeting the Shogun.45 An impatient Date 
Masamune left the political stage after speculations of his involvement in 
a plot against the Bakufu in 1618.46 When Hasekura Tsunenaga returned 
to Japan in 1620 there was no longer mention of friendly trade relations. 
The tables had turned and the Tokugawa, as most powerful lords of the 
tenka, set the terms for diplomatic exchange. An age of more systematic 
foreign relations that left no space for improvising – one that intimidated 
the Spaniards – had begun.
Japan and the Philippines: Alienation and Its Consequences
Without doubt, Hispano-Japanese estrangement was closely connected 
to the anti-Christian propaganda and gradual restrictions on missionary 
activities. On 12 April 1612 Ieyasu forbade Japanese nationals from being 
Christians.47 Further regulations followed in 1614 and 1616. By that time, 
William Adams and EIC representatives such as John Saris and Richard 
Cocks had already successfully established an identity of an ‘anti-Catholic’ 
kingdom and explicitly fuelled anti-Iberian sentiments of the Bakufu. When 
William Adams was interviewed by Hidetada after the Dutch had taken a 
Portuguese ship on the Japanese coast in 1615, he gave a detailed account 
of European affairs, claiming that
[the King of] Spaine did think hym selfe to have more right [in these] 
partes of the world then any other Christian prince, by [reason] of the 
footing he had gotten in the Phillippinas and in other partes of the Indies, 
and thereafter per force ment to keepe all other nations from trading 
into these partes.
The Shogun naturally disagreed and on the same occasion publicly contra-
dicted the policy of enslavement upon military victory that was not only 
common among the Dutch and the Iberians but also in South East Asia.48 
44 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 274. AGI México 28, n. 49, f. 13, ‘Carta del virrey marqués de Guadal-
cazár’, 13 March 1617. 
45 Hayashi et al. (eds) (1967), Tsūkō ichiran, 185/54.
46 Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 356.
47 The original treatise is recorded in the Sunpu ki 駿府記.
48 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 281.
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When in 1616 VOC merchants suggested an attack on Luzon from Taiwan 
to expel the Spaniards from Asia, Hidetada was not ‘unwilling to listen’.49
The Spanish envoy Diego de Santa Catalina already noticed changes in 
foreign policies, and they doubtlessly worsened after Ieyasu’s death in 1616. 
Although trade was in theory not affected by anti-Christian propaganda, 
the Bakufu’s restricted European trade to Hirado and Nagasaki and hostility 
towards the Iberians increased.50 The early 1620s saw drastic confiscation 
and persecution of Catholic friars and their Japanese accomplices as result 
of centralising efforts.51 In particular, captains carrying Spaniards to Japan 
were severely punished.52 In 1621, the Bakufu prohibited the export of 
weapons and the voyage of Japanese on foreign ships. Other provisions 
were not immediately affected: In 1621 Japanese exports to Manila included 
947 bags of wheat flour (for 10,705 pesos) as well as 49,900 pieces of biscuit 
(for 12,554 pesos), soy beans, oil, and pig’s trotters.53 Yet when a Spanish 
intrigue against the Bakufu was reported in 1624, the Shogun closed all 
Japanese ports to Spanish ships.54 The last four shuinsen called into the 
port of Manila that year, while the Spanish made a last attempt in 1625.55
The signif icant decrease in trade showed the Spaniards how dependent 
they were on supply from Japan. The King and his councils belatedly called 
for maintaining secular trade relations with Japan for the sake of the islands’ 
welfare, while high-ranking Spaniards in the Philippines even displayed a 
new economic spirit by suggesting to adopt a system of port-to-port inter-
mediary trade with Japan, carrying Chinese silk there and exchanging it for 
Japanese silver, a strategy that would decrease the necessity of silver cargoes 
from the Americas.56 For the sake of reviving friendly relations with Japan 
Fernando de Ayala, a military officer who had fought back maritime attacks 
of the Dutch for many years, was chosen as ambassador to Japan. Equipped 
49 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 283-284.
50 Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (2006), Nihonshi shiryō, p. 130.
51 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 334.
52 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 248-249. On 11 March 1622 he wrote: ‘Torazemon Dono sent for Capt. 
Camps and me to com to hym, for that he had something to tell us from Oyen Dono, themperours 
secretary. Soe we went to his howse, where we mett Cacazemor Dono, Stroyemon Dono, and 
Jentero Donos secretary. And they tould us that, tuching the priz goodes ir the friggot, the 
Japons, said it was theirs, and not the Spaniardes or Portingales, but themperour would not 
beleeve them, for that we had proved them tretors in bringing padres into Japon, contrary to 
his comandement.’
53 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 338. 
54 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 253-256; Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, p. 120.
55 Shimizu (2012), Kinsei nihon, pp. 234-236. 
56 AGI Filipinas 85, n. 34 and Filipinas 20 (1618).
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with a proper cargo and almost 300 passengers Captain Antonio de Arceo 
guided them to Satsuma in August 1623. A delegation continued the journey 
from Nagasaki to Edo in February 1624, but ultimately did not meet the 
Shogun, since Bakufu authorities forced them to return to Manila.57 Being 
denied access to Edo, they left empty-handed and blamed the failure on 
the false accusations (made by the Dutch) that covert missionaries were 
sneaking onto the islands.58 Governor Tavora (r. 1626-1632), knight of the 
Order of Calatrava, concluded that a trade prohibition equalled a conscious 
Japanese choice to be an enemy of the Castilians.59 But he also promised 
King Philip IV that he would do everything to promote friendly relations.60
Facing cold Bakufu authority and opposition from the Dutch welded 
Spanish and Portuguese relations in the East. In 1628 Spanish forces 
sent by Governor Don Fernando de Silva, assisted the Portuguese in re-
taliating against the actions of the Japanese merchant Takagi Sakuemon 
(高木作右衛門). The maritime battle ended with Juan de Alcarajo burning 
Takagi’s vermillion-seal ship (according to Spanish accounts it carried a 
cargo of about 25,000 pesos) in Ayutthaya.61 Strengthening the Catholic alli-
ance ultimately had negative consequences for the Iberian foothold in Japan 
and moreover reflects a general downturn of Spanish foreign policies in the 
East.62 As news of the incident reached Japan a furious public (spurred on 
by the Dutch) called for revenge for this major offence against the Bakufu’s 
maritime sovereign rights, represented by the shuinjō.63 Japanese authorities 
remained hesitant. The Portuguese, who still had access to Japan, were 
punished when their merchant vessel Trinidad was seized at Nagasaki in 
retaliation in 1630.64 With regard to Luzon, once more local agents were 
used for a half-hearted diplomatic solution: Iemitsu and the Governor of 
Nagasaki dispatched the lord of Hizen, Shimabara Matsukura (松倉重政) 
to Manila.65 Thus an apparently well-meaning mission and the invitation 
to revive trade in Nagasaki surprised the Spaniards in Manila, who had 
been ill at ease learning about increased shipbuilding activity in Japan in 
57 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 5/6.
58 Medina (1630), Historia, p. 264; Zaide, Philippines, 356.
59 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 6, ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre materias de gobierno’, 1 August 1629.
60 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 17, ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre materias de gobierno’, 8 July 1632.
61 See AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 6, ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre materias de gobierno’, 1 August 
1629. Medina (1930), Historia, pp. 263-264.
62 Spate, Spanish Lake, p. 227, based on BR 23, pp. 112, 114; BR 24, pp. 218-220.
63 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 96.
64 BR 23, pp. 93-94; Nagazumi (2001), Shuinsen, pp. 83; 121; Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 97.
65 Iwao (1958), Shuinsen; Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 240-241.
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the aftermath of the Siam affair. Yet, while Matsukura sent merchant ships 
to Manila, Taiwan, and Macao during his reign the Shogun and his senior 
council (rōjū) strongly opposed his plea for continuing trade, still fearing a 
clandestine return of the Catholic missionaries.66 His suggestion to prepare 
an invasion of Manila, on the other hand, was apparently well received. In 
Manila Matsukura’s second embassy was received with far less pretensions: 
Governor Juan Niño de Tavora although accusing the embassy of a hidden 
agenda of a potential invasion discussed the burning of the vessel in Siam 
with his Japanese visitors, who reportedly aimed at soothing hard feelings 
with rich presents.67 When Matsukura Shigemasa died soon afterwards 
his dubious mission left no replacement for organising and executing an 
attack on Manila.68
Although Spaniards from Manila had been accommodating the altered 
relations with Japan in the 1630s, they suspected the Dutch of promoting a 
strike against Manila among Bakufu authorities.69 In fact it was the other 
way around. In the second half of 1637, off icials in Nagasaki began to hint 
that the Dutch should volunteer to attack Manila and styled it as righteous 
punishment for the 1628 sinking of the shuinsen in Thailand.70 Apparently, 
the Nagasaki governors had learned from captured Dominican friars ‘that 
the colonial government in Manila was planning to send a steady flow of 
missionaries into Japan’.71 After the petition had been discussed among the 
VOC factory council in Hirado, the Dutch eventually assured support for a 
potential invasion of the Philippines.72 However, the outbreak of a violent 
peasant rebellion in Kyushu interrupted the Manila campaign.
In the meantime, licences for foreign trade had been restricted to a select 
group of seven families or individuals, each with personal connections 
to the Tokugawa.73 The hoshō or guarantee system inaugurated in 1631 
66 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki, p. 54.
67 San Agustín (1698), Conquistas, pp. 263-265.
68 Clulow (2014), Company, pp. 122-123.
69 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki, pp. 81-82.
70 Clulow (2014), Company, p. 122.
71 Clulow (2014), Company, p. 123. Under these circumstances Japanese authorities tried to 
persuade the Dutch to attack Manila as a faithful act to the shogun. Although VOC off icials 
remained hesitant because of Manila’s strong fortif ication, Nicolaes Coukebacker, captain of 
the Hirado factory, reported on the current circumstances in Manila in detail.
72 The episode is also surrounded by debates. Assumptions are based on Murdoch’s specula-
tions and a scholarly debate between a certain Watanabe and a certain Prof. Tugi in the 1920s. 
Watanabe (1929), ‘Japan Did Plan’. The VOC’s struggle is recorded in the company’s Japan 
Dagregisters. cf. Clulow (2014), Company, pp. 123-125.
73 Jansen (2002), Making, p. 75.
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tightened the reins further. A shipowner now needed specif ic authorisation 
from the rōjū, as well as from the Nagasaki bugyō, to leave the country. In a 
critical analysis of Bakufu laws, Matsui Yōko has shown that laws regard-
ing the treatment of foreigners in Japan between the years 1633 and 1634 
contain the provision that ‘those who have resided abroad for unavoidable 
reasons and return to Japan within f ive years will be allowed to stay, but 
those who wish to leave again will be executed’.74 She further showed 
that the following order of 1635, when shuinsen trade eventually ended, no 
longer included this passage because no more Japanese travelled abroad. 
Macro-regionally speaking, it is important to re-emphasise that Japan’s 
maritime trade, by volume, reached its peak between 1636 and 1639 despite 
severe maritime controls.75
In 1638 the Portuguese experienced a similar fate as the Spaniards, which 
they were equally unwilling to accept. After having been banned from 
Japan in 1635 and off icially expelled in 1639, when peasants of Shimabara 
(島原) and Amakusa (天草) initiated an uprising against their new lords 
Matsukura Katsuie (松倉勝家) of Shimabara and Terasawa Katataka 
(寺沢堅高) of Amakusa. The social rebellion against high taxes and re-
ligious persecution shocked the Tokugawa, who found it hard to curb the 
unsuspected domestic opposition. In fact they only succeeded with the 
help of the Dutch, who provided gunpowder, cannon, and vessels.76 This 
demonstrative strike against Catholic peasants convinced the Bakufu of the 
Dutchmen’s commitment and granted them permission to stay in Japan, 
in a period when the third Shogun Iemitsu even broke off mercantile ties 
with Tonkin and Siam fearing they would transport Spanish or Portuguese 
missionaries.77 The issue of taking over Luzon was brought up again in 
the 1640s, when Tokugawa Iemitsu and Itakura Shigemune clandestinely 
planned to send troops to China in 1646.78 Although none of these projects 
ever materialised, Japan’s geopolitical interest in the Philippines remained, 
as works published on Luzon and the Bakufu’s obsession with updates on 
political circumstances in Manila and Macao, as part of a new intelligence 
service, indicate.79
74 Matsui (2009), ‘Legal Position’, p. 25.
75 Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 137.
76 Tsuruta (ed.) (2005), Amakusa Shimabara. The Bakufu’s troops of about 125,000 soldiers 
only managed to besiege the 27,000 rebels thanks to the Dutch support with canons.
77 Nagazumi (1990), Kinsei shoki, p. 61.
78 Carioti (2011), ‘Overseas Chinese’.
79 For instance, Kawabuchi (1671), Ruson oboegaki (Memoirs of Luzon) or the eighteenth-century 
compilation Gaiban tsūsho by Kondō Morishige. 
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Due to the strong Catholic dimension of the Shimabara/Amakusa events, 
the Portuguese were ordered to leave the country and never to return; 
disobedience would be punished with death. An ambassador sent from 
Macao in 1640 was killed, while the new King’s diplomatic intervention of 
sending an off icial ambassador from Lisbon (Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira 
de Souza) in 1644 failed.80
Early Modern ‘Capacity Building’: Transfer via Manila
Next to geopolitical tensions and strategic intelligence building, the elites’ 
pursuit of useful knowledge – sometimes referred to as empire building 
– frequently reflected central-local dualism. In many cases cultural and 
technological exchange happened much faster within merchant networks.81 
Information gathering from below, in turn, is closely linked to cultural 
transfer and as such includes elements of adapting knowledge to exist-
ing worldviews. In recent years a growing number of studies has focused 
theoretically on the various aspects of the relationship between knowledge 
and power within information-based governing systems. Some scholars 
studied the systematic collection and documentation of knowledge and 
the question of how information was dealt with and communicated.82 It 
goes without saying that the closer a study is located to the age of infor-
mation the more fruitful the indicators for the power of knowledge and 
dissemination will be. Yet examples from the early modern period show 
that information spread rapidly despite less advanced means of transport, 
printing techniques, or media. Yet it followed different patterns and served 
limited purposes. Around 1600 Manila-related information transfer targeted 
primarily maritime and military technology. Political facts for diplomatic 
relations, business strategies, and arts and crafts were of great interest to 
the ruling elites and their advisors. Spanish bureaucratic governing tools, 
including the image of a knowledgeable ruler (Philip II as ‘paper king’, sp. 
rey papelero), have been studied in detail in previous years.83 Around 1600, 
Japan’s elite was more receptive to foreign know-how than their Chinese 
counterparts. After the introduction of maritime restriction policies in the 
80 Boxer (1979), Portuguese Embassy.
81 Kerry (2009), Networks of Empire, p. 64.
82 For information transfer through mobility, see Friedrich (2010), Lange Arm. For a more 
general study of the conception and spread of knowledge, see Burke (2000), Social History of 
Knowledge, vol. 1. 
83 Brendecke (2009), Imperium und Empirie.
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1630s, the Tokugawa regime was particularly keen to gather information 
from Chinese and Dutch traders in Nagasaki.
Ming China and Information Gathering
The Ming dynasty, unlike the Qing, was infamous for taking few initiatives 
to learn about the world outside the Sino-centric cosmos.84 However, it 
would be wrong to label Ming China totally ignorant of the outside world. 
The Ming not only shaped security policies and information gathering 
but also encouraged interest in territories within the Middle Kingdom 
(zhonghua), which were traditionally of more concern than other regions. In 
contrast to certain emperors’ and literati’s fascination with Western science, 
knowledge about Europe – be it of a political or ideological nature – was 
not sought actively in the Middle Kingdom.85 A lively interest in classical 
knowledge, science, and arts are vividly ref lected in a long tradition of 
translation. The f irst institution for studying foreign languages was estab-
lished in 1276, as the Off ice of Interpreters (會通館) which was followed by 
an Off ice of Translators (四夷館) in 1407. These off ices prepared Chinese/
Barbarian-language dictionaries (華夷譯語) for neighbouring languages 
such as Mongolian, Tibetan Sanskrit, Persian, and Siamese. Knowledge of 
Japan increased further with the constant wokou/wakō threat during the 
sixteenth century.86
The Chinese reaction to friars coming from Manila indicates an aware-
ness of Luzon and the new settlers in the Southern Sea. Mendoza’s report 
(based on Martín de Rada’s observations) includes references to several 
friars from the Philippines being accused as spies by Chinese off icials.87 
In more economic terms, the Ming court’s attitude towards trade between 
Fujianese and Japanese traders in Manila is a further source for the off icial 
understanding of the outside world. Cheng Wei-chung quotes a reference to 
the Dongxi yangkao of a Ming coastal defence officer, Han Chung-yung, who 
implied in 1610 that business deals within the proximity of offshore China 
84 For Emperor Kangxi’s initiatives to modify China’s foreign trade system by using information 
from abroad, see Gang (2013), Qing Opening; For the spread of information in early modern China, 
see Ge (2010), Zhai zi zhongguo; Ge (2000), Zhong guo de zhi shi.
85 Brook (2009), ‘Europaelogy?’, pp. 269-294; Blussé (2003), ‘Kongkoan’, p. 98: ‘China’s off icial 
and dynastic histories have never shown much interest in overseas trade or commercial records 
unless the latter happened to impinge on some political or ideological concern of the imperial 
administration.’
86 Tanaka, Murai (2012), Wakō, p. 214.
87 Mendoza (2008), Historia, pp. 263-268.
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were not illegal, if the Chinese involved happened to be living abroad. With 
reference to the annual licensed 16 junks for Manila he wondered whether 
it was ‘really possible that such large amounts of Chinese goods [were] all 
consumed by the limited population [of Manila]?’88
Dispatching spies abroad was the most famous Ming intelligence strategy 
applied both in European dominions in Asia, including Manila, and in 
Japan during Hideyoshi’s Korea invasion.89 Spying on a foreign country’s 
political situation was for the Ming one of the very few plausible reasons to 
send people (disguised as merchants or monks) abroad. In light of the Ming’s 
concerns with national security there can be little doubt that for off icial 
China, information gathering had a different value and followed different 
purposes. The eff iciency of the system and the constant availability of 
potential candidates partially explains why China did not see any need 
for direct contact with foreigners for information gathering, an attitude 
that can again be linked to the question of building trust. Paranoia was the 
flipside of these foreign policies: Chinese off icials used to suspect every 
private merchant of being a political spy, who would take Chinese military 
secrets back to their native country.90
In light of Chinese information gathering, maritime issues are of particu-
lar interest. Against a popular narrative of Ming China’s nautical passive-
ness and weak coastal defence, Fujianese seagoing merchants were widely 
known for their navigating expertise and solid knowledge of sea routes.91 In 
this regard it can be helpful to try and understand the Chinese case from 
a comparative perspective: Unlike in Europe, where rulers, the educated 
class, and adventurers often collaborated in maritime enterprises, Chinese 
maritime people were coastal settlers, whose networks did not reach out 
to the governing elite. The bulk of seafaring traditions were clearly rooted 
88 Zhang (1981), Dongxi yangkao, pp. 250-252, cf. Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, p. 22.
89 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 285: ‘But, howsoever, these men [Chinese merchants] follow the 
matter hardly, and tell me that the Emperour of China hath sent espies into all partes wheere 
the Spaniardes, Portingales, Hollanders, and we do trade, in these partes of the world, only to 
see our behaveours on towardes an other, as also how we behave our sevles towardes strangers, 
especially towardes Chinas. And som have byn in this place and brought by our frendes to the 
English howse, where I used them in the best sort I could, as I have advized to Bantam, Pattania 
and Syam to doe the lyke to all Chinas.’
90 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3116 (accessed 3 December 2013).
91 Leonard Blussé has stressed the notable lack of Chinese shipping accounts because Chinese 
sailors did no leave any travel writings behind. Blussé (2011), ‘Junks to Java’, p. 222: ‘Chinese 
sailors themselves may have been accustomed to life at sea that they saw little use in writing 
up experiences that they took for granted, assuming that they could write at all.’
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in information gathering at the local level; Out of habit and for reasons of 
illiteracy they left only a faint written imprint.
A fascinating example of Chinese maritime awareness is John Selden’s 
map of China, located today in the Bodleian Library.92 Historians believe 
that it was created and used by a mercantile network of Fujianese traders 
between 1618 and 1622.93 Printed in China, the map displays both the waters 
surrounding China and late Ming Fujian cartographic tradition without 
the usual European touch in map-making. Both Luzon and Nagasaki are 
marked on the map. The map offers useful insights regarding Sino-Spanish 
relations: The Spanish are indicated as huaren (ch., 花人) and the author of 
the map is likely to have taken his reference from the Dongxi yangkao. The 
map provides detailed information on the route of the Manila Galleon, as 
well as on silver and gold mines in Japan and thus stresses the importance 
of bullion trade for Fujian.94 Since some of the information is reminiscent 
of a pilot manual the map was clearly used in private merchant shipping 
and is not the result of governmental information gathering.95
Technological Transfer: Case Studies from Japan
Historians have called for a re-examination of the long-held standard 
argument that Japan was backward in shipping technology until the early 
seventeenth century. In particular, unwritten seafaring knowledge and the 
wakō’s accomplishments in controlling the sea encourage overthrowing 
misinterpretations of Japan’s ‘nautical backwardness’. 96 This is not an easy 
task because these myths have a long history. The Chinese geographer 
Zheng Ruozeng (鄭若曾, 1503-1570) described the differences between 
Chinese junks and traditional Japanese ships in 1563, in the military treatise 
Chouhai tubian (ch., 籌海圖編, Illustrated Book on Maritime Defence).97 
Zheng Ruozeng concluded that Japanese ships were not qualif ied for off-
shore journeys because their hulls were too flat. His evaluation reflects the 
92 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, pp. 217-218. For an illustration of the map go to http://
treasures.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/The-Selden-Map (accessed 22 January 2014).
93 Batchelor (2014), Selden Map; Brook (2013), Mr. Selden’s Map of China.
94 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 215.
95 Ge (2010), Zhai zi zhongguo, pp. 91-94. Ge analysed the power discourse in imperial China 
based on the Chinese understanding of the outside world as illustrated in historical studies, 
maps and worldviews. 
96 Shapinsky (2006), ‘Polyvocal Portolans’, pp. 17-18.
97 Zheng (2007), Chouhai tubian. These famous accounts on the wakō during the fourteenth 
and f ifteenth centuries in 13 scrolls describe their routes and weapons, and include comments 
on the poor navigation skills of the Japanese.
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common understanding that Japanese mariners were only able to sail under 
the conditions of a favourable wind.98 Another Chinese source, the Riben 
kao 日本考 (Thoughts on Japan), published around 1593, stated that the 
Japanese received assistance from Chinese carpenters to build large ships 
for several thousand taels.99 A Korean who accompanied a vermilion-seal 
ship recorded: ‘Japanese possess only small ships incapable of traversing the 
great ocean. So with 80 pieces of silver, they purchase passage on Chinese 
ships.’100 Such understanding spread to European observers, who liked to 
underestimate early modern Japanese shipbuilding efforts and navigation 
skills. Pablo Pastells quoted a Spanish account that claimed in 1592 that 
because of the small size and capacity of Japanese ships – most of them 
being simple constructions for rowing crews – a journey from Japan to the 
Philippines was very unlikely.101 Given that in the same year the Japanese 
had transferred thousands of soldiers and battleships to Korea, while the 
Spaniards prepared for a possible invasion, the bias of the record is striking. 
Other accounts hint at Japanese collaborations with Fujinaese seafarers. 
In 1605 a Spaniard praised the ‘vessels built after the fashion of China and 
Japon are very good with both oar and sail, and have greater capacity and 
accommodation for carrying provisions than any other kind’.102 Already in 
the 1590s a Castilian seafarer who visited Japan noted that the ‘emperor’ 
of the islands commanded over two hundred ships and a huge artillery.103
During the sixteenth century, it was indeed common Japanese practice 
to enlist Chinese and Ryukyuan assistance in order to reach ports in South 
East Asia. Hence many Japanese merchants calling at Manila came on 
foreign ships.104 They often employed Portuguese pilots, for instance Vasco 
Diaz, who regularly directed Japanese vessels to Manila in the 1590s.105 At 
the same time, Japanese ships coming to Manila before 1600 were described 
as being of rather big size, each carrying a cargo of 1500 to 2000 picos of 
wheat flour.106 In 1592, Juan Cobo reported of three newly built sea-going 
vessels and Harada’s ship to Manila of the same year was described as having 
98 Zheng (2007), Chouhai tubian, pp. 201-202. Cf. Nakajima (2008), ‘Invasion of Korea’, p. 149.
99 See Nakajima (2008), ‘Invasion of Korea’, p. 150.
100 Shapinsky (2006), ‘Polyvocal Portolans’, pp. 17-18.
101 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 50-51. 
102 BR 14, p. 69.
103 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 7. n. 110, ‘Carta de Pedro González de Carvajal sobre su viaje a Japón’, 1594.
104 For a history of pre-modern Japanese navigation, see Iida (1980), Nihon kōkai jutsushi.
105 Cabezas (1995), Siglo Ibérico, pp. 267-268. He listed Bartolomé Vez Landeiro (‘namban-king’), 
Sebastián Jorge Maxar, Pedro González de Carvajal (who took Pedro Bautista back to Japan), 
Manuel Luis, Pedro Camello, Jorge Pinto Barbosa, Domingo Peres.
106 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 50.
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carried 150 people.107 Such observations match Iwao Seiichi’s explanation of 
a boom in the construction of offshore ships during Hideyoshi’s invasion 
of Korea.108 While ship technology, with certain regional variations, had 
improved during the battles of the late f ifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
increasing maritime trade led to adaptations for cargo ships and the con-
struction of hybrid-style vessels, including indigenous Japanese, Chinese, 
and European elements, of about 500 tons around 1600.109 Regarding ship 
design, the earliest shuinsen (ship used for the overseas vermillion-seal 
trade) showed similar characteristics as the Chinese junk. Over the follow-
ing decades, European shipbuilding knowledge entered Japan and a hybrid 
type with Chinese, Mediterranean, and indigenous Japanese elements was 
developed.110
Hideyoshi displayed an outspoken interest in Iberian shipbuilders. From 
his reign onwards, Japanese def icits in offshore navigation and maritime 
technology played a crucial role in their interactions with the Spaniards.111 
Desire to catch up and make Japan competitive was not limited to maritime 
technology. Japanese rulers moreover insisted on mining experts to be sent 
from New Spain.112 After being denied help by the Spaniards, the Japanese 
sought assistance from other Europeans.113 Two European-style trading 
ships were built under the supervision of William Adams in 1604 and 1605 
in Uraga.114 He pointed out that good quality timber, hemp, and iron made 
it possible.115 Ironically, the Spaniards were to buy one of them several 
107 AGI Patronato 25, r. 50, ‘Trato del embajador del Japón con Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas’, 
1593. See also AGI FIlipinas 6, r. 7, n. 107, ‘Testimonio sobre embajador de Japón, Faranda y Juan 
Cobo’, 1 June 1593: ‘El portador de esta es Faranda Quiemo Xapon el qual va en un navio nuevo 
pintadas unas ojas coloradas en la popa es navio seguro y llevo ciento y veinte hombres chinos 
y xaponeses.’
108 Iwao (1958), Shuinsen, pp. 24-27.
109 Ishii (1995), Wasen, pp. 2-9.
110 Prominent elements came from the Chinese junk and the Iberian galleon. Vivid examples 
include the Suetsugu ship and the Araki ship. For the fascinating story of the Hakata-based 
Suetsugu clan’s involvement in Japanese overseas trade in the 1630s, see Oka (2001), ‘Great 
Merchant’, pp. 37-56.
111 Vivero (1988), Relaciones, pp. 149-157; 165; Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 143; See also Massarella 
(1990), World Elsewhere, p. 79.
112 Gomi et al. (1998), Shōsetsu nihonshi, pp. 216-219.
113 For shuinsen constructions in the context of nautical developments, see Nakamura (1965), 
Goshuinsen kōkaizu; Murai (1997), Umi kara, p. 165: Japanese ships sojourning to China and Korea, 
laden with silver, where referred to as soma-sen by early Europeans. These ships are sometimes 
considered Chinese constructions of 500 to 600 tons.
114 Private ventures even date back to the 1580s, as was the case in Bungo.
115 Adams (1850), Memorials, p. 71.
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years later and admitted its robustness.116 It was around the same time 
that interim Governor Vivero y Velasco proposed buying Japanese vessels 
for local use, arguing that the construction costs in the Philippines were 
intolerable.117 Spanish officials are reported to have made similar suggestion 
once again in 1623.118
The need to construct a ship in Japan was only one of the many irritating 
elements of Sebastián Vizcaíno’s stay in Japan and his controversial collabo-
ration with Date Masamune. After Vizcaíno’s ship had been destroyed by 
the Keichō Sanriku earthquake (慶長三陸地震) of 1611, Tokugawa Hidetada 
offered to build a ship at his own expense, on the condition that Vizcaíno 
would lend him ship carpenters and take some Japanese merchants to New 
Spain.119 Yet the Spanish general could neither agree to Hidetada’s offer nor 
afford the highly priced material. Eventually he accepted Date Masamune’s 
offer. The story of Date Masamune’s 500-ton Western-style vessel, named 
San Juan Bautista, is thought-provoking: 180 Japanese carpenters built a 
Western-style ship in only 45 days in the port of Tsuki-no-ura (月の浦) far 
from the usual foreign maritime interaction centres.120 In a way the episode 
highlights the unpredictable dynamics of technology and knowledge 
transfer.
Other examples point at knowledge exchange as part of everyday mari-
time life around Manila, a Mecca for shipbuilders.121 A certain Ikeda Yoemon 
(池田与右衛門) from Nagasaki visited Manila as part of a shuinsen crew in 
1616 and 1617 before drafting the Genna kōkaiki or kōkaisho (元和航海書) 
(1618/23).122 His navigational treatise included explanations on the quadrant 
and astrolabe, a guide for using solar and nautical calendars, instructions 
on how to determine positions at sea by the sun and the stars, as well as 
navigational charts of the waters between Japan and South East Asia.123 In 
addition, maritime charts and hybrid maps featured reciprocal maritime 
collaborations. Namban cartography and Matteo Ricci’s ‘Chinese’ maps of 
116 For a discussion on these points, see Tremml (2009), ‘Neuzeitliche Schifffahrt’, pp. 179-208.
117 Cf. Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, p. 191.
118 Quoted from Sugimoto, Swain (1978), Science, pp. 177-178.
119 Murakami (1915), ‘Japan’, p. 473.
120 Sola, Tremml-Werner (eds) (2013), ‘Relación’, pp. 37-42, http://www.archivodelafrontera.
com/archivos/una-relacion-de-japon-de-1614-sobre-el-viaje-de-sebastian-vizcaino (accessed 
12 June 2014).
121 Iwao (1958), Shuinsen, pp. 231-232.
122 Ikeda (1943), Genna kōkaisho.
123 For technological transfer of nautical knowledge from the Philippines to Japan, see Sugi-
moto, Swain (1978), Science, pp. 179-185; Shapinsky (2006), ‘Polyvocal Portolans’, p. 19.
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four seas and six continents strongly influenced Tokugawa maps with a 
small and large Eastern Sea.124
Japan’s information gathering from above changed during the 70 years of 
the Manila system. I have argued earlier that encounters with the Europeans 
encouraged the Japanese to pull away from a China-centred cosmos that 
would eventually lead to the creation of a Japan-centred world system 
modelled on the traditional Chinese ka’i order.125 Tessa Morris-Suzuki 
has stressed the steady decline of Chinese hegemonic power as the main 
reason for this development.126 Ethnographical charts illustrate how Ja-
pan’s worldview, although based on a Chinese model, altered thanks to 
knowledge accomplished from the Europeans. A particularly interesting 
example is the Chart of All Nations (万国人物図, jp. bankoku jinbutsuzu) 
printed and published in Nagasaki in 1645, demonstrating Japan’s place in 
a wider world.127 As illustrations of Japan’s newly def ined position in the 
world they contributed to a sense of nationality.128 Yet, despite the newly 
implemented seclusion policies in Japan, symbolism was clearly inspired 
by a European perspective.129 Japan was placed on top of all nations but not 
in a classic hierarchical composition. Signif icantly, European peoples were 
painted with white skin; each ‘ethnic representative’ was equipped with 
characteristic cultural objects of his country. This chart also gives insights 
into the Philippines’ position in Japan’s geopolitics after 1639. While the 
Spaniards were illustrated together with Italians in the chart’s penultimate 
section, just before the giants and the dwarfs, the inhabitants of Luzon were 
124 See Curvelo (2011), ‘Aproximar a Distância’, p. 256. For Japanese map-making (also known as 
karuto) under the Tokugawa and defining sea space, see Yonemoto (1999), ‘Maps and Metaphors’, 
pp. 169-187; Yonemoto (2003), Mapping Early Modern Japan.
125 Morris-Suzuki (1996), ‘Frontiers of Japanese Identity’, pp. 46-65; 50: The Japanese perception 
changed by two forces. ‘The f irst was the force of Japan’s changing relationship with China; the 
second, the force of the encounter with the European powers.’
126 Berry (1999), ‘Was Early Modern Japan Culturally Integrated?’, pp. 103-126; Berry (2006), 
Japan in Print.
127 Morris-Suzuki (1996), ‘Frontiers of Japanese Identity’, p. 46; Toby (2008), ‘Sakoku’, pp. 196-198: 
Later similar charts were printed in Edo and Kyoto. Only in the second half of the seventeenth 
century would larger parts of the society learn about the bankoku concept. Toby also showed 
that East Asia remained the centre of the earth in these global illustrations.
128 Morris-Suzuki (1996), ‘Frontiers of Japanese Identity’, p. 46.
129 The Kyushu University Museum presents the masterpiece on its homepage and gives a fairly 
substantial description of the 40 nationalities displayed. See http://record.museum.kyushu-u.
ac.jp/bankoku (accessed 11 December 2013). Depicted in a table of several lines and columns 
are 40 nations beginning with Japan, followed by Ming China, the Tartars, Taiwan, and other 
South East Asian nations. Only further down in the chart we f ind European nations known in 
Japan, beginning with England.
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tackled as an independent ethnic group. The Luzon male was dressed in 
European style trousers, while the Luzon female covered her hair casually 
with a long scarf reminiscent of the common image of the Virgin Mary.130 
China held a prominent position right next to Japan and was explicitly 
labelled Ming, the name of the dynasty that ironically had been replaced 
just one year before the f irst publication of the chart. While Ronald Toby 
remarked that ethnic categorisation charts existed in China in the form 
of ruisho,131 I am reminded of similar cartographic designs published in 
Europe,132 as well as parallels with the illustrations in the Boxer Codex 
printed with Chinese help in late-sixteenth-century Manila.133
Concluding Remarks: Local-Central Dualism in Foreign Relations
An appropriate starting point in summarising the essence of the last three 
chapters is a consideration of the general nature of diplomatic exchange in 
East Asia. Official commercial exchange was initially restricted to tributary 
trade. This practice was inseparably linked to diplomatic duties, which 
were a necessary precondition prior to the take-off of triangular relations. 
In light of evidence already mentioned with regard to the take-off of tri-
angular trade relations, the augmentation of exchange at an ‘unorthodox’ 
or ‘unoff icial’ level marked a signif icant turning point in both trading and 
diplomatic relations. Consequently, after the 1570s only a minor percentage 
of exchange (be it of an economic or political nature) fell into the category 
of tribute exchange. Of course, ref lecting analytically on the nature of 
diplomatic exchange in sixteenth-century East Asia is not a simple task. 
There has been a contradictory binary concept of hierarchical and inter 
pares foreign relations associated with this f ield of study which rather adds 
an element of confusion.
The key question on the impact of local-central competition on Manila’s 
long-term development has brought to light the intervention of external 
factors which caused a political overhaul in Manila. Key economic processes 
130 What is most striking about the chart is the image of Native Americans with stereotypical 
‘Indian’ symbolism including feathered headdress, bow, and arrow. 
131 Toby (2008), ‘Sakoku’, p. 198.
132 See Blaeu (1644), Nova Totius Terrarum.
133 The Boxer Codex is an ethnicity chart found in the Philippines. It is believed that Governor 
Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas commissioned the project, which probably built upon the studies of 
Miguel de Loarca and the Franciscan friar Juan de Plasencia of the 1580s. For the illustrations, 
see http://www.f ilipeanut.com/2011/09/the-boxer-codex (accessed 11 May 2014).
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shifted from influential actors on the ground to various other stakeholders. 
Thus, there was a change of ‘connectors’ to ‘dis-connectors’ in the 1620s 
and 1630s. It was the beginning of a new age of which the consequences 
for Manila were threefold. Japanese trade with Manila ended, there was 
a steep decline of Fujianese shipping to Manila and the Union of Crowns 
between Portugal and Spain ceased to exist after 1640. Such change to 
Manila’s economic development stood as a microcosm for wider change 
in the whole macro region during the years of intense power shifts in the 
South China Sea, arguably against the background of Dutch maritime ag-
gression and operations of the Zheng Empire. It was now more lucrative 
for Fujianese traders to head straight to Japan, Taiwan, or other fledgling 
Southeast Asian ports.
Comparing operations of the local and the central shows how triangular 
histories connected predominantly in peripheral regions, where function-
ing cross-cultural operations developed parallel to encounters on off icial 
levels. While local initiatives rarely represented off icial policies, they often 
indirectly pushed the ruling elites in their monopolising efforts. The needs 
of the central government in Spain and those of the colonial off icers in 
the Philippines were very often incompatible and more than once caused 
imperial dilemma. Likewise, Ming China should not be considered a back-
ward anti-foreign trade empire. What characterises early modern China’s 
foreign trade is a disconnection between off icial views in the capital and 
local reality and a very complex diplomatic protocol that left no space 
for double-edged inter pares relations, to which both the Spanish and the 
Japanese aspired.
It goes without saying that the central governments of Ming China and 
Imperial Spain faced different constraints than the local merchants in Fu-
jian and Manila. While the lack of government support encouraged private 
Chinese traders to create a distinguished mercantile network spanning from 
Japan via the Philippines and Indonesia to the Southeast Asian mainland, 
local Spanish merchants in Manila often had to give in to government 
demands aiming at maintaining hegemony in and outside Europe. By the 
time of intensif ied Japanese participation in the Manila trade, the newly 
established military-aristocratic government was occupied with building 
a stable pre-modern state. For that project the Bakufu competed with local 
landlords and merchants for the favour of foreign merchants. At the end 
of the day, sovereignty on the Japanese archipelago proved to be more 
important than overseas expansion. Edo managed to turn economic drives 
into political benefits for the central government. The Bakufu monopolised 
foreign trade by means of the vermillion-seal system. This can be regarded 
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as a major difference to the other two pre-modern states where competition 
between local and central levels was never overcome.
During the early decades of trans-Pacif ic trade, both Chinese and 
Japanese merchants had incentives to meet and trade in Manila. Japan’s 
withdrawal and her rigorous foreign policies, including a self-imposed 
maritime embargo after 1639, served to obscure the ability of historians 
to see its relevance to early modern economic history. When reassessing 
Manila’s role in global history, however, we must not overlook that as a 
consequence of successful state formation and economic restructuring, 
Japan’s aspired position in East Asia was redefined. Through interactions 
with Spain and China in the decades prior to her ‘closure’, Japan managed to 
become an independent economic player and what one may label the f irst 
real pre-modern state in East Asia in the seventeenth century, all thanks 
to eff icient institutions.
Having said that, all other cases described suggest the predominance 
of local agency in the Manila system. Fujian, for instance, unlike the Ming 
court in Beijing generally acted as a state. Similarities can be found in 
late-sixteenth-century Japan, when peripheral players from Kyushu made 
similar advances as would be demonstrated in later decades with the 
example of Zheng rulers ruling from their bases in Xiamen and Taiwan. 




Zooming In: Early Modern Manila 
and Regional Globalisation

7 Manila as Port City
It has almost always been true that colonial schemes or their commercial 
equivalents were devised not by government but by private enthusiasts in search 
of wealth, virtue or religious redemption.1
Cohabitating East Asians’, Castilians’, and natives’ bargaining experiences 
were momentous for the urban development of Manila.2 In particular, 
members of the trading community possessed profound economic insider 
knowledge, intercultural understanding, manufacturing techniques, and 
language skills. Shifting focus from dualism between local and central 
interests to the impact of socio-political aspects, I will now add to a compre-
hensive picture with concrete examples of encounters on the ground. Hence, 
an actor-based approach centred on the actual settlers and sojourners 
of the ‘ecumenical maritime trading zone’, as Philip Curtin would have 
called the South China Sea,3 will stress Manila’s outstanding position within 
sustained pre-modern global exchange. Against this background we have 
to ask whether and how ‘cross-cultural brokers’,4 seafaring people, colonial 
officials, licensed merchants, or religious personnel influenced transactions 
in the course of daily business on the ground.5
In recent decades, economic historians inspired by Fernand Braudel’s 
approach to understanding the Mediterranean world have applied 
geography-based methods for studying the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, 
or East Asia.6 Similar to other maritime macro regions, the China Seas 
hosted centres of far-reaching autonomy characterised by ethnic diversity, 
1 Darwin (2009), Empire Project, p. 3.
2 Over the past decade a variety of studies on intercultural trading centres in East and South 
East Asia has revealed the political and cultural importance of such port cities for entire regions. 
Haneda (2009), ‘Introduction’ to Asian Port Cities, pp. 3-4.
3 Phillips (2007), ‘Organization’, pp. 71-86. Focusing on transport and communication net-
works in the administration of the Spanish and Portuguese ‘oceanic empires’ from 1580 to 1640, 
the author argued that the Habsburg rulers managed to control their vast territory thanks to 
the great number of Spanish-born families involved and a substantial net of vessels, as well as 
strong Catholicism ties.
4 A term coined by Curtin (2000), World and the West, p. 1.
5 For Spanish actors and settlers, see the appendix to Merino (1980), Cabildo, pp. 77-109.
6 Several interdisciplinary projects tackled the worlds of waters from various angles. See 
Andaya (2006), ‘Oceans Unbound’, p. 685; Sutherland (2008), ‘Southeast Asian History’; Wills 
(2008), ‘South China Sea’, pp. 1-24; Gipouloux (2009), Méditerranée Asiatique, p. 161.
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a large volume of products traded, and astonishing organisational and 
logistical facilities since the tenth century.7 These characteristics facilitated 
the creation of networks. Networks are a good point of departure when 
trying to understand the singular structure of seascapes.8 Xabier Lamikiz 
claims that networks in the Atlantic trade, mostly composed of autonomous 
or at least very flexible trading families, depending on trust, loyalty, and 
mediation, while its members were strong at cultural assimilation.9 Dennis 
Lombard has studied similar phenomena in large parts of maritime Asia.10 
In addition, Jeppe Mulich’s inter-imperial micro-regional approach on the 
connections between peripheries provides some thought-provoking aspects 
on the relationship between networks and authorities.11 Such considera-
tions seem to be useful for the historical context of the Manila system, 
as long as we remain sensitive to the impact of resistance, absolutism, 
and best policy practices.12 Broad perspectives on possible differences and 
similarities help us to shape our understanding of socio-cultural transmis-
sion within trans-national communities. Whole areas were stimulated by 
cross-cultural trading activities, while members of maritime networks 
themselves depended largely on climate and wind systems that influenced 
navigating conditions and their lives on board. The crossroad character of 
the China Seas and the Indian Ocean affected the Philippines long before 
the arrival of the Spaniards. Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso speak of 
the archipelago’s fluid civilisation open to influence from the outside world 
and willing to enhance existing institutions with ideas from overseas.13
It was not before the 1590s, however, that Manila established its port 
city status. When talking about port cities, we are easily tempted to 
perceive them as centres or key cities but very few ever were. According 
to Braudel, centres control world economies.14 Staying in the region, we 
f ind the formidable international port cities of Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, or 
7 Nakajima (2013), ‘Kōeki to funsō’, pp. 2-5; 19-22.
8 The concept of maritime space here includes not just the ocean but also other locations 
inseparably linked to it such as ports, ships, markets, and workshops. Scholars have been 
sympathising with the idea of ‘regional globalisations’ in the early modern period. Iberian 
imperialism is one of the topics tackled in that f ield. See, for example, Hopkins (ed.) (2006), 
Global History.
9 Lamikiz (2010), Trade and Trust.
10 For Asian merchant networks, see Lombard, Aubin (eds) (2000), Asian Merchants.
11 Mulich (2013), ‘Microregionalism’, pp. 72-94.
12 For examples of colonial policies of European Overseas Empire, see Daniels, Kennedy (eds) 
(2002), Negotiated Empires. 
13 Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, p. 24.
14 Braudel (1977), Afterthoughts, pp. 27-31.
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Nagasaki; yet regardless of their f lorescence neither ever established itself 
as a political centre.15 However, there are also indications that the case of 
Manila was different. Beyond doubt, as home to an early modern colonial 
trade diaspora, where ‘foreign’ Europeans ruled over a merchant settlement, 
Manila classif ies both as multicultural trading hub and as a classic Spanish 
colonial city.16 As the macro-regional centre, Manila attracted attention 
beyond religious, ideological, or sovereign borders.
Similar to other port cities all over the world, Manila’s society did not 
grow organically. Consequently, its market did not follow the usual de-
velopment paths. Strictly speaking, strong stimuli of overseas commerce 
contributed to a strong external market and a neglected domestic economy. 
As a consequence, port cities were always vulnerable to sudden decline and 
loss of influence. Historically speaking this was by no means an uncommon 
urban fate – since neither systems nor their centres were static.17 Exchange 
triggered a number of independent processes, which to a certain extent 
showed characteristics of hybridity or related developments.18 Manila’s 
cross-cultural character is best illustrated by the city’s ‘Sino-European 
co-colonialism’.19 In Manila – as well as in other South East Asian port 
cities – Eurasian interdependence led to constructive negotiations between 
Overseas Chinese, Iberians, and others and offered immigrants remarkable 
social mobility.20 Spanish, Fujianese, and Japanese people in Manila assumed 
new roles by responding to the necessities of the colonial society and the 
market, something they would not have done in a different context.21 Since 
immigrants undertake certain economic tasks in their host countries, 
15 Merchants of both Fujianese cities invested their gains abroad or moved to other booming 
Chinese ports such as Xiamen.
16 For def inition of ‘trade diaspora’, see Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 2-12. He def ines 
them as ‘communities of merchants living among aliens in associated networks’. The common 
notion of diaspora is broader and therefore only partially suitable for the Chinese and Japanese 
in early modern Manila. What is true is that as individuals they defined themselves in opposition 
to their host society, identif ied themselves with their homelands although contacts often 
remained on an ‘irregular and indirect’ basis. See Lovejoy (1997), ‘African Diaspora’.
17 Abu-Lughod (1989), Before European, pp. 6; 37; 303. Melaka is a prominent example for the 
decline of a centre. The Straits entrepôt lost signif icance after Muslim intermediaries had been 
replaced by local merchants.
18 I do not see a way to strictly distinguish between different categories of cultural blends such 
as creolité, mestizaje, accommodation, imitation, or glocalisation in early modern port cities. 
For a discussion of the concepts, see Burke (2009), Cultural Hybridity, pp. 35-112.
19 Andrade (2006), How Taiwan Became Chinese, chapter 6, http://www.gutenberg-e.org/
andrade (accessed 11 December 2013). 
20 Cohen (2000), East Asia, p. 205.
21 For Chinese early migration to South East Asia, see Chang (1995), ‘First Chinese Diaspora’.
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socio-political representation is closely linked to their integration into the 
labour market.22
Despite Manila’s strong dependence on external trade and her impor-
tance as an intermediary port, I argue that if we want to reach an under-
standing of the essence of the Manila system, limiting our study to trade 
would ultimately not suff ice.23 Therefore I consider the term ‘emporium’, 
as Manila has sometimes been labelled, problematic. Unlike the Dutch at 
Batavia, the Portuguese at Macao, or the English in India, the Spanish did 
not develop Manila as an emporium for the export of goods to European 
or Asian destinations.24 The Spaniards were not the dominating trading 
nation and Manila’s institutions remained fragile.25 Yet they possessed 
signif icant political and spiritual control.
New Communication Patterns and Early Modern Globalisation
Manila’s overall setting for human interaction is reminiscent of Marie 
Louise Pratt’s research on asymmetrical encounters between the old core 
and new territories. In her seminal work on transculturation, the American 
philologist insisted on the improvisational character of colonial encounters, 
an explanation that also applies to interaction in Manila.26 In and around 
the city walls, knowledge gathering and implementation of European ideas 
was piecemeal and ‘created in chaotic, improvisational contact zones’.27 Both 
‘foreigners’ and Spaniards had to adapt to cultural and political influences; 
if successful, their encounters would take place between equals.28 However, 
22 Migration studies in global history still have a lot of untapped potential for comparative 
surveys. In global social history quantitative and qualitative studies have profoundly changed 
our knowledge and understanding of historical migration. A recent paradigm in the f ield is the 
human-centred approach to migration. It stresses emotional, spiritual, and intellectual aspects 
next to material security. Hoerder (2002), Cultures in Contact, p. 15; see also Lucassen et al. (eds) 
(2010), Migration History; Wang (ed.) (1997), Global History.
23 Ollé (2008), ‘Relaciones’, p. 75.
24 Villiers (1987), ‘Portuguese Malacca’, p. 52; Blussé, Gaastra (eds) (1981), Companies and Trade.
25 Villiers (1987), ‘Portuguese Malacca’, p. 52: ‘The Spanish did not develop Manila as an 
emporium for the export of Southeast Asian goods to the west, and Manila was never a centre 
of any consequence for local inter-island trade or for goods produced in the Philippines.’
26 Pratt (1992), Imperial Eyes, pp. 38-68.
27 Musselman (2009), ‘Indigenous Knowledge’, p. 32.
28 Williard J. Peterson’s interpretation seems relevant for all groups that f locked together in 
Manila: ‘On a more general level, it also seems to show that an “outsider” might move from being 
an observer to being more a participant in his host’s community, regardless of where he starts 
on some imaginary axis between the stranded victim of a shipwreck and the immigrant eager 
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the Spaniards had a certain comparative advantage in this regard: as the 
‘ruling class’ they had access to more systematic knowledge.29 Yet the ques-
tion, whether the Spanish inside the Manila system developed an equation 
of power with knowledge, as the British did in India, remains. Knowledge 
doubtlessly shaped the perception of the colonisers and influenced their 
attitude and their policies. Pratt and others have stressed the importance of 
the colonial periphery for representation ‘at home’, which spread feelings of 
superiority over native people. But what did that mean for the people on the 
ground? Understanding that a certain level of inequality was rooted in the 
very difference of encounters, we should ask which party enjoyed advantages 
as a result of having regional or local knowledge and how were knowledge 
differences dealt with? Manila possessed various qualities, proving that the 
Manila system worked in terms of communication and cooperation; it was 
not a tale of permanent misunderstanding or miscommunication, but rather 
Manila was a node in a widespread information network, which benefitted 
from frequent contact with Chinese, Portuguese, and South East Asian 
navigators and merchants. A 1616 diary entry by Richard Cocks underlines 
Manila’s key role in supra-regional communication. When the Portuguese 
cargo ship from Macao failed to call at Nagasaki that year he noted: ‘This 
news is come per a galley and a galliot which are arrived at Lanagasaque 
[Nagasaki] and came from the Manillas.’30
In Manila trans-regional communication obstacles were less numerous 
than one would expect. What deserves extra mention is that the Castilian 
language was not abused as an imperial tool for discrimination within 
triangular relations, unlike in other colonial settings.31 Direct multilingual 
communication patterns were available for all members of the colonial 
society without being discriminated against or forced into imperial lin-
guistic structures. Intermediary forms of communication were developed 
during the early decades. Pidgin Hokkien or Pidgin Spanish with Tagalog 
elements were commonly used in daily encounters. In addition, slightly 
different types of lingua franca, including Mandarin, Portuguese, and 
to be assimilated, with tourists, conquistadores, merchants, missionaries, and ethnographers 
arrayed between the poles.’ Peterson (1994), ‘What to Wear?’, pp. 403-421.
29 For considerations on the ‘economy of knowledge’ of an empire, see Bayly (2003), Empire 
and Information. For the construction of knowledge and information transfer, see Stutchey (ed.) 
(2005), Science. For the Spanish case in particular, see Navarro Brotons et al. (2007), Más Álla de 
la Leyenda Negra.
30 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 135; 175.
31 For a discussion of these developments see Rafael (1993), Contracting Colonialism, pp. 23-26.
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Malay elements circulated on the surrounding seascape.32 At the same time, 
Chinese and Japanese were spoken in areas with a primarily East Asian 
population.33 The silk market, for instance, was a multilingual quarter, with 
shops kept by Fujianese serving Fujianese, Spanish, Japanese and other local 
customers. Still, intercultural awareness and willingness to interact were 
often overshadowed by the lack of structured internal communication. The 
system largely maintained its improvised character far into the seventeenth 
century. It did however have its weaknesses in the form of strong church 
authorities, and random interpreters though.34
East Asian Human Agency
While Manila undeniably showed characteristics of a cosmopolitan trading 
metropolis it maintained the character of a local community.35 It has been 
mentioned that Manila could not have survived, let alone turned into an 
internationally recognised city, without steady contributions and human 
migration from the hinterland, from China, and to a lesser extent from Japan 
and other parts of South East Asia.36 Ideas on migration of that particular 
region are closely linked to diaspora – a regionally scattered community, 
sharing language, culture and religion, and often kinship ties.37 Prototypical 
diaspora would retain close ties with their homeland, while often being 
unable to return there.38
32 Shapinsky (2006), ‘Polyvocal Portolans’, p. 18, remarked on the development of an offshore 
lingua franca in the China Seas.
33 Shapinsky (2006), ‘Polyvocal Portolans’, p. 19: The author mentioned Nagazumi Yōko’s 
emphasis on the importance of Southern Chinese (Min Nan) dialects, such as Hokkien, spoken 
by the people from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou.
34 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 245-248.
35 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, pp. 21-26.
36 Wang Gungwu, Lynn Pan, and Carl A. Trocki have brought to light many aspects of Chinese 
overseas history over the centuries: Wang (2004), ‘China Seas’, pp. 7-22; Trocki (1999), Opium, 
p. 15. He divided Chinese migration to South East Asia from the sixteenth to the twentieth 
centuries into f ive periods. See also Pan (1990), Sons of the Yellow Emperor. As indicated earlier, 
the pioneering efforts of Iwao Seiichi also dominate research on early modern Japanese overseas 
ventures. See Hirayama (2003), ‘Firipinasu sōtoku’, pp. 67-91. 
37 Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 2-12. The concept of trade diaspora was introduced 
in Cohen (1971), ‘Cultural Strategies’, pp. 266-281; For a larger study on Japanese migration, see 
Adachi (2006), Japanese Diasporas.
38 Approximately 80,000 people moved permanently to f lourishing Japanese towns in the 
South China Sea. See Ishizawa (1998), ‘Quartiers japonais’, pp. 85-94; Wray (2002), ‘17th-Century 
Japanese Diaspora’, pp. 1-16. See also Ribeiro (2001), ‘Japanese Diaspora’, pp. 53-83.
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Residents of the f luid community differed based on their geographi-
cal origin and cultural background. All Manila residents were port city 
migrants with a close, but sometimes problematic, relationship with the 
seas, as a source of new riches. The sea was a (sometimes a ramshackle, or 
even burned) bridge between their old and new lives. For many there was 
no going back once they had decided to start a new life in Manila. The strict 
ban on foreign trade, including a ban on returning home, made Chinese 
sojourners very adaptive to the inf luences of their host societies. This 
explains why the huaqiao of the early period rarely considered themselves 
as ‘Chinese’, after having left their native country.39 Fujianese members of 
migrant merchant clans put the well-being of their own kind above indi-
vidual gain.40 Their Japanese counterparts came from diverse backgrounds, 
both geographically and in terms of social rank and religious belief, as I 
will show below. Next to Spanish and Mexican residents, who showed the 
greatest interest in political influence, Malay mestizo and members of the 
indigenous population found their niches in the urban society, providing a 
labour force and even replacing East Asian professionals in times of crisis.
The line between sojourners and settlers was a thin one and it remains 
difficult to assess to what extent and at what point a certain migrant popula-
tion was absorbed by the colonial society.41 Others never did, taking the 
opportunity to relocate to even greener pastures, if circumstances required 
it. This is what happened in Manila in the 1630s: Knowing there would not 
be much to gain due to losses on the trans-Pacif ic route, Fujianese traders 
stayed away and probably relocated to other markets in Japan and Taiwan. 
Yet they would return, as soon as Manila had recovered.42
The above-mentioned actor-based approach enables us to learn more 
about the Fujianese and Japanese communities of Manila.43 Most actors of 
previous chapters were either Christian missionaries or related to maritime 
trade. The latter ranged from captains and traders, navigators, sailors and 
ship owners, to those involved in building or rigging ships; linguists and 
government off icials. With regard to Fujianese members of the urban 
society, Lin Renchuan has summarised a Ming period classif ication which 
distinguished between (1) regular merchants who left Manila again after 
business was f inished, (2) merchants who stayed for a certain period, 
39 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, pp. 49-51.
40 Curtin (1984), Cross-cultural Trade, pp. 5-7. 
41 In 1964 Milton Gordon promoted the model of assimilation, a model that was been ref ined 
in the 1990s with a focus on job availability as the most important factor for migration.
42 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 259.
43 Bentley et al. (2007), Seascapes.
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hibernating in Manila and (3) those who settled permanently.44 Fujianese 
maritime merchants were part of a larger business organisation, sometimes 
referred to as ‘family-cum firms’ headed by an adult male and dominated 
by hierarchical structures based on seniority.45 In this regard, Gang Deng 
speaks of Chinese proto-companies, of which two types seem to have been 
relevant for Manila: joint ventures, arrangements between government 
and traders that date back to the days of the Song dynasty, and ship-bound 
partnerships with the ability to provide and maintain large ocean-going 
ships for several hundred passengers. These vessels’ captains were wealthy 
merchants who acted as managers. All crew members were paid regardless 
of their individual status. At the same time, they were all members of several 
family-cum-f irms, who controlled their separate cargo and business ac-
counts. Overheads, such as tolls, were shared among all passengers.46 Many 
of those who settled in Manila came from mountainous regions with minor 
agricultural yield, multiple landownership and various unequal dynamics.47
An advanced entrepreneurial spirit made the Chinese the number-one 
maritime agents in the contact zone in Manila. Catering to the needs of the 
Spaniards in Manila and the elites of the Americas, they adapted quickly to 
their potential customer’s demands and tastes. Imitation became a special 
pattern of transfer that incorporated both cultural and technological ele-
ments, which eventually reached the hinterland and other places along 
maritime routes.48 Kären Wigen’s plea for ocean-oriented research stressed 
that ‘maritime-based social formations have long served as models for social 
change in landed societies’.49 Legal intermediaries or travelling agents with 
language proficiency are of particular interest for socio-political dimensions 
of this study.50 No doubt, huaqiao played an outstanding role in this regard as 
44 Ming shi, Biography of Luzón, juan 323, 8730, cf. Lin (1990), ‘Fukien’s Private Sea Trade’, 
pp. 167-215. The term ‘hibernating’ was also used by Zhang (1617), Dongxi yangkao, for merchants 
who were 壓冬 ya dong, literally ‘pressing the winter’. Cf. Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parián’, 
p. 71. Díaz-Trechuelo (1966), ‘Role of the Chinese’, p. 176: Among the Fujianese there were many 
who involuntarily had to stay because of meteorological conditions. As monsoons only permitted 
travel between May and July, there was often not enough time for trade transactions.
45 Deng (1997), Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 101.
46 Deng (1997), Chinese Maritime Activities, p. 102.
47 Ng (1983), Trade and Society, pp. 17-18.
48 Sucheta Mazumdar discusses Manila’s function as gateway for trans-Pacif ic technology 
transfer: Mazumdar (1998), Sugar and the Society in China, pp. 75-79.
49 Wigen (2007), ‘Introduction’ to Seascapes, p. 16.
50 Niels Steensgaard and others have shown that the concept goes back to the Medieval 
Mediterranean ‘commenda’ agreement between Christians and Muslims. See Steensgaard (1973), 
Carracks.
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well. Traditionally good relations with the indigenous population soon led to 
a sharp increase in intermarriages, linking Chinese settlements to the local 
community. Mestizo members of their community acted as interpreters for 
the ships arriving from China and in daily operations with the Spaniards.51
After having built a solid town to meet the needs of the Castilian ruling 
elite, settling policy for visiting traders remained vague for decades. Finding 
a balance between keeping unwelcome European trading nations’ out of 
Manila and assuring steady support from East Asia was one of the biggest 
challenges.52 As Manila Spaniards did not bother to alter the status quo 
during the f irst century, the system seemed to have worked. Nonetheless 
their attitude was also harshly criticised. Easy access to everything they 
desired made engaging in agriculture or industry superfluous.53 Contem-
poraries’ harsh judgement of the slothful Manila Spanish as malicious 
swindlers and gamblers, who abhorred physical work, may indeed contain 
a grain of truth.54 A combination of unwillingness and inability of the 
Overseas Empires’ administration increased discontent among Spanish 
citizens who soon earned a reputation as decadent merchant soldiers who 
competed with two other groups of actors: powerful New Spain capital-
ists and Manila merchants who were the politico-economic elite of all 
Overseas Spain.55 Inter-imperial correspondence points to a complicated 
fate of lower-class Spaniards in the colony; it suggests that soldiers were 
badly paid (the average monthly salary for a soldier was 6 pesos and for 
a musketeer not more than 8) and their provisions insuff icient.56 Under 
these circumstances the socio-economic integration of Fujianese and 
Japanese remained a complicated venture. Most aspects of everyday life 
were either an incentive for or the product of bargaining on the spot. Strong 
interdependence characterised the urban society, of which all members 
bargained for improved living conditions. After a relatively liberal and 
unrestricted Chinese and Japanese presence in Manila during the f irst 
decades of Spanish reign, colonial authorities began to take steps against 
51 Only a few names have been recorded: For instance, those of Juan de la Cruz, Agustín 
Carpio, and Juan Sansón, who were part of a f lexible network of intermediaries. Cf. Slack (2010), 
‘Sinifying New Spain’, p. 11.
52 Videira Pires (ed.) (1987), Viagem de Comércio.
53 Blussé (1986), Strange Company, pp. 78-79.
54 Cf. Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 42.
55 Merino (1980), Cabildo, pp. 54-56.
56 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 9, n. 173, ‘Carta de Tello sobre asuntos de guerra; Borneo, Japón’, 1600. We 
have reason to believe that Japanese aggression was exaggerated in order to get more support 
for the struggling colony.
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the growing number of East Asian settlers. In particular Fujianese traders’ 
strong position in commercial bargaining called for stricter policies.
The feeling of insecurity during the f irst decade of the seventeenth 
century, described in chapter 5, in fact, went beyond the Dutch threat. 
Fear of Japanese or Chinese conspiracies, revenge, or violent outrages 
dominated the colonial agendas, next to economic concerns. Attempted 
conflict-minimising policies reflect the social consequences of undying 
prejudice and the ambivalent relationship with the East Asians. In this 
regard the question, whether the Spaniards thought of East Asian residents 
as their vassals or whether they saw them as Chinese or Japanese subjects, 
arises. With regard to Japanese settlers, for instance, the attitude of powerful 
Manila-based Spanish actors, including the church, changed frequently. 
Pleas for expulsion took turns with pleas for friendly relations and closer 
collaboration. In general, memoranda of Castilian bureaucrats lack evidence 
that East Asian settlers would have been regarded as subdued to the Castil-
ian Crown. Hernando de los Ríos Coronel is a crucial f igure when it comes to 
understanding Spain’s varying attitudes in administering the multicultural 
society of Manila. In a period when the Spanish Philippines rejoiced in 
mutually beneficial trade and the beginning of rather stable relations with 
Tokugawa Japan, Ríos Coronel tarnished the metropolis in Madrid with an 
anti-Japanese spirit: In an audience with the Consejo de Indias in Madrid in 
1603, he promoted expelling all Japanese ‘because they were thin-skinned 
people who easily get caught up in rows with the Spanish’.57 This xenophobic 
period had already begun a few years earlier, when the interim Governor 
Antonio de Morga expelled 12,000 Chinese in 1596. Such recurring repression 
usually followed minor clashes between Spanish and East Asian settlers.58
By the end of the 1580s, both a Chinese and a Japanese town existed 
in Manila. Both grew fast compared to the Spanish settlement in Intra-
muros (literally, ‘inside the city walls’).59 The scarcity of settlers negatively 
affected the Spanish governing power. Demographic trends contributed 
both to xenophobia and to attempts to live in peace and harmony. Although 
57 Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, pp. 22-23; author’s translation.
58 Cf. Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 341. It remains doubtful whether Morga’s account is reliable. 
BR 10, pp. 81-82: ‘It would be very advantageous forcibly to eject all the Sangleyes who are scat-
tered throughout the islands – namely, those who are protected by the alcalde mayor and the 
religious – because of the money that they take out of the country, and the injury they cause to 
it.’ Antonio de Morga further reported that a minor argument between a Japanese and a Castilian 
settler had led to a major armed battle. See also Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 24.
59 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, pp. 235-240; Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parian’, 
pp. 76-81. The Manila census of 1634 gives insights into their occupations and social status.
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most Spaniards understood that with a de facto presence of strong states 
nearby, systematic discrimination policies bore little fruit; rampant suspicion 
inhibited sustainable multiethnic integration. Tactics of demonstrating 
power and grandeur, as had been tested in the Americas did not have the 
desired effect, nor could the colonial government always afford it. More 
money was needed for imperial representation, as Governor Tello hinted 
in a letter to Spain. The meagre output of his encomienda was not enough 
to represent the glory of his king in light of the daily coming and going of 
subjects of grand kings and nations in Manila.60 The absence of Iberian 
cultural representation, as hinted by Tello, gave rise to a more dominant 
East Asian atmosphere in Manila.
Intramuros
One of the characteristics of Manila that it shared with other enclaves in Asia 
was the walled city. Immediately after its establishment, Spanish Intramuros 
was considered the social, religious, and military capital of a territorial 
colony.61 Like other Spanish colonial capitals, Manila was also considered a 
ciudad de españoles. A special body of law was fashioned exclusively for Span-
ish settlers and silver merchants from Mexico. In an average year about 200 
Spaniards came to Manila, yet a large number also went back to Mexico or 
Spain.62 The fortif ied centre, that reflected sixteenth-century rational Span-
ish urban design with regular and broad streets, squares for representation, 
and the cathedral, hosted both the headquarters of the colonial government 
and the residential area for higher-ranking Spanish townspeople.63
Manila’s stone walls replaced spiritual walls to a large extent. The concept 
of ‘spiritual walls’ or religious frontiers, a major success in American settle-
ments, was clearly inadequate for the Philippines, where strong opposition 
from neighbouring Muslim domains challenged Spanish spiritual rule.64 
The existence of walls is interesting in terms of creating space: it served 
60 AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 7. n. 61, ‘Carta de Tello sobre posible ataque de Japón’, 19 May 1597: ‘Y 
certif ico a Vuestra Magestad que el sueldo que aquí tengo no me alcanza al gasto y presentación 
de casa y creados y todo es necesario a quien aquí representa la real persona de Vuestra Magestad 
avista de tan grande reinos y tantas naciones extrañas como aquí entran y salen cada día.’
61 Díaz-Trechuelo (2003), ‘Legazpi’, pp. 49-66.
62 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 15.
63 Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, pp. 38-40.
64 See also Kagan (2000), ‘World without Walls’, pp. 117-152. Manila is not even mentioned in 
the study. For the history of conflict and compromise between Spaniards and neighbouring 
Muslims, see Majul (1973), Muslims in the Philippines.
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geopolitical purposes and empowered religious orders over non-Spanish 
settlements. Backed by the King, who had assigned friars an intermediary 
position between the Spanish colonisers and other ethnicities, clergymen 
used to settle outside the stone barriers. This step allowed them to place 
their missionary projects right in the settlements of the indigenous or 
migrants from East Asia. Yet, constructing urban space for the sake of 
controlling multicultural neighbourhoods ‘from above’ was by no means 
an Iberian peculiarity. In Bantam (prior to the arrival of the Dutch in 1596) 
and Ayutthaya, a walled centre was surrounded by separate quarters for 
ethnic neighbourhoods of different origins, including Chinese, Malays, 
Chams, Japanese, Indians, Arabs and Persians.65 Similar policies were also 
common practice in Macao and Nagasaki, and in the eighteenth century 
in Dutch Batavia.66 Ordinary Portuguese in Macao were not allowed to 
enter Chinese mainland without special authorisation. A strictly controlled 
gate impeded interaction between Cantonese and Portuguese citizens.67 In 
Canton, ethnic Chinese were for a long time not allowed to stay within the 
foreign quarters after nightfall.68 For Anthony Reid, the European-ruled 
port cities Manila, Batavia, Melaka, Makassar, Penang, and Singapore all 
shared a history of ‘racial discrimination by the ruling class and eventual 
collaboration with the Chinese middlemen minorities’.69
Parian
Before long, the large numbers of private Fujianese traders attracted to 
Manila made the Spanish authorities suspicious. Once their number had 
reached several thousands in the early 1580s they were assigned their own 
quarter, the Parian70, located just outside Intramuros.71 The Parian became 
65 Lockard (2012), ‘Sea Common to All’, p. 241.
66 The Batavian government put heavy taxes on the practice of Chinese rites; moreover, at 
times, women were not allowed to immigrate. See Blussé (2003), ‘Kongkoan’, p. 96.
67 Villiers (1980), ‘Silk and Silver’, p. 70.
68 Dyke (2011), Merchants of Canton, p. 13.
69 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 56.
70 Regarding the origin of the term ‘parian’, an early Chinese settler, Miguel Onte, claimed 
that the word derived from Tagalog, meaning the same as alcaicería (silk market) in Castilian. 
According to James Warren, ‘parian’ means ‘marketplace’ in Tagalog. Warren (2012), ‘Weather’, 
p. 188. Earlier generations of scholars have debated whether the word is of Chinese or Mexican 
origin. Evidence that it is not a Chinese word can be found in the fact that the Chinese referred 
to the Parian as chien-nei: Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parian’, pp. 68-69.
71 Records on the exact date for the establishment of the f irst Parian vary between 1576 and 
1581. In the course of the seventeenth century not only did the number of Chinese settlers 
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the off icial silk market and theoretically the exclusive district for Chinese 
retail and artisans’ shops.72 For easier distinction, colonial authorities 
encouraged clear spatial boundaries between Christian and non-Christian 
Chinese. Binondo became the f irst quarter for Christian Chinese settlers. 
Baybay and Tondo hosted 2000 Chinese in 1589. In 1594 the parish of St 
Gabriel was founded for the Christian Chinese with Filipino wives and their 
children, mestizo de Sangley, across the Pasig River.
A church was one of the f irst proper constructions in these neighbour-
hoods. In 1597 both Binondo and Baybay had one church offering the 
Christian doctrine in Chinese, by Castilian friars, for instance, by Fray Juan 
de San Pedro Martir, vicar of the villages San Gabriel and Tondo.73 There are 
few accounts on the exact number of Christian Chinese; according to the 
f irst baptism register of Santos Reyes kept in the Dominican Convent in 
Quezon City/Manila, 155 Chinese were baptised from 1618 to 1619, whereas 
Diego Aduarte spoke of a total of 4752 until 1633.74 The Spaniards under-
stood that the Parian of Tondo was home to Christian Chinese, whereas 
the parians just outside Intramuros, Baybay and Binondo, were inhabited 
by non-Christian Chinese (sangleyes infieles).75 The Parian of Santa Cruz, 
for instance, remained under Jesuit supervision.76 In the early years, the 
Parian was supervised by the Dominicans and guarded by watchmen, whose 
number could be increased if necessary.77 Following an order by Governor 
Santiago de Vera, they built a wooden church and houses in the alcaicería.78 
Over the years, parians would grow in number, yet the number of parians 
as well as houses inside these Chinese quarters would be limited in order 
increase, but so did the number of their settlements. Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parian, pp. 84-
90; According to one Chinese settler, the f irst Parian was already opened in 1576: See Escribanía 
403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.
72 According to a letter by Governor Dasmariñas to King Philip II of the year 1591, cf. Santamaria 
(1966), ‘Chinese Parián’, p. 90: ‘Within the city is the silk-market of the Parian where the Chinese 
merchants trade. They have 200 stores which probably employ more than 2,000 Chinese.’ For a 
detailed synthesis of the history of the Parian, see Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 142-194. A concise and 
compelling study based on ample, multilingual material with fascinating visual sources is Ollé 
(2008), ‘Relaciones’, pp. 65-80.
73 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 128. 
74 AGI Contaduría 368, 71, ff. 86v-87v, cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 174-176.
75 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 103; BR 36, p. 91.
76 Torres-Lanzas (1928), Catálogo, p. 259.
77 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: In 1595 Antonio de Morga founded 
a Parian in San Gabriel, which also happened to burn down. Thereafter a new Parian was built 
about 600 steps away from the main gate.
78 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 506.
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to minimise Chinese expansion all over the archipelago and into regions 
with only a small number of Spaniards.79
The original Parian was rebuilt several times from 1581 until 1595, when 
it eventually settled outside the city walls. Originally, houses were built 
of wood and reeds and thus easily destroyed by f ire. Some scholars have 
argued that the Chinese were not allowed to build using stone, either due 
to a shortage in construction material or because of outright Spanish dis-
crimination.80 Bishop Salazar acknowledged that under the governorship 
of Santiago de Vera, many Chinese houses were covered with f ire resistant 
tiles; as a consequence of the solid building policy the parian of the Chinese 
became an eyesore, if not a sight worth visiting for its beauty, than for curios-
ity thanks to signs and placards written in Chinese characters and lanterns 
decorating its alleys.81 A 1638 document explains that the Parian hosted a 
specif ic street for every craft or trade. Early in the morning the streets were 
f illed with Chinese people praising their goods.82 The Parian was also fa-
mous for its well-functioning canals used for transporting goods.83 Being a 
centre for proselytising ‘heathens’ it hardly seems surprising that the church 
was described as a magnif icent structure partially as a result of f inancial 
support for the building from the Chinese community. The ‘common money 
pot’ (Chinese public budget) mentioned in this context is of major interest. 
Allegedly Christian and non-Christian Chinese deposited altogether no 
less than 20,000 pesos annually.84 Additionally, like in other Chinatowns 
in South East Asia, cultural life focused on ancestor worshipping.85
79 Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 294, based on a cédula of 1606. 
80 One of them is Daus (1987), Manila, pp. 40-41. He suggests the concept of architectural 
boundaries.
81 BR 7, p. 225.
82 Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 321.
83 BR 7, p. 228; See also Domingo de Salazar, O.P., letter to the King on 24 June 1590, cf. Retana 
(ed.) (1895/96), Archivo, vol. 3, p. 68: ‘In the remaining space within the four fronts of the Parián 
is a large pond, which receives water from the sea through an estuary. In the middle of the pond 
is an islet, where the Sangleys who commit crimes receive their punishment, so as to be seen 
by all. The pond beautif ies the Parián and proves to be of great advantage, because many ships 
sail into it through the aforesaid estuary at high tide, and bring to the Parián all the supplies, 
which are distributed thence all over the city.’
84 Medina (1630), Historia, p. 101: ‘tenían una caja de comunidad, para gastos que se ofrecen’. 
Gil describes a similar phenomenon as ‘Caxa del Parian’. See Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 290-297. The 
institution started in Binondo and used to sustain the hospital and to support members of the 
community in need. Initially 2 reals were collected from all inhabitants. Governor Silva approved 
of the project in 1609. Similarities exist with the original kongkoan, the Chinese Council of 
Batavia, described by Blussé (2003), ‘Kongkoan’, p. 96.
85 Reid (2010), Imperial Alchemy, p. 55.
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The numbers of shops grew rapidly from 185 in 1588 to 200 in 1591.86 Other 
sources claim that the hundred shops of 1595 had quadrupled by 1603, when 
according to Governor Acuña 4000 Chinese permanently crowded in the 
Parian. For their shops they had to pay rent; during the seventeenth century 
rent remained with the Chinese possession, which speaks in favour of their 
quasi property rights.87 The Parian of Salazar’s account was reported to be 
much larger than the first Parian ‘because on the firm ground where the four 
rows of buildings are located they have built their houses and the streets 
leading through the Parián, a separate street for each row of buildings. 
There are long passages and the buildings are quadrangular in shape’.88
All Chinese neighbourhoods were secluded areas to which the residents 
had to return at night with the exception of bakers, gardeners, and domestic 
staff serving Spanish households, who could stay within the city walls.89 
The Parian’s ghetto-like characteristics are one of the reasons why migra-
tion scholars are sceptical about Spanish achievements in the treatment of 
Fujianese settlers. Indeed, the ruling class explicitly hampered assimilation: 
The Chinese should remain Chinese.90 Dirk Hoerder even went as far as 
comparing sangley policies with the pogroms of the Jews and Moriscos in 
Spain, due to constant pressure to convert to Catholicism, the use of spiteful 
stereotypes, a heavy tax burden, and forced labour.91 While Spanish authori-
ties wished all Chinese to be good Christians, at the same time they preferred 
them not to become too ‘Hispanicised’ but easily distinguishable. However, 
seclusion policies were only effective to a limited extent. Clear evidence 
of rigid confinement to the Parian is missing and many accounts suggest 
that they were easily circumvented: Many Chinese settlers found a modus 
operandi to keep their shops within the city walls and return there on a daily 
basis.92 Their daily life happened among Spaniards inside the city walls, until 
the evening prayer that called them back to their allocated Parian.93
86 Ch’en (1968), Chinese Community, p. 107.
87 Cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 145-148.
88 BR 7, p. 224.
89 The Jesuits employed 500 Chinese for the cultivation of their gardens in the surroundings of 
Manila. See BR 10, p. 150: ‘They give each Sangley, for the portion of the garden which he works, 
one peso and one fowl each month.’ For the fascinating story of Sino-Jesuit co-operation in 
the Philippines I refer to De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, pp. 68-69. Father Sedeño, who decided that 
instead of Tagalog, the newly arrived Chinese should be ministered in Chinese, should receive 
special mention in this respect. Ollé (2006), ‘Formación’, p. 28.
90 Reid (1993), Expansion and Crisis, pp. 311-319.
91 Hoerder (2002), Cultures, 179.
92 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 91 (1597).
93 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.
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The outstanding role of Manila’s expat Fujianese community even 
features in Ming Chinese accounts; off icial China was well aware of the 
Spanish desire to keep the number of huaqiao as small as possible, as 
well as of Spanish attempts to expel them, if felt necessary.94 Based on 
the off icial Chinese perspective it is indeed doubtful how tolerant the 
atmosphere was in multicultural Manila. An evaluation and comparison 
with the situation of Japanese settlers follows in the next chapter.
Japanese Towns
Legend has it that the Japanese used to live among the Spaniards of In-
tramuros before they were assigned their own residential district. 95 Yet 
already in the 1580s and thus much earlier than shuinsen trade set people in 
motion, the Spanish ruling elite felt the community of ‘arrogant’ sojourners 
from Japan was too large and too diff icult to control and designated them 
a separate quarter called Dilao in 1585.96 Dilao was close to the Chinese 
Parian in San Gabriel, where Fujianese and Japanese used to trade silk. 
The Japanese lived under the supervision of the Franciscan Order, whose 
members would become the most inf luential ‘Spanish’ missionaries in 
Japan a few years later. One signif icant difference with the Chinese Parian 
was that the Japanese actively tended to seclude themselves and build their 
own settlements, as we have seen with the case of Aparri. For that reason, 
scholarship on Dilao, (a.k.a. the ‘Parian of the Japanese’97) has created an 
image of a fairly independent village.98 Within a few years, the place turned 
into a lively Japanese town. When in June 1606, the f iscal of the Audiencia, 
Rodriguez Diaz Guiral, visited the Japanese settlement for an inspection, 
he counted 91 shops and lodgings.99 The Overseas Japanese who lived there 
were granted a certain form of self-governance over the following decades.100
94 Ch’en, Chinese Community, p. 143, summarised records of the Ming shi and Dongxi yangkao.
95 Ortiz Armengol (1958), Intramuros.
96 Colín, Labor Evangélica (1900-1902), vol. 1, p. 37. ‘Dilao’ was a Tagalog word for yellow and 
also refers to a medical plant with yellow f lowers.
97 Gil (1991), Hidalgos y Samurais, pp. 102-103.
98 Iwao (1937), Nanyō.
99 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 5, p. 101; Wray (2001), ‘Japanese Diaspora’, p. 23: ‘The 
Japanese in Manila were at one point much more numerous, reaching a peak of about 3000 
residents in the early 1620s. However, following the suspension of the vermillion-seal ships 
their numbers fell more quickly than those of other towns [e.g. Batavia, Ayutthaya, or Hoi An]. 
By 1637, there were only 800 compared to 2000 Spanish residents, and 20,000 Chinese, but they 
also seem to have survived longer than Japanese in other towns.’
100 Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 182; Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 315.
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Even though the number of Japanese residents was much smaller than 
that of the Chinese, they are said to have caused serious trouble for the 
Spanish authorities. In particular, tensions with Hideyoshi and Spanish 
encounters with wakō tarnished the image of the inhabitants of Dilao. In the 
period between 1605 and 1609, a series of riots occurred. After an uprising 
in 1606, the Jesuit Gracián described them as the ‘Spaniards of Asia’.101 A 
further aspect of their troublemaker image rooted in the merchants’ request 
for extraterritoriality in Manila, a claim no other trading nation made at 
that time.102 Often turbulent and resentful to controlling measures, they 
generally conducted themselves as though they were conscious of the sup-
port of their rulers at home, who were known for taking ‘national’ honour 
very seriously. Hence, Japanese settlers could act more independently than 
Fujianese settlers, who could not count on the patronage of the Chinese 
authorities.103 After a Japanese riot in 1607 the settlement was temporarily 
destroyed but soon re-erected. A second Japanese quarter, known as San 
Miguel, followed in 1615 and lasted until 1768. It belonged under the jurisdic-
tion of Tondo and hosted exiled Christian Japanese men and women under 
Jesuit supervision.104 William D. Wray has divided Japanese emigrants in 
three categories: (1) the vermillion-seal ship businessmen, (2) Christian 
refugees, and (3) military people, including mercenaries and low-rank 
samurai. The last group left the country due to increasing political and 
social pressure and consisted mainly of opponents of the Tokugawa clan.105
Similar to Fujianese merchants, sea-going Japanese brokers’ high degree 
of mobility raised suspicion among the colonial off icers.106 For almost 50 
years the Japantowns or nihonmachi (日本町) Dilao, San Miguel, and a third 
settlement in Cavite, retained a cultural atmosphere reflective of Japan.107 
Its residents continued to use their mother tongue, to wear kimonos and 
other traditional dress, and to maintain their native cooking.108 Curiously, 
the community managed to preserve certain Japanese customs and tradi-
tions for many years, as a Chinese record of the early eighteenth century 
101 De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 362.
102 Igawa (2010), ‘Toyotomi Hideyoshi’, p. 77. 
103 Schurz (1985), Manila Galleon, p. 99.
104 Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, p. 749; BR 36, p. 92.
105 Wray (2001), ‘Japanese Diaspora’, p. 8. See Dainihon shiryō, pp. 12-38, Genna 7, month 7, day 
27, cf. Matsui (2009), ‘Legal Position’, p. 29. Also mentioned by Bhattacharya (2005), ‘Making 
Money’, pp. 1-20.
106 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 342, refers to an account of 1621.
107 For the success stories of other Japanese overseas communities in Ayutthaya, Hoi An, or 
Tonkin, see Iwao (1958), Shuinsen.
108 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 282; Morga (1890), Sucesos, p. 367.
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indicates.109 This indeed implies that most Japanese in Manila were not 
willing to assimilate to the society of their new home country and shows 
that they did not experience a lot of pressure to intermarry since a relatively 
large number of Japanese women migrated together with Japanese men.
A Flexible Labour Market?
What is even more interesting than the question of how East Asians ended 
up in Manila, is why they stayed and under what circumstances. In order to 
provide reasonable answers it will f irst of all be necessary to differentiate 
between the East Asian migrants’ backgrounds. Even within that compara-
tively small group one encounters various types, which moreover changed 
considerably over time. The largest group was the above-cited maritime 
actors, namely sailors, merchants, and f ishermen, who spent parts of their 
lives at sea. Members of this group flocked to Manila mainly from Fujian 
and a lesser degree from Guangzhou, Kyushu, and Sakai for the prospect 
of a steady income and a better living standard. Quantitative data offers 
insights into their rags-to-riches stories. When the Ming Ministry of War 
estimated in the 1630s that 100,000 Fujianese came to Manila annually,110 we 
must not take it literally. Nevertheless, it gives a rough idea of the number of 
Chinese workers, as well as of the availability of work in Manila. Fujianese 
port city dwellers provided abundant skills to satisfy colonial demand. 
A maritime curriculum vitae could turn from piracy to a settled life of 
security and stability. Towards the end of the sixteenth century when jobs 
were easily found in Spanish construction projects, agriculture, or in the 
harbour, day labourers without a secure position or f ixed income became 
a common sight in Manila. The daily wage of non-professional East Asian 
workers was 1 real without meals.111 Discussing Chinese indentured labour 
in British colonial settings, Adam McKeown defined Chinese labour as a 
commodity. His assertion that ‘mobilization and exchange of labour were 
indispensable aspects of expanding markets and trade’112 also makes a valid 
point for Manila. We may even assume that mobile labour was a specif ic 
109 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 365-367.
110 Brook (2010), Troubled Empire, p. 225: ‘For the people living along the coast have no other 
way to make a livelihood’, wrote a Fujian petitioner in 1639. ‘The poorest always band together 
and go to sea to make a living. The most coastal restrictions are tightened, they have no way to 
get food, so they turn to plundering the coast.’
111 BR 7, p. 229.
112 McKeown (2011), ‘Social Life’, p. 62. 
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development in Manila and that during the early decades the existence of an 
abundant workforce replaced slave labour of previous, and the indentured 
labour of later centuries.113 These circumstances even inspired the Crown to 
revise the old system of repartimiento in 1609.114 Modif ications foresaw the 
integration of East Asian settlers into work for the Crown, such as personal 
assistance, public construction and naval services for a ‘just salary’.115
A second group, whose members were all resident Fujianese, consisted 
of retailers and artisans; many of them managed to open their own busi-
nesses in Manila. They dominated all important service branches, worked 
as gardeners, carpenters, bakers, butchers, painters, smiths and goldsmiths, 
or produced bricks and lime. 116 Although Japanese likewise engaged in 
Manila’s service sector, without Chinese diligence and commitment, the 
Spaniards could not have built f ine houses at low cost. Fujianese residents 
were fully aware of how essential they were to the material welfare 
of the islands,117 in an urban climate dominated by ad hoc cooperation 
and improvised cooperation. In fact, the circumstances in early modern 
Manila gave the allegedly exploited and suppressed power over the ruling 
elite. Chinese control of the majority of respectable professions, including 
shipbuilders, translators, or linguists ( jurebassos, naguatatos, or lenguas), 
put them into influential positions in the urban community.118 Linguists, 
in particular, had the means to manipulate information in favour of their 
community or benefactors.119 In theory, a rise in their social status was only 
possible if the East Asians were to convert to Christianity. But even if they 
113 See Seijas (2008), ‘Portuguese Slave Trade’, p. 21: Portuguese became the primary suppliers 
of slaves (both Black and Asian) for the Spaniards beginning as early as 1580s; For the general 
situation of slaves in the Philippines, see Scott (1991), Slavery.
114 Nuchera (1995), Encomienda, p. 241.
115 AGI Filipinas 36, n. 62, ‘Carta de Miguel Talledo pidiendo empleo’, 9 November 1611.
116 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 109: Capitán Juan de México, 
1614: ‘En esta ciudad no hay personas que usen los of icios que son necesarios en una republica 
sino son los sangleyes los cuales los usan y van a parar a sus manos todas las cosas que son 
necesarias para los dichos of icios y así de ninguna suerte se puede excusar el trato y comercio 
con los dichos sangleyes.’ See also BR 7, pp. 228-229.
117 According to records in AGI Escribanía 403B some Castilian inhabitants of Manila employed 
up to eight Chinese in their households.
118 The word was commonly used for ‘interpreter’ in early modern South East Asia. See Kaisla-
niemi (2009), ‘Jurebassos and Linguists’, pp. 60-73. For jurebassos in Manila, see Cocks (1883), Diary, 
p. 334, where he mentioned Hernando Ximenes as a jurebasso who offered his service in Bantam 
and Manila in 1622. Early Spanish colonisers in the Philippines used the term naguatatos for 
Chinese interpreters and linguists, deriving from Mexican Nahuatl. See Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 784.
119 I have discussed the role of Chinese interpreters and intermediaries in a recent compilation 
on Asian maritime worlds: Tremml-Werner (2014), ‘Communication Challenges’, pp. 235-255.
286 SPAIN, CHINA, AND JAPAN IN MANILA, 1571-1644
did, baptism hardly ever made them devoted Christians. Some Japanese 
residents managed to accumulate a certain amount of wealth and social 
status by running their own shops, trading the cargo of the Japanese ships 
or f inding employment as captains, sailors, soldiers, personal assistants, or 
mercenaries for the Spanish.120 Initially, control was linked with strategic 
evangelisation, for one part because it was believed that Christians were 
theoretically more submissive and for another part because only Christians 
could legally be integrated into forced labour arrangements. However, the 
Philippines proved to be very different from other Spanish colonial experi-
ences despite the efforts of numerous friars so that even Philip II lamented 
that not a single Chinese on the island was a believer anymore.121
A third group consisted of (maritime) mercenaries. The phenomenon 
dates back to the wakō raids along coastal China in the 1550s, when 
mercenaries, who were recruited from the civilian population, became 
the backbone of coastal defence. It re-emerged with slightly different 
characteristics in the 1620s during the smuggling boom on the Fujianese 
coast and Dutch collaborations with Chinese illicit traders.122 Japanese 
maritime mercenaries, whose members often came from rōnin (jp., 浪人), 
samurai without a lord, who emerged during the Warring States period and 
in particular after the Battle of Sekigahara (1600) and the Battle of Osaka 
(1615). They had offered their services a few decades earlier – for instance, 
in the infamous Cambodia expedition of Diego Belloso and Blas Ruiz in 
1598.123 In 1615, Governor Silva employed Japanese military personnel of 
several hundred on a fleet of 15 ships against the Dutch, who penetrated 
the Moluccas.124 Military assistance was one specif ic form of semi-private 
Hispano-Japanese collaboration. The Japanese also offered their service to 
the Dutch and to the Portuguese in Macao.125 As far as maritime mercenaries 
were concerned the line between voluntary and indentured service was 
120 Okada, Katō (1983), Nichiō kōryū, p. 157.
121 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 91 (1597).
122 Cheng (2013), War, Trade and Piracy, pp. 13; 42.
123 Morga (1890), Sucesos, p. 43.
124 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 291. According to Iwao, Silva’s squadron consisted of 15 ships, for which 
he took 500 Japanese into his service.
125 In this context, see also Clulow (2007), ‘Japanese Mercenaries’, pp. 15-34. See Iwao (1937), 
Nanyō, pp. 246-256, for the fascinating example of Yamada Nagamasa, who commanded 700 
Japanese mercenaries. Boxer (1963), Great Ship, p. 82: In 1612 many Japanese served as personal 
assistants, replacing black slaves.
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particularly blurred, as an example of a Chinese mutiny on the Moluccas 
expedition of 1593, discussed below, will show.126
A common paradigm in migration studies is that work is the key to 
positive social integration. The picture above obscures certain ambigui-
ties of the system. Although the division of labour in Manila indicates an 
advanced economic structure that allowed the integration of the Chinese 
work force, off icial policies remained conservative, stipulating that only 
those absolutely necessary for services the Spanish could not perform 
should remain in Manila.127
It goes without saying that the indigenous population played a vital 
part in Manila. The indigenous did affect social policies despite their 
marginal role in foreign trade. The manner in which this happened under 
less deliberate and less free conditions as for East Asian settlers has already 
been discussed in chapter 2. Only when the Chinese were unwilling or 
unable to satisfy the demands of the labour market could the Governor 
assign native people.128 Through intermarriage parts of the indigenous com-
munity became linked to the Chinese population. Such bonds were already 
common among Chinese traders visiting the archipelago in pre-Hispanic 
times.129 The number of Sino-Filipino families grew and with the mestizo 
de sangley, an entirely new group of colonial settlers, appeared. Thanks 
to a high level of bilingualism, their familiarity with the Hispanic culture 
compared to people born outside the Philippines, the Spaniards found 
it easier to trust them. Hence they qualif ied as linguists for the colonial 
government as ladino en lengua castellano (sp., ‘Castilian language experts’) 
and accompanied the judges on their inspections of incoming merchant 
vessels from Fujian.130
Spanish and Portuguese accounts are f illed with references to Chinese 
and Japanese servants, usually with Christian names, who worked as 
interpreters and we have reason to believe that some of them were unfree 
individuals as recent research has shown that the Portuguese slave trade 
126 ARSI Phil 16, ff. 157-161v: Esc il Gov. G.P. ‘Dasmariñas per andare a Maluco: egli avienne una 
violenza e disgratiata norte.’
127 BR 10, pp. 81-85.
128 Cf. Nuchera (1995), Encomienda, p. 241: ‘Si estos no quisieran o no pudieran satisfacer las 
demandas laborales, se facultaba al gobernador para que convenciese a los naturales a que 
acudiesen a tales trabajos.’
129 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 703-742.
130 Famous interpreters include Nicolás Ramírez from Binondo and Juan Sanson/Sauson, both 
mestizos de sangley f luent in Castilian. Cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 41.
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in South East Asia included people from China and Japan.131 Shipbuilding 
in the yards of Cavite was a further example of close collaboration between 
Chinese and Filipino labour under the supervision of Spanish experts, with 
f ixed wages.132 For that reason, members of all Catholic orders were present 
in Cavite for the spiritual welfare of indigenous and foreign labour.133 Those 
who did not f ind employment with construction worked as ironsmiths, 
forging nails and bolts, tacks, and other things needed. According to a 
Spanish record of 1619, ‘the native Indians who are smiths are paid twelve 
reals per month, and the [S]angley Chinese smiths twenty-eight reals per 
month, and their ratio of rice which is equivalent to one-half a Spanish’.134 In 
comparison Chinese wages had barely changed in 30 years. Next to Filipino 
shipwrights, Filipino mariners were sought after on all Spanish maritime 
enterprises in Asia. Their nautical knowledge, in particular of the peril-
ous seas surrounding the archipelago, made them indispensable.135 Both 
Chinese and natives signed on the trans-Pacif ic galleons, and a signif icant 
number used that position to remain in New Spain. Edward R. Slack has 
thus argued that the Chinese were remarkably mobile within the Spanish 
Pacif ic. In Mexico they left their imprint in urban handicrafts and social 
institutions.136
The strong position of Chinese in Manila is particularly evident in their 
insuff iciently studied role as moneylenders. On a temporarily expanding 
Manila market with increasingly elaborate exchange they were sought 
after by Spaniards short of money. Ironically, Chinese moneylenders stood 
in for those waiting for the silver carried on the galleon as the following 
example shows: In 1610, about 480 borrower’s notes (for 3 pesos each) from 
the Chinese to the Spanish were outstanding.137 This led to the curious situ-
ation that Chinese merchants acted as capitalists offering loans to Spanish 
merchants,138 and unmistakably demonstrate how Spanish attempts to 
monopolise the galleon trade failed.
131 De Sousa, Breites Manso (2011) ‘Os Portugueses’; BR 9, p. 45: For instance, Luis, who worked 
as servant for the Spanish merchant Juan de Solís, served as interpreter during Juan Cobo’s 
embassy to Japan 1592.
132 Scott (1981), Boat Building, pp. 17-18.
133 BR 36, p. 95. 
134 BR 18, pp. 175-176.
135 Scott (1981), Boat Building, p. 19: The author argues that in particular the Bernardino Straits 
between Luzon and Samar were hard to cross without local knowledge.
136 Slack (2010), ‘Sinifying Mexico’, p. 11.
137 Medina (1630), Historia, p. 102.
138 Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 183; BR 13, p. 219.
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The fact that the Chinese dominated several sectors implies their swift 
adaptation and appropriation of necessary skills that corresponded to any 
change in material culture or modif ied practices.139 This inevitably leads 
to such fancy concepts as cultural transfer. In the context of this study 
the def inition of ‘cultural transfer’ clearly needs to be questioned. While 
it is commonly understood as the adaptation of knowledge to established 
ideas and practices it implies a willingness to learn.140 Foreign residents of 
Manila doubtlessly acquired new skills when working for the Spaniards, yet 
the degree of unconscious accommodation must have been very high, as 
the example of worship paintings and church furniture implies. Bookbind-
ing is another particularly interesting example of Chinese adaptability: 
although a new craft that the Chinese learnt in Manila, they mastered it 
quickly thanks to their familiarity with Asian traditions of paper, letters, 
and scripts.141 Within a few years, they gained a reputation of being very 
gifted with their hands, industrious and moreover produced goods cheaply. 
Their ability to copy almost any product after a short period of time was 
admired by many Spaniards. Manila’s overall positive climate for cultural 
exchange gradually increased the quality of the products manufactured 
there.142 Sangley manufactures enriched Manila’s urban society. Yet while 
Chinese entrepreneurs created a vibrant economic climate, the Spanish 
production sector remained small and was no competition for the Chinese. 
Spanish residents held positions as encomenderos, landowners, merchants, 
bureaucrats, or ecclesiastical authorities, but only very few made money by 
providing their fellow countrymen with daily necessities.143 This being the 
job of the Chinese, the Japanese, and the indigenous population, primary 
and secondary sectors depended almost entirely on what was regarded as 
‘second-class citizens’.
139 For some effects of cultural transfer, see Osterhammel (1998), Entzauberung Asiens, pp. 25; 
29; 64-68; Osterhammel (2009), Verwandlung der Welt, pp. 28-45.
140 Berg (2004), ‘Pursuit of Luxury’, pp. 85-142; For the effects of cultural exchange on consump-
tion patterns, see Muslow (2003), ‘Konsumtheorie und Kulturtransfer’, p. 134.
141 Chia (2006), ‘Butcher’, pp. 509-534.
142 BR 7, p. 225: ‘They make much prettier articles than are made in España and sometimes 
so cheap that I am ashamed to mention it.’ BR 7: 226: Bishop Salazar praises their virtue of 
‘produc[ing] with exactness’.
143 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: Miguel Onte noted that 
‘non-Christian sangleyes have taken all jobs of the republic; they are shoemakers, tailors, 
smiths, carpenters, embroiderer goldsmiths, hatter, and all other necessary professions and 
the Spanish do not provide them, nor do they have more than f ive or six shops where they only 
send Castilian goods and presents’.
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This chapter on the Manila dream would not be complete without 
mentioning its dark side. For many people from mainland and insular 
Asia, who did not travel to Manila voluntarily, life in Manila ended in the 
nightmare of permanent servitude. Slavery was not new in insular South 
East Asia at the end of the sixteenth century. Enslavement of war captives 
continued without Spanish participation but as a by-product of Spanish 
colonial rule, challenged by the so-called Moro raids. Slaves from abroad 
challenged Spanish morality. Bishop Salazar asked the King’s advice on 
slaves from Melaka and India, whom the Portuguese brought to Manila to 
sell, wondering whether these people were free in the eyes of the King.144 
In the seventeenth century, under unsolvable demographic pressure, Span-
ish demand for slaves, either for employment as house servants (owners 
included even the church) or for work on the galleys, increased. Under 
these circumstances humans became a commodity on the Manila market. 
Portuguese maritime traders sustained the Spanish in the Philippines with 
unfree labour from China, Japan, and other Asian ports. Tatiana Seijas 
claimed that Hispanic purchasers in Manila preferred Asian over African 
slaves.145 She has furthermore shown that traff icking in slaves continued far 
into the seventeenth century despite legal barriers. By 1621, almost one-third 
(or 1970 out of a population of 6110) of the population of Intramuros was 
unfree. Fifteen years later, the number of slaves and black freedmen was 
such that the Governor actually recommended that 400 to 500 of these 
‘disorderly’ men be forcibly relocated to a nearby island under the care of 
Jesuits.146 Most recently, Lúcio de Sousa’s remarkable research on Portuguese 
slave traff icking practices in East Asia has stressed the f irm ties with the 
market in Manila.147 Portuguese merchants started as early as in the 1550s 
to buy and sell Asians. At the turn of the century, Manila became increas-
ingly involved. Traff icking practices relocated huge numbers of Chinese, 
Japanese, and Koreans; many of them women and children, either came 
to Manila on transit or found their new home there.148 Some of them even 
ended up in Europe or were shipped to Mexico, while members of the church 
often collaborated with the slave traders to legalise transactions.149
144 Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, pp. 77-78.
145 Seijas (2008), ‘Portuguese Slave Trade’, p. 22.
146 AGI Filipinas 330-4-40v-42r, ‘Real Cédula’, 1638, cf. Seijas, ‘Portuguese Slave Trade’, p. 21.
147 De Sousa (2013), ‘16-17 seiki’, pp. 229-281.
148 Lorenzo (1996), Manila-Acapulco Slave Trade.
149 De Sousa (2013), ‘16-17 seiki’, pp. 242-249; Oropeza (2011), ‘Esclavitud asiática’, pp. 5-57.
8 Actors and Agency
Everyday Life Constraints: Head Taxes, Revenues, Residence 
Permits
Shifting focus to a micro history of social constraints of individuals in 
Manila ideally involves access to local voices. Yet, early modern local 
voices have hardly survived in written sources. So, if we want to study 
individuals in Manila we have to approach them through the institutions, 
which determined their lives. Controlling Fujianese settlers in Manila was 
closely intertwined with benefitting from them financially: colonial leaders 
charged various taxes and Chinese residence permits were mandatory.1 
Collecting revenue from the Fujianese hardly ever followed a clear pat-
tern. When in 1593 word of Fujianese grievances reached Madrid, the King 
decreed a more subtle way of taxation for the f irst time: Instead of paying 
the Governor, the alcalde mayor as direct Parian authority should be paid. 
Being a mere lip service the reform did not bring any real improvement. 
Colonial authorities continued to embezzle, while the Chinese often refused 
to pay their alcalde mayor in the early seventeenth century.2
Colonial off icials, such as Antonio de Morga, criticised the lack of clear, 
transparent book-keeping with regard to Manila’s external trade revenue, 
including almojarifazgo.3 Concerned about the migration of silver to China, 
Spaniards tried to cut potential losses with a complex system of differ-
ent sums of poll tax for the indigenous, the Chinese, and the Japanese 
populations. After they had experienced the f irst major wave of Chinese 
migration, 64 reals were charged for the privilege to stay, 12 reals for owning 
a house, and 5 reals as tribute.4 After 1611, per capita tribute was levied on 
the Chinese.5 Rafael Bernal stated that 8 pesos were collected annually from 
non-Christian Chinese. The tax burden imposed by Governor Juan de Silva 
(r. 1609-1616) brought in 80,000 pesos in 1621.6
The early-twentieth-century Japanese historian Murakami Naojirō 
presented quantitative data based on a compilation of decrees by Philip IV 
1 Audiencia oidores were in charge of issuing those permits. AGI Filipinas 76, n. 53, ‘Carta del 
Obispo de Nueva Segovia Diego de Soria, sobre alzamiento de sangleyes’, 8 July 1594.
2 Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 295.
3 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 48-49.
4 Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 333.
5 Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 47: An annual head tax was laid on the Chinese after 1611: 
Eight pesos annually for non-Chinese Christians.
6 Data based on Ríos Coronel 1621, cf. von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 232.
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of the year 1627. He acknowledged that newly converted Chinese were 
exempted from the payment of tribute for ten years.7 This points to an 
acknowledgment of their necessity and proves that foreigners could live 
comparatively freely in Manila; even if the ruling elite would not want 
to admit it. Along with the 1630s crisis in the South China Sea trade, the 
Spaniards seemed to try even more actively to lure Chinese to Manila, as 
can be seen in the significant increase of residence permits. In the year 1636, 
Governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (r. 1635-1644), who, on a slightly 
different note, was f ined for the loss of Taiwan in 1645,8 prided himself on 
his collection of between 11,000 and 13,000 licences. His diligent efforts in 
collecting head taxes gained the hacienda 170,000 pesos.9 Revenue from 
residence permits indeed peaked at 135,904 pesos in 1634, almost twice the 
amount of an average year in the 1610s.10
Although Chinese and Japanese are often mentioned together, we have 
reason to believe that the latter were treated differently. Spanish off icials 
used to complain that the Japanese merchants did not pay any custom fees 
when exchanging their silver for Chinese silk in Manila.11 While Iwao’s 
claim that Japanese traders had to pay the same entrance fee as the Chinese 
is convincing,12 there is no clear evidence for a head tax.13 Besides, Spanish 
authorities deliberately drew a clear line between Chinese and Japanese 
policy. Nothing served that purpose better than manipulating public 
opinion. In the early days, Chinese settlers were described in the brightest 
of colours as easy-going neighbours, being clean, well-educated and above 
all industrious.14 Stereotypes changed from ‘very unassuming and modest 
people’ and diligent, hard workers15 to ‘an unscrupulous race’ famous for 
adultery and sodomy.16 Twentieth-century scholarship likewise backs up a 
discourse of cultural clashes due to Spanish ignorance or arrogance, while 
7 Siehe Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, book 6, title 18, law 7 issued by Philip IV, 14 June 1627, 
cf. Murakami (1915), ‘Japan’s Early Attempt’.
8 AGI Escribanía de Cámara, 409B, ff. 407-409. cf. Borao et al. (2002), Spaniards in Taiwan, 
vol. 2, pp. 560-562.
9 Pastells (1933), Historia, vol. 8, p. 246.
10 Nuchera (1995), Encomienda, p. 241.
11 AGI Filipinas 29, n. 94, ‘Carta de los of iciales reales sobre varios asuntos’, 14 July 1607.
12 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 335.
13 Japanese residents certainly paid tribute in the 1630s. Iwao, p. 298. 218 tribute paying 
Japanese households were registered for the year 1637. Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 298.
14 BR 3, pp. 155-180.
15 BR 3, pp. 168; BR 7, pp. 228-229.
16 Morga in BR 10, pp. 83; 150. The archbishop of Manila, Ygnacio de Santibañez, wrote the 
account in June 1597 to Philip II. Medina (1630), Historia, pp. 68-69.
AC torS AND AgeNCy 293
more positive narratives of a mutually enriching port city environment 
are rare.17 Similar wavering tendencies can be traced for the ‘belligerent’ 
Japanese, a recurring label probably influenced by the Chinese, since Ming 
sources commonly describe the Japanese as always carrying weapons.18 
Contemporary Japan experts such as Francisco Xavier, Luís Froís, or Diego 
de Santa Catalina treated the same discourse as common knowledge.19 
To be fair, Chinese stereotypes of the folangji were hardly more flattering. 
Sixteenth-century Portuguese merchants were accused of kidnapping 
and eating children. This reputation goes back to an incident with Simão 
Andrade who purchased underage Chinese in Guangzhou to sell them as 
slaves in 1517; the rumour spread to the court in Beijing where it harboured 
ill feelings for many decades.20
Juridical Issues and Multicultural Conflicts
Diverse actors of different ethnicities, ranks, and religions required specif ic 
legal and administrative institutions. Similarly to commercial exchange 
policies, legal, and administrative institutions changed as a by-product of 
bargaining on the spot. Immigration and geopolitical threats created pe-
culiar social, urban, and juridical models. Manila’s ruling class initially set 
out to build a functioning multilayered urban society based on an elaborate 
administration and a specif ic juridical body, which was negotiated with the 
Crown over the years. Complex legal standards for different ‘nationalities’ 
were the consequence. The application of ethnic jurisdiction was assigned 
to the Governor.
The fact that representatives of the church became self-appointed guard-
ians of the Chinese in Manila in the late 1580s meant constant potential 
for friction with the civil government. Friars eagerly protected Chinese 
merchants’ interests and protested against unfair intervention of the colo-
nial authorities. In an attempt to solve some of the problems of Philippine 
society, Bishop Domingo de Salazar gathered together intellectuals and 
policymakers in 1582 to discuss new strategies for evangelising the Philip-
pines and empowering the Spaniards in the East.21 One of the questions 
17 Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, pp. 27-28.
18 Watanabe (2012), Kinsei Ryūkyū, p. 42.
19 AGI México 28, n. 49, ‘Carta del virrey marqués de Guadalcázar’, 13 March 1617.
20 Fok (1987), ‘Early Ming Images’, pp. 143-156. Wills (1998), ‘Relations’, pp. 337-338; Disney 
(2009), Portugal, pp. 141-144.
21 Camúñez (1988), Sínodo.
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addressed was whether the Governor should punish crimes according to 
Spanish law (Leyes de Indias or Laws of the Indies) or consider localist 
ethnic measures.22 Such dedicated efforts to integrate or at least consider 
‘other’ legal traditions were a novelty in Spanish imperial politics, differing 
fundamentally from earlier conquests on the Iberian archipelago or the 
Americas.23 All in all, the attitude of the metropolis concerning the jurisdic-
tion of the Chinese and Japanese was wavering and got constantly mixed 
up with the question of restricting Chinese f inancial gains in Manila.24 
Over the years reports on abuse increased and reformers in Spain, worried 
about an economic and moral collapse, joined in. Memorialists from the 
Philippines, including Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, or arbitristas such as 
Duarte Gomes Solis (Portuguese New Christian), who published a speech in 
favour of the East India Company in 1628, warned of worsening conditions 
and increasing social distress and urged the King to react. Duarte Gomes 
Solis even urged the King to invest in Far Eastern trade between Acapulco, 
Manila, and Goa.25
Overseas Chinese (Huaqiao) in Manila
According to China historian S.A.M. Adshead, Overseas Chinese communi-
ties in South East Asian Chinatowns had criminal potential because of the 
high number of small-scale, non-established private enterprises and un-
welcome, plebeian emigrants.26 Indeed, contemporary observations mostly 
22 Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 267.
23 Ladero Quesada (1995), ‘Spain circa 1492’, p. 100; BR 7, p. 221; Dasmariñas to Felipe II on 
20 June 20 1591. BR 8, p. 274: ‘From the pulpits they say that the governor is going to hell, because 
the Chinese have their laws, and we cannot dictate them unless we f irst govern ourselves 
according to the laws and customs which we found among the Indians of that country, because it 
was and is theirs.’ AGI Filipinas 76, n. 41, ‘Carta del obispo de Nueva Segovia Miguel de Benavides 
sobre quejas de los chinos’, 5 July 1598.
24 BR 7, pp. 154-155; BR 10, pp. 83-84: ‘The Sangleys should not be allowed to have Pariáns in 
certain towns of the islands, where there are but few Spaniards. The justices harbor them there 
for their own prof it, and the harvests that they gather from them and their ships, as in Manila. 
This might prove very harmful and injurious, and renders it necessary that, at the very least, 
the ship coming to trade shall dispose of its cargo as quickly as possible, and return to China 
with all those who come in it. It is only just that, when the Sangleyes arrive with their ships, 
they should observe the proclamations issued which prohibit them from bringing many people. 
Penalties should be exacted, and when the Sangleyes return they should take as many people 
as they can, thus relieving the country from the many here who are an injury to it.’
25 Boyajian (1993), Portuguese Trade, p. 237.
26 Adshead (1988), China, p. 210.
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deny the possibility for acculturation and this, the Spaniards believed, 
would justify the means for legal discrimination against the Chinese.27 It is 
important to note that legal discrimination was simply an administrative 
tool, which had hardly any impact on maritime trade. Initial resistance 
against Spanish trade control policies introduced in the days of Governor 
Ronquillo (r. 1583-1584) were soon replaced by resilient compromises. Nei-
ther restricting freedom of trade, nor the oppressive behaviour of Parian 
supervisors, stopped the Fujianese from frequenting Manila. As early as 1586 
positive steps towards a more peaceful co-existence led to the establishment 
of a protector of the natives and a protector of the Chinese (protector de 
los sangleyes).28 The position dated back to the governorship of Francisco 
de Sande, who appointed Benito de Mendiola as the f irst protector of the 
native population of Manila,29 had a two-folded agenda: on the one hand, 
protectors were in charge of controlling ethnic groups so they would not 
disturb Christian, social order; on the other hand, they assisted members 
of ethnic minorities in legal and political affairs and made sure they would 
not be cheated by other functionaries.30 In the case of the protector de los 
sangleyes, the off ice (with an average annual salary of 800 pesos) was often 
combined with the post of the f iscal off icer of the Audiencia.31 Benito de 
Mendiola, was the f irst protector de los sangleyes and he described abuses 
of Chinese by Spanish off icials.32 The case of Juan de Alvarado Bracamonte, 
off icial protector of the Chinese in the seventeenth century, shows that 
in certain cases the Chinese would have been better off without him.33 
As we have seen, friars were also committed to the non-Spanish popula-
tion. Dominican friars made special efforts to administer the huaqiao in 
Mandarin.34 Juan Cobo was one of the f irst four Chinese-versed priests. The 
issue of attending to the Chinese was politically of ever-growing importance 
27 In 1619, Chunquian, governor of the sangleyes, was excused of exploitation, fraud, and a 
general arbitrariness in dealing with Chinese residents. Cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 47.
28 See BR 6, pp. 167-168; Ch’en (1968), ‘Chinese Community’, p. 73: ‘A Protector of the Indians 
should be appointed, a Christian man, and with authority to defend them, and prosecute their 
suit [...]. The alcaicería and the care of the Chinese residing in Manila, be annexed to his off ice.’ 
29 Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, pp. 75-76. 
30 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 215; Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, p. 75. Usually they were of Spanish decent 
and enjoyed a f ixed income.
31 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 12, ‘Carta de Távora sobre la India, conflictos oidores’, 27 November 
1630.
32 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 75.
33 Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 223-225.
34 San Agustín (1698), Conquistas, p. 381.
296 SPAIN, CHINA, AND JAPAN IN MANILA, 1571-1644
and fuelled conflict between the church and the royal government. A few 
years later, Philip II sided with the friars, rejoicing that
they have started to preach the sangleyes in their language with a lot of 
success because they were docile people with good intentions, I order 
to favour and honour in everything that happens and animate them to 
continue so that it serves God most and before long a good number of 
religious would exist.35
Philip II intended to act as a just king in all matters concerning the Chinese 
in Manila. Relying on Bishop Salazar’s accounts, the Spanish monarch 
suggested providing the Chinese with legal representatives such as alcaldes 
mayores (sometimes referred to as capitanes) and regidores; he furthermore 
ordered that Christians among them should be allowed to elect their own 
mayor and municipal councils.36 But while the King was literally far away, 
his protégés were subject to discrimination. Chinese intellectual superiority 
especially distressed the Spaniards in Manila. Militating against an exces-
sive number of Chinese interpreters, Antonio de Morga insisted that ‘these 
Sangleys should not be afflicted as at present by any judges, constables, and 
interpreters – who, by various pretexts and calumnies, cheat and rob them, 
and perpetrate much fraud, coercion, and bribery’.37 And he urged stricter 
control of Chinese merchants whom he accused of ‘robbing the country, 
enhancing the value of articles, and imparting many bad habits and sins 
to the natives’. Having his own view on well-organised Chinese mercantile 
networks, de Morga furthermore interpreted their mobility on the islands 
as indication for spying activity likely to be used against Spanish sovereign-
ty.38 Given the persistent fear of a Chinese invasion, the government held 
exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction over the Chinese during these early 
years. Obedience and disobedience were closely intertwined in the realm 
of Chinese administration. While many deliberately subordinated to the 
will and jurisdiction of the colonial government, others took advantage of 
35 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 45 (1593).
36 See Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 71 (1591): ‘Por ser ya esta población de sangleyes 
de muchos vecinos, y que cada día se van aumentado se les podría conceder que hiziesen elección 
de alcaldes y regidores y otros of iciales de justicia y gobierno mayormente que es gente que 
vive con publicia.’ For election rights see ibid: ‘Que hiziesen elección de alcaldes y regidores y 
otros of iciales de justicia y gobierno mayormente que es gente que vive con publicia, y tienen 
discreción para governarse.’
37 BR 10, p. 82.
38 BR 10, p. 81.
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corrupt off icials. In addition, collaborations with indigenous people or the 
church were tempting due to these two groups’ access to the hinterland that 
would often serve as a welcome hideaway.
The agenda of multilayered jurisdiction stretched from settling regula-
tions to political competition between government off icials. The king’s act 
of good intentions of 1594 granted the Chinese their own alcalde capitán, 
a Castilian who often held other appointments such as e.g. regidor or pro-
curador.39 Ten years later, the Governor, who had been in charge of issuing 
residence licenses, was appointed protector of the Chinese. In terms of 
executing power, the capitán of the Parian had to obey the instructions of 
the King, respectively his representative in the Philippines, the Governor; 
and technically the Audiencia, who monitored him and could report abuse 
of authority.40 The earliest legislation to be found in the Laws of the Indies 
dealing with the government of the Chinese was enacted on 15 April 1603.41 
Although the Chinese had the right to appeal against their alcaldes, only 
a single judge was in charge of both civil and criminal cases of a total of 
20,000 settlers.42
Among other things, accumulation of off ices naturally had a negative 
impact on social and legal affairs in the Chinese community.43 Injustice has 
to be traced within the system.44 To begin with, the colonial government 
did not pay the alcalde of the Chinese a regular salary. Instead he was 
39 Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, book 2, title 5, law 55, cf. Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the 
Philippines’, p. 30.
40 For instance in the case of Marcos de la Cueba as recorded in AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 
de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: ‘En ir a hazer causas de diputación al dicho Parián siendo 
contra cédula expressa de Su Magestad que les prohibe al hazerlo y manda que privativamente 
el alcalde que fuere del Parián tenga el conocimiento de todas las causas de sangleyes que se 
ofrecieren sin que otra ninguna justicia se entremeta a conocer de ellas las qual dicha cédula 
esta mandada guardar y cumplir por la real audiencia y así no se puede decir exceder yo sino 
antes los dichos alcaldes y diputados pues van contra tantos mandalos y provisiones.’
41 Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, book 5, title 3, law 24.
42 Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 213.
43 BR 10, p. 83. In 1598, Morga urged that ‘action should be taken, so that these sangleys should 
not be aff licted as at present by any judges, constables, and interpreters – who, by various 
pretexts and calumnies, cheat and rob them, and perpetrate much fraud, coercion, and bribery.’ 
See also Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 261.
44 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 100: A Christian sangley 
beyond the jurisdiction of the alcalde mayor of Tondo did not pay for their alcalde mayor. Instead, 
the King had to pay him a salary. ‘Los sangleyes cristianos que están en la jurisdicción del alcalde 
mayor de Tondo pagan ninguno alclade mayor de aquella jurisdicción sino que Su Magestad 
paga a el dicho alcalde mayor y sin el dicho salario el dicho alcalde tiene sus aprovechimientos 
de poyos y f irmas que es de consideración y esto sabe y responde a esta pregunta.’
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supposed to collect 2 pesos from every single shop in the Parian. The system 
enabled the alcalde to establish Spanish norms and standards in direct 
interaction with the Chinese entrepreneurs’ business.45 Hence, off icials 
must have been tempted to increase their salaries by f ining retailers for 
not adhering to Spanish standards whenever the opportunity presented 
itself.46 Bakers, f ishermen, and butchers complained regularly about the 
unfair tax-collecting methods and attempts to increase the amount of 
money to be paid.47
A local Chinese authority, the ‘governor of the sangleys’ or alguacil mayor 
with legal capacities, co-existed with Spanish oversight.48 The off ice of the 
‘Chinese governor’ was the only one within the Chinese administration 
exclusively held by a native of China.49 He received a regular salary, as 
did his proxy and his clerk. Yet the position came with one condition: the 
aspirant had to be a Christian. A similar off ice existed in other port city 
communities: a Hokkien merchant captain administered, for instance, 
the Chinese quarter Tay Kie Ki (Tin Kap) in Melaka. In Manila, his off ice 
indicates a certain degree of Chinese self-governance and political repre-
sentation.50 In 1590, the Christian Chinese Don Juan Zanco was the f irst 
publicly acknowledged person to hold that off ice.51 Juan Bautista de Vera 
held the position in 1603 and closely collaborated with Governor Acuña.52 
Restricted self-governance and ethnic jurisdiction were not compatible. A 
certain paragraph in the law regarding the Audiencia’s non-intervention 
in the jurisdiction of the Chinese rendered almost every attempt to reform 
45 The regular price for the post of alcalde in the early decades was 2000 pesos while it is 
reported that they were often sold for only 1000 pesos, which meant a major loss for the royal 
treasury. See AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.
46 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 95; For controversial policies, 
see Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 6, p. 208.
47 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620: Between 1611 and 1614 four alcaldes 
(Antonio Arzeo, Hernando de Avalos, Luis de Contreras, and Marcos de la Cueba) were publicly 
accused by high-ranking members of the Chinese population, including Christians and esteemed 
interpreters, of abusing their off ices.
48 Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, pp. 30-31; Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 237-244. Ap-
pendices IX and XI mention the names of many Chinese who held the off ice of ‘governor of the 
sangleys’. Gil (pp. 237-238) describes the raison d’etre of the off ice as follows: ‘Era una cómoda 
manera de ejercer un control más riguroso sobre ese grupo por medio de una persona integrada 
en él y afecta al poder, una persona a quien, llegado el caso, se pudieran exigir responsibilidades.’
49 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 47. In 1619 Chunquian was governor of the sangleyes. 
50 BR 16, p. 197: ‘The Chinese have a governor of their own race, a Christian, who has his off icials 
and assistants.’
51 Cf. Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 56.
52 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 239.
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their administration useless. It said: ‘unless in case so extraordinarily neces-
sary and imperative that it may appear convenient to limit this rule’.53 
Other circumstances, such as allegiance and social pressure, impinged 
upon Chinese self-determination, as we will see below.
A secretary for the Chinese community, the escribano público, was 
established in 1608, for the large number of administrative issues.54 In 
1614 laws regarding Overseas Chinese administration were once again 
slightly modif ied. The f iscal of the Audiencia, the highest court in Manila, 
became their legal protector while an alcalde mayor continued to supervise 
legal matters. Thereafter no other judge was allowed to deal with Chinese 
legal matters, or even to enter Chinese shops.55 In the late 1620s, when 
the number of Chinese settlements around Manila numbered at least six, 
Governor Tavora made attempts to increase church taxes imposed on the 
Chinese.56 Not surprisingly, the missionaries too tried to f inance their 
work with revenues taken from the newly converted and potential converts, 
or by paying church expenses from money from the caja de sangleyes.57
At times the Chinese faced diff iculties in defending their property within 
the linguistically challenging environment. The Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 
Miguel de Benavides, as head of the principal self-declared protecting 
institution for Chinese settlers, wrote to Philip II in July 1598 about ‘the 
grievous injuries that [the Chinese] suffer daily from [his] Majesty’s officials 
and other Spaniards’. A group of Christian and non-Christian Chinese had 
expressed their feelings in their language and characters in two letters 
addressed to the Spanish King, which were added to Benavides’s account. 
The Bishop claimed that the King’s own vassals were the greatest enemies 
of the Christian law since they violated the royal decree of leaving Chinese 
property untouched.58 Ill-treated Manila Chinese would again appeal 
directly to the monarch in Spain in later decades, for instance in 1630 with 
53 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, pp. 250-251.
54 AGI Filipinas 36, n. 62, ‘Carta de Miguel Talledo pidiendo empleo’, 16 July 1610.
55 Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 301.
56 BR 23, p. 36.
57 As described for the year 1631: ‘Cien pesos y cien fanegas de arroz en cáscara y dos arrobas de 
vino de Castilla para celebrar, que es la mitad que se da a los dos religiosos que administran en la 
Iglesia de Parián, y se le pague de la caxa de dicha comunidad de los sangleyes; por haber constado 
por los papeles que presentó tenerlos en doctrina y administrandoles los santos sacramentos 
y para ella tomen la razon los dichos tenedores de la orden en los papeles de dicha caxa de 
comunidad, para que en todo tiempo conste.’ Cf. Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 255. 
58 BR 10, pp. 166-167. According to the Bishop the two Chinese petitions were sent to Spain 
and delivered by the Dominican Soria who acted as envoy. The petition only reached Philip III 
in April 1600.
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a plea to be governed by mandarins or alcaldes mayores of the Chinese 
nation.59 The same year the Chinese of Manila presented a petition in which 
they requested the f iscal to act as their protector.60 Philip IV apparently did 
not comply with their requests.
At times wealthy Chinese merchants, such as the above-mentioned Li Tan 
(‘Captain China’), became politically influential in the Chinese community 
in the Parian.61 His intervention during the peak of his merchant career 
coincided with the flourishing years of the Japan-Taiwan-Fujian network, 
when Nagasaki ultimately replaced Manila as the port for Sino-Japanese 
trade. As traff icker of porcelains and silks, he served as ‘governor’ of the 
sangleyes in Manila, before he fled to Hirado after allegedly being forced 
to work on the galleys by the Spanish. Historian John E. Wills reported of 
a Spanish merchant who searched for him in Hirado to try to collect on a 
debt for which he had earlier stood surety in Manila.62
The Japanese in Manila
We have seen in various contexts that contemporary sources draw a rather 
ambivalent picture of the Japanese presence in Manila. Firstly, Japanese 
were perfectly connected with their compatriots in other South East Asian 
Japantowns and Japan. Secondly, historically close ties between seagoing 
merchants and local lords in their motherland let them appear to be a 
potential threat to Manila’s social order. Another obstacle for peaceful 
integration must have been the fact that several of the earliest settlers of 
Dilao were said to have come from the wakō settlement of Aparri, in the 
province of Cagayan.63 Encounters with these self-declared rulers, military 
conflicts, and the strong personalities of some, had a strong impact on the 
Spanish perception of the Japanese.64 Yet despite defamation and regular 
59 As indicated in a memorial entitled ‘King to the President and oidores’, 21 December 1630, 
cf. Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 253.
60 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 12, ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre La India, conf lictos oidores’, 
27 November 1630.
61 Ollé (2009), ‘Manila’, p. 91; For other individual Chinese in Manila, see Gil (2011), Chinos, 
p. 123.
62 Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 217.
63 Some sources and historians like to refer to it as ‘Kingdom of Cagayan’. See Zaide (1949), 
Philippines, p. 346.
64 Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 11.
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stereotypical labelling, strikingly no pejorative term such as ‘sangley’ 
existed for the Japanese.
When the f irst Spaniards arrived in Manila in the late 1560s, they found 
a community of 20 Japanese, including a Christian named Pablo, a convert 
of the Jesuits in Japan.65 Early on individual Japanese entrepreneurs actively 
sought to gain control in Manila. Over the course of a joint Japanese-Filipino 
conspiracy of 1585 that started in Pampanga, the f irst Spanish province on 
Luzon, from where it ultimately spilled over to Tondo just outside the colonial 
capital. There, in the outskirts of Manila, some Japanese merchant settlers 
collaborated with Magat Salamat (datu of Tondo and son of a pre-Hispanic 
leader) and Agustín de Legazpi, both former indigenous chiefs of the region. 
Dissatisf ied with power loss they had asked the Japanese to send soldiers 
for a strike against the Spaniards.66 Indeed, a Japanese squadron arrived in 
1587 and brought a large provision of arms, including arquebuses.67 Captain 
Juan Gayo, a Christian from Hirado, who came to Manila on a Japanese 
ship that year, was also implicated in the plot following the conspiracy of 
Tondo. Ultimately all suspected traitors down to their interpreter Dionisio 
Fernandez, another Japanese Christian, were executed.68
Thereafter Spanish suspicions were hard to allay. Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas 
declared in a letter dated 1592, that those 30 or 40 Japanese, who were dressed 
as pilgrims and pretended to visit the church in Manila, were in fact spies who 
came to study the port facilities.69 Rumours about the ambition of Hideyoshi’s 
ambassador, Harada Kiyemon, to become captain of Dilao fit perfectly into 
the picture.70 In particular, once we accept that the same Harada was among 
the 11 merchants sent from Nagasaki in 1586/87.71 An eyewitness of the time 
warned about the ambivalent relationship between Japanese and heathen 
Chinese settlers, and that the latter were not to be trusted because most of 
them had previously done business in Japan.72 He insisted that many Japanese 
65 AGI Patronato 24, r. 17, f. 6r, cf. Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 47.
66 Agoncillo (1960), Short History, p. 135.
67 Tōyō Bunko, ‘Filipinas y el Japón’, p. 14; Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, p. 72.
68 AGI Filipinas 18A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 
1587; BR 7, pp. 95-110.
69 AGI Filipinas 18B, r. 2, n. 8, 1592, cf. Ch’en (1968), Chinese Community, p. 99.
70 BR 9, p. 48; For more details on the Japanese conspiracy, see BR 9, p. 40: Antonio López 
cautioned against the inf idel sangleyes who collaborated with the Japanese.
71 AHN, Diversos-Colecciones, 26, n. 9, cf. Iaccarino (2013), ‘Comercio y Diplomacia’, p. 110.
72 This was all learnt from interpreter Antonio López, who had discussed the matter with a 
Japanese called Don Baltasar. Don Baltasar by then had been travelling from Japan and Cagayan 
via Ryukyu for seven years. See AGI Patronato 25, r. 50, ‘Trato del embajador del Japón con Gómez 
Pérez Dasmariñas’, 1593.
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from Cagayan were now in Manila and that Harada Kiyemon himself had been 
involved in wakō trade in Cagayan.73 Prior to the first of a total of three expul-
sions in 1597, Bishop Benavides described relations with Japan as ‘war’ and 
lamented the Governor’s reluctance in taking the Japanese threat seriously. 
He complained of insufficient measures in fortifying the city, while individu-
als reconstructed their houses as fortresses with the help of cheap Chinese 
labour.74 Following Ieyasu’s encouragement for anti-piracy campaigns, the 
Spaniards considered it necessary to punish Japanese troublemakers publicly. 
In 1599 a small Spanish squadron under the command of Captain Gaspar 
Pérez chased illegal Japanese ships off the shore of Luzon. Of the pirate ship 
he captured, he killed all the Japanese crew except one, who was taken to 
Manila and ‘executed in the sight of the Xaponese and the Chinese’.75
With an increasing influx of Japanese settlers during the f irst decade 
of the seventeenth century friction increased and attempts were made 
to decrease the number of settlers. In the years 1606 and 1607 Japanese 
residents revolted against deportation and the Audiencia’s order to work 
in the suburbs.76 Whilst in the f irst incident, Franciscan fathers managed 
to settle the conflict,77 the Japanese were defeated by joint Spanish-Filipino 
troops, who are reported to have burnt down the houses of the Japanese 
during the second.78 Thereafter Japanese intending to stay on the island 
had to surrender their weapons before stepping on the mainland.79 A royal 
order of 1608, issued in response to reports of Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, 
charged the Governor with the task of restricting the Japanese population, 
but directed him at the same time to exercise all care to avert any clash 
with them and not to do anything that would arouse the resentment of the 
Japanese ruler.80 The following year (1609) the Japanese reportedly joined 
forces with the Chinese and are said to have killed numerous Spaniards, 
including Captain Cardoso, in a riot.81 A letter by Philip III, which reached 
Manila in 1611, urged the local authorities to ban the Japanese from the 
Philippines, but obviously no concrete steps were taken in Manila.82
73 BR 9, p. 40.
74 BR 10, p. 164.
75 BR 10, p. 211.
76 Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 286.
77 Morga (2008), Sucesos, p. 248.
78 Schurz (1939), Manila Galleon, p. 248.
79 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 261-265.
80 Schurz (1939), Manila Galleon, pp. 100-101; BR 10, p. 211.
81 Cf. Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 287.
82 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, p. 289. No evidence was found in the available Spanish data. All records 
between 1607 and 1612 emphasise the good relations with the ‘emperor’ of Japan.
AC torS AND AgeNCy 303
Dilao’s administration is sometimes referred to as self-governance, under 
supervision of the Franciscans who were watching over Dilao from a nearby 
convent – which reflects parallels with Dominican and Jesuit cooperation 
with the Chinese. It has not yet been fully resolved, whether a Japanese or 
a Spaniard governed them. In 1627, a certain Capitan Juan Suion (probably 
the shuinsen merchant Itoya Zueimon) is mentioned as head of the Japanese 
in Manila.83
As indicated earlier, persecutions of Christians in Japan brought new 
impetus to the Japanese community in Manila. In autumn 1614 a large 
group of Japanese Christians fled to Manila to settle there permanently. 
Naitō Tadatoshi (内藤忠俊, 1550-1626; also known by his baptismal name 
Juan), a so-called Christian daimyō and commander of the Korea inva-
sions, who had assisted Konishi Yukinaga in peace negotiations with the 
Ming, became a leading f igure of the Japanese community. His noble travel 
companion to Manila was Takayama Ukon (高山右近, 1552-1615), Don Justo, 
daimyō of Takatsuki (高槻) in Osaka and later of Akashi (明石) before being 
disempowered by Tokugawa Hidetada.84 Both were warmly welcomed by 
Governor Juan de Silva and the Bishop and settled in San Miguel. In 1616 
a group of Jesuits f leeing repressions landed in Manila with numerous 
Japanese Christians unwilling to give up their faith.85
Consequently, the number of Japanese immigrants in Manila grew and 
exceeded 3000 in 1623.86 The new Japanese Christian community in Manila 
attracted the Jesuits of the Philippines – who until then had stayed in the 
background in Japanese matters and had not crossed the seas northwards 
to join their Portuguese brothers ‘in the f ield’. With the arrival of the f irst 
refugees in Manila, they started to administer the new community in 
Japanese.87 Manila became a spiritual centre for newly converted Christians 
from the entire region and served as a portal to other Catholic cities in the 
Americas for some of them, as the example of a chapel in the cathedral of 
Mexico City, built for the f irst Japanese martyrs by a relative of executed 
Japanese Christians, proves.88 Devoted Japanese Christians did not lack 
spiritual guidance in Manila either. In 1629, for instance, Jesuits organised 
spectacular festivities for the beatif ication of the 1597 martyrs: the bulk of 
83 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 209-213.
84 Nakanishi (2014), Takayama Ukon. ARSI Phil 11, ff. 67-69 v. (Ukondonus). For his Christian 
life in Japan, see Laures (1954), Takayama Ukon.
85 ARSI Phil. 9, f. 246.
86 Zaide (1949), Philippines, p. 351.
87 ARSI Phil 11, f. 74; Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 294-297; 355; 361-363; Borao (2005), ‘Colonia’, p. 13. 
88 AHN Diversos, ‘Documentos de India’, f. 329 (1637).
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the expenses was covered by the municipal government.89 Two more ships 
with a total of approximately 200 Japanese religious refugees, many of them 
sick, landed in 1632.90 During the same period many Japanese Christians, 
encouraged by the expelled Jesuits from Japan, also moved to Vietnam 
instead of Manila.91 With no more new arrivals, the number of Japanese 
settlers gradually decreased after the 1640s.
Despite these new settlers’ devotedness – praised by their supporters 
within the Society of Jesus92 – civilian Spaniards did not see much of a 
change in mentality and stayed alert. In fact, their arrival meant growing 
complexity and increasing trouble for the colonial government in Manila.93 
In 1620, Philip III ordered that the Governor and the Audiencia should adopt 
whatever measure they saw f it for minimising the risk of insurrections. He 
warned them not to harm the relations of trade and friendship. Before this 
letter could reach Manila, Governor Fajardo wrote to the King: ‘A large part 
of the Japanese had been expelled, so that for a long time there have not 
been so few of them as now.’ However, a royal decree of the following year 
was critical to the fact that the Japanese were allowed to stay because of 
the ‘negligence and carelessness’ of the authorities in Manila. The number 
of Japanese should not exceed 500, according to royal decrees.94
Cultural and Social Issues
Concrete case studies are a second possible way to get access to local, 
individual voices within controversial matters of the multicultural ad-
ministration. Integrating micro history into the bigger picture creates an 
entirely new context, for instance, when we look at the strange tale of the 
seemingly minor aesthetic peculiarity of Chinese Christians’ hairstyles. The 
question, whether the Chinese should be allowed to grow their hair long or 
cut it after having received baptism, resulted in a serious conflict between 
89 AGI Filipinas 8, r. 1, n. 12, ‘Carta de Niño de Távora sobre La India, conf lictos oídores’, 
27 November 1630.
90 Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 294-297.
91 Gonoi (2008), ‘Betonamu’, pp. 47-49; 51-52. Gonoi estimates that at least 500 Japanese 
Christians migrated to the Japanese town in Faifo in the years 1618 and 1619 and contributed to 
the largest Japanese Christian community in Indochina.
92 Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, pp. 745-750. 
93 AGI Filipinas 74, n. 94, ‘Carta de García Serrano sobre incidente de Dilao’, 1 August 1622. It 
is not entirely clear whether the incident can be related to Japanese settlers.
94 Schurz (1939), Manila Galleon, p. 101; Iwao (1937), Nanyō, pp. 292-293.
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the ecclesiastic and the civil government in Manila. They debated whether 
hairstyle was a matter of rite and habit. The stumbling block in Manila and 
Madrid was whether converted Chinese should be forced to cut their hair 
short in ‘Christian fashion’. A pro and a counter party argued heatedly until 
the King himself lay down the law. On 23 June 1587 he commanded Governor 
Santiago de Vera not to cut the new converts’ hair against their will under 
any circumstances.95 Yet the fussy issue was taken up again, when Bishop 
Salazar argued in 1590 that not cutting Chinese pigtails posed a major risk 
for Christianity. Neither did circumstances on the ground change during 
the tenure of Bishop Miguel de Benavides: When two principle members of 
the Chinese community (Lorenzo Ungac and Don Salvador Tuigam) were 
to receive baptism in Cebu, he urged the priest in charge not to cut their 
hair by any means, but in vain.96 Most friars did not see the bigger picture 
and stubbornly insisted on the haircut far into the seventeenth century. 
Multiethnic governing continued to lack a general level of continuity.97 With 
a short, ‘Western-style’ haircut there was no way for Chinese Christians to 
go back. Given that the measure was only applied to converts it is diff icult 
to understand why of all people those who were willing to compromise and 
adapt were punished? The hairstyle issue remained a recurring theme in 
social policies and therefore serves as a signif icant example for the phe-
nomenon of ‘dis-learning’. It moreover stands in sharp contrast to Spanish 
attempts to impede full assimilation, illustrated in Antonio de Morga’s 
remark of 1596 that ‘it would be much better for the Chinese who become 
Christians not to dress like Spaniards’.98
Civil government’s conflict with Catholic missionaries peaked with 
Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas’s philanthropic, but ambivalent, stance 
regarding Chinese ethics: He intended to permit local non-Christians to 
celebrate their heathen deities, and permitted f ireworks during the Chi-
nese New Year.99 On other occasions his harsh conduct and short temper 
threatened their lives, while the fact that he was killed at the hands of the 
same Overseas Chinese he had defended in his period in off ice, puts things 
into perspective: In 1593 he requested 250 Chinese as rowers on the Spanish 
95 Ayers (ed.) (1700-1746), Cédulas reales, no. 22 (1587); see also Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 429.
96 Chirino (1969), Relación de las Islas Filipinas, p. 61; Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 3, 
p. 14, cf. Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 430.
97 For the controversy between Bishop Salazar and Governor Vera, see AGI Filipinas 34, n. 75, 
‘Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general’, 26 June 1587.
98 BR 10, p. 83. 
99 Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, p. 623; for the f ireworks, see Gil (2011), Chinos, 
p. 431.
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galleys in return for a monthly salary of 2 pesos from the royal treasury.100 
When the Chinese merchants refused, they were taken by force and as a 
reaction they killed the Spaniards, including the Governor, who served as 
military general of the expedition, on 25 October 1593.101 Upon request of 
Luis Pérez Dasmariñas, the deceased Governor’s son, a Chinese war fleet 
with seven mandarins arrived in Manila Bay a few months later.102 Claiming 
to have come in search of the Chinese renegades and to recall Chinese 
settlers, the interim Governor and other high-ranking Spaniards received 
them politely, while suspecting them of preparing an invasion.103
From a socio-economic perspective, it is interesting that a comparatively 
high number of Chinese settlers were literate, as Lucille Chia has plausibly 
shown.104 Indeed, in late imperial China merchant class and gentry increas-
ingly participated in classical learning and acquired elaborate writing skills 
(for drafting genealogies, taking care of accounting, and mortgages); this 
corresponds with Spanish observers’ frequent admiration for the high 
command of writing of the Chinese in Manila.105 Although controversial 
scholarly views persist, what speaks in favour of a higher degree of education 
of the Chinese was their quick appropriation of sophisticated techniques, 
their involvement in printing in Manila and their reliable work as linguists, 
including teaching calligraphy and Chinese classics to interested Spanish 
parties.106 The latter point is illustrated by works produced in the printing 
press of the Parian run by the Dominicans. The f irst books were published 
in the late 1590s, though just like in other Asian missionary centres, transla-
tions of spiritual works were common.
One question that is still open for debate is, whether cultural and political 
divergences between the Catholic Castilians and the Confucian Chinese 
had any consequences for intercultural communication in Manila. One way 
100 Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 96.
101 The Dongxi yangkao 5 and the Ming shi-lu describe the events, referred to as P’an Ho-wu 
incident, in detail.
102 Ch’en (1968), Chinese Community, p. 143. Ch’en calls this act of protecting the huaqiao ‘a 
remarkably new phenomenon in the history of the Chinese immigration abroad’.
103 Bernal (1966), ‘Chinese Colony’, p. 51.
104 Chia (2011), ‘Chinese Books’, pp. 259-283.
105 For learning traditions in late imperial China, see Elman (1990), Classicism, p. 23; For Spanish 
accounts, José de Acosta, author of Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias (1590), who wrote about 
the cultural and social importance of books and written documents for Chinese settlers while 
in Peru in De Procuranda Indorum Salute (1588). Cf. Camuñez (1988), Sínodo, p. 209.
106 Van der Loon (1966), ‘Manila Incunabula’. The printing press of the Parian, run by the 
Dominicans, published its f irst books in the late 1590s. Just like printing presses in other Asian 
missionary areas it mainly covered translations of spiritual works.
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to understand the impact of non-verbal communication is re-examining 
the uprising of the Chinese in 1603 and its infamous reaction by Spanish 
forces. I have referred to the incident sporadically but left the analysis of 
events for this section.107 The early seventeenth century was a period when 
tensions between the Overseas Chinese and colonial off icials surged. When 
three mandarins arrived in Manila in 1603, ostensibly searching for the 
legendary gold mountains of Cavite, anxious Spanish leaders misinterpreted 
it as a sign of a long-feared Chinese invasion.108 Much has been written on 
the severe punishment handed out by the Spaniards, who were accused of 
having slaughtered several thousand people. It is hard to ascertain what 
exactly happened, since accounts on the event differ largely depending on 
the standpoint of the authors.109 The Spaniards are reported to have burnt 
the Chinese silk market, the alcaicería, after having noticed that inhabitants 
of the neighbourhood were preparing for an attack.110 During the following 
weeks, joint Spanish-Filipino and Japanese forces supposedly killed between 
15,000 and 30,000 Chinese.111 There is no concrete evidence to support the 
large number of victims claimed in both Chinese and Western circles.112 
The Spanish refuted the allegation of having killed as many as 30,000 in an 
off icial letter to China, claiming that the total number was less than half of 
that.113 Not only is reliable data for the exact f igure of Fujianese settlers in 
1603 unavailable, but the Chinese and the Spanish (the latter because they 
were in permanent need of f inancial and military support from their mother 
country and the Mexican viceroyalty) also had good reasons to exaggerate. 
107 The following paragraphs are largely based on my article in the Journal of World History 
23/3. For a chronological overview of the events, see Borao (1998), ‘Massacre’, pp. 22-29. For the 
Chinese view, see Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji, pp. 90-101.
108 For explanations regarding the legendary gold mountain, see Zhang (1934), Ming shi folangji, 
p. 91.
109 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1,n. 12, ‘Carta de Acuña sobre sublevación de sangleyes, galeras’, 8 August 
1603; AGI Filipinas 35, n. 68, ‘Carta de Juan de Bustamante sobre la sublevación de los sangleyes’, 
18 December 1603; AGI Filipinas, 19, r. 6, n. 91, ‘Carta de audiencia sobre asuntos de gobierno’, 
30 June 1605.
110 AGI Filipinas 84, n. 118, ‘Carta del cabildo eclesiástico de Manila sobre sublevación de 
sangleyes’, 11 December 1603.
111 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 28, ‘Carta de Acuña al virrey de Ucheo sobre castigo al sangleyes’, 
1 July 1605; Merino (1980), Cabildo, p. 36. A f irst hand source of Manila’s municipal government 
indicates that 20,000 Chinese revolted.
112 In Chinese records numerical data vary between some 10,000 and 30,000. See Wade, MSL, 
http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3169 (accessed 10 September 2013).
113 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 28, ‘Carta de Acuña al virrey de Ucheo sobre castigo de sangleyes’, 
August 1605. Jesuits’ reports in the annual letters to Rome reflect a critically different notion 
of the events. See ARSI Phil 1, f. 22, P. Angelo Armano (Manila).
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Even if the number of Fujianese settlers had doubled the officially permitted 
6000 and if we add several hundred visiting merchants we do not reach such 
a high number. Insuff icient munitions are a further stumbling block. After 
all that we have heard about shortcomings in weapons, gunpowder, and 
men, it is hard to believe that the Spaniards, despite Japanese and Filipino 
support, were able to hand out such a drastic punishment. What certainly 
helped the Spaniards was that the alcalde of the Parian, a Chinese Christian 
called Juan Bautista de la Vera transcribed as Eng Kang, was loyal to the 
colonial government and thus fuelled opposition.114
What might have caused social unrest of such a degree? Firstly, the 
Chinese had been subjected to extra taxes, were ghettoised and had 
been suppressed by the government and church. Secondly, Spanish envy 
of Chinese settlers who dominated large sections of the Manila market 
and accumulated increasing wealth could be a reasonable explanation.115 
Gatherings of the Chinese were interpreted as a violation of a cédula real 
of Philip IV that prohibited the Chinese from leaving their parian. Anti-
Chinese propaganda accused the Chinese of having destroyed sacred items, 
of collaborating with the Dutch, and of having killed a provincial Castilian 
alcalde mayor.116 A document about the administration of a hospital run 
by the Dominicans, the Hospital de San Gabriel, reveals that a necessary 
condition to receive medical treatment was baptism.117 What does this 
mean in light of the earlier considered notion of tolerance? Again, the friars 
of the Catholic orders had a hard time fulf illing expectations for their role 
as protectors of the non-Spanish ethnicities living in and around Manila. 
The more they became involved with daily politics the less empathetic they 
became to the needs of their protégés.
The events of 1603/4 caused by no means a caesura for Sino-Philippine 
relations, as one would assume. Judging from the number of Chinese ves-
sels calling at Manila, a sharp increase to 39 is noticeable in 1607, after 
fluctuations around 15 and 18 between 1602 and 1605.118 Influential Fujianese 
114 Cf. Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, p. 57.
115 Juan Gil has identif ied several Chinese merchant captains for the decade between 1590 and 
1600. A certain Guansan was the richest and most influential of them. In 1599 he had goods for 
137,761 pesos registered in Cavite. See Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 79.
116 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 248; vol. 9, p. 305: Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera 
(r. 1635-1644) defended the cruel Spanish reprisal of setting f ire to the Parian as an inevitable 
reaction to the violent outrage of a heavily armed mob of 24,000 Chinese.
117 Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 321.
118 Chaunu (1960), Philippines, pp. 148-160; BR 14, pp. 50-52: A letter to Philip III of 1605 also 
conf irms that 18 ships arrived with merchandise and 5500 Chinese on board.
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merchant captains who had been dominating trade with Manila for years, 
such as Guansan, Sinu, and Guanchan, convinced other merchants in 1605 to 
return to Manila. Guansan, who submitted both the letter of the mandarin 
and the Spanish response, was one of the Chinese traders who collaborated 
with Spanish off icials.119 In 1606, Chinese merchants revived trade with Ma-
nila, resettled in the rebuilt parian, and started working for the Spaniards 
again.120 Off icial records show that in 1606, 6533 Chinese came to Manila 
when 1500 received permits of residence and approximately 2000 stayed.121 
In 1607, Spanish off icials reported that 14,000 Chinese merchants had come 
to Manila.122 The Spaniards more than welcomed this rapid recovery of 
the status quo ante since the city and its inhabitants had faced lean years 
after the entire Chinese supply network had collapsed after the revolt.123 
Nevertheless, they neither admitted the necessity of allowing Chinese set-
tlers, nor refrained from maligning the Chinese thereafter.124
Reactions from the mainland to the infamous incident unmistakenly 
hint at cultural and political divergences between the Catholic Castilians 
and the Confucian Chinese. Given the big losses on the Chinese side, most 
people would expect the Chinese Emperor to seek revenge for the injustice 
that had happened to his people. Yet, whilst still opposing private foreign 
trade vigorously, the Ming court did not consider the settlers of these overseas 
communities as Chinese subjects any longer. Although the events were dis-
cussed among Ming officials, who resented the fact that the ‘Luzon chieftain’ 
punished Chinese merchants without permission, the Ming never took action 
against the Spanish.125 The Emperor made it clear that he would not wage war 
for the sake of ordinary merchants, even less to avenge something that had 
happened outside China.126 This reflected not only Confucian social hierarchy 
but also the bitter feeling of betrayal felt by the great Celestial Empire that 
119 Gil (2011), Chinos, p. 80.
120 AGI Filipinas 74, n. 58, ‘Testimonio de Luis de Salinas sobre sangleyes’, 15 June 1605.
121 BR 14, pp. 186-191; Díaz-Trechuelo (1966), ‘Role of the Chinese’, p. 184; Pastells (1925), Historia 
General, vol. 1, p. 100: ‘Y que toca a las licencias para venir de China navios a contratar a Luzon, 
no esta tan mal el darlas, que ni el Rey ni los demas quieren perder el mucho provecho que 
tienen con la mucha plata que de aquí se llevan cada año; pues esta se queda en china sin salir 
de alla un real, y las haciendas que nos dan en trueque della se consumen y acaban en muy breve 
tiempo, y asi podemos decir que son en esto tan intresados o mas los chinos que los Castillas.’
122 AGI Filipinas 29, n. 94, ‘Carta de los of iciales reales sobre varios asuntos’, 14 July 1607. 
123 AGI Filipinas 27, n. 48, ‘Copia de cédula aumentando derecho sobre mercaderías chinas’, 
20 November 1606.
124 AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620.
125 Wade, MSL, http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3136 (accessed 10 September 2013).
126 Cf. Borao (1998), ‘Massacre of 1603’, p. 33.
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in centuries to come would stigmatise Chinese migrants as traitors to their 
motherland.127 The Emperor’s only reaction was to ask the Audiencia in 
Manila to deliver justice.128 Chinese authorities are believed to have defamed 
South East Asian huaqiao as having abandoned ‘the tombs of their ancestors’. 
Suchlike accusations remind us of lineage and kinship (家 ch., jia) traditions, 
and the principal Confucian concept of ancestor worship.129
From a more neutral point of foreign relations, we note that the incident 
did encourage one of the rare direct acts of correspondence between the 
Ming and the Spaniards in the Philippines. It has been claimed that Ming 
emperors were eager to maintain military supremacy in East Asia. Com-
paring China’s reaction during the Imjin War to off icial China’s reluctant 
behaviour after the 1603 ‘mutiny’ indicates that tributary countries and 
the maintenance of the status quo were dearer to the Ming than to its 
own people. Korea had been one of China’s oldest and most loyal tributary 
partners and therefore Hideyoshi’s invasion brought the Chinese into the 
picture. At the same time offending Overseas Chinese was not considered 
a direct insult against the country or a potential threat.
Since similar massacres occurred in 1639, 1662, 1686, and 1762, we have 
to understand the revolts as cyclic dynamics of unsolved social conflicts 
provoked by juridical discrimination and external factors. In Manila dis-
crimination led to uprisings, which were followed by reprisals.130 Clashes 
commonly originated from the numerical disequilibrium between Chinese 
and Spanish settlers. In 1639, the rebellion was stimulated by the loss of 
two Manila Galleons and subsequent economic deprivations.131 Spanish 
chronicles refer to it as guerra and are once again full of praise for the heroic 
Spanish victors as well as questionable exaggerations.132 Between 17,000 and 
22,000 of 26,000 revolting Chinese were reported to have been killed by 300 
127 McKeown (2011), ‘Social Life’, p. 70.
128 AGI Filipinas 74, n. 60, ‘Testimonio de memoriales de Benavides sobre sangleyes’, 7 July 
1605.
129 MacNair (1923), ‘Relation’, p. 30; Elman (1990), Classicism, pp. 19-25; Freedman (1966), Lineage 
and Society. 
130 For further reference, see Andaya (2004), ‘Interactions’, p. 5. 
131 BR 29, pp. 194-196; 168-171: The larger of two Manila Galleons was wrecked in 1638 en route 
to Acapulco with the loss of its entire cargo.
132 Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. 249. Fire always meant a threat to the Spaniards in 
Manila and in case of doubt they blamed the Chinese. On the uprising of 1639 a Manila citizen 
reported: ‘Al principio del alzamiento, dió orden al Gobernador por atajar el fuego, que pasasen 
a cuchillo a cuantos sangleyes gentiles o cristianos vivían en los pueblos cercanos a Manila, por 
la sospecha que de ellos se tenía executóse en muchos este rigor, y socorriendo la gracia de Dios 
a algunos, no quisieron perder las almas con las vidas, y así recibieron antes el bautismo.’
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Castilian soldiers and their 300 Filipino supporters.133 Given that both in 1603 
and 1639, Japanese residents provided major assistance and made materials 
available to the Spanish, a more nuanced consideration of continuous inner-
Asian conflicts complements the narrative.134 The 1639 rebellion against 
social injustice and high economic pressure took place in the hinterland and 
spread over to the Parian, where the armed conflict eventually escalated.135 
Combat lasted between November 1639 and March 1640 and devastating fires 
harmed large parts of the city. In 1662, unstable geopolitical conditions in 
the China Seas had once again an impact on a violent Sino-Hispanic clash. 
The Zheng clan, who then claimed sovereignty over the Chinese Seas and 
Fujian, threatened Spanish sovereignty in Manila and on top of that sent 
Fujianese authorities to administer justice in the Parian.136
Maritime Manila’s and Post-1624 Developments
Port cities have the tendency to become unattractive at certain points in 
history. The 1620s were doubtlessly a turning point for Manila. Manila’s 
‘decline’ shows parallels to the economic cycles of urban centres in Europe 
such as Venice or Antwerp at certain points in history.137 In the short run, 
Manila simply lost its previous popularity to fierce competition with Taiwan 
or Nagasaki, while in the long run the trading systems of the macro region 
changed over the seventeenth century. Exterior developments, including 
militarily stronger ‘Chinese’ merchant communities, the rise of the Dutch 
in Japan, Taiwan, Batavia, and Melaka, explain Manila’s downturn well. 
Manila was no longer attractive as an intermediary port for Sino-Japanese 
bartering, while alongside a general destabilisation of Iberian trade in 
South East Asia, naval clashes with the Dutch coincided with the growing 
influence of Portuguese traders in Manila.
The loss of locational advantage is closely linked to declining interest 
from Japan. Accordingly we may argue that Manila turned into a semi-
periphery of a new maritime space. VOC and EIC accounts show that 
Manila and the Spaniards became somewhat more passively involved in 
133 De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, pp. 389-392; Santamaria (1966), ‘Chinese Parián’, pp. 103-105.
134 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 18, ‘Carta de Acuña sobre temas de gobierno’, 15 July 1604.
135 Wills (2010), ‘Maritime Europe’, pp. 59-60.
136 AGI Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 18, ‘Carta de Acuña sobre temas de gobierno’, 15 July 1604; Busquets 
(2007), ‘Frailes de Koxinga’, pp.  393-422, http://www.ugr.es/~feiap/ceiap1/ceiap/capitulos/
capitulo24.pdf (accessed 5 February 2012).
137 Braudel (1977), Afterthoughts, p. 26.
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a new triangular trade network towards the end of the second decade of 
the seventeenth century. The position of the Castilians in Japan gradually 
became complicated, while both the Dutch and English were determined 
to control foreign trade off the coast of Japan after the establishment of the 
Dutch and the English Factory in Hirado in 1609 and 1611 respectively, were 
happy to see the Spaniards losing ground in Japan.138 Constant remarks on 
what was going on in Manila suggest that it was far too important to be 
ignored.139 A complete downturn can also be ruled out. The English seemed 
particularly interested in the Spaniards and the role of European realpolitik 
played in East Asia, which is also reflected in the impressive evidence of an 
eff icient English global information network.140
Other examples of external interest testify to the importance of the 
port city. The Dutch blockade of Manila, between the years 1619 and 1621, 
targeted the Spanish and the Chinese. Thus it would be too simple to con-
clude that this resulted from political conflicts in Europe. Dutch assaults 
should be considered a commercial strategy and a simple consequence of 
an expanding Manila system that had become more competitive and more 
violent.141 Within the limits of the Asian setting, the trading companies 
put in a major effort to disturb Sino-Spanish trade. In 1621 the Protestant 
merchant alliance was equipped with as many as nine ships.142 Manila’s 
political importance received further impetus by Dutch and English priva-
teering practices during the f irst decades of the seventeenth century.143 The 
138 Massarella (2001), ‘“Ticklish Points”‘, pp. 43-50.
139 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 50, 8 July 1618: ‘Also, that the f leet in Manillas, which fought with the 
Spaniards the last yeare, is all cast away per stor wether, many Mores, Chinas, and 50 Spaniard 
being drowned in it; and that their in 8 new gallions built theare in place thereof. For the 8 
gallions, I esteem it a lie, that on such a sudden they canor be made. Also, that the Frenche have 
sett out 8 gallions, or men or warr, to aide the Spaniardes in the affares. And that the King of 
Spaine had ordayned a f leete of gallions to have com by Cape Bona Speranza, to have joyned 
with them at Manillas, to have gon for the Molucas; but had staid them to make warrs against 
the Duke of Savoy.’
140 Cocks (1883), Diary, p. 55: ‘He writes also how the King of Spaine maketh sharp warrs against 
the Duke of Savoy, and that the Venetians and the Turk take the Savoyans part. Allso that Prince 
Charles of England hath maried or is made sure to the King of Spaines daughter.’
141 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 325-326; Even Cocks criticised Dutch barbarian behaviour in Manila 
and their cruel treatment of Chinese captives. Ibid., p. 327: ‘But the barbarousnesse of the 
Hollanders at Manillias the last yeare is much; for, after they had taken the China junkes and 
that the pore men had rendred them selves, the Hollandars did cut many of them in peeces 
and cast many others into the sea; whereof our men saved and took many of them up into our 
shipps.’
142 Cocks (1883), Diary, pp. 172; 187: Another campaign of 14 ships was planned the same year.
143 Kempe (2010), ‘Remotest Corners’, p. 353.
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Twelve Years’ Truce, agreed in Antwerp in April 1609 between Philip II and 
the United Provinces, aimed at off icially ending such actions by granting 
the Dutch the right to trade in Asia except in Spanish and Portuguese 
ports.144 But as we have seen, reality was different in Asian waters, where 
the situation started to escalate again in 1618, and the Anglo-Dutch siege 
disrupted junk trade to Manila until 1622.
Even in the 1640s, it would be wrong to speak of a decline of Manila. It is 
more appropriate to speak of stagnation relative to other trading centres in 
South East Asia that developed after Manila. Galleons from Acapulco – as 
well as Fujanese junks – came in smaller numbers but Manila’s role for silver 
exchange remained mostly unchanged. Since Chinese settlers stayed after 
1644, the main characteristics of port cities did not change either. Evidence 
is found of an attempt of the English East India Company at Bantam to 
establish trade between Tonkin and Manila as late as in 1673. The endeavour 
to obtain a trade licence for Manila in London followed a fruitless attempt to 
reopen trade with Japan that failed over a diplomatic misadventure. It was 
then when a company merchant wrote that Manila ‘proves almost as good 
as Japon’. Maintaining that trade there was ‘free for all nations’ he suggested 
selling cheap raw silk from Tonkin ‘could reap of very high profits [...] where 
the local Chinese could weave it into beautiful cloth for garments to be ex-
ported to New Spain’.145 Even though, the English project never materialised, 
the consideration testifies for Manila’s importance as a liberal global trading 
centre and indicates that Asian merchants thus clearly remained attracted 
by the American market. Altogether, the facts and f igures presented should 
encourage revisiting the thesis of general decline in the 1630s.
Concluding Remarks
Does the specif ic development of social and juridical affairs at Manila’s 
micro level during this period deserve the label of a pioneering early modern 
port city? A word of caution regarding Manila’s exclusiveness shall be raised 
here. It has never been my intention to suggest that Manila was more open, 
more important, or more successful, let alone superior of other port cities 
in the region. Yet, certain peculiar developments due to its involvement 
in formal and informal networks as well as its geographical and imperial 
nature are undeniable. In short, Manila’s global accomplishments found 
144 Lach, Vankley, Asia, vol. 3, book 4, p. 10. 
145 Cf. Hoang (2005), ‘Japan to Manila’, p. 83.
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their expression in the specif ic seascape centre, with more egalitarian 
political structures. The lack of evidence that East Asian settlers would have 
been regarded as subdued to the Castilian Crown is just one implication of 
Manila’s free spirit. When it comes to extraterritorial rights however, little 
was achieved for foreign traders. Nor did Asian merchants insist on such. 
Instead, the signals their rulers sent were exactly the opposite. Holden 
Furber has already concluded that extraterritorial rights accorded to foreign 
merchants were a matter of custom and that rulers assumed that foreign 
merchants would respect the local rules and therefore in turn did not ask 
for such privileges for their outgoing traders either.146
Agency was one factor that negatively affected economic institutions. 
Unlike in other port cities, there was no particular group of merchants acting 
as primary mediators or intermediaries in dealings with the outside world. 
However, this does not mean that cultural or political intermediaries did not 
exist. One of the outstanding accomplishments of the multiethnic environ-
ment was its potential to create global intermediaries. Their fluid identities 
indirectly demonstrate the lack of uniform procedures. The urban society 
was characterised by constant change, the ability to adapt, and permanent 
bargaining on the spot. The port city positively affected social mobility. A 
remarkable number of migrants found ways to improve their chances and 
even to move to a different place within the social hierarchy. The nature of 
Manila’s multicultural society has to be understood exactly against this back-
ground. Friction that resulted in bloody mutinies was rooted in unsolved, 
and often even unexpressed problems. It was the imbalance of settlers, some 
discriminated against by law or social policies, and the permanent lack of 
manpower that represented the biggest challenge for the urban society.
The stumbling block for Manila was the arrival of the Protestants. A 
critical turning point, therefore, was the establishment of trade factories 
in Hirado that inspired the Fujian-Kyushu-nihonmachi network and cir-
cumvented Manila. From the perspective of locational advantage, we may 
conclude that it was lost in times of change; thus Manila had to cope with 
successful rivals and the burden of the bulky Overseas Empire at the same 
time. We may say that after the 1630s, Manila was no longer considered a 
South East Asian port city, but instead became an intermediary port or 
Iberian outpost for largely two-dimensional operations. To what extent 
it is appropriate to speak of a multicultural society when different ethnic 
communities remained largely segregated in their ethnic quarters still 
needs to be critically evaluated in the future.
146 Furber (1976), Rival Empires, p. 311.
 Conclusion
The encounters between Spain, China, and Japan in Manila between 1571 
and 1644 played an important role in shaping the political and economic 
development of all parties involved. Chinese demand for silver, Japanese 
interest in Chinese silk, and Spain’s need to maintain a colony separated 
from the rest of its vast empire by thousands of miles, became the building 
blocks for Manila-centred triangular relations. Using micro studies as a 
base for such a broad topic enabled a nuanced view on the macro processes; 
embedding case studies into the bigger picture of cross-cultural trade and 
early modern state formation has simultaneously provided a contextualised 
view of seemingly minor events. In short, combining comparisons and 
connections has proven to be an efficient approach in dealing with complex 
questions without over-generalising. As such, it is not individually tailored 
for early modern Manila but applicable for various regions, periods, and 
topics. Many of the factors mentioned above help to explain why Manila was 
different. Unlike in other European-ruled port cities, there was no uniform 
group of merchants acting as intermediaries. The multiethnic environment 
created remarkably adaptive, mobile and flexible global actors. Against this 
background, high social mobility may be expected, but to what extent it 
actually existed still needs to be studied in further detail. In a future study, 
a systematic comparison with other port cities will hopefully provide us 
with new answers.
The Manila system mattered for the formation of cross-cultural trade 
between the Philippines, China, Japan, the Americas and eventually the 
Iberian Peninsula. The bridging of micro and macro histories, in order to 
grasp the essence of complex historical encounters, enabled the four main 
f indings of this study, emphasising the validity of the chosen approach of 
comparison and connections.
My f irst f inding stresses the lofty roles of politics, culture, and mentality 
for early modern trade and business relations. In other words, the case of 
Manila shows that economic developments can never be fully understood 
by exclusively focusing on strictly economic arguments and quantitative 
data. Although there is no denying that China’s demand for silver was the 
driving force behind most commercial interaction, the actual exchange 
patterns were hardly ever solely determined by supply and demand. Hidden 
agendas of trade missions, bargaining traditions, politically or culturally 
motivated obedience or resistance to trade regulations became the real 
determining factors for success or failure of all operations. Despite the 
efforts of different central governments to regulate and control maritime 
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trade, non-state actors managed to circumvent state control through various 
loopholes and niches.
My second finding is that the dualism between the ‘local’ and the ‘central’ 
had a major impact on various processes in the South China Sea during 
the entire period. The examples range from illicit traders who could act as 
semi-integrated suppliers, to local authorities who simply acted as if they 
were a sovereign power. Connections can be traced between Fujianese 
f isher villages, Japanese ports, and Mexican towns, while exchange and 
collaboration occurred parallel to the central governments’ efforts to sup-
press them. Although extra-governmental groups hardly ever followed the 
official policies of the ruling elite, these and the allegedly peripheral regions 
turned into fundamental pillars of the system. While the lack of govern-
ment support encouraged private Fujianese traders to create a mercantile 
network spanning from Japan via the Philippines to the Asian mainland, 
most Spanish merchants in Manila subjected themselves to the desire of 
their government to maintain a strong political position inside and outside 
of Europe. By the time Japan began to intensively participate in the Manila 
trade, its newly established military-aristocratic government was very much 
occupied with building its own stable state. That it eventually became the 
strongest of these three states becomes clear from the focus on comparisons 
and connections applied in this book.
My third f inding is that diplomacy, with its manifold features such as 
language, communication, knowledge gathering, and representation, actu-
ally shaped foreign affairs. The ambivalent role of off icial and diplomatic 
exchange has always been underrepresented in studies of Manila’s role in 
world history. Even rather frequent encounters, however, did not automati-
cally result in stable foreign relations. While off icial Sino-Spanish relations 
never reached any serious level, relations between Japan and the Castil-
ian Empire switched between promising stages of mutual agreements to 
ignorance and aggression. For Japan, the intensif ied contacts with Spanish 
and Chinese off icials positively stimulated the Bakufu’s state formation 
and economic restructuring. The Spanish Empire and Luzon, in particular, 
offered a welcome testing f ield for new forms of diplomatic contact and also 
at times as a target for aggressive geopolitical activities.
A local-central duality was also prominent in most diplomatic encoun-
ters. Whenever convenient, the Spaniards addressed or responded to 
non-sovereigns. Initially, Japan showed similar tendencies of pragmatism 
or diplomatic calculus, as I have indicated with the example of intermedi-
ary diplomacy, when localising its new position in international relations. 
What all three states had in common was a fear of displaying inferiority. 
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Ideological similarities, however, stood in sharp contrast to the crucial 
differences in the way they collected information, disseminated knowledge, 
or perceived others.
Successful negotiations were usually dominated by themes of mutual 
interest. Fighting piracy was clearly the most vivid example of a shared 
goal, with means and measures easy to agree on. The nature of negotiations 
offers a great deal of challenges such as the question of how to create legal 
space and trust, as well as the choice of cultural, mercantile, and political 
intermediaries in intercultural correspondence. In general, the impact 
of language and communication has been underestimated in previous 
research. Linguistic issues such as language proficiency, different writing 
styles, recording cultures, rhetoric, and terminology, had a much stronger 
impact on Manila than previously assumed. Risks of abusing interpreta-
tions and unstable transportation were just two of many obstacles that all 
parties involved had to face. At the same time we, as historians, have to be 
careful not to renarrate incorrect tales of constant misunderstanding and 
unwillingness to learn about or from the ‘other’.
The f inal f inding features Manila’s ‘open zone’ character for multiethnic 
neighbourhoods. As a port city, Manila displayed a special environment, 
characterised by a hybrid social and juridical setting, despite ethnic segrega-
tion and thus only limited social integration. As a regulatory power, colonial 
Spain in theory controlled urban administration and social interaction. 
Imbalance of power between the different parties naturally encouraged 
compromises between various actors. Hence, despite legal discrimination 
Fujianese and Japanese nationals supported the colony. Still, Overseas 
Chinese seem to have adapted better to the situation, as the ever-growing 
number of settlers from China suggests. Neither social pressure nor any 
form of tribute kept them from returning or even permanently immigrating 
to the Philippines.
A historical study like this has to tackle questions of continuity and 
change of interconnectedness between the global and the local. While 
global f lows and demands deterritorialised local spaces, they created new 
ones at the same time. Only by taking local history into account can global 
history truly reveal the multifaceted interdependence and imbrications 
between different world regions and their effects on shaping local and 
national histories. In doing so, we are incidentally reminded of the many 
shifts and disruptions that took place. The period between 1571 and 1644 
was neither static nor displayed linear development. All dis-learning pro-
cesses were rooted in the ambiguity of the triangular relations. Prominent 
examples are the events surrounding the Chinese uprisings and their violent 
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demise, the Dutch blockades, and the changing patterns of off icial contact 
with the Japanese. After each massacre, Fujianese traders came back, after 
each display of Japanese aggression the Spaniards (be they missionaries 
or colonial authorities) sought a revival of friendly relations and the local 
Japanese population would continue to sail to Manila after the official trade 
ban had been introduced. Yet, Manila’s locational advantage was certainly 
fragile and its other appeals were easily lost in times of friction or change.
In that respect, however, it remains unclear whether we should regard 
the 1640s as a turning point. Both from the point of view of Japanese and 
Chinese history there are strong arguments in favour of a 1640 caesura. 
But zooming in on Manila suggests the opposite. In passing, I have shown 
that, from a Spanish perspective, things were different. Intellectuals and 
government authorities suggested strengthening universal Catholicism, a 
prudent diplomacy with neighbouring countries and the relaxing of trade 
prohibitions between China and New Spain. Motivated by material and 
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Murakami Naojirō, ‘Japan’s Early Attempts to Establish Commercial Relations with Mexico’, 
in H. Morse Stephens and Herbert E. Bolton (eds), The Pacific Ocean in History: Papers and 
Addresses Presented at the Panama-Pacific Historical Congress (San Francisco, CA: The 
Macmillan Company, 1917).
Murray, Alan, and Rajit Sondhi, ‘Socio-political Influences on Cross-cultural Encounters: Notes 
towards a Framework for the Analysis of Context’, in Werner Enninger, Karlfried Knapp, 
and Anneliese Knapp-Potthoff (eds), Analyzing International Communication (Berlin, New 
York, Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 1987), 17-35.
Murray, Dian, ‘Silver, Ships, and Smuggling: China’s International Trade of the Ming and Qing 
Dynasties’, Ming Qing Yanjiu 3 (1994), 91-144.
Muslow, Martin, ‘Konsumtheorie und Kulturtransfer. Einige Perspektiven für die Forschung 
zum 16. Jahrhundert’, in Wolfgang Schmale (ed.), Kulturtransfer. Kulturelle Praxis im 16. 
Jahrhundert (Wien and Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2003).
Musselman, Elizabeth Green, ‘Indigenous Knowledge and Contact Zones: The Case of the Cold 
Bokkeveld Meteorite, Cape Colony, 1838’, Itinerario 33 (2009), 31-44.
Muto, Giovanni, ‘The Spanish System: Centre and Periphery’, in Richard Bonney (ed.), Economic 
Systems and State Finance (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 231-260.
Myscofski, Carole A., ‘Against the Grain: Learning and Teaching’, Honorees for Teaching Excel-
lence, Paper 4 (2001), http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/teaching_excellence/4/.
Nagahara Keiji and Yamamura Kozo, ‘The Sengoku Daimyo and the Kandaka System’, in Naga-
hara Keiji, John Whitney Hall, and Yamamura Kozo (eds), Japan before Tokugawa: Political 
Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500 to 1650 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
1981), 27-63.
Nagazumi Yōko, ‘Ayutthaya and Japan: Embassies and Trade in the Seventeenth Century’, in Mark 
Caprio et al. (eds), Japan and the Pacific, 1540-1920 (Aldershot: Ashgate Varium, 2004), 241-258.
—, Kinsei shoki no gaikō (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1990).
—, Shuinsen (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001).
—, ‘17 seiki shotō supeinryō f iripin seifu no nihonkankei monjo’, Nantō shigaku 63 (April 2004).
— (ed.), Large and Broad: The Dutch Impact on Early Modern Asia: Essays in Honor of Leonard 
Blussé, Tōyō Bunko Research Library 13 (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 2010).
— (ed.), Sakoku wo minaosu (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999).
— (trans. and ed.), Hirado Oranda shōkan nikki, 4 vols (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1970).
Nakabayashi Masaki, ‘The Rise of a Japanese Fiscal State’, in Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla et al., 
The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500-1914 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 378-397.
Nakajima Gakushō, ‘16 seikimatsu fukken-f iripin-kyūshūbōeki’, Shien 144 (2007), 55-92.
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